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Abstract 
 
My thesis will reconsider the failed attempt by a number of Roman 
citizens to gain power in Rome in 63 B.C., commonly labeled “The Conspiracy 
of Catiline.”  Two Roman authors, M. Tullius Cicero and C. Sallustius Crispus, 
were eyewitnesses to the events occurring that year and both wrote lengthy 
accounts about the discovery and suppression of the affair and its participants, 
who were planning to gain power in Rome through violent means.  The 
participants planned murder and arson inside of Rome and threatened the city 
with an army in northern Etruria.  Our sources tend to ascribe the leadership of 
these hostile activities to L. Sergius Catilina, presented as a debauched, and 
indebted, scion of a noble family.  However, our sources discuss many other 
Roman citizens who participated with the affair.  My thesis provides a 
comprehensive study of the terminology Cicero and Sallust used and the lexical 
choices they made to describe the affair and its participants.  I examine the 
terminology that both these authors used to identify the affair’s context, primarily 
focusing on the terms coniuratio (“conspiracy”) and bellum (“war”), with the aim 
of showing how these terms and concepts become crystallized in this period.  In 
addition, I examine the portrayal of the reported disturbances occurring inside 
and outside of Rome and the representation of the Roman citizens who were 
involved in them.  By scrutinizing the terminology found in Cicero and Sallust’s 
accounts of the affair of 63, my thesis demonstrates that its common appellation 
as “The Conspiracy of Catiline” and all that it means – in terms of a single event 
with one leader – needs to be reconsidered due to the interpretations of its 
multifarious aspects.  
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Notes and Abbreviations 
 
 
Texts and translations 
I have used the text and translations from The Loeb Classical Library 
throughout my thesis.  I note the cases when a textual dispute or uncertainty 
impinges on an argument.  The passages I cite are in translation, with the 
original text supplied alongside the English in double quotes in the main body or 
in the footnotes in all instances.  A passage or quote I have supplied a modified 
translation of into English appears in single quotes alongside the original text.  If 
the original text or translation does not come from The Loeb Classical Library, I 
cite the text or author in the footnotes.  Key terms are in the original, usually 
with an accompanying translation in single quotes.  I tend to supply the 
headword and sub voce found in the Oxford Latin Dictionary of the 
corresponding definition of the term in a footnote for clarification.  Any failure in 
not applying this method is my own error.  The translations used for the ancient 
sources I specifically cite can be found in the bibliography. 
Spelling  
I use American English spelling throughout my thesis.  Roman authors 
and certain names of Romans are found in their recognized anglicized forms, 
for example Caesar, Pompey, Mark Antony, and Octavian.  The decision as to 
which names to render in the anglicized form has been a subjective one and 
any confusion or inconsistencies are my error.  For the Roman praenomen 
“Gaius” or “Caius”, I use “C”.  Possessives are marked by an apostrophe alone 
when they end with “s”, i.e. Manlius’ army and Lentulus’ influence. 
Dates  
All dates are 'B.C.' unless otherwise stated. 
Footnotes 
Each part of my thesis contains its own footnotes.  References to 
footnotes within the Chapter are designated as, see n.#.  Any reference to 
footnotes or pages in the other Chapters and sections are designated as, 
Chapter# section # n.# or p.#.  References to the participants or possible 
participants in the affair located in Appendix I are designated as, Appendix I, 
[no.]. 
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Abbreviations  
Ancient authors and their works, where abbreviated, are done so 
according to standard conventions; for a listing of these refer to the Oxford 
Classical Dictionary (revised 3rd edition, 2003).  For Sallust’s Catilina, I use the 
abbreviated form Sall. B Cat. in order to distinguish it from the abbreviation of 
Cicero’s Orations, which are abbreviated Cic. Cat.  Note the trial numbers not 
the page numbers appear alongside any reference to the TLRR in the 
footnotes.  For journal title abbreviations in the bibliography refer to L'Annee 
Philologique.  Note further: 
Ampel.   Ampelius, Liber memoralis 
App. B Civ.   Appian, Bella civilia 
Asc…C   Asconius, ed. A.C. Clark (Oxford 1907) 
B Afr.    De Bello Africo 
B Alex.   De Bello Alexandrino 
B Hisp.   De Bello Hispaniensis 
BTL    Bibliotecha Teubneriana Latina, On-line database 
Caes. B Civ.   Caesar, De Bello Civili 
Caes. B Gall.   Caesar, De Bello Gallico 
CAH The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd 
edn.(Cambridge 1984-2005) 
 
Cic. Ad Brut.   Cicero, Epistulae ad Brutum 
Cic. Att.   Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 
Cic. Balb.   Cicero, Pro Balbo 
Cic. Brut.   Cicero, Brutus 
Cic. Caecin.   Cicero, Pro Caecina 
Cic. Cael.   Cicero, Pro Caelio 
Cic. Cat.   Cicero, In Catilinam 
Cic. Clu.   Cicero, Pro Cluentio 
Cic. Comment. pet.  Cicero (Quintus), Commentariolum petitionis 
Cic. Deiot.   Cicero, Pro rege Deiotaro 
Cic. Div.   Cicero, De divinatione 
Cic. Dom.   Cicero, De domo sua 
Cic. Fam.   Cicero, Epistulae ad familiars 
Cic. Fin.   Cicero, De finibus 
Cic. Flac.   Cicero, Pro Flacco 
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Cic. Font.   Cicero, Pro Fonteio 
Cic. Har. resp.  Cicero, De haruspicum responso 
Cic. Leg. agr.  Cicero, De lege agraria 
Cic. Lig.   Cicero, Pro Ligario 
Cic. Mil.   Cicero, Pro Milone 
Cic. Mur.   Cicero, Pro Murena 
Cic. Nat. D.   Cicero, De natura deorum 
Cic. Off.   Cicero, De officiis 
Cic. Orat.   Cicero, De oratore 
Cic. Parad.   Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 
Cic. Phil.   Cicero, Orationes Philippicae (Philippics) 
Cic. Pis.   Cicero, In Pisonem 
Cic. Prov. cons.  Cicero, De provinciis consularibus 
Cic. Q Fr.   Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem 
Cic. Quinct.   Cicero, Pro Quinctio 
Cic. Rab. perd.  Cicero, Pro Rabirio perduellionis 
Cic. Red. sen.  Cicero, Post reditum in senatu 
Cic. Rep.   Cicero, De republica 
Cic. S. Rosc.   Cicero, Pro S. Roscio Amerino 
Cic. Scaur.   Cicero, Pro Scauro 
Cic. Sest.   Cicero, Pro Sestio 
Cic. Sull.   Cicero, Pro Sulla 
Cic. Tusc. Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes (Tusculan 
disputations) 
 
Cic. Vat. Cicero, In Vatinium 
Cic. Verr.   Cicero, In Verrem (Verrines) 
Dio Cass.   Dio Cassius (Dio) 
Diod. Sic.   Diodorus Siculus 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. Dionysius of Halicarnassis, Antiquitates Romanae 
Eutr.    Eutropius 
Flor.    Florus 
Front. Str.   Frontinus, Strategamata 
G-L Gildersleeve, B.L. and Lodge, G. Gildersleeve’s 
Latin Grammar (London 1895). Reprinted1976. 
 
Gell. NA   Gellius, Noctes Atticae 
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Gran. Lic.   Granius Licinianus 
H-B Hale, W.G and Buck, C.D. A Latin Grammar 
(Alabama 1903). Reprinted 1966. 
 
HRR Peter, H. Historicorum Romanorum Reliquaie, 2 
vols. (Leipzig 1906-14). Reprinted with addenda 
1993. 
 
ILS Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau, 3 
vols. (Berlin 1892-1916) 
 
Jul. Obs. Julius Obsequens 
Lact. Div. inst.  Lactantius, Divinae institutions 
Lact. Ira  Lactantius, De ira 
Liv.  Livy, Ab urbe condita 
Liv. Per.  Livy, Periochiae 
LSJ Liddell, H. and R. Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 9th 
edn., rev. H. Stuart Jones; suppl. E. Barber et al. 
(Oxford 1968) 
 
Luc.  Lucan, De bello civili 
MRR Broughton, T.R.S. Magistrates of the Roman 
Republic, 3 vols. (New York 1951 - Atlanta 1986) 
 
Nep. Alc.  Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades 
Nep. Dion  Cornelius Nepos, Dion 
OLD Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P.G.W. Glare (Oxford 
1982) 
 
Ov. Fast.   Ovid, Fasti 
Ov. Met.   Ovid, Metamorphoses 
Plaut. Asin.   Plautus, Asinaria 
Plaut. Cist.   Plautus, Cistellaria 
Plaut. Merc.   Plautus, Mercator 
Plin. NH   Pliny (the Elder), Naturalis historia 
Plin. Ep.   Pliny (the Younger), Epistulae 
Plut. Caes.   Plutarch, Life of Caesar 
Plut. Cam.   Plutarch, Life of Camillus 
Plut. Cat. min.  Plutarch, Life of Cato Minor 
Plut. Cic.   Plutarch, Life of Cicero 
Plut. Luc.   Plutarch, Life of Lucullus 
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Plut. Mar.   Plutarch, Life of Marius 
Plut. Mor.   Plutarch, Moralia 
Plut. Num.   Plutarch, Life of Numa 
Plut. Pomp.   Plutarch, Life of Pompey 
Plut. Sull.   Plutarch, Life of Sulla 
Polyb.    Polybius 
Quint. Inst.   Quintillian, Institutio oratoria 
RE Real-Encyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft, edd. A. Pauly, G. Wissowa 
and W. Kroll (Stuggart 1893-1980) 
 
Sall. B Cat. Sallust, Bellum Catilinae or De Catilinae coniuratione 
(Catilina) 
 
Sall. B Iug.  Sallust, Bellum Iurgurthinum 
Sall. Hist.  Sallust, Historiae 
Sen. Ira  Seneca (the younger), De ira 
Serv.  Servius, Ad Aeneis (commentary of Vergil’s Aeneid) 
Stat. Ach.  Statius, Achilleis 
Stat. Theb.  Statius, Thebais 
Strabo  Strabo, Geography 
Suet. Aug.  Suetonius, Divus Augustus 
Suet. Gai.  Suetonius, Gaius 
Suet. Iul.  Suetonius, Divus Iulius  
Tac. Ann.  Tacitus, Annales 
TLL  Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Leipzig 1900 -) 
TLRR Alexander, M.C. Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 
149 B.C. to 50 B.C. (Toronto 1990) 
 
Val. Max.  Valerius Maximus 
Varro Ling.  Varro, De lingua Latina 
Varro Rust.  Varro, Res rusticae 
Vell. Pat.  Velleius Paterculus 
Verg. Aen.  Vergil, Aeneid 
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to provide an in-depth examination of the interpretation 
by M. Tullius Cicero and C. Sallustius Crispus of an unsuccessful attempt by 
Roman citizens to gain power in Rome in 63 B.C.  Both Cicero and Sallust were 
alive that year; the former was consul and the latter was a young aspiring 
politician.  In addition, both men witnessed the events and wrote lengthy 
accounts regarding this failed attempt to gain power in Rome, both of which 
survive today.  One of the key questions at the heart of this study is how Cicero 
and Sallust interpreted this event primarily by examining the terminology both 
writers chose to describe it and the people who were involved.  In so doing it will 
show how it was in this period that such events began to be conceived of as 
one category, which we today term “conspiracy.”  Modern historians most 
commonly label the plot, “The Conspiracy of Catiline.”  However, it will be 
demonstrated that the lexical choices Cicero and Sallust made to portray the 
actions occurring both inside and outside of Rome from July 63 until mid-
January 62 were more nuanced than the title “The Conspiracy of Catiline” 
suggests.  Both Cicero and Sallust most often used either the term coniuratio, 
usually translated into English as a “conspiracy”, or the term bellum, meaning 
“war”, to interpret certain actions of the plot. Throughout my thesis, I generally 
avoid using either the word “conspiracy” or the word “war” in reference to these 
events and instead use a more neutral phrase “the affair of 63.”  
Correspondingly, I use the word “participants” or “supporters” instead of the 
word “conspirators” to refer to those involved with the affair.  In most cases, I 
retain the specific Latin term found in our sources’ texts to eschew representing 
the affair as a “conspiracy”, or a “war” until a comprehensive study of the 
terminology establishes how the affair should be interpreted. 
Orosius, writing in the fifth century A.D., recalled that the primary actions 
of the affair of 63 occurred both in Rome and in northern Etruria.  He explained 
that in Etruria vero belli civili extincta est; Romae conscii coniurationis occisi 
sunt  ‘Indeed [the affair] was extinguished by bellum civile in Etruria; in Rome, 
the accomplices of the coniuratio were put to death’ (Oros. 6.6.5).  Part of my 
thesis examines the usage of the terms coniuratio, bellum civile, and other 
related terms that Cicero and Sallust used to emphasize the multifaceted nature 
of the affair.  In addition, I investigate the disturbances occurring inside and 
outside of Rome by examining the lexical choices our sources used to interpret 
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these disturbances and the people involved.  Furthermore, I explore the 
contexts the term coniuratio described in other writers’ works from the Late 
Republic to demonstrate how its ideology developed. 
Both Cicero and Sallust’s accounts of the affair portray the Roman 
Senator L. Sergius Catilina, as the mastermind and instigator of a plan to gain 
power in Rome through violent and subversive means.  Catiline was a 
debauched and indebted scion of a noble family who had most recently lost the 
election for consul a second time in 63 after being defeated by Cicero in 64.  In 
addition, Cicero and Sallust presented Catiline as the lynchpin between the 
actions occurring both inside and outside of Rome that were threatening the 
stability of the res publica in the waning months of 63 and the beginning of 62.  
All of the later accounts of the affair used Cicero and Sallust’s works as their 
sources and therefore emphasized Catiline’s role as the leader of the affair.  
However, when examining the text of Cicero and Sallust’s accounts and the 
terminology they used to identify the roles of the other Roman citizens involved 
there is evidence suggesting two other men were perhaps as influential as 
Catiline.  Most ancient historians and modern scholars often focus on the 
complicity of two of the major power players in Rome at the time, namely C. 
Julius Caesar and M. Licinius Crassus.  Nevertheless, neither man was ever 
brought to trial or suffered any setback in their careers to suggest that their 
support of the affair was anything more than rumor.  Instead, explicit evidence 
suggests that the actions of one of the praetors of 63, P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Sura, and a Sullan veteran, C. Manlius, were perhaps acting independently 
from Catiline.  This evidence has led some scholars to suggest that Catiline’s 
influence on the affair can be tested.  In general, they employ similar 
methodologies to examine Lentulus and Manlius’ roles.  By methodically 
examining the lexical choices the accounts of the affair used to describe 
Lentulus and Manlius’ roles and the actions that they were in charge of inside of 
Rome and outside of the city respectively, my thesis plans to demonstrate that 
Catiline’s established role as the most influential and sole mastermind behind 
the affair should be reconsidered.  
According to our sources, citizens from all classes in Rome and in 
several regions within Italy participated in the affair.  Whether the disturbances 
in other parts of the country were directly linked to the plan to gain power in 
Rome remains inconclusive.  Cicero and Sallust’s accounts primarily focus on 
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the actions occurring in Rome and certain parts of Etruria.  Therefore, the 
citizens involved in these locations become the dramatis personae we know 
about most.  Many leading Roman citizens, nobles, senators, knights, and 
magistrates were purportedly involved in the scheme, therefore, we cannot 
determine a primary leader.  Some of these citizens were directly involved and 
others were rumored to support the affair, but in either case, we know many of 
their names.  Some, including Catiline and Manlius, met their fate in the final 
battle near Pistoria and five other citizens, including Lentulus, who confessed to 
participating in the affair, were executed in Rome on December 5, 63 without 
recourse to a formal trial.  In the following years, other citizens were prosecuted 
in court and found guilty.  A few were acquitted of these allegations and there is 
evidence that some of the affair’s supporters were never formally tried. 
Despite the good amount of surviving works that recount the affair, its 
multifaceted plans acted upon by a diverse group of supporters from both inside 
and outside of Rome make it a complex event to definitively classify.  It is a rare 
opportunity to be able compare two eyewitnesses’ accounts describing the 
same subject in Antiquity, but in so doing we can best understand an event’s 
context at the time by scrutinizing the terminology found in these writers’ works.  
While there are other surviving accounts regarding the affair of 63 written in 
Greek by Plutarch, Appian, Dio Cassius, and the brief accounts in Latin by 
Velleius Paterculus, Florus, Eutropius, and Orosius, these were written 
centuries later.  Therefore, I will only note the later accounts when necessary.  
Instead, my thesis focuses on the almost contemporaneous accounts written by 
Cicero and Sallust to offer the closest terminological comparison regarding the 
affair’s interpretation and the representation of its participants. 
On November 8, 63 Cicero addressed the Senate divulging his initial 
discovery of a subversive plot to gain power in Rome.  He claimed that many 
Roman citizens planned to murder the leading magistrates of the current 
regime, to burn parts of Rome, and at the same time march on the city with an 
army from northern Etruria completing the general massacre of those in 
opposition to their ultimate goal to gain power in Rome.  Cicero gave this 
speech after an attempt was made on his own life and after he had received 
reports of Catiline’s involvement in the affair.  Catiline was present in the Senate 
when the speech was delivered.  Either due to embarrassment, or guilt, or due 
to the insistence of others involved in the affair, or perhaps according to its 
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plans, Catiline left Rome the next day.  There were rumors that he was 
proceeding to Massilia to live in self-imposed exile.  Cicero dispelled these 
rumors when he delivered another speech from the rostra to the people of 
Rome on November 9 insisting that Catiline was on his way to the camp in 
northern Etruria where Manlius had gathered an army.  Cicero delivered two 
more speeches against the participants in the affair who remained in Rome on 
December 3 and 5, 63.  These two speeches revealed that these citizens were 
continuing the plan to overthrow the current regime in the city through arson, 
murder, and by attempting to solicit support from a Gallic tribe, the Allobroges, 
to lend military support to Catiline and Manlius’ army. 
Cicero’s four impassioned speeches revealing the affair are referred to 
as In Catilinam I-IV, according to the manuscript tradition. However, Cicero did 
not refer to these speeches with these titles.  Three years after Cicero’s 
consulship, his friend Atticus requested the consular speeches Cicero had 
delivered due to a personal interest in them as well as their oratorical appeal to 
other young enthusiasts.  In the letter, Cicero describes the first speech 
regarding the affair of 63 as cum Catilinam emisi “when I allowed Catiline to 
escape”, the second quam habui ad populum, postridie quam Catilina profugit 
“which I delivered to the people, the day after Catiline fled”, the third in contione, 
quo die Allobroges indicarunt “in a public meeting, on the day that the 
Allobroges made their revelation”, and the fourth in senatu Nonis Decemberis 
“in the Senate on the fifth of December” (Cic. Att. 2.1.3).1  As mentioned, these 
speeches are labeled In Catilinam I-IV and more commonly referred to as the 
“Catilinarians” by modern scholars.  This appellation fuels the assumption that 
the four speeches were directed at Catiline alone due to his role in the affair.  
This assumption is incorrect and is confirmed by Cicero’s own words in his letter 
to Atticus.  Only the first speech was directed at Catiline.  The second claimed 
Catiline had fled Rome to join Manlius’ army at Faesulae and described the 
types of people who would be attracted to the affair.  The third and fourth 
speech specifically focused on the fate of Lentulus and the other participants 
remaining in Rome that confessed to their involvement.  Therefore, in order to 
avoid being misleading, I refer to In Catilinam I-IV throughout my study as the 
Orations or individually as the First, Second, Third, or Fourth Oration. 
                                                
1 For a detailed explanation of this passage in the letter, cf. Settle 1962, 41-3; Shackleton Bailey 
1965, 345-6; Dyck 2008, 10. 
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The letter to Atticus was sent in June 60 and most scholars believe that 
Cicero most likely edited the Orations he delivered in 63 to mollify his severe 
punishment of those who participated in the affair during his consulship.  The 
debate continues. We are reasonably sure that the publication of some of 
Cicero’s works can be attributed to Atticus, however, whether his forensic 
speeches were edited remains debatable.  Scholars presume that most of 
Cicero’s forensic speeches were most likely published shortly after their 
delivery.2  Cicero remarked in the Pro Sulla, when the evidence against the 
participants remaining in Rome was given on December 3 in the Third Oration, 
that he had instructed four senators who were skilled in writing by memory with 
understanding and speed to correctly record what was said (Cic. Sull. 42).3  
This was done in anticipation of the other participants, who were brought to trial 
regarding their involvement in the affair years later, in order that that they could 
be defended or prosecuted accurately.  However, other scholars have 
examined the instances in the Orations when Cicero seemed to defend his 
actions as consul before the capital punishment of Lentulus and the others had 
been decided and his foresight of the political jeopardy Cicero had to confront in 
the years following his consulship suggesting that the speeches were revised.4   
Despite the ongoing scholarly debate regarding the revision of the 
Orations, we cannot adequately determine if the surviving text was published 
soon after they were delivered or three years later when he sent his letter to 
Atticus.5  If the Orations were revised then the rhetoric Cicero employed against 
Lentulus and the other participants remaining in Rome and the affair’s threat 
might have been exaggerated due to the continued hostility from Cicero’s 
political enemies after 63.  I believe the scholars’ arguments for a later 
                                                
2 Cf. Settle 1962, 46 and 60-7; McDermott 1972, 277-80. 
3 See Chapter 2 n.219. 
4 Settle (1962, 60-7) explains that while most of Cicero’s forensic speeches were published 
soon after delivery, the impromptu speeches, such as the First and Fourth Oration, had to be 
written down later leaving room for revision.  McDermott (1972, 283-4) concludes that there is 
not enough evidence to prove that the consular orations were revised. Cape Jr. (1995, 257-9) 
maintains the Fourth Oration was circulated soon after. In contrast, other scholars argue that 
some, or all four, of the Orations show certain signs of revision, cf. Nisbet 1964, 62-3; Syme 
1964, 105-11; Rawson 1975, 75 and 81-3; Konstan 1993; Offerman 1995; Berry 2006, 153-4; 
Dyck 2008, 11-2; Lintott 2008, 17-8 and 142-8. 
5 Scholars argue that Cicero’s consular orations were published as a corpus, cf. Settle 1962, 
127; Nisbet 1964, 62; Cape Jr. 1991, 14 contra McDermott 1972, 284.  NB: Cicero sent Atticus 
copies of the consular speeches for Atticus himself, his clients and to have them distributed in 
Greece, but the letter does not indicate that Cicero’s consular orations were not already in 
circulation in Rome.  For the debate regarding Atticus’ role in publishing Cicero’s speeches, cf. 
Settle 1962, 37-46; McDermott 1972, 281; Phillips 1986; Starr 1987, 218-9; Murphy 1998, 496-
501.   
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publication are the most cogent.6  Fortunately, Cicero also recounted the affair 
in the Pro Murena, delivered some time between the Second Oration and Third 
Oration (November 9 and December 3 respectively), and in the Pro Sulla that 
was delivered the following year.  Although a similar argument could be made 
regarding the revision of the Pro Murena since it was one of the consular 
orations sent to Atticus in 60, the Pro Sulla was most likely published soon after 
it was delivered.7  However, all of Cicero’s writings that recount the affair of 63 
are significant and for my purposes the terminology Cicero chose to use to 
describe the affair is more important than whether the speeches were revised 
for publication or not. 
The evocative and eloquent narrative about the affair of 63 written 
approximately twenty years later by C. Sallustius Crispus also survives.  The 
protagonist of his monograph is Catiline, however, Sallust named many other 
Roman citizens as participants of the affair.  Some scholars label Sallust’s work 
according to the grammarian tradition, as the Bellum Catilinae.8  However, in 
the preface of Sallust’s monograph, it states that he will discuss de Catilinae 
coniuratione (Sall. B Cat. 4.3).  Therefore, some commentators either choose to 
entitle their commentaries of Sallust’s work as De coniuratione Catilinae instead 
of Bellum Catilinae further complicating the representation of the affair as a 
whole.9  Gellius referred to Sallust’s monograph as the Catilina and I will use 
this appellation when I refer to it throughout the thesis (Gell. NA 3.1).  We may 
speculate as to why Sallust chose to use Catiline as the primary protagonist in 
his monograph.  Firstly, Sallust’s portrait of Catiline served as an exemplum to 
demonstrate the decline of the mos maiorum in Rome since the loss of the 
metus hostilis when the Carthagians were decisively defeated in 146.10  Sallust 
represented Catiline as the archetypical Roman nobilis whose lust for money 
                                                
6 See n. 4. 
7 Both forensic speeches were probably circulated soon after their delivery.  For a discussion of 
the immediate circulation of the Pro Murena, see Settle 1962, 148-54.  For the Pro Sulla, cf. 
Settle 1962, 158; Berry 1996, 58.  
8 Quintillian collectively called Sallust’s monographs on Catiline and Jurgurtha as in bello 
Iugurthino et Catilinae (Quint. Inst. 3.8.9). The title Bellum Iurgurthinum most likely influenced 
the title of the Catilina.  Rolfe (1931, xiv n.3) explains that most grammarians from the fourth 
century A.D. chose to label Sallust’s work the Bellum Catilinae.   
9 For example, the Teubner Edition is titled Catilinae Coniuratio and the Loeb uses Bellum 
Catilinae.  Commentators of Sallust’ work from the fifteenth century A.D. alternately named their 
commentaries using the term bellum or more often coniuratio (this information was gathered 
from a search of commentaries’ titles in the British Library, February 2009.)  Modern 
commentators also vary using the title De coniuratione Catilinae (primarily used in European 
commentaries) or Bellum Catilinae (primarily used in English or American commentaries.) 
10 Sall. B Cat. 10. 
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and power, which had increased to dangerous levels during the Late Republic, 
drove him to attempt to gain power in Rome through subversive and violent 
means after failing to be elected consul in 64 and 63.11  Secondly, Catiline was 
the lynchpin between the actions occurring inside and outside Rome in 
conjunction with the affair.  Catiline was in Rome when the affair was initially 
discovered and then joined Manlius’ army in Etruria.  The climax of Sallust’s 
monograph describes the final battle between Catiline and Manlius’ forces and 
the forces loyal to the current ruling establishment in Rome.  Sallust wrote his 
monograph after the recent struggles between Pompey and Caesar and during 
the conflicts between the members of the Second Triumvirate that rocked the 
foundations of the res publica.  Therefore, the final battle between Roman 
citizens in the Catilina offered Sallust a perfect opportunity to condemn civil 
wars and emphasize the immoral qualities of those involved in these types of 
conflicts.12  These might be reasons why Sallust chose Catiline as his main 
character, however, Sallust included the names of many others who 
participated or supported these actions as well.  The Catilina contains evidence 
that suggests Lentulus and Manlius were as significant as Catiline despite the 
latter’s dominance throughout the narrative. 
The five chapters that follow include their own comprehensive 
introductions and conclusions.  Chapter 1 introduces the affair with a summary 
of the events beginning in July 63 until Catiline and Manlius’ defeat in northern 
Etruria in mid-January 62, as described in our sources.  Cicero and Sallust 
frequently used the term coniuratio or its cognates to identify the affair and its 
participants.  The term coniuratio is most often translated as a “conspiracy” and 
this chapter examines the particular terminology both authors chose to 
emphasize the conspiratorial aspects of the affair.  Both authors used similar 
language that accentuated its clandestine, criminal, immoral, and plural 
aspects.  Each aspect and its corresponding terminology are reviewed in the 
sections of Chapter 1 to demonstrate the way Cicero and Sallust interpreted its 
                                                
11 On Catiline’s choice to resort to arms, cf. Sall. B Cat. 14, 26.5.  On the decline of morals in 
the Catilina, see Chapter 4 nn. 47, 98, 113.  Sallust admitted that he, too, desired avaritia and 
ambitio and was accused of these vices during his own political career (3.3-4).  On Catiline’s 
unsuccessful bids for the consulship, see Chapter 2 n.239.!
12 The terminus post quam of Sallust’s Catilina is after Caesar’s murder in 44.  Sallust wrote the 
monograph sometime between this date and his death in 35, see McGushin 1977, 3.  For a 
more detailed discussion, see Syme 1964, 128-9. 
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conspiratorial context and how these terms accentuated the definition of a 
coniuratio. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the way our sources interpreted the disturbances 
in Rome and those who stayed in the city after Catiline left and were continuing 
to participate in the affair after it was exposed.  As mentioned, after Cicero’s 
delivery of the First Oration divulging the affair’s plans on November 8, Catiline 
left Rome.  In the subsequent Second Oration and the Pro Murena, delivered 
after Catiline’s departure and before some of the participants remaining in 
Rome were seized on December 3, Cicero frequently stressed the seriousness 
of the threat these men represented.  The threat in Rome emanated from the 
many participants among the Roman elite who were determined to continue the 
affair’s ultimate goal to gain power in Rome through murder and arson.  Part A 
of this chapter examines the threat in the city by reviewing the specific criminal 
and violent actions that were planned.  The next section highlights our sources’ 
insistence that many were willing to support the affair due to their debilitating 
financial condition.  I review the debt crisis in the res publica at the time and 
conclude that this was not an excuse for those willing to support the affair, as 
the crisis was ubiquitous regardless of status.  The chapter continues to 
concentrate on the presentation of the remaining participants in Rome.  I 
examine the terminology used to describe the participants in the city and 
demonstrate how the leadership of the affair shifted after Catiline’s departure. 
In Part B of Chapter 2, I evaluate the influence of the praetor P. 
Cornelius Lentulus Sura as the highest-ranking member who was apprehended, 
confessed, and executed for planning murder, arson, and soliciting support for 
the affair from the Gallic envoys of the Allobroges.  In comparison to the other 
participants remaining in Rome, our sources focus on Lentulus’ role and 
represent him as the leader of the actions in the city.  First, I examine our 
sources’ portrayal of Lentulus as the leader in Rome comparing it to the 
depiction of Catiline as leader of the army in Etruria.  Subsequently, I discuss 
Lentulus’ career to further demonstrate the significance of the participation of a 
current magistrate to overthrow the current ruling establishment.  The role 
Lentulus played in soliciting the Allobrogean envoys is examined by exploring 
the language in the letter and verbal message to Catiline that were entrusted to 
the messenger T. Volturcius.  Volturcius and the Gallic envoys were ambushed 
and the letters were seized supplying Cicero with concrete evidence and 
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witnesses who were prepared to testify against the participants remaining in 
Rome.  Furthermore, I investigate the evidence in our sources regarding 
Lentulus’ possession of a prophecy that predicted he would rule Rome in 63.  I 
proceed to review the significance of prophecy in Roman religion to explain that 
Lentulus’ prophecy cannot be readily discarded.  The prophecy offers an 
alternative reason why Lentulus continued to participate in the affair long after it 
had been initially exposed.  This chapter demonstrates that when we closely 
scrutinize our sources’ representation of Lentulus’ influence on the affair, the 
hierarchy of its leadership can be reevaluated.  
The disturbances outside of Rome that our sources connect with the 
affair are investigated in Chapter 3.  To begin, I discuss the consular elections 
of 63 to demonstrate that Catiline’s supporters from outside of Rome included 
Sullan veterans and colonists as well as those adversely affected by Sullan 
colonization.  Catiline’s defeat in the elections prompted him to join Manlius’ 
army in northern Etruria.  The following section explores the connection 
between Catiline, Etruria, and the Sullan veteran Manlius and his army of 
disgruntled citizens from the region.  This exploration leads us to the next 
section, which demonstrates how our sources connected Catiline and Manlius’ 
actions with those that remained in Rome.  The reason the Senate decided to 
pass the Senatus Consultum Ultimum (SCU) was due to reports that an army 
had assembled in Etruria.  After Catiline left Rome and arrived in the army’s 
camp, both he and Manlius were declared hostes rei publicae (‘enemies of the 
State’).  Having been awarded extraordinary powers to defend the res publica, 
Cicero sent his co-consul C. Antonius, several other magistrates, and former 
generals to secure other regions in Italy where the participants of the affair were 
attempting to incite.  Another section reviews the reasons why certain regions in 
Italy were targeted to further demonstrate the connection between the 
disturbances occurring outside of Rome with the affair as a whole.  On the other 
hand, this chapter provides another reason to reconsider Catiline’s influence on 
the affair by examining the evidence in Sallust’s Catilina, which suggests 
Manlius and his army might have initially acted independently to those planning 
to gain power in Rome.     
I resume my investigation of the lexical choices Cicero and Sallust made 
to interpret the affair in Chapter 4.  As mentioned, both authors also used the 
term bellum to describe its plans.  The first two sections of the chapter review 
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the usage of bellum in Cicero and Sallust’s accounts respectively.  Although the 
battle between the loyal armies of the res publica and Catiline and Manlius’ 
army that was eventually fought clearly was a war between citizens, Cicero and 
Sallust tended to avoid calling the affair a bellum civile.  I explore the reasons 
why this expression was avoided and examine the other expressions Cicero 
and Sallust used to imply that the affair’s plans pitted Roman against Roman.  
Lastly, I review Cicero’s perception of the affair after it was suppressed to 
determine whether his use of bellum and the other expressions, which were 
previously examined, were used rhetorically.  This final section provides an 
initial conclusion of the overall interpretation of the affair and its failed attempt to 
gain power in Rome. 
Returning to the term coniuratio, Chapter 5 seeks to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the term by examining its usage in Cicero and 
Sallust’s other works that do not describe the affair of 63 as well as its usage by 
others who wrote in the Late Republic.  Initially, I review the first surviving 
occurrences of the term that appear in the works of Plautus.  The playwright 
used coniuratio to stress the mutuality of the oath and its sacred bond.  On the 
other hand, the occurrence of coniuratio on the early second century inscription 
of the SC de Bacchanalibus was used to convey its negative meaning of a 
mutual oath taken to commit a crime.  I continue to review the term’s usage to 
indicate the mutual oath taken by soldiers joining an army further demonstrating 
the term’s flexibility depending on the context it was used to describe.  Section 
5.2 and its subsections review the specific contexts the term was used to 
identify primarily in the authors of Caesar’s Commentarii and the few instances 
found in Varro and Cornelius Nepos.  This examination demonstrates that these 
authors did not invariably use coniuratio to identify a conspiratorial context.  
However, the term was used most often to describe a negative state of affairs.  
This chapter continues to examine the usage of coniuratio in Cicero and 
Sallust’s works not concerned with affair.  The examination shows that both 
writers chose to use the term to interpret a criminal action and used the term to 
imply the aspects identified in Chapter 1 that indicate a conspiratorial context.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates that although coniuratio could be used in a neutral 
context, such as indicating a mutual oath or the military oath taken to join an 
army, by the Late Republic, the term was most often used to interpret a criminal 
activity expressing a decidedly negative ideology. 
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Accompanying my thesis is an addendum and two appendices that can 
be consulted throughout.  The addendum reviews the varying definitions of the 
term conspiratio, the contexts it described, and its usage as a synonym with 
coniuratio when describing a conspiratorial context.  Appendix I lists the 
recorded names of the participants and possible participants in the affair of 63.  
I also supply references and a summary in each entry.  Appendix II is a timeline 
of events related to the affair from July 63 until Cicero’s death on December 7, 
43. 
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Chapter 1 
Describing a coniuratio: The terminology Cicero and Sallust used to 
identify the conspiratorial context of the affair of 63 
 
Before I begin my examination of the specific and distinct terminology 
Cicero and Sallust used to identify the affair and those participating in the affair 
of 63, I will briefly outline the context that led to it.  The events that are 
supposed to have threatened the stability of Rome in 63 are detailed in the 
timeline in Appendix II.  I will consider certain actions in more detail in the 
following chapters when necessary.  The following is a summary of the key 
moments of the affair:1 
In July of 63, Rome was full of supporters for the candidates at the 
magisterial elections for the following year.  The known candidates for the 
consulship for 62 were: L. Sergius Catilina, Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, D. Junius 
Silanus and L. Licinius Murena, who had fought under L. Licinius Lucullus in the 
war against King Mithridates in Asia.  As one of the consuls for 63, it was 
Cicero’s obligation to conduct the elections that summer.2  He suspected 
violence in the Campus Martius and wore a breastplate under his toga to 
demonstrate the danger he felt, primarily from the supporters of Catiline, whom 
he had defeated in the consular elections in 64.  Cicero decided he could not 
conduct the elections in an orderly manner, so they were postponed.3  When 
the elections were held, Murena and Silanus were voted as the two consuls for 
62.  Catiline had now been defeated in the consular elections two years in a 
row.4 
Around October 20, M. Licinius Crassus and other leading citizens 
informed Cicero that they had received anonymous letters warning them that 
there were imminent plans for a massacre in Rome.  At approximately the same 
time, it was reported in the Senate that a Sullan army veteran named C. 
Manlius was amassing an army of colonists and other citizens from Faesulae 
and Arretium in northern Etruria, approximately 150 miles from Rome.  On 
October 21, the Senatus Consultum Ultimum (SCU) was declared, which 
                                            
1 This summary is a fusion of the events described in Cicero, Sallust, Plutarch, Appian, and Dio 
Cassius’ accounts.  The discrepancies between these authors are not discussed here in order 
to preserve the flow of this summary.  See further, Appendix II. 
2 Pina Polo 2011, 284-90. 
3 See Chapter 3 n.18. 
4 For a detailed account of the elections of 63, see Chapter 3.1. 
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awarded the consuls extraordinary power to defend the res publica from 
impending danger using any means necessary.  Cicero reported that he had 
been warned that those who were behind these subversive activities were 
attempting to capture Praeneste, a town approximately twenty miles from 
Rome.  The town was alerted and the attempt to take Praeneste on November 
1 was foiled.  Cicero was informed of a secret meeting that took place at the 
Senator M. Porcius Laeca’s house between Catiline and other leading citizens 
on the night of November 6.  Cicero discovered that these men were planning to 
murder him and other leading citizens in Rome.  In addition, they planned to set 
fire to parts of the city.  Furthermore, they planned to solicit inhabitants from 
other regions in the Italian peninsula to join in a simultaneous armed uprising to 
support their attempt to overthrow the current rule in Rome.5  Cicero, informed 
of their decision to murder him the following morning after the meeting, was 
able to thwart the attempt.  When the two assassins about whom Cicero was 
warned appeared at his house on the morning of November 7, his suspicions 
were confirmed.  A day after the assassination attempt, Cicero summoned a 
meeting of the Senate and delivered the First Oration informing them of Catiline 
and the others’ designs.  He linked Catiline and the others with the revolt in 
Etruria, claiming that Catiline had sent arms to Manlius.  Cicero claimed 
Manlius’ instructions were to wait for Catiline before marching the army in 
Etruria towards Rome.  Meanwhile, the other participants in the affair who had 
remained in the city were to continue with the plans for murder and arson to 
create panic when the army entered the city.  Then, according to our sources, if 
these plans were successful the leading members of the affair would assume 
power in Rome and begin a ‘reign of terror’ similar to what occurred under Sulla 
twenty years earlier.6 
After the First Oration, Catiline left Rome the night of November 8.  After 
Cicero had exposed the subversive and violent plans that Catiline and other 
leading citizens were intending, some assumed that Catiline was withdrawing 
into voluntary exile.  However, the day after Catiline departed from Rome, 
Cicero delivered the Second Oration from the rostra and told the people of 
Rome that Catiline was traveling to Faesulae to join the army in Etruria.  Cicero 
claimed that Catiline had already sent a military standard ahead to Manlius and 
                                            
5 See Chapter 3.4. 
6 App. B Civ. 2.3.  See also, Chapter 2 n.257. 
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was gathering more men and arms on his way to the army’s camp.  Cicero 
explained that these were not the actions of a citizen going into exile, instead, 
he insisted that these actions signaled preparations for war.  Subsequently, the 
Senate passed the Senatus Consultum Ultimum (‘SCU’) and then declared 
Catiline and Manlius hostes rei publicae (‘enemies of the Republic’).  However, 
they continued their military preparations.  Employing the powers awarded to 
the consul by the SCU, Cicero sent former generals, current praetors, and 
quaestors with orders to levy armies to prevent the other areas in Italy from 
supporting the affair.  In addition, C. Antonius, Cicero’s consular colleague, was 
ordered to raise an army to attack the forces amassing in Etruria while Cicero 
kept watch over Rome.7     
Cicero continually claimed that many of the participants supporting the 
affair had not left with Catiline and had remained in the city instead.  Cicero had 
no concrete evidence to prove this claim, until he was informed that several 
leading citizens in Rome had attempted to solicit support from the Allobroges, a 
Gallic tribe bordering the region of Transalpine Gaul.8  The tribe’s envoys were 
in Rome to address certain grievances, which were ignored by the Senate.  One 
of the current praetors, P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, along with several other 
senators and knights approached the Gallic envoys believing that the 
Allobroges would most likely support a plan to overthrow the current regime in 
Rome.  Lentulus, the senator, C. Cornelius Cethegus, and two knights, P. 
Gabinius Capito and L. Statilius swore a mutual oath and gave the Allobrogean 
envoys written pledges promising to reward the Gallic tribe if they aided Catiline 
and Manlius’ army in Etruria.  Unsure about the offer, the envoys informed their 
patron in Rome Q. Fabius Sanga of Lentulus and the others’ plans.  Sanga duly 
informed Cicero.  He learned that Lentulus had instructed a man named T. 
Volturcius to escort the Allobrogean envoys from Rome to Catiline and Manlius’ 
camp at Faesulae before daybreak on December 3.  The envoys were told that 
Cicero planned to ambush T. Volturcius, as they were leaving Rome on the 
Mulvian Bridge a few miles outside of the city, in order to seize the letters he 
was carrying from Lentulus and the others to Catiline.  The ambush was 
successful and Volturcius and the letters were secured.  Volturcius and the 
                                            
7 On the hostis declarations and the SCU of 63, see Chapter 3.3. 
8 The territory of the Allobroges was situated between the Rhône and Lake Geneva, cf. Caes. B 
Gall. 1.6, 10, 11, 28.  Q. Fabius Maximus subdued the tribe of the Allobroges in 121 (Vell. Pat. 
2.10.2). 
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envoys told Cicero who had written the letters and Lentulus, Cethegus, 
Gabinius, and Statilius were summoned to the consul’s house.  Lentulus had 
also written a letter to Catiline requesting that he hurry with his army to Rome 
proving their apparent participation with the affair that Cicero had revealed a 
month earlier.  The four Roman citizens were apprehended until a decision 
could be made regarding their subversive activities.  
On the day of the ambush, Cicero called a meeting of the Senate to hear 
the testimonies of Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys.  Cicero told the 
people of Rome in the Third Oration what had transpired in the Senate and 
explained that the four citizens openly confessed to writing the letters.  
Volturcius and the envoys’ testimonies also named two other senators, another 
Sullan veteran, and a freedman, but these men remained at large.  However, M. 
Caeparius, a nobleman from Terracina, was also named and was caught trying 
to leave Rome on the same day.  Two days later on December 5, Cicero and 
the Senate debated the punishment of these nine Roman citizens in the Fourth 
Oration.  The five Roman citizens, who had confessed to supporting the affair 
and soliciting the Allobrogean envoys, were sentenced to death and executed 
without being allowed an appeal to the public or a formal trial.9 
After Catiline and Manlius heard the news about the executions in Rome 
and realized that an integral part of the affair had failed, they decided that the 
army in Etruria should retreat to Gaul.  However, Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, 
the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, blocked their path to the northwest and the 
consul C. Antonius’ forces were pursuing them from the south.  In early January 
of 62, the rebel army was penned in the mountains near Pistoria and decided to 
face Antonious’ army.  Antonius feigned an illness so he did not have to engage 
his former friend Catiline.  Antonius’ legate M. Petreius took command of the 
army and a pitched battle ensued.  Petreius’ army was victorious and almost all 
the men in Catiline and Manlius’ army perished.10  Catiline’s head was sent to 
Rome and the affair was effectively suppressed since its presumed leading 
members were dead.11  However, a few sources recorded that certain areas in 
the Italy supporting the affair were not subdued until a few years after its 
suppression.12  Later in 62, seven more Roman citizens were convicted for their 
                                            
9 Four others accused on December 3 remained at large, see Chapter 2 n.72. 
10 On the final battle, cf. Sall. B Cat. 56.1-61.5-6; Plut. Cic. App. B Civ. 2.7; Dio Cass. 38.40.1. 
11 Only Dio recorded that Catiline’s head was sent to Rome (Dio Cass. 38.40.2). 
12 See Chapter 3 n.107. 
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involvement and in 59 C. Antonius was found guilty for his support.13  
Furthermore, our sources implicated other influential Roman citizens, who 
perhaps supported the affair.  However, these men were never formally 
charged.14   
Cicero and Sallust’s accounts depict the affair of 63 as an attempt to 
overthrow the current rule in Rome through various subversive and hostile 
means.  According to their accounts people supported the affair from both 
inside and outside of Rome.  Therefore, the affair was occurring on two fronts 
per se.15  Both authors used the terms coniuratio or bellum to describe the affair 
and the activities of its participants. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate both 
terms and the related terminology Cicero and Sallust used to describe the affair 
in order to attempt to understand its context.  This chapter focuses on the term 
coniuratio and the distinct terminology that Cicero and Sallust chose to describe 
the affair of 63.16  
Cicero and Sallust initially identify the affair as a coniuratio.  In the First 
Oration, Cicero declared that the entire Senate knew Catiline was embroiled in 
a coniuratio (Cic. Cat. 1.1).  The statement was clearly hyperbole because 
many in the Senate including Cicero were not certain of who else was involved 
in the coniuratio or its true intentions.  The purpose of the speech was to explain 
to the Senate what Cicero had discovered regarding the designs of the 
coniuratio and to divulge his knowledge and suspicions that many other citizens 
besides Catiline were involved with the coniuratio.  Sallust stated in his preface 
of the Catilina that he would discuss de Catilinae coniuratione (Sall. B Cat. 4.3)  
Sallust uses the term 29 times in the Catilina in reference to the affair of 63.17  
                                            
13 See n.64 and Chapter 2 n.106. 
14 Most notably our sources suggest that C. Julius Caesar and M. Licinius Crassus supported 
the affair of 63.  See Appendix I [nos. 26 and 27]. 
15 Sallust remarks ea cum Ciceroni nuntiarentur, ancipiti malo permotus, quod neque urbem ab 
insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat, neque exercitus Manli quantus aut quo consilio 
foret satis compertum habebat “When these events were reported to Cicero, he was greatly 
disturbed by the twofold peril, since he could no longer by his unaided efforts protect the city 
against these plots, nor gain any exact information as to the size and purpose of Manlius’ army” 
(Sall. B Cat. 29.1). 
16 NB: To avoid repetition I usually use coniuratio to refer to all of its forms and cognates, e.g., 
the verb coniurare and the concrete noun coniurati.  When commenting on the term’s specific 
form, I am more exact.   
17 For coniuratio, cf. Sall. B Cat. 4.3, 17.1, 7, 18.1, 19.5, 23.1, 23.4, 24.1, 27.3, 30.6, 36.5, 37.1, 
39.5, 40.6, 41.5, 43.1 (bis), 46.2, 47.1 (bis), 48.1, 48.4 (bis), 51.10, 52.14, 52.17, 52.24, 56.5, 
57.1.  NB: Sallust only used the concrete noun coniurati to refer to all the ‘conspirators’ in the 
affair once (52.17).  He used coniuratio twice in reference to the affair of 66/65 (18.1, 19.5) but I 
have included theses instances in my overall count because Sallust represented this affair using 
similar conspiratorial language to the affair of 63.  
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In Cicero’s speeches directly concerning the affair of 63, the term occurs 18 
times in the Orations18, four times in the Pro Murena, and 31 times in the Pro 
Sulla.19  Cicero also uses the term to either refer or allude to the affair and its 
participants in some of his later works.20  In the entire Ciceronian corpus, almost 
three-quarters of the occurrences of the term coniuratio or its cognates refer or 
allude to the affair occurring in 63 and its participants.21  Due to the frequency of 
the usage of the term coniuratio when describing the affair of 63 in Cicero and 
Sallust’s works, it is necessary to examine the specific terminology to express a 
context that the term coniuratio can identify. 
According to the OLD, the noun coniuratio, the verb coniurare, and the 
concrete noun coniuratus have the following definitions: 
coniuratio / ~nis: 1. The taking of an oath in common; b. the action of leaguing together; 
2. a conspiracy, plot, treason, intrigue; (also) a friendly conspiracy; b. (meton.) a band 
of conspirators. 
coniuro/~are: v.i. 1. To join in taking an oath; b: (of enemies) to form an alliance or 
league; 2. to join in a plot, form a conspiracy; 3. (poet. of things) to act in unison, 
conspire. 
coniuratus/-i: 1. A conspirator; pl. a band of conspirators.22  
The term coniuratio is most frequently translated into English as a “conspiracy” 
and the term typically identifies a context that we would describe as 
“conspiratorial”.  According to the entries for “conspiracy” in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, a conspiratorial context, in sum, describes a secret plan to commit a 
crime or to cause harm often for political means.23  Translating coniuratio into 
                                            
18 The term coniuratio occurs once in a more general sense to describe the subversive activities 
since the plot to murder the new consuls of 65 at Cic. Cat. 1.31: Etenim iam diu, patres 
conscripti, in his periculis coniurationis insidiisque versamur, sed nescio quo pacto omnium 
scelerum ac veteris furoris et audaciae maturitas in nostri consulatus tempus erupit. “We have 
lived among these dangers and plots of coniuratio for a long time, gentlemen, but it has turned 
out that all these crimes and the reckless frenzy of such long standing have come to a head in 
my consulship.” 
19 Coniuratio occurs 38 times in the Pro Sulla in total.  P. Cornelius Sulla was also accused of 
being involved in the superior coniuratio of 66/65 (Cic. Sull. 14).  This coniuratio is referred to 8 
times in the speech, cf. 11, 12(bis), 14, 67, 81(bis), 82.  NB: Both coniurationes of 66/65 and 63 
are referenced once together at Pro Sulla 11 (duae coniurationes), therefore I included this 
occurrence in the count regarding the reference to the superior coniuratio above. 
20 The term occurs twice in the Pro Flacco, four times in the Pro Sestio, five times in the Pro 
Caelio, four times in the In Pisonem, once in the Pro Plancio, three times in De Domo Sua, once 
in De Haruspicem Responso, once in Post Reditu ad Senatu, once in De Provinciis 
Consularibus, once in the Paradoxa Stoicorum, twice in De Divinatione and six times in Cicero’s 
epistolary corpus.  For a discussion of some of these instances, see Chapter 4.7. 
21 84 out of 115 or 73%. 
22 NB: While the derivative coniuratus/-i, most commonly found in its plural form, was often used 
to denote the “conspirators”, the noun coniuratio could also be used metonymically in reference 
to “a band of conspirators.” 
23 The definition I use for a “conspiracy” combines most of the sub voce found under the 
headword in the Oxford English Dictionary 1993-. 
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English as a “conspiracy” is not imprecise, however, for the purposes of my 
argument I often retain the Latin term in the translation of the passages I 
examine to avoid labeling the affair. 
I examine the specific terminology Cicero and Sallust used when they 
present the affair as a coniuratio in order to provide a clearer meaning of the 
type of context, which the term coniuratio defined.24  The significant passages 
from Sallust’s Catilina and Cicero’s speeches that described these aspects, in 
particular, the Orations, the Pro Murena, and the Pro Sulla, are reviewed in the 
following sections.  As both authors’ works examine the same events, it is not 
surprising that they used similar terms or expressions to identify certain 
common aspects to describe the context of a coniuratio.  As demonstrated 
below, this terminology is used to describe the criminal, clandestine, immoral, 
and plural aspects of the affair that identify a coniuratio or defined a 
conspiratorial context.25  Although distinguishing these aspects helps identify 
this specific context, the following chapters demonstrate the complex and, at 
times, ambiguous manner in which Cicero and Sallust classified the 
multifaceted subversive activities occurring in 63. 
 
1.1  The clandestine aspects of the affair 
The following examples in this section demonstrate Cicero and Sallust’s 
emphasis on the clandestine aspects during the affair of 63.  Both writers detail 
events that were arranged in secret and hidden from public view.  They used 
specific terminology to describe this aspect.  The terms tenebrae (‘darkness’), 
nox (‘night’) or the latter term’s corresponding adjective nocturnus (‘nocturnal’) 
are used to describe the actions that were conducted at night.  The verbs latere 
(‘to lie hidden’), occultare (‘to keep hidden’), its corresponding adjective occultus 
(‘hidden’), or the adverb clam (‘secrectly’) are used to identify the plans of the 
coniuratio that were kept secret.  In addition, Cicero and Sallust use either the 
verbs comperire (‘to disclose’), patefacere (‘to lay open’), illustrare (‘to bring to 
light’), erumpere (‘to burst forth’), aperire (‘to uncover’) or its corresponding 
adverb aperte (‘openly’) to explain how the clandestine activities of the affair 
                                            
24 The various meanings and usages of the term coniuratio that do not refer to the affair of 63 in 
Cicero are examined in Chapter 5.3. 
25 Pagan (2004, 7-10) notes the similar story lines in conspiracy narratives written by Sallust, 
Livy, Tacitus, Josephus, and Appian. 
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were revealed from obscurity.26  First, I review examples of the terms that were 
used to express the nocturnal activity of the affair.  Second, those examples 
that suggest secrecy and how Cicero and Sallust expressed the discovery of 
the affair are examined. 
Cicero and Sallust recorded certain activities of the affair that occurred at 
night to emphasize its obscurity.  In the First Oration, Cicero stationed a 
nocturnum praesidium ‘night garrison’ in Rome, indicating that those 
participating in the affair were primarily active at night in order to conceal their 
intentions.27  When Cicero reported his prevention of the plan to capture 
Praeneste, he used the expression nocturnus impetus (‘a night attack’) to 
express the covert activity (Cic. Cat. 1.8).28  Later, Cicero reported that Catiline 
and others supporting the affair met at the house of the senator M. Porcius 
Laeca to discuss their plans priore nocte ‘the night before’ (1.9). Sallust’s 
narrative concurs that the meeting occurred intempesta nocte ‘in the dead of 
night’ (Sall. B Cat. 27.3).29  Clearly, Cicero and Sallust recorded that the 
meeting at Laeca’s house took place at night to emphasize that the type of 
subterfuge that was planned at the meeting could only occur in such a setting.30  
Sallust reported it was eo nocte ‘that night’ when the decision was made to 
murder Cicero (28.1).31  In the Second Oration, again referring to the night 
meeting, Cicero claimed that he discovered omnia superioris noctis consilia ‘all 
the plans from the previous night’ (Cic. Cat. 2.6).  He emphasizes the obscurity 
of the meeting using the phrase in nocturno and told the people that patefaci 
cetera: quid ea nocte egisset, ubi fuisset, quid in proximam constituisset “I 
revealed the rest: what he [Catiline] had done that night, where he had been, 
what he had prepared the night before” (2.13).  In these instances in the 
Second Oration, Cicero magnifies his diligence as consul, suggesting that his 
discovery of the affair and who was involved was a tireless effort as they tried to 
conceal their operations by meeting at night.  When Sallust described Catiline’s 
flight from Rome, he remarked that it was intempesta nocte ‘in the dead of night’ 
                                            
26 All of these terms listed can carry various definitions and some of these terms are clearly 
analogous.  I have translated these terms to correspond with the definitions found in the OLD 
and to correspond with the usual way Cicero and Sallust used them in reference to the affair. 
NB: Cicero wrote the verb illustrare with its alternate affix inl-.  
27 Cf. Dyck 2008, 78 and 81. 
28 On Praeneste, see Chapter 3.4 pp. 171-3. 
29 Cf. Appendix I n.29. 
30 Cicero rhetorically questions if Catiline can enjoy the light of the sun, further implying the 
“darkness” of the affair (Cic. Cat. 1.15).  Dyck 2008, 94. 
31 See Chapter 2 n.261. 
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(Sall. B Cat. 32.1).  Cicero insisted that Catiline was on his way to join the army 
in Etruria in the Second Oration.32  Cicero indicated that Catiline would continue 
to move during the night and stated he had notified all the colonies and 
municipalities in the Italian peninsula de hac nocturna excursione Catilinae 
‘about Catiline’s night journey’, so that they could defend themselves from an 
attack (Cic. Cat. 2.26). 
In addition, Cicero and Sallust reported the night activities of those 
remaining in Rome who continued to support the affair after Catiline left the city.  
When T. Volturcius was escorting the Allobrogean envoys from Rome to 
Faesulae, they left cum advesperasceret “when it was growing dark” (Cic. Cat. 
3.5).33  After Catiline joined Manlius’ army, Sallust asserted that L. Calpurnius 
Bestia, a tribune-designate for 62, was to give the signal to the participants 
remaining in Rome to start the fires and the massacre of leading citizens 
proxuma nocte “On the following night” (Sall. B Cat. 43.1).34  Similar to the 
instance in the Second Oration mentioned above when Cicero warned those 
outside of Rome about Catiline’s nocturnus excursus (Cic. Cat. 2.26), in the 
Third Oration he advised the people of Rome to stay on guard because others 
involved with the affair were still in the city tamen aeque ac priore nocte 
custodiis vigiliisque “As you did last night with your pickets and sentries” (3.29).  
In the Fourth Oration, Cicero claimed that the Senate must decide the 
punishment of Lentulus and the other four citizens that were apprehended ante 
noctem “before nightfall” (4.6). 
Sallust’s narrative suggests that part of the reason behind the swift 
decision to execute the five Roman citizens was ratus noctem quae instabat 
antecapere, ne quid eo spatio novaretur “To forestall any new movement during 
the approaching night” (Sall. B Cat. 55.1).  Sallust explains that Cicero wanted 
the Senate to decide on a sentence quickly because there were attempts by 
Lentulus and Cethegus’ clients and slaves to free them from custody on 
December 4, the day before the Fourth Oration was delivered (50.1-2).35  It is 
                                            
32 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.1-7, 14-16, 20, 24. 
33 Sallust’s account concurred that Volturcius would leave in the night (Sall. B Cat. 45.1). 
34 NB: Cicero’s works did not mention that L. Calpurnius Bestia participated in the affair.  See 
Appendix I, [no. 6]. 
35 After Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, Statilius, and Caeparius were apprehended on 
December 3, they were held in custody in other leading senators’ homes (Sall. B Cat. 47.3-4) 
NB: Cicero did not record where Lentulus and the others were held or an attempt to rescue 
them.  In contrast, Cicero states that while Lentulus was in custody one of his clients was 
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understandable that those involved with the affair of 63 conducted certain 
activities under the cover of darkness.  However, the examples above display a 
clear motive in Cicero and Sallust’s description of the affair.  They placed 
emphasis on the nocturnal activities of the affair to present it as a shadowy, 
sinister affair and demonstrate that its actions contained a degree of uncertainty 
being hidden from public view.  On the other hand, Sallust contended that 
nocturnis consiliis…plus timoris quam periculi effecerant “By their meeting at 
night…they caused more apprehension than actual danger” (42.2).  However, 
when highlighting the nocturnal activities of the participants, both authors 
accentuated the fear of the unknown, a distinctive aspect identifiable in a 
conspiratorial context.36  Regardless, Cicero had been informed about the affair 
and soon divulged its secrets. 
Both writers use specific terminology to describe the nocturnal activities 
of the affair and to indicate how these secret activities were uncovered.  From 
the beginning, Cicero declared that neque nox tenebris obscurare coetus 
nefarios…potest ‘Night cannot keep their criminal meetings hidden in the 
darkness’. The verbs illustrare and erumpere appear in this passage to convey 
that their plans had ‘burst into the light’ and Cicero emphasized this sentiment 
stating that luce sunt clariora nobis tua consilia omnia “All your plans are as 
clear as daylight to us” (Cic. Cat. 1.6).37  He professed to the Senate that he 
had discovered everything (1.10: omnia…comperi).  In the conclusion of the 
First Oration, Cicero further remarked that once the Senate had realized that 
Catiline was leaving Rome to join the army in Etruria then omnia patefacta, 
inlustrata, oppressa, vindicata esse videatis “You will see everything not only 
revealed and illumined but crushed and punished” (1.32).  In the Second 
Oration, Cicero boasted that the disclosure of the affair’s plans in the First 
Oration was a success because Catiline was driven ex occultis insidiis ‘from 
hidden plots’ (2.1).  However, some people believed that Catiline was not 
leaving Rome to join Manlius’ army, but was instead going into voluntary exile at 
Massilia (2.14).  Cicero rejected the idea that Catiline was going into exile, and 
                                                                                                                                
allegedly trying to gain support for his patron among the poor in Rome (Cic. Cat. 4.17).  Dyck 
2008, 232-3. 
36 Pagan (2004, 22) argues that conspiracy narratives emphasize the unknown as a technique 
to add an element of suspense.   
37 Cf. Cic. Mur. 82: omnia quae per hoc triennium agitata sunt…in hoc tempus erumpunt “All the 
plots hatched over the last three years…are coming to a boil…this very moment.”; Sest. 9: cum 
illa coniuratio ex latebris atque tenebris erupisset “After that coniuratio bust out from its hiding-
place in the dark.” 
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when it was reported that Catiline did join the army in Etruria, he claimed that 
vos omnes factam esse aperte coniurationem contra rem publicam videretis 
“You all see that a coniuratio has been openly formed against the Republic” 
(2.6).  This passage in the Second Oration reiterates Cicero’s claim made at the 
end of the First Oration regarding Catiline’s plan to join Manlius’ army.  
However, Cicero’s claim in the First and Second Oration that he knew omnia 
consilia (‘all the plans’) of the affair was not confirmed until the letters on the 
Mulvian Bridge were seized and the testimonies of Volturcius and the 
Allobrogean envoys were heard nearly a month later.38 
Cicero described the groups of supporters that were willing to join the 
affair in the Second Oration to demonstrate his assertion that many were 
involved with the affair other than Catiline.39  Cicero warned those supporting 
the affair specifically inside of Rome that their punishment would be harsh when 
ut id quod latebat erumperet ‘that which lay hidden burst forth’ (Cic. Cat. 2.27).  
When Cicero disclosed the secret plans of the affair’s participants who were 
apprehended on December 3, he used the verbs comperire, patefacere, and 
illustrare again to emphasize the initial clandestine nature of the affair in the 
Third Oration.  In an exultant flourish from the rostra Cicero proclaims quae 
quoniam in senatu inlustrata, patefacta, comperta sunt per me “It is through my 
efforts that these plots have been detected, laid bare, and displayed to the 
Senate” (3.3).40  Despite his boast, he insisted that he was assisted in exposing 
the affair through divine providence.41  The statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus 
was erected on the same day the letters written by the participants remaining in 
Rome were seized in the ambush on the Mulvian Bridge.  Cicero exploited the 
coincidence.42  He recalled the haruspicum responsa regarding certain ‘bad’ 
omens that occurred in 65.43  The haruspices purportedly suggested that the 
statue should be placed facing east towards the forum and the Curia in order 
                                            
38 Cicero claimed he knew omnia consilia, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.1, 6, 10, 24, 32, 2.5-6, 13, 19, 26; Sull. 
4, 14, 85. 
39 See Chapter 2.2. 
40 Cf. Cic. Cat. 4.5, which declared he received thanks because perditorum hominum 
coniurationem patefactam esse “a conspiracy of criminals had been revealed.” 
41 See Cic. Cat. 3.18-22; cf. 1.32, 2.19. On the use of religious imagery and rhetoric in the Third 
Oration, cf. Goar 1978, 41-5; MacKendrick 1995, 104-5; Dyck 2008, 192-9. 
42 Cf. Cic. Div. 1.17-21.  NB: An excerpt from Cicero’s De Consulato Sua reproduced in De 
Divinatione referred to the clandestine aspect of the affair using the adjective occultus.  The 
excerpt from Cicero’s poem on his consulship describes the providential placement of Jupiter’s 
statue tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus cernere conatus posset “Then would 
the people and the venerable senate be able to fathom hidden designs” (Div. 1.20).  See also 
Chapter 2 n.317. 
43 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.19; Jul. Obs. Prod. 61.  For these ‘bad’ omens, see Chapter 2 n.316. 
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that ea consilia quae clam essent initia…inlustrarentur ut a senatu populoque 
Romano perspici possent “The plots which had been hatched in secret…would 
be illuminated so brightly that they could be seen by the Senate and the people 
of Rome” (3.20).  Cicero contended that the incident demonstrated divine 
intervention because omnia et senatus et vos quae erant contra salutem 
omnium cogitata inlustrata et patefacta vidistis “Both Senate and people saw 
the plots against the safety of you [the gods] all brought into the light of day and 
laid bare” (3.21).44  The emphasis placed on the role of the gods in revealing 
the threat posed by the citizens involved with the affair remaining in Rome 
stressed Cicero’s good fortune that he was able to discover such a clandestine 
affair. 
The verb occultare occurs once in the Catilina in reference to the 
informer Q. Curius who, according to Sallust, divulged the designs of the affair 
to his former lover Fulvia.45  Sallust characterized Curius as vanus (‘vacant’) 
and audax (‘audacious’), therefore someone who could neque 
reticere…neque…occultare ‘neither keep quiet… nor…keep a secret’ (Sall. B 
Cat. 23.2).  Sallust proclaimed that Curius acted violently towards Fulvia, which 
made her inform Cicero of the affair.46  Sallust explained that Fulvia tale 
periculum rei publicae haud occultum habuit “had no thought of concealing such 
a peril to her country” (23.4).  Since Cicero was apprised of the affair and the 
plan to murder him, Sallust comments that quae occulte temptaverat aspera 
foedaque evenerant “[Catiline’s] covert attempts had resulted in disappointment 
and disgrace (26.5).47  Pagan argues that Sallust uses narrative techniques 
such as retrogression and digression to keep his audience in suspense.48  In 
contrast to Cicero, Sallust reveals the clandestine plans of the affair to his 
readers piecemeal before all is divulged.  Finally, in Cato’s speech in the 
                                            
44 Cf. Cic. Sull. 40: vos denique in tantis tenebris erroris et inscientiae clarissimum lumen menti 
meae praetulistis “You [the gods] in short who amid the deep shadow of uncertainty and 
ignorance illumed my thought with the brightness of your light.”  Cf. Berry 1996, 218. 
45 Cf. Diod. Sic. 35.2-5F; Plut. Cic. 16.2; App. B Civ. 2.3; Suet. Iul. 17.  NB: Neither Q. Curius or 
Fulvia are mentioned in any of Cicero’s works, see Appendix I, [nos. 18 and 20].  On the 
reasons why Sallust’s Catilina included the anecdote regarding Q. Curius and Fulvia, cf. Syme 
1964, 125, 134-6; Vretska 1976, 338-9; Pagan 2004, 41-6. 
46 Sallust alternately claims Cicero persuaded Curius, not Fulvia, to reveal the plans of the affair 
(Sall. B Cat. 26.3).  Cf. McGushin 1977, 158-9 and 166-7; Pagan 2004, 45-6; Dyck 2008, 86. 
47 The adverb occulte occurs two other times in the Catilina, but not explicitly regarding the 
clandestine activities of the affair.  Sallust used occulte to refer to the ‘unknown’ nobiles who 
purportedly supported the affair (Sall. B Cat. 17.5).  The second instance of the adverb refers to 
Cicero’s reaction to Fulvia and Curius’ information that the affair’s participants planned to 
murder him.  Sallust states Cicero ‘secretly’ surrounded himself with bodyguards (26.5). 
48 Pagan 2004, 39-41.  Cf. Syme 1964, 67-8.   
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Catilina regarding the sentence of Lentulus and the others and after the Senate 
had heard Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys’ testimonies confirming the 
affair’s plans, Sallust wrote neque parari neque consuli quicquam potest occulte 
“Neither preparations nor plans can be kept secret” (52.35).  As explained in the 
introduction, Cicero is hampered by his active role in the affair and the oratorical 
medium he uses to relate the events, whereas Sallust is relatively free of these 
constraints.  However, as shown above, Sallust does emphasize the nocturnal 
activities of the affair and uses the verbs aperire, comperire, and patefacere to 
convey the disclosure of its clandestine plans, similar to Cicero, and to 
emphasize how the affair was initially kept secret. 
The verb aperire was used in Sallust’s Catilina several times when those 
involved disclosed the affair’s plans to their associates.  After all the leading 
participants in the affair swore an oath, Catiline laid out the intended plans and 
aperuisse consilium suum “disclosed his project” (Sall. B Cat. 22.2).  When 
Lentulus and the others remaining in Rome solicited the Allobrogean envoys for 
their support, Sallust reported that the freedman P. Umbrenus coniurationem 
aperit “disclosed the plot” and named some of the leading members involved 
with the affair to prove to the envoys that the affair had support from influential 
citizens in Rome (40.6).  Consequently, Sallust uses the verb to describe the 
detection of the participants remaining in Rome.  He stated the Allobroges rem 
omnem…aperiunt “divulged the whole affair” to their patron Q. Fabius Sanga 
(41.4), and when Volturcius gave his testimony to the Senate, Sallust explains 
that he omnia…aperit ‘disclosed everything’ (47.1).49 
Sallust’s usage of the verb patefacere distinctly referred to the disclosure 
of the affair after Lentulus and the others had confessed and affirmed Cicero’s 
claim that there were influential people remaining in Rome and planning the 
affair regardless of Catiline’s absence.  Sallust remarks that Cicero was 
overjoyed coniuratione patefacta civitatem periculis ereptam esse “By the 
disclosure of the coniuratio his country was saved from peril” (46.2).  
Furthermore, Sallust argues that once the affair’s plan of mass murder and 
arson in Rome was confirmed and after coniuratione patefacta “the disclosure 
of the coniuratio,” the plebs in the city, who according to Sallust were willing to 
support the affair, began to curse Catiline and praise Cicero (48.1).50  Using the 
                                            
49 For a discussion of Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys’ testimonies, see Chapter 2.4.2. 
50 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 37.4-8. 
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same phraseology, Sallust uses the verb to describe the situation at the army’s 
camp in Etruria after Lentulus and the others had been executed.  Sallust 
claims that there were some desertions from the army after Romae 
coniurationem patefactam ‘the coniuratio in Rome had been laid open’ (57.1). 
Cicero and Sallust used distinct and consistent terminology to identify the 
clandestine aspects of the affair.  When the clandestine aspects of certain 
activities were revealed, both authors chose specific phraseology to accentuate 
how these activities moved from obscurity to clarity.  Sometimes both authors 
chose to use the term coniuratio when explicitly referring to the affair’s 
clandestine plans that were discovered to further signify that these plans 
corresponded with a conspiratorial context.  In addition, Cicero and Sallust 
represented the secret activities of the affair as crimes and those involved with 
them as criminals. 
 
1.2  The criminal aspects of the affair 
Cicero and Sallust often used the analogous terms facinus or scelus to 
describe the affair of 63 as a crime and the participants who were involved in it 
as criminals.  Both terms carry a criminal aspect and can be loosely translated 
as a “crime.”51  When these terms occur in the same passage with the term 
coniuratio, it is clear that the authors are suggesting that a conspiratorial context 
also contained a criminal aspect.  Sallust used both facinus and scelus to 
describe the coniuratio in the preface of the Catilina (Sall. B Cat. 4.4-5).  Cicero 
also used the terms to further describe the coniuratio in the First Oration, 
employing the expression omnia scelerum “all the crimes” in comparison to the 
expression coniurationis insidiae “the plots of conspiracy” (Cic. Cat. 1.31).  
Similarly, in the Pro Sulla, Cicero used the expression nefarium facinus 
“nefarious crime” to describe this particular aspect of the coniuratio when the 
prosecution accused P. Sulla of soliciting the people of Pompeii to support the 
affair (Sull. 60).52  When Cicero referred to C. Pomptinius’ victory over the 
Allobroges who had revolted against Rome in 61 in his speech De Provinciis 
                                            
51 OLD (facinus) s.v. 2; (scelus) s.v. 2.  As synonyms for crime, see TLL s.v. facinus 77.74-
78.77.  
52 NB: Cicero more often qualified the noun scelus or the related adjectives sceleratus and 
consceleratus in apposition with the adjective nefarium to stress the immoral aspect of the 
affair’s crimes, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.19: conscelerata ac nefaria; 27: nefariorum ac manifestorum 
scelerum; 29: nefario scelere; 3.27: sceleratae ac nefariae; 4.7: nefarii sceleris; 4.13: in hoc 
scelere tam immani ac nefando; Sul. 28: consceleratas ac nefarias.  See section 1.3 and nn.68-
9. 
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Consularibus delivered in 57, he claimed that the war against the Allobroges 
was borne out of the scelerata coniuratione “wicked conspiracy” of 63 (Prov. 
cons. 32).53 
The terms facinus or scelus more frequently occur in Cicero and Sallust’s 
works without any qualifying or descriptive adjectives to identify the affair of 
63.54  The instances reviewed below demonstrate that Cicero and Sallust use 
the terms facinus or scelus to specifically refer to the affair’s criminal activities.  
According to Cicero and Sallust’s accounts, the participants’ intentions were: i) 
to raise an army in Etruria, ii) to murder Cicero, iii) to murder other leading 
citizens, iv) to strategically burn parts of Rome, v) to persuade the Allobroges to 
lend military support to the army in Etruria, and vi) to solicit other urban areas 
throughout Italy to revolt.55  The first, second, fifth and sixth actions in this list 
were actually attempted before the affair was compromised.  However, the 
authors suggested that all of the actions occurring both outside and inside of 
Rome were not only connected, but also integral parts for the affair to 
succeed.56  The affair’s activities occurring inside and outside of Rome are 
discussed in further detail in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.  At the present, it is 
important to note that Cicero collectively referred to these activities using the 
expression omnia scelera.57  Having represented their intentions as scelera 
signifies that all of their intentions were criminal, therefore the affair’s plans 
were perceived as ‘crimes’.  Subsequently, the scelerati who were conducting 
or accused of being involved with these scelera or facinora could be prosecuted 
for their actions.  
In 62, Cicero defended P. Cornelius Sulla, who was accused of being 
involved in duae coniurationes (Cic. Sull. 11).58  The first coniuratio referred to 
the aborted plan to murder the consuls of 65, the second coniuratio referred to 
the affair of 63.  The Pro Sulla records several trials against those suspected of 
                                            
53 Cf. Cic. Flac. 94: de coniuratorum scelere.  NB: C. Pomptinius was one of the praetors in 63 
who was ordered by Cicero to ambush T. Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys (Cic. Cat.. 3.5, 
14; Sall. B Cat. 45.1, 4).  Pomptinius was governor of Transalpine Gaul in 61, which bordered 
on the territory of the Allobroges (Liv. Per. 103; Dio Cass. 37.47.1).  
54 The terms explicitly or implicitly refer to the affair in the following passages in Cicero and 
Sallust’s works. For facinus: cf. Cic. Sull. 16, 56, 76,78; Sall. B Cat. 4.4, 15.4, 51.15. For scelus: 
cf. Cic. Cat. 1.8, 27, 31, 33, 2.11 (bis), 14, 25, 3.3, 6, 4.8; Mur. 78, 80; Sull. 16, 30, 67, 70; Sall. 
B Cat. 4.5, 22.1, 23.2, 51.7, 52.31. 
55 Cicero and Sallust referred to all of the actions occurring inside and outside of Rome, cf. Cic. 
Cat. 1.5,7,9, 2.4-6, 3.3-4, 8, 4.13; Mur. 80; Sall. B Cat. 27-28, 32.1-2; 43.1-2. 
56 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.30, 2.1, 23-24, 27, 3.3-4, 8, 16-17, 25, 4.11-13; Sall. B Cat. 29.1, 32.1-2, 43.1-
2, 52.17, 24, 35-6, 56.1, 57.1, 5, 58.4. 
57 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.31, 33, 3.6 
58 On the accusations against P. Sulla, see Chapter 2 n.131. 
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being involved with either coniuratio. Cicero used the term crimen 23 times in 
the speech in relation to those accused of supporting the affair of 63.  He 
referred to the trial against P. Sulla as a crimen coniurationis ‘an accusation of 
conspiracy’ (12).  Although the term crimen can be defined as a ‘crime,’59 both 
Cicero and Sallust primarily used the term not in reference to the actual crime 
itself but to define the criminal charge instead.60  Sallust used the term crimen 
when he described Catiline’s feint that he was going into exile at Massilia after 
he left Rome instead of joining Manlius in Etruria.  Sallust stated that Catiline 
sent letters to his friends claiming that he had been maligned by falsis 
criminibus “false accusations” (Sall. B Cat. 34.2).  Surely, one of these crimina 
levied against Catiline was his involvement with the affair in 63.  Instead, the 
term explicitly defines an allegation, not the specific crimes of which Catiline 
had been accused.61 
Cicero demonstrated this distinction in the Pro Sulla.  When Cicero 
discusses the previous cases against those convicted of participating in the 
affair of 63, he noted that their friends did not come to their defense.62  Cicero 
explained: 
quia ceteris in causis etiam nocentis viri boni, si necessarii sunt, deserendos esse non 
putant; in hoc crimine non solum levitatis est culpa verum etiam quaedam contagio 
sceleris, si defendas eum quem obstrictum esse patriae parricidio suspicere. 
“Because men loyal to their friends think that in other types of cases they should not 
desert them even if they are guilty, but in a case such as this you would not only be 
guilty of irresponsibility but also in danger of infection, as it were, from the crime if you 
were to defend a man whom you suspect of being implicated in high treason.” (Cic. Sull. 
6)  
The other cases Cicero referred to concerned the following Roman citizens: 
Ser. Cornelius Sulla, P. Cornelius Sulla (not to be confused with the 
homonymous Sulla Cicero was defending), L. Vargunteius, M. Porcius Laeca, 
P. Autronius Paetus, L. Cassius Longinus, (who were all once senators), and 
the knight C. Cornelius.63  Cicero used the phrase crimen coniurationis in 
reference to the accusations made against these citizens who were tried in 62 
(Sull. 13).  They were subsequently convicted under the lex Plautia de vi.64  We 
                                            
59 OLD (crimen) s.v. 4. 
60 Cf. OLD (crimen) s.v.1-3; TLL s.v. crimen 1193.52-1194.82 IB. 
61 For the purported crimes committed by Catiline prior to the affair of 63, see Dyck 2008, 2-4. 
62 Berry 1996, 143. 
63 See further Appendix I, [nos. 3, 8, 11, 16, 17, 32 and 42]. 
64 Cicero alluded to the convictions of the Sullae, Vargunteius, Laeca, and C. Cornelius (Cic. 
Sull. 6), Autronius (7), and Cassius (36-39).  NB: According to the Pro Sulla Cassius stood trial 
in 62.  He was away from Rome when Cicero reported in the Third Oration that Cassius would 
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know little about the statutes of this lex other than it was supplementary or 
complementary to the lex Lutatia de vi, which was specifically passed against 
M. Aemelius Lepidus during his revolt against Rome in 78/77.  Presumably, 
either lex de vi covered acts of violence against a citizen(s) or the res publica.65  
There is no evidence that a specific lex or statute existed during the Republic to 
address an affair called a coniuratio.66  Evidently, one of the intended actions of 
both coniurationes was the murder of citizens.  However, both episodes 
apparently included subversive political activities as well, otherwise the accused 
would most likely have been charged under the lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficiis.67  Regardless of which law these citizens were specifically charged 
under, those facing a crimen coniurationis were convicted indicating that the 
offense of being involved in a coniuratio was punishable by law.  This evidence 
confirms that a coniuratio was not only depicted as a clandestine affair, but also 
an official crime. 
One facet of Catiline’s character both authors described was his intimacy 
with scelera and facinora.  Cicero asked Catiline quod facinus a manibus 
umquam tuis “What crime has never stained your hands?” (Cic. Cat. 1.13).  He 
claimed Catiline was scelus anhelantem “breathing crime” (2.1) and had oculi 
sceleris “crime in his eyes” (Mur. 49).  Sallust concurred that Catiline taught 
multis modis mala facinora “many forms of wickedness” (Sall. B Cat. 16.1).  
Similarly, Cicero and Sallust described the other people who were willing to join 
or participated in the affair using the adjectives sceleratus, consceleratus, or the 
adjective scelestus to emphasize their villainous nature and tendency to be 
involved with scelera.68  These ‘wicked criminals’ were also attracted to 
flagitium (‘scandal’) like Catiline.  Cicero claimed that nullum…facinus exstitit 
                                                                                                                                
face the same sentence as those who were apprehended (Cat. 3.14).  There are no reports of 
Cassius’ execution, so we must assume he was only exiled in 62.  See also Appendix I, [no. 8]. 
65 Cicero discussed the leges de vi in the Pro Caelio (Cic. Cael. 70-2).  See also, Chapter 2 
n.131. 
66 The sources assume that all of the leges di vi in the Republic addressed both vis privata and 
vis publica.  However, the former referred to a violent attack against a person, the latter against 
the state.  This delineation in the leges de vi are projected from the statutes found in lex Iulia de 
vi preserved in the Digesta. 
67 Passed by Sulla, the lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis covered homicide, but also had a 
wide scope including other acts of violence, arson, see Marcian Inst. 14=Digesta 48.8.  Cf. 
Robinson 1995, 41-44; Lintott 1999, 158; Gaughn 2010, 134-40. 
68 For sceleratus: cf. Cic. Cat. 1.23, 3.27; Sull. 32, 87; Prov. cons. 32; Sall. B Cat. 52.12, 36.  
For consceleratus: cf. Cic. Sull. 28, 29.  For scelestus: Sall. B Cat. 52.15.  NB: A derivative of 
facinus occurs once in reference to the participants with the affair.  In the Second Oration, 
Cicero collectively describes the fifth group of people involved with the affair as omnium 
facinerosorum “every sort of criminal” (Cic. Cat. 2.22). 
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nisi per te, nullum fagitium sine te ‘no…wicked act or scandal has happened 
except through you [Catiline]’ (Cic. Cat. 1.18). 
Sallust often used the terms flagitium and facinus together to express the 
similar criminal character traits of those in Rome who were willing to support the 
affair.  He declared that Rome in the 60’s was a place where Catiline could find 
id quod factu facillumum erat omnium flagitiorum atque facinorum circum se 
tamquam stipatorum catervas habebat “it a very easy matter to surround 
himself, as by a bodyguard, with troops of criminals and reprobates of every 
kind” (Sall. B Cat. 14.1).  Sallust insinuated that some of these men had 
acquired massive debts through bribes when accused of flagitium aut facinus 
(14.2).  When describing Q. Curius, the affair’s supporter turned informer, 
Sallust remarked that Curius had been involved with flagitiis atque facinoribus, 
which led to the latter’s expulsion by the censors of 70/69 (23.1).  These 
examples suggest that anyone who was willing to support the affair or was 
involved with it had a criminal background and was familiar with scelus, facinus, 
and/or flagitium. 
In addition, the terms scelus and facinus more often defined a ‘wicked 
act’ than a crime, as both substantives carry an immoral undertone.69  Arguably, 
any crime committed against the ius Romanum was considered impious; and 
Cicero and Sallust’s accounts stressed the immorality of the affair and its 
participants.  Both authors frequently qualified the terms facinus and scelus with 
the adjectives tantum and quantum; as well as using the substantive 
magnitudino to emphasize the great degree of criminality regarding their violent 
intentions.70  Cicero used this phraseology in the Third and Fourth Oration 
whenever he wanted to reiterate the fact that other influential Roman citizens 
and even a current praetor, Lentulus, were involved in these wicked and 
criminal activities in addition to Catiline.  In the Third Oration, Cicero addressed 
Lentulus as his dead grandfather P. Cornelius Lentulus, who fought against the 
revolt of C. Sempronius Gracchus’ supporters in 121 and whose image his 
grandson Lentulus’ used for his signum (‘wax seal’).  This seal was found on the 
letter Lentulus gave to the Allobrogean envoys proving his attempt to obtain 
                                            
69 The terms facinus and scelus can be used as synonyms for the term nefas (‘sacrilege’), see 
TLL s.v. facinus 82.3-31.  See also, n.52. 
70 NB: Cicero uses the expression tantum facinus once in reference to Catiline’s alleged 
involvement with the affair of 66/65 (Cic. Cat. 1.14). 
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support from the Gallic tribe.71  Cicero proclaimed that the image of Lentulus’ 
grandfather quae quidem te a tanto scelere etiam muta revocare debuit “Even 
though it can’t speak, should have called you back from so heinous a crime” 
(Cic. Cat. 3.10).  Furthermore, Cicero twice comments that the magnitudinem 
scelerum (‘the enormity of the crime’) was unbelievable (cf. 3.4, 21).72  The 
theme continued in 62, when Cicero used the expression tantum scelerum to 
stress the extent of the criminal activities of the affair of 63 in the Pro Sulla.73  
One of the affair’s criminal designs was to murder the leading members 
of the current regime, starting with the assassination of the consul Cicero.  
Cicero and Sallust use the term insidiae (‘an ambush or a treacherous attack’) 
to describe the abortive assassination attempt.74  Although no specific verbs of 
“killing” are used to express the intentions of the insidiae against Cicero, both 
authors’ accounts are clear that the consul was the target of the attempted 
insidiae.  Sallust used the term insidiae six times in the Catilina to refer to the 
affair’s plans or attempts to murder Cicero and other leading citizens.75  Sallust 
used variations of the phrase insidiae consulibus five times and explicitly 
mentioned Cicero’s name once to clarify the primary intended target of the 
insidiae.76  Cicero’s speeches used similar phraseology when referring to the 
affair’s plans to have him murdered.  Cicero either used the term insidiae and a 
personal pronoun or used insidiae and the term consul to identify himself to 
describe the assassination attempts.77  However, the instances of the term 
                                            
71 Lentulus’ grandfather was wounded in the attack against C. Sempronius Gracchus’ 
supporters in 121 and his actions were portrayed as an act of loyalty to the res publica, cf. Cic. 
Cat. 4.13; Phil. 8.14; Val. Max. 5.3.2. Lentulus’ grandfather was consul in 162, therefore he was 
at the least eighty-five years old in 121.  See RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 203, 1375.1-1376.32.  
72 Cic. Cat. 3.4: quoniam auribus vestris propter incredibilem magnitudinem sceleris minorem 
fidem faceret oratio mea “Since I realized that you would be the more reluctant to believe my 
story because the extent of their crime defies belief.” Cf. 3.21: quae tum propter magnitudinem 
scelerum non nullis incredibilia videbantur “The enormity of the crime made some people refuse 
to believe it.” 
73 Cf. Cic. Sull. 6, 74, 75, 82, 88.  NB: All these instances cited in the Pro Sulla were in 
reference to the affair of 63.  Once in the speech Cicero used the phrase tantum facinorum in 
reference to the plot to murder the new consuls of 65 (Sull. 68).  
74 OLD (insidiae) s.v. 1 and 4.  Gaughn (2010, 3) notes that there are many verbs in Latin that 
mean “to kill”, but argues that there is no specific noun for “murder”. 
75 The term occurs a total of eight times in the Catilina, cf. Sall. B Cat. 26.1, 5, 27.2, 29.1, 32.1, 
2, 43.2, 45.1. 
76 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 26.1: omnibus modis insidias parabat Ciceroni; 26.5: insidiae, quas consulibus 
in campo fecerat; 27.2: consulibus insidias tendere; 32.1: insidiae consuli procedebant; 32.2: 
insidias consuli maturent; 43.2: ad consulem ceterosque, quibus insidiae parabantur.  NB: This 
last instance refers to the affair’s plan to murder Cicero and other leading citizens.  
77 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.11, 32, 4.2, 18; Mur. 82.  NB: In the Second Oration, Cicero used the term 
insidiae alone in reference to the affair’s plan for caedem bonorum “the murder of loyal citizens” 
(Cat. 2.10).  In the Pro Sulla, the term insidiae occurs alone when recalling the assassination 
attempt of Cicero in 63 (Sull. 18). 
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insidiae in Cicero’s speeches are most often used to compare the affair to a 
treacherous ambush, further emphasizing the danger of the affair’s clandestine 
and criminal plans. 
In the First Oration, Cicero reminded the Senate that etenim iam diu…in 
his periculis coniurationis insidiisque versamur “We have lived among these 
dangers and plots of conspiracy for a long time” (Cic. Cat. 1.31).  The term 
coniuratio and insidiae occur in conjunction to refer to the alleged plans of the 
affair of 66/65 and the affair of 63.  Similarly, in the Pro Murena, the phrase 
insidiis coniuratorum occurs in specific reference to ‘the treacherous attacks by 
the coniurati’ (Mur. 87).  In these two cases, the term insidiae was used to 
allude to the plans of the coniuratio or the coniurati who intended to perform the 
insidiae.  Although these are the only two cases where the terms coniuratio and 
insidiae are used in apposition, the reasoning is clear.  The term insidiae not 
only emphasized the criminality of the plans to murder the leading citizens in 
Rome, but also conveyed the clandestine aspect found in a conspiratorial 
context.78 
In the Second Oration and Third Oration, Cicero used the term insidiae 
either in reference to the activities occurring inside of Rome or to the affair’s 
plans as a whole.  When Cicero boasted about coercing Catiline to leave Rome 
by exposing the affair’s plans, he used the phrase ex occultis insidiis ‘from 
hidden attacks’ (Cat. 2.1) and ex domesticis insidiis ‘from attacks within the city’ 
(3.17) to stress the secrecy of the affair and to emphasize that the threat within 
Rome remained although Catiline had left the city.79  In the Second Oration, 
Cicero claimed he knew who had volunteered for urbanas insidias caedes atque 
incendiorum “the plans for murder and arson in Rome” (2.6); and that there 
remained intus insidiae ‘the plots inside the city’ (2.11).80  Cicero directly 
referred to the activities that those involved with the affair inside of Rome were 
planning as insidiae in the Third Oration.  Cicero stressed the difficulty of 
ensuring the city’s safety in tantis et tam absconditis insidiis “In the midst of 
such wide-ranging and deep-laid plots” (3.3).  Evidently, Cicero and Sallust 
primarily used the term insidiae to refer to the activities occurring inside of 
Rome.  On the other hand, when Cicero recalled his discovery of the affair in 
                                            
78 NB: Cicero used the adjective insidiosus (‘treacherous’) to qualify the term bellum in 
reference to the affair (Cic. Cat. 2.28).  See Chapter 4. 
79 Cf. Cic. Sull. 83: ex insidiis. 
80 Cf. Cic. Mur. 79. 
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the Pro Sulla delivered in 62, he used the expression insidiae rei publicae to 
suggest that the plans were directed against the whole of the Republic.81  The 
expression insidiae rei publicae alluded to the participants’ ultimate goal to gain 
power in Rome through these treacherous attacks, which included using the 
army from northern Etruria.  Cicero and Sallust’s accounts of the affair 
presented its ultimate goal using a distinct terminology to explicitly accentuate 
the gravity of the threat to the stability of the res publica. 
The analogous verbs opprimere, perdere, delere, exstinguere, or vastare 
occur in Cicero and Sallust’s works to express the affair’s ultimate goal “to 
destroy” the res publica.82  In addition, the related nouns pernicies, exitium, 
occasus, or interitus were used to describe this final aim.83  This vocabulary of 
“destruction” is used more frequently in Cicero’s works than in Sallust’s 
monograph.  The Catilina initially recorded that the corrupted youth and other 
assorted criminals in Rome as well as the Sullan veterans outside of the city 
were willing to support the affair.84  Sallust claimed that Catiline, who was 
bolstered by the extent of the support for the affair, then opprimundae rei 
publicae consilium cepit “formed the plan of overthrowing the government” (Sall. 
B Cat. 16.4).85  Sallust surmised that if the affair was successful and its 
supporters gained power in Rome then magna clades atque calamitas rem 
publicam oppressisset “great bloodshed and disaster would have fallen upon 
the state” (39.4).  Instead, Cicero used the verb opprimere more often to 
describe his own suppression of the affair.86  Sallust also used the verb perdere 
when recounting Catiline’s rebuttal of Cicero’s accusations in the First Oration.  
Sallust claimed Catiline answered that due to his patrician status he would 
hardly benefit from perdita re publica ‘having ruined the Republic’ (31.7).  The 
supine of the verb perdere with the verb ire (‘to go’) appears twice in the Catilina 
to express that the affair’s purpose to bring ruin on the res publica would bring 
ruin on those involved with such a plan (36.4) and would bonos omnis perditum 
                                            
81 Cf. Cic. Sull. 14, 45. 
82 All of these verbs can carry the meaning of “to destroy.” Cf. TLL s.v. deleo 433.81-2; TLL s.v. 
opprimo 784.52-786.19. 
83 All of these nouns can convey “destruction.” TLL s.v. exitium 1528.17-20. 
84 NB: Before Sallust named the other leading members of the affair who were purportedly 
involved with the affair (Sall. B Cat. 17.3-7), he mentions the support from the youth (14.5-7; 
16.1-2), the reprobates in the city (14.1-4) and the Sullan veterans (16.4). 
85 NB: Sallust also used the verbs perturbare and conturbare to convey the attempts to “disturb” 
the Republic. Cf. Sall. B Cat. 18.4: ad perturbandam rem publicam; 37.10: conturbari rem 
publicam. 
86 For opprimere in reference to Cicero’s suppression of the affair, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.32, 2.4, 26, 
3.27, 4.6.  NB: Cicero used the verb to allude to the “destruction” of the patria only once (1.18).  
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eant “bring ruin upon all good men” (52.12).87  In contrast, Cicero most often 
used the term perditus as a noun or adjective to portray the ‘ruined’ character of 
the affair’s participants.88  Cicero used variations on the phrase civium 
perditorum or perditorum hominum throughout his speeches to explain the type 
of men attracted to support this criminal and desperate plan to overthrow the 
government.89 
Cicero used a more varied terminology than Sallust to refer to the 
participants’ goal to gain power in Rome.  Cicero used the verbs delere, 
exstinguere or vastare, to describe the affair’s attempts to bring “destruction” to 
the res publica.  In addition, he used the nouns exitium, occasus, interitus, or 
pernicies, to define the “destruction” that was planned.  This terminology 
primarily occurs in hyperbolic passages to exaggerate the unique and 
outrageous criminality of the activities and plans that were simultaneously 
occurring inside and outside of Rome in 63.  In the Orations, Cicero often used 
variations of the phrase perniciem rei publicae to explicitly describe the affair’s 
ultimate plan for the “destruction” of the res publica.90  He also used the other 
terms of “destruction” listed above in apposition with res publica to explicitly 
identify the affair’s eventual target.  In the Third Oration, Cicero claimed that the 
affair of 63 was unique and different from several other attempts in Rome’s 
recent history by Roman citizens to gain power in the city.  He explained that 
the affair of 63 was different because exitium rei publicae quesivit “[it] sought 
the destruction of the Republic.”  Furthermore, he contended that the other 
attempts to gain power in Rome non ad delendam, sed ad commutandam rem 
publicam pertinerent “Were not concerned with destroying the Republic but with 
changing it” (Cic. Cat. 3.25).  In addition, the gerundive phrase delendae rei 
publicae referring to the affair’s ultimate goal is found in the Fourth Oration.  
When distinguishing the crime and subsequent execution of M. Fulvius Flaccus 
for supporting C. Sempronius Gracchus in 121 from the crime and capital 
                                            
87 On supines, see H-B, 333-4. 
88 NB: Cicero used the perfect passive participle of perdere only once, but not in reference to 
the ‘ruin’ that the affair planned.  Instead, Cicero exclusively used perdere or its cognates in 
reference to the affair’s participants (Cic. Cat. 4.22). 
89 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.13, 23, 27, 2.8, 11, 12, 3.15, 4.5, 22; Sul. 1, 33(bis), 66, 75.  
90 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.5, 8, 4.2, 22.  Variations on the expression perniciem rei publicae in Cicero’s 
Orations include perniciem populi Romani: 4.10(bis); in patria civiumque pernicie: 4.12; 
perniciem civitatis: 2.11; pernicies moenibus: 2.1.  NB: Alternatively, Cicero used the noun 
pernicies to describe the literal or figurative “destruction” of the affair’s participants, cf. 1.24, 33.  
Similar to perditorum civium, Cicero used the adjective perniciosus to qualify the character of 
the cives in the affair, cf. 1.3, 12, 28. 
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sentence of those supporting the affair of 63, Cicero rhetorically asked quorum 
quod simile factum, quod initum delendae rei publicae consilium? “What 
[similar] deed had those men done, what plan to destroy the Republic had they 
made?” (4.13).91  Similar terminology to describe the affair’s plan to “destroy” 
the res publica occurs in all of Cicero’s speeches concerning the affair of 63, 
and he used other metaphors for the res publica to further emphasize the extent 
of the criminal intent to “destroy” Rome and the Roman people. 
In the First Oration, Cicero used the terms vastare, exitium, or interitus to 
describe the plan to overthrow the government.  Cicero used the phrases tota 
Italia (‘all of Italy’) and orbis terrae (‘the whole world’) to accentuate the extent of 
the “destruction” that was planned.92  Cicero used the verbs delere or 
exstinguere to describe the affair’s attempt “to destroy” the nomen populi 
Romani (‘name of the Roman people’) or Rome’s imperium (‘dominion’).93  In 
the Fourth Oration, Cicero claimed that the affair’s participants were men qui 
delere imperium, qui populi Romani nomen extinguere “Who have tried to 
destroy the empire and erase the name of the Roman people” (Cic. Cat. 4.7).  
The same sentiment is expressed in the Pro Murena and the Pro Sulla.  In the 
former speech delivered after the Second Oration, Cicero claims the 
participants’ plans were urbis delendae, civium trucidandorum, nominis Romani 
exstinguendi “To destroy the city, slaughter the citizens and obliterate the name 
of Rome” (Mur. 80).94  In the latter speech delivered in 62, Cicero recalled that 
the affair’s plans were exstinguendi imperi, delendae civitatis “To annihilate our 
empire, to destroy the State” (Sull. 3).  This terminology was used by Cicero to 
rhetorically stress the danger of the affair’s ultimate criminal aim.  However, 
Cicero and Sallust are not explicit whether the “crime” was part of the coniuratio 
or vice versa. 
                                            
91 NB: MacDonald (1977, 151) inserts the phrase “…as terrible as the plot of these 
conspirators?” extraneously. 
92 For orbis terrae: cf. Cic. Cat. 1.3: Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendiis vastare 
cupientem nos consules perferemus? “Shall we, the consuls, then tolerate Catiline whose aim it 
is to carry fire and the sword throughout the whole world?”; 1.9: qui de nostro omnium interitu, 
qui de huius urbis atque adeo de orbis terrarum exitio cogitent! “There are men whose plans 
extend beyond the death of us all and the destruction of this city to that of the whole world.”  For 
tota Italia: 1.12: templa deorum inmortalium, tecta urbis, vitam omnium civium, Italiam denique 
totam ad exitium et vastitatem vocas. “You are hailing to their destruction and devastation the 
temples of the immortal gods, the buildings of this city, the lives of all the citizens and the whole 
of Italy.”  NB:  In the Orations, the phrase tota Italia appears more often with the verb vastare in 
reference to the “devastation”, which the affair’s plan to wage bellum would bring, cf. 1.29, 4.2, 
4.13.  See Chapter 4.1.   
93 OLD (imperium) s.v. 5-6. 
94 For the approximate date of the Pro Murena, see Chapter 2 n.1. 
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Sallust insisted that the Sullan veterans and the plebeians who 
supported the affair were desirous of res novae, suggesting that they were not 
content with those in charge of the government in 63 or the res publica itself.  
However, it would be misleading to use the modern word “revolution” to define 
res novae and the affair’s primary goal to gain power in Rome, which was more 
frequently described as a plan to “destroy” the res publica.95  Furthermore, as I 
demonstrate in Chapters 2 and 3, the groups purportedly supporting the affair 
were from every class and had heterogeneous motives to join the affair and 
different expectations.  This section demonstrated that Cicero and Sallust used 
various terms and expressions to interpret the affair, its plans, and those 
supporting it as a criminal venture planned by criminals.  The criminal 
terminology either explicitly corresponded with the term coniuratio or sometimes 
occurred alone to simply interpret certain activities of the affair as a “crime” or to 
identify someone involved with the affair as a “criminal.”  The indignation in the 
pertinent passages referring to the goal of overthrowing the current regime in 
Rome, in Cicero’s speeches reviewed in the section above, is palpable and the 
rhetoric Cicero employs is clear – the criminals who planned to gain power in 
Rome were depraved enough to willingly and utterly shake the foundations of 
the res publica in the attempt.  Therefore, Cicero implied that the attempt to 
“destroy” the res publica was an immoral act.   
 
1.3  The immoral aspects 
 Cicero and Sallust used other specific terminology to stress the immoral 
character of the affair’s participants as well as its sacrilegious aspects.96  The 
pertinent passages from their works that included the terms improbus, nefarius, 
impius, malum, and parricida are examined in this section.  Cicero and Sallust 
used this terminology to emphasize both the immorality of the affair and its 
participants.  First, this section examines how the terms were used to describe 
the immorally depraved character of everyone who joined or supported the 
affair.  Second, I review the same terms that were used to stress the immoral 
aspect of the affair itself.  Finally, I introduce the specific language Cicero and 
Sallust used to present the affair’s alleged plans to set fire to Rome, the mutual 
                                            
95 See also Chapter 4.7. 
96 Regarding the inclusion of women to stress the immorality of the affair in Sallust’s Catilina, 
see Pagan 2004, 35-36 and 44-5.  On the decline of morals in the Catilina, see Chapter 4 nn. 
47, 98, 113. 
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oaths sworn between the affair’s participants, and the oaths given to the 
Allobrogean envoys, as sacrilegious acts.   
Cicero, in certain cases, used the term improbus (‘morally unprincipled’) 
as a noun or an adjective sometimes paired with the term perditus, which can 
also convey a sense of immorality, in reference to the types of persons who 
were involved with the affair.97  In the First Oration, Cicero portrayed Catiline as 
tam improbus, tam perditus (Cic. Cat. 1.5).98  Cicero indicated the immoral 
character of the others joining Catiline in the affair professing nactus es ex 
perditis atque ab omni non modo fortuna, verum etiam spe derelictis conflatam 
improborum manum “You have got a band of evil men, swept together from the 
refuse of society and from those who have been abandoned by all fortune and 
hope” (1.25).  In the Fourth Oration, Cicero affirmed his opinion that those who 
committed these crimes were immoral citizens, improborum civium (4.15).99  
Subsequently, the term improbus occurs most often in the Pro Sulla when 
Cicero reflected on the immoral citizens who were condemned for their 
involvement with the affair.  He consistently remarked that Catiline, P. Autronius 
Paetus (the deposed consul-designate of 65 who had been convicted of 
supporting the affair)100, and the other participants in the affair were all 
improbi.101 
As discussed in Section 1.2 above, Cicero often used the term nefarius 
to accentuate the wickedness of the affair’s criminality in conjunction with the 
terms facinus and scelus.102  In addition, he used nefarius to express the 
immoral qualities of those involved with the affair.  Cicero twice called Catiline a 
nefarius gladiator (‘wicked gladiator’) and twice referred to the others involved 
with the affair as nefarii homines (‘wicked men’).103  Cicero also used the term 
impius in a similar manner to describe the affair’s participants.  In the First 
Oration, Cicero claimed that when Catiline arrived in the army’s camp in 
                                            
97 OLD (improbus) s.v. 2; (perditus) s.v. 4: “Morally depraved”.  The term improbus can be 
synonymous with the terms malus and nefarius, see TLL s.v. improbus 693.31. 
98 In the Pro Murena, Cicero used improbus alone to describe Catiline’s character (Cic. Mur. 
17). 
99 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.21: nefariis civibus. 
100 See Appendix I [no. 3]. 
101 For Catiline as an improbus: cf. Cic. Sull. 81(bis); for Autronius: cf. 66, 71; for the rest of the 
participants as improbi: cf. 1, 20, 28(bis), 29, 30, 79, 92.  
102 See n.53. 
103 Regarding Catiline: cf. Cic. Cat. 2.7; Mur. 50.  Regarding the others: cf. Cat. 4.8; Mur. 83.  In 
addition to nefarii homines, Cicero referred to the participants as nefarii cives (Cat. 3.21) and 
once described their ‘wicked minds’ (Dom. 92: nefariis mentibus). 
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Faesuale he would be amongst other impii (Cic. Cat. 1.23).104  In the Pro Sulla, 
Cicero portrayed the praetor Lentulus’ supposed belief in a prophecy, which 
predicted that he would gain power in Rome in 63, as a perversam atque 
impiam religionem “Perverted and godless superstition” (Sull. 70).105  Evidently, 
Cicero’s works consistently declared that all of the affair’s participants shared 
an immoral character trait, which seemingly was necessary for anyone to 
consider joining this type of affair. 
In Caesar’s speech reproduced in the Catilina, Sallust wrote that Caesar 
remarked that the affair’s participants were impii homines (Sall. B Cat. 51.15).  
However, when Sallust described the type of people willing to support such an 
affair, he most often used the term malum (‘evil’).  When describing Catiline, 
Sallust depicted him as inherently “evil.”106  According to Sallust, Catiline was 
able to find support from the young Roman nobles that were attracted to the 
same type of vices or mala as Catiline.107  In addition, Sallust used the term 
malum generally to identify others who were attracted to the affair.108  He 
remarked that the plebes, who he claimed were supporting the affair, malos 
extollunt “exalt the base” (37.3).109  These assorted criminals inside of Rome 
that were attracted to the affair, according to Sallust, included those who had 
been convicted of parracida and sacrilegium (14.3).110  Cicero also referred to 
these various criminals as parricidae (Cic. Cat. 2.22).  Furthermore, he used the 
term parricida in reference again to Catiline and the others involved.  Cicero 
claimed Catiline was a parricida civium (1.29) and the others involved were 
those qui se tecum omni scelere parricidioque iunxerunt “Who have joined you 
in every crime and act of treason” (1.33).111  Both authors used the terms 
improbus, nefarius, impius, malum and parricida not only to describe the 
                                            
104 Catiline would be at home among these men because he had ‘an impious hand’ (Cic. Cat. 
1.24: impiam dexteram).  Dyck 2008, 110. 
105 See Chapter 2.4.5. 
106 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 5.1, 16.3. NB: Sallust remarked that Cicero did not accuse Crassus of 
supporting the affair to stop him from suscepto malorum “taking up the cause of the wicked” 
(48.8).  Cn. Calpurnius Piso was also malum (18.4). 
107 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 13.5, 16.1. 
108 NB: Sallust used the term malum to convey the participants’ “misfortunate” situation, alluding 
to their massive debt, cf. Sall. B Cat. 21.1, 40.2, 48.8, 52.15.  More often Sallust used the 
adjective miser or its cognates to describe the participants’ dire financial condition.  See further 
Chapter 3.2. 
109 Sallust claimed the plebes urbana withdrew their support when the affair’s plan to burn 
Rome was divulged (Sall. B Cat. 48.1-2). 
110 OLD (parricida) s.v. 1: “murderer of a near relation” and 3b: “a traitor”. 
111 For Catiline as a parricida: Cic. Cat. 2.7.  For C. Cornelius: Sull. 19.  For the others who were 
involved: cf. Sull. 76, 77. 
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immoral character of the affair’s participants, but also to refer to the affair 
itself.112  
When Cicero discovered that Rome was facing a threat from both inside 
and outside of the city, Sallust referred to the threat of the affair as a malum 
(Sall. B Cat. 29.1).113  Cicero also described the affair using the same term to 
stress its “evilness.”  In the Fourth Oration, Cicero explained that ego magnum 
in re publica versari furorem et nova quaedam misceri et concitari mala iam 
pridem videbam “It had long been observed by me that a dangerous madness 
was abroad and that evils yet unknown were seething and welling up in the 
Republic.”  He referred to the affair later in the same passage, simply calling it 
hoc malum “this evil” (Cic. Cat. 4.6).  According to Cicero, all the classes of 
people in Rome agreed that Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, Statilius, and 
Caeparius should be sentenced to death. Cicero promised that if the res publica 
were able to maintain this concordium (‘harmony’) between all of the classes in 
Rome, then he would be able to prevent malum civile ac domesticum ad ullam 
rei publicae partem esse venturum ‘any future civil and domestic evils from 
occurring against the res publica’ (4.15).114  The adjective nefarius or the 
analogous adjective nefandus also carry a sacrilegious meaning due to the 
terms’ derivation from nefas (‘an offense against divine law’).115  Cicero referred 
to the affair’s intention to gain power in Rome through various hostile and 
violent means as a crime tam immani ac nefando ‘so savage and sacrilegious’ 
(4.13).  Sallust also described the affair as a nefarium consilium ‘sacrilegious 
plan’ (Sall. B Cat. 52.36).  Cicero clarified the sacrilege of the affair in the Pro 
Sulla, declaring that the accusation that his client P. Cornelius Sulla was 
supporting the affair of 63 was akin to obstrictum esse patriae parricidio ‘Being 
accused of parricide against your country’ (Cic. Sull. 6).116    
As shown above, both authors used this specific terminology to 
emphasize the immoral aspect of the affair and its participants.  The affair’s plan 
to set fires to Rome, which, according to our sources, was intended to cause 
confusion and panic in order to create the perfect situation for those involved 
with the affair inside of Rome to murder Cicero and other leading citizens and 
                                            
112 Wirszubski (1951) examines the terminology of Cicero’s works in reference to antisocial 
character traits. 
113 See n.15. 
114 See Eagle 1949.  See also Addendum Section 1. 
115 OLD (nefas) s.v. 1-2. See Dyck 2008, 78. 
116 For the full text of this passage, see p. 38. 
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for Catiline and Manlius’ army to attack the city.117  Cicero presents the plan to 
burn Rome not only as a crime, but also a sacrilege.  If Rome was set on fire, 
consequently the templa deorum in the city were also targets.  When Cicero 
described the “destruction” of the res publica examined in the previous section, 
he frequently included the burning of Rome along with its tecta (‘roofs’) and 
templa in the same passages.118  According to Cicero, only people with no 
moral scruples would think of such a sacrilegious and dangerous plan as setting 
parts of the city on fire.  Cicero summed up the intended victims of the affair’s 
plans in the conclusio of the Fourth Oration delivered in the Senate on 
December 5.  He implored: 
quapropter de summa salute vestra populique Romani, de vestris coniugibus ac liberis, 
de aris ac focis, de fanis atque templis de totius urbis tectis ac sedibus, de imperio ac 
libertate, de salute Italiae, de universa re publica decernite diligenter, ut instituistis, ac 
fortiter. 
“With the care, therefore, and the courage that you have displayed in the beginning, 
take your decision upon the salvation of yourselves and of the Roman people, upon 
your wives and children, your altars and hearths, your shrines and temples, the 
buildings and homes of the entire city, your dominion and your freedom, the safety of 
Italy and upon the whole Republic.” (Cic. Cat. 4.24). 
The passage suggests that if the Senate were to sentence Lentulus and the 
four other men who had confessed to be supporting the affair to death, then the 
others who continued with the plans might withdraw their support.  However, 
Catiline and Manlius’ army in Etruria was not yet defeated, other influential 
citizens in Rome remained at large, and many supporters still remained 
unknown.119 
Cicero once referred to the affair as an impia coniuratio, specifically 
suggesting that a coniuratio could be considered an impious act (Cic. Cat. 
4.18).  According to the definition of the verb coniurare cited in the introduction 
to this chapter, those who conspired had taken a mutual oath.  The verb is 
derived from the verb iurare (‘to swear’), therefore the literal meaning of 
coniurare is “to swear together.”  In the Third Oration, Cicero explained that an 
ius iurandum (‘an oath’) had been taken between Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius 
                                            
117 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 43.1-2; Plut. Cic. 18.1; App. B Civ. 2.3; Dio Cass. 37.34.1.  See further 
Chapter 2.1. 
118 Cicero used the terms urbs, tecta, and templa in reference to what would be burned in the 
same sentence, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.12, 33, 2.29, 3.2, 3.22(bis), 4.2, 18, 22; Sull. 19, 33, 86. 
119 NB: Sallust claimed Lentulus and the others’ execution led to some instances of desertion in 
Catiline and Manlius’ army (Sall. B Cat. 57.1).  L. Cassius Longinus, Q. Annius Chilo, P. 
Umbrenus, and P. Furius, who were named by T. Volturicus and the Allobroges as participants 
in the affair, remained at large and were sentenced to death in absentia (50.4).  Others are 
named in the Pro Sulla, see n.64.  For the disturbances continuing outside of Rome, see 
Chapter 3.4.  
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and Statilius and the Allobrogean envoys pledging their mutual support for the 
affair (3.9).120  Although Cicero did not use any explicit immoral terminology in 
reference to the ius iurandum, he implied that a sacred oath taken between 
Romans and Gauls to assist in a violent and subversive plan to gain power in 
Rome was sacrilegious.  When Sallust recounted the oath that was taken 
between the participants of the affair, he used specific religious terminology to 
stress the solemn ritual that an oath entailed.  He recorded a rumor that those 
involved with the affair of 63 confirmed the ius iurandum by drinking humani 
corporis sanguinem vino permixtum “Human blood mixed with wine” (Sall. B 
Cat. 22.1).121  The term execratio (‘an imprecation’) occurred in the passage to 
describe the solemnity of the oath indicating that those who broke the oath 
would be “cursed.”122  In addition, Sallust compared the act to the normal 
sollemna sacra (‘ceremonial rites’), which he explained were customary before 
a religious activity (Sall. B Cat. 22.2).123  The religious terminology Sallust used 
reporting this rumor clearly emphasized the sacrilegious perception of the affair.  
Therefore, it follows that the affair itself was not only immoral because its 
participants planned in secrecy to commit crimes to ultimately overthrow the 
current rule in Rome, but also sacrilegious because planning to attack the res 
publica was by extension a plan to attack Roman religion. 
 
1.4  The plurality of the affair 
As the concise summary of the affair in the introduction to this chapter 
indicates, many Roman citizens participated in the affair.  Our sources furnish 
over forty names of male and female Roman citizens who were either killed, 
executed, formally, or informally accused.  These participants or possible 
participants of the affair are individually listed in Appendix I.  According to the 
definitions cited in the introduction to this chapter, the term coniuratio or its 
cognates inherently indicate plurality.  Cicero often uses the concrete noun 
coniuratus to refer to the affair’s participants invariably in its plural form, 
coniurati.  However, when Cicero uses the verb coniurare in reference to the 
participants’ actions, it unexpectedly occurs in the singular. 
                                            
120 For ius iurandum, see OLD (ius2) s.v. 5: “an oath”. 
121 Dio Cassius also recorded a version of the “blood oath” (Dio Cass. 37.30.3). 
122 OLD (execratio) s.v. 2. 
123 OLD (sollemne) s.v. 1-2. On Sallust’s use of the terms execratio and sollemne, cf. Vretska 
1976, 333-4; McGushin 1977, 153. 
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Sallust, on the other hand, preferred to use the term coniuratio to refer 
metonymically to “a band of conspirators” instead of using the term coniurati in 
the Catilina.  In contrast to Cicero, Sallust invariably used the verb coniurare 
either in the plural or with a plural noun to indicate that a group of people was 
“conspiring.”  Both Cicero and Sallust use the term multitudo and grex (‘a 
crowd’) to refer to the great number of supporters.124  Cicero also used the term 
numerus (‘number’) either with a qualifying adjective to indicate the large 
number of supporters or in a context that alluded to the increasing numbers of 
people the affair attracted.  Finally, in a similar manner, Sallust used the term 
manus (‘a band of soldiers’) with an adjective to express its size.125 
The plural noun coniurati occurs eighteen times to refer to the affair’s 
participants in Cicero’s works.126  Cicero used the term coniurati either in 
reference to the affair’s participants in general or to specifically refer to those 
who had remained in Rome after Catiline left the city.127  Sallust only used the 
concrete noun coniuratus once, but the phrase de omnibus coniuratis still 
suggests that there was more than one “conspirator” (Sall. B Cat. 52.17).  He 
similarly used the term coniuratio, usually in conjunction with a plural noun as a 
metonym for “a band of conspirators” without using the substantive coniurati.  
When reporting Catiline’s failure as a consular candidate in 64, Sallust 
remarked that quod factum primo popularis coniurationis concusserat “This at 
first filled the conspirators with consternation” (24.1).128  The context is clear 
that the term coniuratio was used as a metonym for the “conspirators.”  
Furthermore, the substantive popularis (‘accomplice’) in this instance suggests 
that the members in the coniuratio were concerned about Catiline’s failure to be 
elected consul, not the “conspiracy” itself.129 
                                            
124 OLD (grex) s.v. 2-3. 
125 OLD (manus) s.v. 8 and 22. 
126 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.12, 3.3, 21, 4.20; Mur. 52, 87; Sull. 30, 31(bis), 83, 88; Flac. 94, 102; Red. 
sen. 26; Sest. 42; Pis. 5, 15, 16. 
127 The term coniurati is used eleven out of eighteen times in reference to the “conspirators” 
both inside and outside of Rome, cf. Cic. Cat. 4.20; Mur. 52, 87; Sull. 30, 31, 83, 88; Flac. 94; 
Sest. 42; Pis. 5, 15.  Cicero sometimes used the expression reliqua coniuratorum to refer to 
those remaining in Rome, see Chapter 2.3. 
128 Sallust antedates the beginning of the affair to before the consular elections of 64, not after 
Catiline’s subsequent loss in the consular elections of 63.  On the antedating in Sallust’s 
Catilina, cf. Syme 1964, 79-81; McGushin 1977, 296-7; Ramsey 1984, 15-9; Pagan 2004, 20-3 
and 89-90. 
129 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 22.1; 52.14.  OLD (popularis2) s.v. 1b.  Ramsey (1984, 129) explains that in 
the Catilina Sallust used popularis as a substantive and not to refer to political preference.  Cf. 
Smith 1968, 192; McGushin 1977, 152.  
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All of the instances of the verb coniurare in reference to the affair of 63 in 
Cicero’s works occur in the Pro Sulla.  The verb was used five times in the 
singular in reference to the actions of the affair.130  The verb most likely occurs 
in the singular because Cicero was defending only one person, his client P. 
Sulla, from the accusation that he was “conspiring” in 63.  However, twice the 
singular verb was used in relation to a group of people.  The first instance refers 
to the inhabitants of the town Pompeii.  The prosecution accused P. Sulla with 
attempting to incite the town to join the affair of 63.  Cicero refuted the charge 
by countering that P. Sulla’s influence on Pompeii prevented any dissension in 
the town.  He rhetorically asked the prosecution an tibi Popmpeiani coniurasse 
videntur? “Do you think that they did join the conspiracy?” (Cic. Sull. 60).  In this 
case, the singular coniurasse referred to the action by a group of people.  The 
second instance occurs when Cicero professed that he had no time to name all 
of the affair’s participants, indicating that the list would take too long.  Therefore, 
he asked the jury in the trial ut taciti de omnibus quos coniurasse cognitum est 
cogitetis “to recollect in silence all those known to have been in the conspiracy” 
(71).  Clearly the occurrence of the term omnes in this case suggested a 
plurality of participants.  On the other hand, the verb coniurare appears in the 
plural twice in Sallust’s Catilina.  Furthermore, Sallust used a plural noun to 
precisely qualify that more than one person was “conspiring.”  When referring to 
Lentulus and the others remaining in Rome, Sallust remarked that coniuravere 
nobillissumi cives “citizens of the highest rank have conspired” (Sall. B Cat. 
52.24).131 
The plural aspect of the affair is also indicated by the usage of terms 
multitudo and grex.  Both authors used these nouns to refer to the number of 
the participants, sometimes with the adjective tantum to emphasize their size.  
In the Third Oration, Cicero remarked that coniuratione tantaque hac multitudine 
domesticorum hostium “The coniuratio was so widespread and the number of 
traitors so great” (Cic. Cat. 3.15).  He reiterated the same sentiment in the 
Fourth Oration, using the term multitudo to acknowledge the large numbers of 
people still supporting the affair (4.20).  Sallust used the term multitudo three 
times in the Catilina to indicate the plurality of participants.  When recounting 
                                            
130 Cf. Cic. Sull. 60, 70, 71, 85(bis). 
131 Sallust referred to the affair of 66/65 using the plural of coniurare in conjunction with the 
plural noun pauci to indicate that a “few” more than one person was involved in this event as 
well (Sall. B Cat. 18.1).  
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the Senate’s offer to reward those who had information about the affair, Sallust 
claimed ex tanta multidine neque praemio inductus coniurationem patefecerat 
“Not one man of all that great number was led by the promised reward to betray 
the coniuratio” (Sall. B Cat. 36.5).  Sallust used the term coniuratio once again 
in conjunction with the term multitudo, indicating that the former term easily 
corresponded with the latter in that both terms were intrinsically plural (43.1).132  
In addition, when recounting the attempt by Lentulus and Cethegus’ clients to 
rescue them from custody on December 3 and 4, Sallust used the term 
multitudo to refer to these men in general (52.14) and the term grex once to 
describe the “crew” specifically of Cethegus’ slaves and freedmen (50.2).  
Cicero also used the term grex once in the Second Oration to describe the 
members of the affair that he hoped would leave the city with Catiline.  Cicero 
called them desperatorum hominum flagitiosi greges “The criminal bands of 
desperate men” (Cic. Cat. 2.10). 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Cicero used the term 
numerus in reference to the amount of people supporting the affair.133  The term 
occurs twice in the First Oration.  The first instance of numerus described the 
numbers of people who were joining Manlius and his army in Etruria, which 
Cicero claimed crescit in dies “were increasing daily” (1.5).  The second 
instance specifically referred to the many people who were also supporting 
Catiline (1.26).  In the Second Oration, Cicero commented on how quickly 
Catiline was able to gain ingentem numerum perditorum hominum  ‘a huge 
number of ruined men’ from both inside and outside the city (2.8).134  Cicero and 
Sallust also used the term manus to refer to the participants in the affair of 63.  
However, only Sallust used the term to refer to the large size of this manus and 
only once.135  When the Catilina recounted Statilius and Gabinius’ task to set 
fires in Rome, Sallust wrote that they would be helped cum magna manu ‘by a 
large band of followers’ (Sall. B Cat. 43.2).  
                                            
132 Sall. 43.1: multitudo coniurationis 
133 Cicero used the term numerus to describe the large amount of weapons that were seized 
from Cethegus’ home (Cic. Cat. 2.8). 
134 The phrase ex numero civium occurred in the Fourth Oration to indicate that a number of the 
supporters were citizens (Cic. Cat. 4.22).  However, in this case, the term numerus does not 
specifically express that this was a large group. 
135 For the term manus in reference to the armed forces outside of Rome, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.23, 
2.24, Sall. B Cat. 51.36.  In reference to those who remained in Rome after Catiline left the city, 
cf. Cic. Cat. 1.12, 3.3.  In reference to the affair’s participants in general, cf. Cic. Cat.. 1.25, 
4.20(bis); Sall. B Cat. 14.3. 
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Both Cicero and Sallust’s accounts of the affair clearly identified the 
plural aspect by using specific vocabulary that expressed the extensive reach of 
the affair or to describe the great number of people involved with or willing to 
support it.  Most often they used the plural term coniurati to describe the people 
involved with the affair and to indicate their plurality.  This description of the 
participants signifies that the affair they were participating in was a coniuratio 
and demonstrates that more than one person was always involved. 
 
1.5  Chapter conclusions 
 This chapter demonstrated that the term coniuratio was not the only term 
Cicero and Sallust used to interpret the affair.  Both authors used other specific 
terminology to describe the affair’s context and its participants.  At times, they 
chose to use a term to emphasize either the clandestine, criminal, immoral, or 
plural aspects of the affair’s context.  Therefore, we cannot yet make a precise 
conclusion regarding their interpretation.  However, we can conclude that the 
language Cicero and Sallust chose to identify the clandestine, criminal, immoral, 
or plural aspects of the affair certainly defined what we would today term a 
conspiratorial context.  Clearly, this was the reason they frequently chose to use 
the term coniuratio or its cognates in reference to the affair or its participants.  
However, Cicero and Sallust also used the term bellum (‘war’) to interpret the 
affair, which I examine in Chapter 4.  In addition, the term coniuratio was not 
always used to interpret a conspiratorial context.  Chapter 5 further examines 
the term coniuratio to provide a more comprehensive analysis of its meanings.  I 
primarily examine the other occurrences of coniuratio in Cicero and Sallust’s 
works that do not specifically refer to the affair of 63.  I also examine the usage 
of the term in De Bello Gallico by Cicero and Sallust’s contemporary Caesar to 
further understand what the term coniuratio meant to the Roman people and 
what context it typically described at the time of the affair of 63 in Chapter 5.  
Before I investigate further the terminology used to identify the affair, the 
following two chapters examines our sources’ presentation of the people 
involved with the disturbances that occurred both inside and outside of Rome. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The disturbance inside of Rome: Identifying the threat, examining the 
representation of the supporters, and reevaluating the influence of P. 
Cornelius Lentulus Sura 
 
 
This chapter focuses on those who were involved with the affair and 
stayed in Rome after Catiline left the city on November 9, the day after Cicero 
exposed the plans of the affair.  According to our sources, many of the 
influential participants of the affair remained in the city and intended to commit 
arson and murder.  I examine the representation of the seriousness of the threat 
facing Rome from those supporting the affair within the city in Part A section 
2.1.  The section begins with a discussion of Cicero’s Pro Murena, in which he 
argued that it was paramount that two consuls were in office in January of 62 
because he believed the affair would not be suppressed before his year as 
consul came to a close.  The Pro Murena emphasizes the remaining threat in 
the city despite Catiline’s absence.  Section 2.1 concludes with an examination 
of the intended plans of those remaining in Rome, specifically the intended 
murder of Cicero and other leading citizens as well as the plan to burn parts of 
the city.  I examine to whom our sources assigned these tasks, and discuss the 
discrepancies regarding the names of the participants to demonstrate the 
complexity of the affair.  The violent and criminal intentions of those involved 
with the disturbances in Rome further demonstrate the seriousness of the threat 
remaining in the city. 
Section 2.2 continues to discuss our sources’ perception of those 
remaining in Rome willing to support the affair.  I examine Cicero and Sallust’s 
categorization of the various groups of people from diverse social classes.  
They asserted that these groups were attracted to the affair because of one 
overriding factor – extreme debt.  Therefore, I briefly review some recent 
studies on the seemingly perpetual debt crisis in the Late Republic.  I argue that 
this single explanation for why these heterogeneous groups joined the affair is 
unsatisfactory.  Then section 2.3 discuses the representation of the nine men 
who were arrested on December 3 and who confessed to supporting the affair.  
The terminology our sources used to represent these nine men, or to use 
Cicero’s phrase, the reliqua coniuratorum manus, further demonstrates the 
significant influence of the actions occurring inside the city.  These men were 
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depicted as the socii (‘allies’) of Catiline while he was in Rome, but after he left 
the city they were depicted as duces (‘leaders’). 
Our sources’ representation of P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, a praetor in 
63 and one of the reliqua coniuratorum manus who confessed to participating 
with the affair, is examined in Part B of this chapter in section 2.4 and its 
subsections.  The predominance and emphatic positioning of Lentulus’ name in 
our sources suggests that his role in the affair was foremost compared to the 
other reliqua coniuratorum manus that were named.  I also briefly examine the 
record of the accusations against the other influential leaders remaining in 
Rome, namely C. Antonius, Cicero’s consular colleague, and the future 
triumvirs Crassus and Caesar.  However, I show that our sources continue to 
represent Lentulus as the most influential leader of the participants who 
remained in Rome and our sources’ emphasis regarding the criminality of his 
actions.  Moreover, some of our sources suggest that the plan to solicit the 
Allobrogean envoys was instigated by Lentulus. 
Lentulus was consul in 71, but was expelled from the Senate by the 
censors the following year.  However, Lentulus was soon able to rehabilitate his 
career and win the praetorship for a second time in 64.  Subsection 2.4.1 
reviews Lentulus’ checkered political career and the influence of the Cornelii 
Lentuli to prove that he was the leader of the disturbances in Rome, in part, due 
to his status.  The subsection 2.4.2 explores the evidence that Cicero obtained, 
which compelled Lentulus to confess to supporting the affair including his 
solicitation of the Allobrogean envoys.  Then I examine Cicero and Sallust’s 
accounts of the letter Lentulus gave T. Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys 
intended for Catiline in subsection 2.4.3.  In the letter, Lentulus urged Catiline to 
increase the numbers in the army in Etruria by enlisting slaves.  Lentulus’ 
request of Catiline in the letter suggests that Lentulus’ influence on the affair 
can be reevaluated.  In order to further demonstrate this reevaluation, I also 
examine other letters of “asking” between those of equal status for comparison.  
Subsection 2.3.4 examines the mandata (‘instructions’) that Lentulus also 
wanted Volturcius to deliver to Catiline verbally.  The mandata reiterated 
Lentulus’ written request of Catiline to use slaves in the army, but the former 
message also included instructions to march on Rome as soon as possible.  
The language of Lentulus’ letter and mandata suggests that his influence on the 
affair of 63 was, at the very least, equal to that of Catiline. 
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I offer an esoteric reason why Lentulus perhaps continued to support the 
affair a month after its initial exposure and after he had just rehabilitated his 
political career in section 2.4.5.  Most of our accounts of the affair record a 
prophecy that supposedly stated that Lentulus would “rule” Rome specifically in 
the year 63.  I examine the prophecy first by evaluating its significance in 
regards to Roman religion.  I proceed to examine the prophecy’s specific 
timeline as well as the political and religious implications of its prediction 
regarding Lentulus’ future.  Lentulus’ letter, mandata, and his apparent belief in 
the prophecy of 63 challenge our sources’ assertion that the affair’s participants, 
who remained in Rome, were subordinate to Catiline. 
 
Part A 
2.1  The threat remaining in Rome 
After Catiline left Rome on the night of November 8 and before the arrest 
of some of the affair’s participants remaining in Rome on December 3, Cicero 
defended the consul-designate L. Licinius Murena, who was accused of 
electoral bribery.1  Cicero emphasized his concern regarding the extent of the 
affair’s threat to the Rome throughout the Pro Murena.  If Murena were found 
guilty of ambitus, he would be stripped of the office.  Perhaps Ser. Sulpicius 
Rufus, who was one of Murena’s prosecutors and whom Murena and D. Junius 
Silanus recently defeated in the consular elections for 62, thought that he would 
win the consulship in a reelection if Murena were convicted.2  Traditionally when 
Rome was under threat of an attack, one consul was sent out to confront the 
enemy while the other stayed in Rome.3  Cicero attempted to convince the jury 
that the succession of two new consuls in Rome on January 1, 62 was 
paramount to ensure that the participants in the affair of 63 did not continue to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 On the date of the Pro Murena, cf. Settle 1962, 147; MacDonald 1969, ix and 1977, 183; 
TLRR 1990, no. 224; Marinone 2004, 87.  The Pro Murena was not specifically listed as part of 
Cicero’s corpus of orationes consularis that he sent to Atticus (Cic. Att. 2.1.3).  It was a forensic 
speech, so it was most likely published soon after its delivery, cf. Settle 1962, 147-54. 
2 Cicero remarked this was Sulpicius’s motive to prosecute Murena (Cic. Mur. 82).  It was not 
uncommon for the defeated consular candidates to prosecute those who won the election, see 
Alexander 2002, 121.  In 66, the consul-designates P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus 
were convicted de ambitu and stripped of the office (Sull. 1, 15, 66).  The successful 
prosecutors L. Manlius Torquatus and L. Aurelius Cotta, who had lost the first consular election 
to P. Sulla and Autronius, replaced them as consuls in the reelection later that year (49).  On 
the charge of electoral bribery, cf. Lintott 1990; Yakobson 1992; Riggsby 1999, 21-49. 
3 Only in times of extreme peril were both consuls sent to war.  Sometimes one of the two 
consuls would return to Rome to preside over the elections while Rome was at war, cf. Liv. 
37.50.6-7 contra 27.4.1-4. See also Pina Polo 2011, 199-203.  
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threaten the stability of the res publica the following year.4  Although it was 
ironic that Murena was charged under Cicero’s own law de ambitu passed in 
635, Cicero explained he was defending Murena because as consul he was 
obligated ad communem salutem defendendam “to defend the safety of all her 
citizens” (Cic. Mur. 5).6 
Cicero emphasized Murena’s extensive military experience in the Pro 
Murena.7  He claimed Murena’s experience as a soldier would be necessary if 
Catiline and Manlius’ forces in Etruria were not defeated before the end of the 
year, not to mention the other regions in Italy allegedly supporting the affair.8 
Cicero knew many others were involved with the affair and were still in the city 
(Cic. Mur. 84-85).  But in the Pro Murena, no one else was explicitly named 
except Catiline.9  When Murena was standing trial, Cicero was probably not yet 
aware of the participants’ attempt to solicit the Allobrogean envoys.  
Conversely, the participants remaining in Rome might not have approached the 
envoys of the Gallic tribe before Murena’s trial.  It remains uncertain when the 
Allobrogean envoys arrived in Rome, but Cicero did not mention the envoys 
when he initially disclosed the affair’s plans in the First Oration.10  The Gallic 
envoys are not mentioned until the Third Oration, which suggests that the 
participants remaining in Rome did not approach them until late November or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Cf. Cic. Mur. 4: ostendam alio loco quantum salutis communis intrsit duos consules in re 
publica Kalendis Ianuariis esse. “I shall show elsewhere how vital it is for the preservation of us 
all that there are two consuls in the Republic on the 1st of January.” 79: Magni interest, iudices, 
id quod ego multis repugnantibus egi atque perfeci, esse Kalendis Ianuariis in re publica duo 
consules. “It is vital, gentlemen, that there are two consuls in the State on the 1st of January and 
that is what in the face of strong opposition I have worked so hard to achieve.”  Also cf. Mur. 5, 
82, 85. 
5 Cf. Cic. Mur. 3, 71. On the lex Tullia de ambitu, cf. Greenridge 1901, 473-5; Kinsey 1965; 
MacDonald 1969, xxiv; Robinson 1995, 85-6; Alexander 2002, 123-4. 
6 Cf. Cic. Mur. 90.  On the reasons why Cicero defended Murena, see Mur. 3-10. Cf. Kinsey 
1966, 273; MacDonald 1969, xxxvi-ix and 1976, 180-2.    
7 Murena served under his father in the Mithridatic war in 85/84 until his father’s recall by Sulla 
in 82 (Cic. Mur. 15, 32).  His father was awarded a triumph in 84, which Cicero claimed was 
amplissime atque honestissime “magnificent and thoroughly deserved” (15).  For his father’s 
career, see RE XIII (Licinius) no. 122, 444-6.  Murena later served in Asia under the command 
of L. Licinius Lucullus in 75/74 until he was replaced in 67 (20, 89).  On Murena’s career see, 
RE XIII (Licinius) no. 123, 446-9. 
8 Cicero compares the importance of a military career to a civil career (Cic. Mur. 22-30).  He 
conceded that the former was usually the more important profession in regards to the 
consulship, cf. 24, 29, 30, 83.  On the reported disturbances outside Rome, see Chapter 3.4. 
9 Most likely Cicero did not have any concrete evidence of anyone else’s participation at this 
time, so he avoided mentioning names except C. Manlius and M. Porcius Laeca. 
10 NB: Normally the Senate reserved the early months of the year to listen to foreign envoys, cf. 
Cic. Ver. 2.1.90; Fam. 1.4.1; Q. fr. 2.11.3.  The Allobrogean envoys were probably not in Rome 
in the beginning of 63 nor were they contacted before mid-November otherwise Cicero would 
have doubtlessly indicated this in the first two Orations or the Pro Murena.  NB: Not all foreign 
ambassadors were only received in the beginning of the year, see Pina Polo 2011, 261-4.  See 
also, n.190. 
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early December.  However, Cicero was aware that Murena’s brother Caius had 
been left as temporary governor of Transalpine Gaul, which Lucius governed 
from 65-63, when the latter came to Rome to stand for the consulship.11  
Certainly, the strategic location of this region, its stability, and the loyalty of its 
people were important if Catiline and Manlius’ army tried to retreat from Etruria 
towards Gaul.  Therefore, Cicero wanted to ensure the loyalty of the Licinii 
Murenae whose influence in the region might prevent any military support from 
the Transpadanes or perhaps from Gaul.12  Of course, Cicero’s Pro Murena is 
embued with rhetoric, which we would expect from such a competent orator and 
advocate defending his client.  However, he was not entirely misleading when 
he emphasized the importance of having Murena installed as consul in 62, as 
there is literary evidence that some of the regions targeted by the affair’s 
participants were in revolt and others continued in this state several years after 
63, regardless of the executions on December 5 and the eventual defeat of 
Catiline and Manlius’ army in Etruria in mid or late January 62.13 
Cicero alluded to the strategic reasons why Murena’s election as consul 
was imperative to convince the jury that the latter had the necessary military 
ability to defeat Catiline and Manlius’ army in the field.  Furthermore, Cicero 
continued to warn his audience that Rome, without two consuls, was not only 
vulnerable to the threat of the army amassing in northern Etruria, which is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 3, but also the threat that was gathering 
momentum within the city.  As Cicero did in the Second Oration, he frequently 
claimed that there were many remaining in the city supporting the affair 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Cf. Cic. Mur. 42, 68, 89. Sallust claimed C. Murena was a legatus in citeriore Gallia “Hither 
Gaul” probably referring to Cisalpine Gaul (Sall. B Cat. 38.3). NB: Allen (1953, 176) argues that 
L. Murena was governor of both Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul as the two provinces were not 
yet formally divided therefore C. Murena replaced him in these regions.  See also, Allen 1952.  
According to the RE, C. Licinius Murena replaced Lucius as governor of Transalpine Gaul, see 
RE XIII (Licinius) no. 119, 444.6-15.  On the other hand, the RE stated that Lucius was governor 
of Gallia Narbonesis at 446.6-8.  Clearly, until these province’s borders were demarcated during 
the Empire there is conflicting evidence.  
12 Murena also had support in Umbria another region those involved with the affair of 63 were 
attempting to solicit (Cic. Mur. 42).  See further, Chapter 3.4. 
13 For the evidence of the revolts continuing several years after 63, see Stewart 1995.  Orosius 
recorded that in 62, M. Bibulus and Cicero’s brother Quintus suppressed disturbances related to 
the affair of 63 in Bruttium and among the Paeligni respectively (Oros. 6.6.6-7).  Suetonius 
recorded that the revolt in Bruttium suppressed by Octavian’s father in 60 included remnants of 
supporters of Spartacus and Catiline (Suet. Aug. 3.1).  The Allobroges also revolted from Rome 
in 61 (Dio Cass. 37.47-8).  But whether these continuing disturbances were related to the efforts 
of those involved with the affair of 63 is further investigated in Chapter 3.4. 
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throughout his defense for Murena.14  In the peroration of the Pro Murena, 
Cicero metaphorically compared those supporting the affair remaining in the city 
to the Greeks hiding in the Trojan horse (Cic. Mur. 78).15 Although he did not 
name any Roman citizen involved except Catiline in the Pro Murena, he 
declared that some of the affair’s supporters in Rome were senators (86).16  
The term periculum (‘danger’) occurs eleven times in the Pro Murena 
implicitly referring to the threat facing Rome.  Three times the term is used to 
refer to the danger facing Cicero as consul (Cic. Mur. 3, 52, 87).  The term is 
used four times to specifically refer to the affair’s participants in Rome and the 
danger they still imposed on the city (80, 83, 84, 86).  Twice the term is qualified 
with the adjective tantum (80, 83), once with summum (6), and once juxtaposed 
with the noun magnitudo (86).  Clearly, the language Cicero used in the speech 
emphasized the extreme seriousness of the affair and its hostile plans.  He 
implied that the affair’s participants would not cease their scheming even if 
Catiline and Manlius’ army were eventually defeated.  Cicero claimed he feared 
those remaining in the city more than the forces outside of Rome (79).17  Cicero 
reiterated the necessity that a man of Murena’s qualities was installed as consul 
in January 62 to properly defend the res publica.  Cicero closed his defense for 
Murena recommending that if his client were acquitted he would be: 
cupidissimum oti, studioissimum bonorum, acerrimum contra seditionem, fortissimum in 
bello, inimicissimum huic coniurationi quae nunc rem publicam labefactat futurum esse 
 
“Devoted to peace, zealous in the support of loyal citizens, active in the suppression of 
rebellion, intrepid in war and a bitter enemy of this coniuratio which is now rocking the 
foundations of the Republic” (Cic. Mur. 90). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The Second Oration was delivered the day after Catiline left Rome on November 9 and 
frequently alluded to the people supporting the affair who remained in the city, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.4-
6, 8, 10-11, 17, 23, 27-28; Mur. 78-80, 82, 84-86, 90.  See also section 2.2 below.   
15 Cic. Mur. 78: latius patet illius sceleris contagio quam quisquam putat, ad pluris pertinet. 
Intus, intus, inquam, est equus Troianus “The infection of [that] crime is more widely spread and 
affects more people than anyone imagines.  The Trojan horse is within our walls, yes, within our 
very walls.”  NB: MacDonald (1976, 285) translates illius as “his” implying that Cicero was 
referring to the affair as Catiline’s crime.  However, if Cicero wanted to stress that the scelus 
referred to Catiline alone, surely he would have used the corresponding personal pronoun eius 
instead of a demonstrative pronoun.  Therefore, translating the demonstrative pronoun as “that” 
is less misleading. 
16 Cic. Mur. 86: non nemo etaim in illo sacrario rei publicae, in ipsa, inquam, curia non nemo 
hostis est “There are even some [supporting the affair] in our national holy of holies, yes, in the 
very Senate-house.” Cf. Mur. 85; Cat. 1.5. 
17 Cic. Mur. 79: curavi ne quis metueret, sed copias illius quas hic video dico esse metuendas “I 
have seen to it that nobody need fear him [Catiline], but I do say that there is a good reason to 
fear his forces which I see here.” Cf. Cat. 3.16: ille erat unus timendus ex istis omnibus, sed tam 
diu dum urbis moenibus continebatur “Catiline was the only one out of all these men [Lentulus, 
Cassius, and Cethegus] to be feared and he only so long as he was within the walls of Rome.” 
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Cicero had continually advised his audience that he knew other influential 
participants remained in Rome and warned the threat would persist despite the 
fact that Catiline, who Cicero presumed was the primary agitator, was no longer 
in the city.  After Catiline left the city, Cicero’s stance regarding his influence 
over the participants remaining in Rome had apparently changed.18  Perhaps 
the jury actually believed Cicero’s claim that the affair was more complex and 
believed his claim that many more were involved than initially thought.  
Furthermore, perhaps the jury believed Cicero’s claim that the affair would not 
be entirely suppressed before the end of the year.19  Cicero seemingly 
convinced the jury that the threat of the affair was serious because of the 
presence of those who remained in Rome and Murena was acquitted.20 
Our sources attest that the participants remaining in Rome had three 
primary tasks: i) to obtain the support of the Allobroges to strengthen Catiline 
and Manlius’ army in Etruria, ii) to set fire to the city, and iii) to murder the 
leading citizens loyal to the current regime.  Cicero rhetorically stated that the 
threat these men represented and the violent schemes they were attempting to 
implement were to destroy the res publica and everything along with it.  Cicero 
opened the Third Oration from the rostra professing: 
“Rem publicam, Quirites, vitamque omnium vestrum, bona, fortunas, coniuges 
liberosque vestros atque hoc domicilium clarissimi imperi, fortunatissimam 
pulcherrimamque urbem, hodierno die deorum immortalium summo erga vos amore, 
laboribus, consiliis, periculis meis e flamma atque ferro ac paene ex faucibus fati 
ereptam et vobis conservatam ac restitutam videtis.” 
 
“The Republic, citizens, the lives of you all, your property, your fortunes, your wives and 
your children, together with this heart of our glorious empire, this most blessed and 
beautiful of cities, have, as you see, on this very day been snatched from fire and the 
sword.  The great love that the immortal gods hold for you has combined with the toil 
and the vigilance that I have undertaken, and with the perils that I have undergone, to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Cicero implied that Catiline was the primary agitator of the affair both inside and outside the 
city in the First Oration.  Cic. Cat. 1.5: eorum autem castrorum imperatorem ducemque hostium 
intra moenia atque adeo in senatu videtis intestinam aliquam cotidie perniciem rei publicae 
molientem. “The commander of that camp [Manlius’ army] and the leader of those enemies you 
see within the walls and even, indeed, in the Senate, plotting daily in our midst the destruction 
of the Republic.”, cf. Cat. 2.17, 27-29, 3.3-4, 16-17, 25, 4.2, 6, 12, 19-20. 
19 Cic. Mur. 85: sed quid tandem fiet, si haec elapsa de minibus nostris in eum annum qui 
consequitur redundarint? “What will happen though, if these dangers slip from our fingers and 
spill over into next year?” NB: In 62 the tribune Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos proposed that 
Pompey should return to Italy with haste to battle Catiline and Manlius’ forces (Plut. Cat. min. 
26.2). 
20 In the Pro Flacco delivered in 59, Cicero boasted that the jury in Murena’s case was 
completely convinced that the affair of 63 posed a serious threat and two consuls were needed 
in Rome in January 62.  Cicero claimed that not one juror thought Murena was guilty of electoral 
bribery (Cic. Flacc. 98).  NB: Our sources are silent regarding Murena’s activities during his 
consulship and there is no indication he interfered with the subsequent prosecutions of the 
affair’s supporters. 
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bring them out of the very jaws of destruction and restore them to you safe and sound.” 
(Cic. Cat. 3.1) 
 
Cicero used varying forms of the expression flamma atque ferro (Cat. 2.1, 3.1; 
Mur. 85; Sull. 83) or the analogous phrase caedes atque incendium (Cat. 1.3, 6, 
2.6, 10, 3.8, 15; Sull. 19, 33, 52) to describe both what actions those in Rome 
were planning and what actions Cicero had prevented from occurring.  
Throughout the Orations, he continually repeated this rhetoric to persuade 
everyone in the city to renounce the affair and anyone associated with its 
criminal and hostile plans.21 
In the First Oration, Cicero claimed that on the night of November 6 at 
the house of M. Porcius Laeca where the affair’s supporters were meeting, 
Catiline meted out instructions before he left the city.  He purportedly instructed 
some people to travel to different parts of Italy to incite the local inhabitants and 
encouraged those who would stay in Rome to continue with the designs to 
murder Cicero and to set fire to parts of the city.22  The day after the meeting, 
Cicero reported that duo equites approached his house early in the morning 
intending to murder him.  Apparently, Cicero was informed about everything that 
transpired at the meeting, so he was ready for the assassins when they arrived 
and prevented their attempt (Cat. 1.9).  It was the meeting at Laeca’s house and 
the abortive assassination attempt that spurred Cicero to deliver the First 
Oration in order to divulge the affair’s plans on November 8.  However, Cicero 
did not name the two would-be assassins in the First Oration, which has 
prompted some scholars to question the veracity of the assassination attempt.23  
But, a year later in his defense of P. Sulla, Cicero wrote that a C. Cornelius, 
who happened to be the father of one of the prosecutors in the case, had 
volunteered to assassinate Cicero (Cic. Sull. 18).  C. Cornelius was convicted 
for his involvement with the affair (6). 
Sallust’s Catilina states that C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius had 
volunteered to murder Cicero (Sall. B Cat. 28.1).  Sallust ranked L. Vargunteius 
and C. Cornelius as senator and eques respectively (17.3-4).  Linderski argues 
that Vargunteius probably lost his status as a senator when he was convicted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Forms of flamma, incendium or the latter term’s corresponding verb incendere are used 
fifteen times in the Orations all regarding the intended arson, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.3, 6, 9, 29, 2.1, 6, 
10, 3.1, 8, 15, 25, 4.2, 4, 11, 17.  The term ignis is also used, cf. Cat. 3.2 (juxtaposed with 
gladius), 22.  Cicero also used the term conflagrare once at Cat. 3.25. 
22 See n.261. 
23 Cf. Waters 1970, 203; Seager 1973, 243.  For C. Cornelius, see Appendix I [no.11].   
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de ambitu in 66.24  If Cicero was implying that the other eques that volunteered 
to murder him in the First Oration was Vargunteius, then perhaps Cicero was 
referring to Vargunteius’ current status in 63, not his previous rank as senator 
like Sallust.25  Cicero never confirmed Vargunteius was one of the would-be 
assassins, but Vargunteius was convicted in 62 for his involvement with the 
affair (Cic. Sull. 6).26  The later narratives of the affair complicate the 
identification of the assassins further.  Plutarch names an unknown Marcius and 
the senator C. Cornelius Cethegus (Plut. Cic. 16.2).27  He either confused the 
latter with the eques C. Cornelius mentioned by Cicero in the Pro Sulla or 
antedated Sallust’s claim that Cethegus volunteered to murder Cicero after 
Catiline had left Rome (Sall. B Cat. 43.2).  Appian wrongly names P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Sura and Cethegus as the assassins, and postdates the attempt to 
when Catiline had arrived in Faesulae (App. B Civ. 2.1.3).28  Dio recorded the 
assassination attempt, but did not mention any names (Dio Cass. 37.32.4).  The 
reasons why Cicero chose not to publish the names of the assassins in the First 
Oration can be endlessly debated.  However, the fact that C. Cornelius was 
convicted explicitly for the attempted assassination of Cicero makes it difficult to 
argue that the event was an exagerration. 
 As Catiline was in Etruria, the responsibility to continue the designs to set 
fire to Rome and murder its leading citizens clearly fell to those remaining in the 
city.  These tasks were ascribed to specific people, but again the names 
identified in our sources are not concordant.  Cicero claimed that the intended 
conflagration was the senator L. Cassius Longinus’ task (Cic. Cat. 3.14, 4.13; 
Sull. 53), and that Cethegus and a knight named P. Gabinius Capito were going 
to murder the leading citizens (Cat. 4.13).  Sallust attributed the task of setting 
fires in Rome to the knights L. Statilius and Gabinius instead.  Sallust further 
claimed Cethegus was to murder Cicero and instruct other anonymous young !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Linderski 1963.  
25 Cf. Robinson 1947; Linderski 1963; Berry 1996, 141; Dyck 2008, 85. 
26 See Appendix I [no. 42]. 
27 No Marcius is attested in any other source, therefore, the name is either an original error that 
has continued in the manuscript tradition [(perhaps !"#$%&' was a corruption of ()*$%&' 
(‘Lucius’), which might have referred to Lucius Vargunteius)]; or simply it was Plutarch’s own 
error like he mistakenly named, Cethegus, the wrong Cornelius, as the other would-be 
assassin. 
28 Appian was perhaps misled, like Plutarch, by Sallust’s claim that Cethegus later volunteered 
to murder Cicero (Sall. B Cat. 43.1).  In the same passage, Sallust also stated Cicero’s murder 
and the burning of the city was to coincide with Catiline’s arrival at Faesuale, which perhaps 
explains Appain’s anachronism of the initial assassination attempt before Catiline had left 
Rome.  
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nobles involved to murder their fathers (Sall. B Cat. 43.2).29  On the other hand, 
Plutarch and Dio state that Lentulus instructed the others remaining in Rome to 
burn the city and murder its leading citizens.30  Although none of the plans in 
Rome came to fruition, we can disregard Waters’ opinion that Cicero had 
completely “exaggerated” and “fashioned” the whole affair.31  Certainly the 
threat was real to Cicero, and the other narratives concurred.  Cicero continually 
boasted about his discovery of Catiline and Lentulus’ actions and his 
suppression of the affair of 63.32  Cicero insisted that his suppression of the 
affair was more important than the greatest Roman victories won by famous 
generals abroad.  He logically argued that victories against external foes were 
useless if Rome was destroyed.33  He also spoke of the unprecedented triumph 
that the people of Rome wanted to reward him because of the affair’s 
prevention.34 
There should be no doubt about Cicero’s opinion concerning the 
seriousness of the threat to his own life and to Rome.  However, one could 
argue that the plan to burn Rome was flawed from the beginning.  The panic 
that would ensue might have been helpful if Catiline and Manlius’ army were 
poised to attack the city, but they were still approximately 150 miles from Rome.  
Most likely, the fires would have been detrimental for the affair.  How could they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Sallust claimed a senator named A. Fulvius had his son killed because he heard his son was 
preparing to join the army in Faesulae (Sall. B Cat. 39.5).  See Appendix I, [no.21]. 
30 Plut. Cic. 18.1: &ὐ+ὲ' &ὖ' ἐ,)'-)% $.$ὸ' ὁ (/'01&2 ἰ"3%µ&' “Accordingly, it was no trifling or 
insignificant plan which Lentulus was cherishing.”  Plutarch also claimed Lentulus and the 
others planned to hold Pompey’s children as hostage as collateral for when he returned from 
Asia (18.1).  Plutarch also claimed there were one hundred men that Lentulus instructed to start 
fires, to block the aqueducts, and to kill anyone who tried to retrieve water (18.3).  Cf. Dio Cass. 
37.34.1: ,.#.3$)4.5&µ/'&4 6ὰ# 0&ῦ ()'0&*1&4 $.0.,#ῆ3.7 0/ 0%'.2 $.ὶ 38.6ὰ2 ἐ#6"3.39.% 
µ)0" 0) 0ῶ' ἄ11:' 0ῶ' 34'&µ:µ&$-0:' $.ὶ µ)0ὰ Ἀ11&;#76:' “For Lentulus made preparations 
to burn down the city and commit murder with the aid of his fellow-conspirators and of 
Allobroges.”  
31 Waters 1970, 208. 
32 Cf. Plut. Cic. 24.1; Dio Cass. 37.38.2.  Cicero often emphasized his singular success over the 
affair, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.1-2, 15, 23, 25-7, 4.1-2, 20-1; Sull. 33, 83, 85. Cicero also claimed he was 
assisted in the affair’s prevention through divine providence, cf. Cat. 3.1-2, 18-22, 4.2; Sull. 40, 
86; Div. 1.17-22.   
33 Cicero compared his triumph to Scipio’s over Carthage, Paulus’ over Macedonia, Marius’ over 
the Germanic tribes, and all of Popmey’s victories (Cic. Cat. 4.20-23, cf. 3.25-27). 
34 Cicero supposedly turned down triumpho ceterisque laudis insignibus “The triumph and the 
other marks of honor” (Cic. Cat. 4.23).  Cicero ‘modestly’ proclaimed the only reward he wanted 
was for the people of Rome to remember his suppression of the affair forever (cf. 3.25, 4.23).  
The triumph the people conferred on Cicero was apparently unprecented because he was a 
civilian not a general (cf. 3.14, 4.5).  In 55, Cicero declared that Q. Lutatius Catulus called him 
pater patriae (“father of his country”) after his suppression of the affair (Pis. 6). Crassus also 
praised Cicero’s actions as consul (Fam. 5.8.2).  Plutarch and Appain also remarked that 
Cicero’s triumph was unique and that in 62, Cato, who was now tribune, and the people 
honored him as ,.0/#. ,.0#7+&2 (cf. Plut. Cic. 23.3; App. BC 2.7). 
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control the fire once it was set?  Cicero used the threat of the planned 
conflagration to convince the people in the city from retaining any sympathy 
towards the affair, if indeed they supported it at all (Cic. Cat. 4.17).35  The 
proposal to burn the city apparently backfired.  The plebes urbana, who could 
perhaps lose their possessions in a fire, turned against those supporting the 
affair (Sall. B Cat. 48.2).36 
On the other hand, the murder of the leading loyal citizens in Rome 
would have been a great blow to the established authority in the city. Cicero 
frequently attempted to strike fear in other Senators by reminding them that they 
themselves were targets (Cic. Cat. 1.17).37 But, after the first failed 
assassination attempt against Cicero, the other leading citizens were warned 
and on guard (1.7).  After the plans were initially divulged, any action intended 
by the affair’s participants was conceivably limited.  Although no violence 
occurred in Rome, our sources contend that the participants’ were still intent on 
arson and murder. 
Logically, Cicero emphasized these violent intentions to incite hatred 
against the participants remaining in Rome.  In the Third Oration, Cicero named 
nine Roman citizens who had confessed to soliciting the Allobrogean envoys to 
support the affair (Cic. Cat. 3.14).  Whether these men also confessed to 
attempted arson and murder is only implied.  However, their attempt to enlist 
the Gauls, the most feared enemy of Rome, was probably considered more 
detestable to the multitude in the city than the rumors of arson and murder.  
Arguably, the people of Rome were less worried about a rebel army encamped 
in Faesulae, approximately 150 miles from the city’s gates, than the violent and 
ambitious plans of those supporting the affair within the walls of Rome.  If 
Cicero was aware of the plans both outside and inside of Rome since early 
November, or perhaps earlier, and had made these plans public in the First 
Oration, then why did the participants in Rome continue to support the affair, 
after Catiline left the city, for an entire month?  The answer to this question is 
not straightforward, as each participant might have separate motives.  By !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Sallust claimed that initially omnia cuncta plebes novarum rerum studio Catilinae incepta 
probat “The whole body of the commons through desire for novarum rerum favored the designs 
of Catiline” (Sall. Cat. 37.1). Due to the rumors of arson the plebs mutata mente Catilinae 
consilia exsecrari “Faced about and denounced the designs of Catiline” (48.1). 
36 Yavetz (1963, 498) argues that the failure of the affair of 63 was because those involved with 
the affair did not obtain the support of the plebes urbana.  Contra Waters 1970, 206-7. 
37 Cicero used these scare tactics in the Fourth Oration to his advantage, cf. Cic. Cat. 4.18-24.  
See Cape, Jr. 1995, 263-4.  
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examining our sources representation of the supporters remaining in Rome, 
perhaps we can reevaluate their influence on the affair as a whole. 
 
2.2 The common debt crisis 
Cicero’s claims made in the Pro Murena regarding the plurality of people 
involved with the affair, examined in the previous section, echoed his earlier 
claims made in the Second Oration.  In the latter speech, he explained that 
many other people were motivated to join the affair in order to improve either 
their political position or financial condition, or because they were attracted by 
the crime itself (Cic. Cat. 2.18-23).  Cicero grouped these would-be supporters 
into six general categories: i) wealthy citizens, who were unwilling to sell their 
estates to cover their debt hoping that if the affair was successful the new 
regime would institute tabulae novae (‘new accounts’) canceling their massive 
debts (2.18)38; ii) other indebted citizens attracted by the prospect of future 
magistracies (2.19); iii) some of the Sullan colonists, including both the veterans 
of Sulla’s legions and small colonial land holders, who were now in dire financial 
straits.  They hoped if the affair was successful then the new regime would 
pursue proscriptions and confiscations for their benefit, similar to those enacted 
by Sulla (2.20)39; iv) an assortment of citizens from Rome and other areas in the 
res publica who were in perpetual debt that could only profit by joining the affair 
(2.21)40; v) an assortment of criminals (2.22); and vi) certain young men from 
Rome who were engaged in every sort of vice (2.23).41  Cicero emphasized the 
civil nature of the affair, stating that all the groups of supporters in Rome were 
hostes, tamen, quia nati sunt cives “enemies, still they were born citizens” 
(2.27).42 
The groups of supporters described in Sallust’s Catilina correspond, in 
part, with Cicero’s categories.  Sallust offered similar political, financial, and 
immoral reasons as to how those who were attracted to the affair were induced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 On tabulae novae, see further Chapter 3 n.13. 
39 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 21.2. 
40 NB: Cicero claimed this group was reported to be joining Catiline and Manlius’ forces in 
Etruria: in illa castra conferre dicuntur (Cic. Cat. 2.21). Therefore they are excluded from those 
participating with the disturbances in Rome.  On the composition of Manlius’ army, see Chapter 
3 n.82. 
41 For other descriptions of Cicero’s groups of supporters, cf. Yavetz 1963, 488; Dyck 2008, 
148. Yavetz (1963, 488) also recounts six groups but splits Cicero’s third group into two: Sullan 
colonists and the rural poor.  Yavetz does not include the group regarding young follows, in 
contrast to Dyck 2008, 148.  On the problems of identifying ‘the Roman youth’ involved in the 
affair of 63, see Isayev 2007, 8-11.  
42 Cf. Cic. Mur. 80. 
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to join it.  Similar to Cicero, Sallust discussed the inclusion of every type of 
immoral and criminal person within the Republic: i) those in debt (Sall. B Cat. 
14.1-2, 17.4, 20.8, 13, 21.1-2, 39.6); ii) the Sullan veterans, colonists and others 
from the countryside (16.4, 17.4, 27.1 28.4, 37.6, 9)43; iii) assorted criminals 
(14.1-4, 36.4, 39.6); and iv) anonymous young Romans (12.2, 13.4-5, 14.5-7, 
17.6, 37.7, 38.1).  In contrast to Cicero, Sallust also disclosed that: i) indebted 
women were attracted to the affair (24.3, 25, 40.5); ii) other political factions not 
in power (37.10, 38.1-3); iii) the urban plebs (37.4)44, and iv) the impoverished 
immigrants of Rome (37.5-8).45 
According to Cicero and Sallust’s categories, debt was apparently the 
common reason why certain people were tempted by or supported the affair of 
63.46  In the Late Republic, the debt crisis was addressed and appropriate 
legislation was passed to attempt to alleviate the problem in 88 and 86.47  But it 
is known that Romans from every social class in the Italian peninsula were 
indebted to some degree in the Late Republic.48  A brief digression regarding 
the Roman economy will demonstrate that debt was a constant concern for 
many Romans.  Hence, Cicero and Sallust’s claims that debt was the common 
reason so many were willing to support the affair carries less relevance than 
their descriptions of supporters would lead one to believe. 
Barlow highlights the financial crisis in the Roman economy by first 
examining the estimates in coin production from the years 92-80, taking his cue 
from Crawford’s estimates of the minting of obverse dies during this tumultuous 
period.49  Barlow explains that the Republic’s income steadily decreased due to 
rapid expansions in the army during the Social War, the invasion of Asia by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 NB: Sallust stated that the Sullan veteran, C. Manlius, also attempted to recruit those 
dispossessed by Sulla because of their dire financial condition (Sall. B Cat. 28.4, 37.9). See 
Chapter 3 n.81. 
44 See n.35. 
45 Appian claimed the affair received support from anonymous ἀ!"#ῶ! $% &'ὶ ()!'*&ῶ! “Both 
men and women” (App. BC 2.2).  For the role of women in the affair of 63 see, Pagan 2004, 41-
6. 
46 Cic. Cat. 2.4: reliquit quos viros, quato aere alieno “But the men he [Catiline] has left behind, 
what debts they have!” 
47 On the lex Cornelia Pompeia of 88 that reduced interest rates and debt, see Barlow 1980, 
214.  On the lex Valeria de aere alieno of 86, which reducing debt by three-fourths, cf. Sall. B 
Cat. 33.2; Vell. Pat 2.23.2. 
48 For the issue of debt in various social classes in the Late Republic, see the following: for the 
Italian agricultural community, cf. Brunt 1971, 129-30 Evans, 1980, 134-73; Havas 1984, 35; De 
Ligt 2004, 754-5. For the urban plebs, cf. Yavetz 1958, 515-7; Brunt 1966, 3-27. For the upper 
classes, cf. Shatzman 1975. 
49 Barlow 1980, 203-12. Barlow examines the estimated statistics of obverse dies from M.H. 
Crawford’s studies from 1964 and 1974 to support his conclusions, see Bibliography. 
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Mithridates, the civil wars between Octavius and Cinna, and Marius and Sulla.50  
However, Barlow concedes that the estimates of minted coins do not explain 
the entire story.51  The rest of his article focuses on the collapsing credit 
structure52, the deflation of the Roman currency through legislation passed to 
aid debtors53, and the subsequent counterfeiting of specie.54  All of these factors 
had an impact on the Roman economy and, according to Barlow, stemmed from 
the continuing state of war. 
The subsequent decades had no shortage of conflicts either (i.e., the 
wars against Sertorius, the pirates, and the perpetual struggles against 
Mithridates in Asia).  These factors had an adverse affect on the Roman 
economy, and the debt crisis continued.55  Harris contends that, “debt was in 
fact the life-blood of the Roman economy, at all levels.”56  He cogently explains 
that Romans used little hard currency in most transactions, which were more 
typically paid using various documentary transactions instead.57  Debt was paid 
off in a variety of ways and not always in a prompt manner.58 
The debt crisis was certainly a concern in 63, but the reasons for the 
affair that year were as varied as the groups that supported it.  The omnipresent 
debt crisis in Republican Rome seems a too superficial reason for the affair to 
be planned.  In addition, Catiline, Manlius, and Lentulus would have no trouble 
finding the support needed to overthrow the current regime if the entire indebted 
populace were prepared to revolt, as Cicero and Sallust assert.  However, by 
the time Catiline, Manlius, and Lentulus acted, the affair was soon detected 
and, therefore, jeopardized from the very beginning.  Our sources indicate that 
their support, although widespread, was far too inadequate to be successful 
after the affair’s initial detection.59  Clearly, not everyone in debt agreed that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Barlow 1980, 204-5, 207-12. 
51 Ibid. 208-9. 
52 Ibid. 212-3. 
53 Ibid. 213-7. 
54 Ibid. 217-9. 
55 Crawford 1974. 
56 Harris ,2006, 9.  Harris criticizes the earlier seminal works on money in the Roman world for 
investing too much emphasis on hard cash as a determinant of the money supply in Republican 
Rome, contra Finley 1973; Crawford 1974. 
57 Credit, fides, was frequently paid using nomina on collateral instead of using coins (Harris 
2006, 8-17). 
58 Harris 2006, 3. 
59 Sallust claimed that only a quarter of the soldiers in Catiline and Manlius’ army were properly 
armed (Sall. B Cat. 56.3).  Appian similarly claimed that only a quarter of the army was armed, 
but contrastly claimed that the army in Etruria had 20,000 soldiers (App. B Civ. 2.7).  Clearly, 
this is an overestimation by Appian as 20,000 soldiers, even if not properly armed, would have 
been difficult to defeat in one battle.  Dio recorded that the army was not small, but claimed 
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resorting to violence was a way to solve his or her financial woes.  Surely the 
prospect for power was a more persuasive reason for those who joined the 
affair than the reduction of something as commonplace as debt.60  Therefore, 
Cicero and Sallust’s claim that the underlying reason why so many different 
groups were willing to support the affair was debt and the hope that the new 
regime would alleviate their debilitating financial condition is too general.61  We 
cannot ignore our sources’ perspective that debt was a shared concern of those 
willing to support the affair, but the reasons someone supported the affair were 
more heterogeneous and individual, as will be shown. 
 
2.3 The representation of the reliqua coniuratorum manus 
Cicero demarcated those who had remained in Rome after Catiline had 
left the city as the reliqua coniuratorum manus (‘the remainder of the 
conspirators’).62  Only four times during Cicero’s Orations is the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus specifically referred to as socii (‘allies’) of Catiline.  In the 
First Oration, Cicero uses the word twice, then only once more in both the 
Second and Third Oration.63  The latter instance of socii is juxtaposed with the 
word duces (‘leaders’), as Cicero proclaimed ut Catilina paucis ante diebus 
erupit ex urbe, cum sceleris sui socios huiusque nefarii belli acerrimos duces 
reliquisset “Ever since Catiline dashed from the city a few days ago, he has left 
in Rome socii in his crime, the most active duces in this wicked war” (Cic. Cat. 
3.3).  By the Fourth Oration, Cicero no longer used the term socii to refer to the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus.64  Significantly the members of the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus were no longer described as Catiline’s companions but as 
leaders in their own right.  After his First Oration had the desired effect of 
exposing the affair’s plans and forcing Catiline to leave Rome, Cicero realized !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
many soldiers deserted after hearing about the executions in Rome (Dio Cass. 37.39.1-2).  
Plutarch did not comment on the size of the army, but , like Sallust, claimed that there were 
desertions (cf. Sall. B Cat. 57.1; Plut. Cic. 22.8).  
60 Plutarch claimed in 62, Caesar was inciting the poorer classes to continue the disturbances 
the affair of 63 intiated.  Consequently, Cato passed a corn-dole as tribune in 62 to alleviate the 
Senate’s concern regarding the poor in Rome, cf. Plut. Cat. min. 26.1; Caes. 8.6.  See 
Drummond 1999.   
61 Sallust reported that Catiline could pay off his debts using collateral (Sall. B Cat. 35.3).  In 
contrast, Cicero claimed Catiline was eager to start the affair to avoid paying the interest on his 
loans (Cic. Cat. 1.14). See MacDonald 1976, 46 [n. a].   
62 Cic. Cat. 1.12, 3.3. 
63 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.8, 33, 2.4, 3.3. 
64 NB: societas (‘alliance’), a related term to socius did occur in the Fourth Oration. But the term 
referred to the agreement between the Senate and the equites regarding the sentence of the 
reliqua coniuratorum (Cic. Cat. 4.15). 
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that other influential citizens were leading the affair inside of the city.65  In the 
subsequent Orations, Cicero began to use the term duces, which indicates that 
the role of the affair’s participants who remained in Rome had changed since 
Catiline’s departure. 
Cicero used the term dux or its cognates eight times in the Orations to 
refer to the most influential participants involved with the affair of 63.  The term 
is used five times in the First and Second Oration referring specifically to 
Catiline’s leadership.  But each instance of the term duces that was ascribed to 
Catiline implied that he was the leader of the army in Etruria.  The first 
occurrence of duces explicitly referred to Catiline as both eorum autem 
castrorum imperator ducemque hostium intra moenia atque adeo in senatu 
videtis “The commander of that camp and the leader of those enemies you see 
within the walls and even, indeed, in the Senate” (Cic. Cat. 1.5).  When the First 
Oration was delivered Cicero seemingly had little information or evidence 
regarding the identity of the other hostes intra moenia except for Catiline, 
Manlius, and M. Laeca, who hosted the meeting for these so-called hostes.66  
His primary goal in this speech was to convince the Senate that Catiline was the 
instigator of the entire affair, so Cicero perhaps thought there was no reason to 
specifically name other suspected participants.  But after the First Oration, the 
situation in the city had changed.  According to Cicero, Catiline’s primary task 
was preparing the army outside of Rome, not the murder and arson planned 
inside of the city.67 
After Catiline had left Rome, those remaining in the city were presented 
as the new “leaders” of the affair.  Cicero used the term duces three times 
specifically referring to the reliqua coniuratorum manus.  I discussed the first 
instance those remaining in Rome were represented as duces at Cic. Cat. 3.3 
on preceding page.  A second time occurs when Cicero was outlining the plan 
that the army in Etruria would march on Rome.  He declared that the army 
would cum his urbanis ducibus coniungeret “Join up with these leaders in the 
city” (3.8).  Lastly, Cicero reiterated that he had arrested consceleratissimi 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 NB: Cicero contradictorally claimed that he had either forced Catiline from Rome or that it was 
Catiline’s plan from the beginning to leave Rome to lead the army in Etruria, see Chapter 3 
nn.37-41. 
66 It is indeterminable whether Cicero knew who was supporting the affair and withheld names 
until he could prove their participation. 
67 Catiline as the ‘leader’ of the army in Etruria, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.5, 2.14, 2.15.  As the leader in 
bellum (‘war’), cf. 1.27, 2.1.  Cf. Chapter 3 n.36.  
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periculosissinique belli nefarios duces “The duces in this most criminal and 
dangerous of wars” (3.16).  These instances demonstrated the transition of the 
members of the reliqua coniuratorum manus as mere socii of Catiline to being 
regarded as leaders themselves.  In addition, these instances portrayed how 
Cicero had shifted his focus after the First and Second Orations from Catiline’s 
plan to join Manlius’ army in Etruria to matters closer to home.   
In the Catilina, Sallust used the term socii six times to describe those 
involved with the affair of 63.68  However, Sallust only explicitly stated that the 
affair’s participants were the socii of Catiline once.69  Sallust used the term four 
times to describe the participants who stayed in Rome: i) when P. Gabinius 
Capito met the Allobrogean envoys, Sallust claimed the freedman P. Umbrenus 
coniurationem aperit, nominat socios “Disclosed the plot [and] named the socii” 
(Sall. B Cat. 40.6); ii) Sallust remarked the senator C. Cornelius Cethegus 
semper querebatur de ignavia sociorum “Constantly complained of the inaction 
of his socii” (43.3), iii) when T. Volturcius testified against the affair, Sallust 
recorded that se paucis ante diebus a Gabinio et Caepario socium adscitum 
“He [Voluturcius] declared that he had been made a socius of the cabal only a 
few days before by Gabinius and Caeparius” (47.1); and iv) when Catiline and 
Manlius were still enlisting men in Etruria, Sallust reported that Catiline hoped 
the numbers of the army would be increased si Romae socii incepta 
patravissent “If the socii at Rome succeeded in carrying out their plans” (56.4).  
Significantly, each of the occurrences of socii reviewed above does not explicitly 
identify those involved with affair as socii of the army in Etruria.  Instead, the 
term was used in referenc to the socii remaining in Rome.  However, the final 
occurrence of the term socii in the Catilina referred to those whom Catiline and 
Manlius enlisted into the army in Etruria.70  Sallust did not specify who these 
socii were who joined the army, but the term is juxtaposed with the adjective 
voluntarius.  The latter term implied that some chose to join the army under their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 16.4, 40.6, 43.3, 47.1, 56.2, 4. 
69 Sall. B Cat. 16.4: eis amicis sociisque confisus Catilina…opprimundae rei publicae consilium 
cepit “Relying on such friends and accomplices as these, Catiline formed the plan of 
overthrowing the government.”  NB: When this passage occurs in Sallust’s narrative he had only 
specifically discussed the support Catiline had from various anonymous criminals (14.1-3), the 
young Romans that Catiline attracted to the affiar with indecent proposals (14.4-7, 16.1-2), and 
the Sullan veterans (16.4). 
70 Sall. B Cat. 56.2: deinde, ut quisque voluntarius aut ex sociis in castra venerat, aequaliter 
distribuerat, ac brevi spatio legions numero hominum expleverat, cum initio non amplius duobus 
milibus habuisset“Then distributing among them equally such volunteers or [allies] as came to 
the camp, he soon completed the full quota of the legions, although in the beginning he had no 
more than two thousand men.”  
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own free will.  Therefore, the term socii, in this case, most likely referred to 
those who were supporters of the affair from the beginning, not the voluntarii, 
who most likely joined the army hoping that if they were victorious they would 
get a share of the spoils.71  Whether Sallust used the term socii in this instance 
to imply that some of those who joined the army were the socii remaining in the 
city, who might have joined the army after the arrest of Lentulus and the others 
on December 3, or whether these socii were entirely new supporters in the affair 
is inconclusive.  Sallust, in contrast to Cicero, used the term socii more often to 
denote those involved with the disturbances inside of Rome than those outside 
the city.  However, our sources continually stressed the connection between 
those inside and outside of Rome therefore implying that they were all socii, 
which is reviewed and challenged in Part B of this chapter and Chapter 3. 
The term dux rarely occurs in the Catilina.  Sallust used dux three times 
and only once in reference to the affair.  His invented speech for Cato described 
Catiline as dux hostium cum exercitu “The leader of the enemy with his army” 
(Sall. B Cat. 52.24).  Catiline was again represented as the dux of the army in 
Etruria.  Catiline was the primary protagonist of his monograph, however, 
Sallust never classified him as the princeps coniurationis (‘the foremost leader 
of the affair’).  In comparison, Sallust employed the phrase principes 
coniurationis twice to identify those involved with the affair remaining in Rome.  
First, Sallust claimed those who met Catiline at Laeca’s house were 
coniurationis principes “The ringleaders of the conspiracy” (27.3).  Second, 
Sallust explicitly stated that Lentulus and the others remaining in Rome were 
principes coniurationis (43.1).  These two instances of the phrase suggested 
that there were other influential participants in the affair than Catiline. 
Perhaps Cicero and Sallust used the term duces as a rhetorical ploy to 
make the members’ roles among the reliqua coniuratorum manus appear more 
important and emphasize the serious threat they represented.  However, on 
December 3, Cicero obtained the evidence to prove that a praetor P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Sura; three senators L. Cassius Longinus, C. Cornelius Cethegus, and 
T. Annius Chilo; two knights P. Gabinius Capito and L. Statilius; a freedman P. 
Umbrenus; a Sullan colonist from Faesulae P. Furius; and a local aristocrat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Ramsey (1984, 224) states that the term voluntarius referred to the extra coniurationem at 
Sall. B Cat. 39.5 and the term socii defined Catiline’s “confederates.”  Perhaps, the voluntarii 
were those who joined the affair later than the socii already involved.  On the other hand, Sallust 
might have just chosen the term voluntarii for stylistic variety. 
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from Terracina M. Caeparius were involved with the affair (Cic. Cat. 3.14).72  
The inclusion of these nine men from a variety of social classes and locales 
demonstrates the diverse composition of the affair.  In addition, Cicero and 
Sallust represented these men, as duces or principes coniurationis in the affair, 
emphasizing that the affair’s designs were not dependent on the leadership of 
Catiline.  Instead the leadership was now in the hands of the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus.  Seemingly, the threat represented by Catiline and 
Manlius’ army encamped at Faesulae in the mountain passes of northern 
Etruria was less of a concern than the number of supporters remaining in 
Rome. 
 
Part B  
2.4  Evaluating P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura’s influence on the affair 
The prominence of P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura’s name in our sources 
implies that his role was foremost in the affair of 63 compared to the eight 
others identified above as the reliqua coniuratorum manus in Rome.  Lentulus is 
mentioned by name thirty-six times in the Ciceronian corpus73, nineteen times 
by Sallust, fifteen times by Plutarch74, ten times by Appian, eight times by Dio, 
twice by Florus, twice by Velleius Paterculus, and once (alongside Catiline’s 
name) in the only fragment mentioning the affair of 63 in Diodorus Siculus’ 
Biblioteca Historica (F35.1).75  In comparison, the names of the eight other men 
in the reliqua coniuratorum manus appear thirty-three times in the Ciceronian 
corpus76, forty-five times in Sallust77, and twice in Florus.78  On the other hand, 
in Plutarch, Appian, and Velleius Paterculus, the senator C. Cornelius Cethegus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Sallust claimed all nine men were sentenced to death (Sall. B Cat. 50.4).  However, Cassius, 
Annius Chilo, Umbrenus, and Furius had not been found in Rome, so they were not executed 
with the other five on Decemebr 5.  See March 1988-9.  For the fates of these four men, see 
further Appendix I, [nos. 1, 8, 23, 41]. 
73 Excluding the Orations, the Pro Murena, and the Pro Sulla, only Lentulus’ name appeared 
from the reliqua coniuratorum in Cicero’s other works.  Lentulus was named once in three other 
works, cf. Cic. Att 1.16.9; Pis. 7; Phil. 2.18. 
74 Lentulus’ name occurs twelve times in Plutarch’s Life of Cicero, twice in the Life of Cato the 
Younger, and once in the Life of Caesar. 
75 Orosius (6.6.5-7) and Eutropius (6.15) only name Catiline and none of the reliqua 
coniuratorum.  However, Orosius mentioned that a C. and M. Claudius Marcellus participated in 
the affair (Oros. 6.6.7).  See Appendix I, [nos. 9 and 10]. 
76 In Cicero’s works: Cethegus and Cassius are mentioned sixteen times, Statilius seven times, 
Caeparius six times, Gabinius five times, Umbrenus four times, Annius Chilo and Furius only 
once. 
77 Sallust’s Catilina mentioned Cethegus twelve times, Gabinius ten times, Statilius seven times, 
Caeparius six times, Cassius and Umbrenus four times, Annius Chilo twice, and P. Furius once.  
78 Florus listed the gentes of the influential families who were involved, but only the Cethegi and 
Longini are mentioned among the reliqua coniuratorum I list (Flor. 2.12.3). 
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is the only other of the reliqua coniuratorum manus named besides Lentulus, 
although several other senators were convicted for supporting the affair.79  
Lentulus was the only one of the reliqua coniuratorum manus named in Dio’s 
history and in the fragment of Diodorus Siculus.  Taken collectively, the eight 
members of the reliqua coniuratorum manus in Rome are referred to by name 
more than Lentulus only in Sallust’s Catilina.  However, Lentulus’ name still 
dominates almost 30% of the occurrences out of the sixty-four times the nine 
condemned men are named in Sallust’s monograph.  The reasons why Lentulus 
was mentioned more than any other participant in the affair except for Catiline 
are explored in the remaining sections of this chapter.  This opening section 
focuses on the way our sources emphasized Lentulus’ influence on the affair. 
Cicero first mentioned Lentulus in the Third Oration explaining that he 
confessed to soliciting aid from Allobrogean envoys in Rome to lend support to 
the affair (Cic. Cat. 3.4).  Cicero claimed that other participants remaining in 
Rome had contacted the Allobrogean envoys as well, but he indicated that 
Lentulus was their most significant contact by mentioning his name first.80  
Sallust confirmed that Lentulus was the first of the reliqua coniuratorum manus 
to seek the assistance of the Allobrogean envoys through Umbrenus, who had 
business dealings in the same region of Gaul (Sall. B Cat. 40.1).  Cicero and 
Sallust also professed that Lentulus had instructed T. Volturcius to escort the 
envoys to Catiline and Manlius’ camp to inform the army that certain members 
of the reliqua coniuratorum manus swore a mutual oath of alliance with the 
Allobroges, who, in turn, pledged to support the affair.  Lentulus also ordered 
Volturcius to deliver a separate personal letter and mandata to Catiline (Cic. 
Cat. 3.4; Sall. B Cat. 44).  Other accounts concur that Lentulus was responsible 
for soliciting the envoys’ aid.81 
Cicero mentioned Lentulus when he listed those in the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus whom he had summoned to his house after their letters to 
the Allobroges, along with Lentulus’ letter to Catiline, were seized during the 
ambush on the Mulvian Bridge.  Lentulus’ name appears last in this list after !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Plutarch’s works mentioned Cethegus eleven times.  Appian mentioned Cethegus six times; 
Velleius mentioned Cethegus twice.  
80 Cicero claimed that all the reliqua coniuratorum were involved with the Allobrogean envoys at 
one time or another except M. Caeparius. Cethegus and Statilius also swore an oath with the 
envoys and gave them letters along with Lentulus.  Cassius supposedly requested the 
Allobroges send cavalry to support the army in Etruria (Cic. Cat. 3.9).  Cicero claimed Gabinius, 
Annius Chilo, Furius, and Umbrenus had also met with the envoys (3.14). 
81 Cf. Plut. Cic. 18.5; App. B Civ. 2.4; Dio Cass. 37.34.1; Flor. 2.12.9. 
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Gabinius, Statilius, and Cethegus (Cic. Cat. 3.6).  Lentulus’ name usually 
occurred in an emphatic position when our sources named any of the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus.  In this case, Lentulus’ name appeared last to emphasize 
his tardiness to his summons.  Cicero wanted to accentuate the irony of 
Lentulus’ late arrival to mock the brevity of the letter Lentulus wrote to Catiline.82  
When Cicero recounted the confessions of Cethegus and Statilius, who also 
wrote letters pledging their support to the Allobrogean envoys, he similarly 
mentioned Lentulus’ confession after them for emphasis.  Cicero wanted to 
highlight Lentulus’ criminal intentions of attempting to solicit the envoys inside of 
Rome and attempting to make contact with Catiline in Etruria (Cic. Cat. 3.10).83  
Cicero continued to inform his audience about Volturcius and the envoys’ claim 
that they had often been to Lentulus’ house and how Lentulus professed that he 
was predicted to rule Rome in 63 according to a prophecy (3.11).84  Cicero also 
emphasized that Lentulus alone wrote to Catiline, connecting the two men for 
the first time and, in turn, the actions occurring inside and outside of Rome 
(3.12). 
Consequently, the Senate voted that Lentulus abdicate from the 
praetorship due to his association with the affair.  According to Cicero, Lentulus’ 
resignation also meant he had to forfeit his rights as a citizen (Cic. Cat. 3.15, 
4.10).85  Cicero declared that the letters to the envoys were read out in the 
Senate and those who wrote them confessed (3.10).  There is no indication by 
any of our sources that Lentulus or the four others, who were executed, 
exercised their right of provocatio.86  The letters written by Cethegus, Gabinius, 
and Statilius connected them with the Allobrogean envoys, but not with Catiline 
directly.  Apparently, the others who were executed were considered guilty by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 See section 2.4.3. 
83 NB: Cicero actually mentions Gabinius last concerning the confessions, but his name appears 
as an afterthought, see Cat. 3.10.  
84 The prophecy is examined in section 2.4.5. 
85 The Senate voted that Lentulus should resign from the praetorship, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B 
Cat. 47.3; App. B Civ. 2.5; Dio Cass. 37.34.2.  Whether Lentulus’ resignation was purely 
symbolic or legal and whether he retained his status as citizen is debatable, cf. Weinrib 1968, 
46; Vretska 1976, 478-9; McGushin 1977, 227; Barlow 1994, 182-3; Drummond 1995, 97-102; 
Dyck 2008, 185.  Cf. nn. 214-15. 
86 According to Cicero, the lex Sempronia, passed by C. Sempronius Gracchus in 123, 
reaffirmed the leges de provocatione and contained the caveat that qui autem rei publicae sit 
hostis eum civem esse nullo modo posse “That an enemy of the Republic cannot in any respect 
be regarded as a citizen” (Cic. Cat. 4.10).  On Roman citizens’ right to provocatio, cf. Cic. Rab. 
Perd. 11; Orat. 2.199; Rep. 2.53-54, 61-2; Dion Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.19.4; Liv. 2.8.2, 3.45.8, 55.4; 
Val. Max. 4.1.1; Dig. 1.2.2.16.  For the history of provocatio in general, cf. Lintott 1972b; Jones 
1972, 33; Develin 1978; Robinson 1995, 6. 
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association not only because of their involvement with the envoys, but also due 
to their connection with Lentulus, who attempted to communicate with Catiline. 
The three other times when the reliqua coniuratorum manus are named 
in a list in the Third Oration, Lentulus’ name emphatically appears in the first 
position.  Lentulus was mentioned first before Cethegus, Statilius, and Cassius 
when Cicero discussed the oath and letters pledging their support to the 
Allobrogean envoys (Cic. Cat. 3.9).87  When Cicero named all nine of the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus who were condemned by the Senate, Lentulus’ 
name occurred first (3.14).  Later in the Third Oration when Cicero boasted 
about saving every Roman citizen from uno post hominum memoriam maximo 
crudelissimoque bello “the most important and the most savage war within 
memory of man,” it was Lentulus who headed the list of those that had brought 
this “war” to Rome before Catiline, Cethegus, and Cassius (3.25). 
Sallust’s Catilina introduced the affair’s participants by compiling their 
names in a list.  He recorded fifteen Roman citizens by name: eleven, according 
to Sallust, from the senatorial order (including Lentulus) and four equestrians 
(Sall. B Cat. 17.3-4).88  When Sallust named the participants who remained in 
Rome, Lentulus’ name retained the primary position:89 i) when the Allobroges 
first demanded an oath of allegiance from those soliciting their aid (44.1); ii) 
when Lentulus and the others were summoned by Cicero after the letters were 
seized (46.3); iii) after the participants were proclaimed guilty and when they 
were taken into custody (47.3-4); iv) on December 4 when L. Tarquinius 
claimed that he was ordered by Crassus to encourage Catiline after Lentulus 
and the others were apprehended (48.4); v) when describing the rumors that 
the freedmen and slaves of those arrested were attempting to break them out of 
captivity (50.1); vi) during Cato’s speech when he was appealing that the 
Senate remain firm in their decision for capital punishment (52.33); vii) when 
recording the order of execution (55.5); and viii) in Catiline’s speech to the army 
before their final battle, Sallust’s text reads: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 NB: The language implied that Cassius did not swear an oath like Lentulus, Cethegus, and 
Statilius.  Cassius might not have written a letter either, see Dyck 2008, 178. 
88 According to the order recorded in the Catilina, the eleven senators were: Lentulus, P. 
Autronius Paetus, Cassius, Cethegus, P. Cornelius Sulla, Ser. Cornelius Sulla, L. Vargunteius, 
Annius Chilo, Laeca, L. Calpurnius Bestia, and Q. Curius (Sall. B Cat. 17.3); and the four 
knights were M. Fulvius Nobilior, Statilius, Gabinius, and C. Cornelius (17.4). 
89 NB: The only exception occurred when Sallust claimed that Catiline instructed the others in 
Rome to carry on with the affair’s plans before he left the city.  In this instance, Cethegus is 
mentioned first then Lentulus (Sall. B Cat. 32.2). 
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scitis equidem, milites, socordia atque ignavia Lentuli quantam ipsi nobisque cladem 
attulerit quoque modo, dum ex urbe praesidia opperior, in Galliam proficisci nequiverim 
 
“You know perfectly well, soldiers, how great is the disaster that the incapacity and 
cowardice of Lentulus have brought upon himself and us, and how waiting for 
reinforcements from the city, I could not march into Gaul” (Sall. B Cat. 58.4).90 
 
However, the emphatic position of Lentulus’ name, in the occurrences 
examined above, might be due to the flexible word order permitted in Latin.  The 
positioning of Lentulus’ name does not necessarily prove that Cicero and 
Sallust thought Lentulus was the leader and most influential member of those 
remaining in Rome.  
A more significant indication of Lentulus’ influence over the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus than when his name appearing with the others remaining 
in Rome is when Cicero specifically names Lentulus and uses either the 
pronouns alii or ceterae (‘the others’) in reference to the others members.  
Cicero stated that Lentulus et aliis had determined that the Saturnalia was the 
most opportune date for commencing their plans to set fire to Rome and murder 
the leading citizens (Cic. Cat. 3.10).91  When Cicero referred to intrigue with the 
Allobrogean envoys, he berated the choice of Lentulus ceterisque to solicit 
support from barbares (3.22).  This phraseology demonstrates that Cicero, in 
certain cases, felt Lentulus was the only person supporting the affair in Rome 
worth mentioning. 
This mode of representing Lentulus’ influence over the other reliqua 
coniuratorum manus also occurs in the Catilina.  Sallust, more frequently than 
Cicero, used a pronoun to anonymously refer to the reliqua coniuratorum 
manus alongside Lentulus’ name.92  Sallust used this particular arrangement 
five times: i) when explaining that the affair’s ultimate plan was to 
simultaneously commence the arson and murders in Rome as the army in 
Etruria marched on the city, Sallust referred to those in Rome as Lentulus cum 
ceteris (Sall. B Cat. 43.1); ii) when recording that the Senate ordered Lentulus 
and the others to be placed in custody until a sentence was reached, Sallust 
used Lentulus itemque ceteri (47.2-3); iii) when Sallust reproduced Caesar’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 According to Sallust, Catiline and Manlius’ army was in retreat due to the failure in Rome.  Cf. 
Dio Cass. 37.39.1-2. 
91 NB: Cethegus thought the Saturnalia, which started on December 17, was far too late to act, 
cf. Cic. Cat. 3.10; Sall. B Cat. 43.3-4. 
92 NB: Sallust twice named both Lentulus and Cethegus and then used a pronoun to refer to the 
others in Rome, cf. Sall. B Cat. 32.2: Cethego atque Lentulo ceterisque, 48.4: Lentulus et 
Cethegus aliique ex coniuratione. 
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speech regarding their punishment, Caesar referred those awaiting the 
sentence as P. Lentuli et ceterorum (51.7); iv) also in Cato’s speech, they were 
referred to as P. Lentulo ceterisque (52.17); and v) when recording the 
procession to the Tullianum where the five men sentenced to death were 
executed, Sallust recorded that Lentulum in carcerem deducit; idem fit ceteris 
per praetores “He [Cicero] personally led Lentulus to the dungeon, while the 
praetors performed the same office for the others” (55.2).93  Sallust most likely 
presumed that the reader understood whom the pronoun referred to in each 
instance because he had already named certain members of the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus before he started using this particular phraseology.  
However, Lentulus was always named whenever Sallust discussed the other 
participants remaining in Rome regardless of the action being described.  
Therefore, Sallust clearly considered that Lentulus was the most influential 
member of the reliqua coniuratorum manus.  
The accounts written in Greek also tend to follow the pattern of naming 
Lentulus and then using a pronoun to describe the others in the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus.  When Plutarch and Dio mention Lentulus by name, they 
also use either the corresponding form of the plural article &ἱ (‘the men’) or the 
pronoun ἄ++,* (‘the others’) to denote the other participants remaining in Rome.  
This syntax suggests Lentulus’ dominance over the latter.  For example, 
Plutarch described the attempt by Lentulus and the others in Rome to solicit the 
aid of the Allobroges by naming Lentulus and using the plural article to refer to 
the others $,-$,). ,ἱ /%#ὶ 01!$+,! “These men Lentulus and his partisans” 
(Plut. Cic. 18.5).  When Plutarch recorded the executions, he used a similar 
construction $ῶ! "ὲ /%#ὶ $ὸ! 01!$+,! “Lentulus and his associates” (Cat. min. 
26.1).  Cethegus was the only other participant remaining in Rome other than 
Lentulus mentioned in Plutarch’s works94, indicating that Plutarch considered 
the two senators as the most influential members of the affair remaining in 
Rome.  However, Plutarch claimed that Lentulus, not Cethegus, encouraged all 
the others in Rome to continue with the affair after Catiline had left the city.  
Plutarch wrote $,ὺ. "' ὑ/,+%*231!$'. ἐ! $ῇ /4+%* $ῶ! "*%23'#µ1!5! ὑ/ὸ $,ῦ 
6'$*+7!' 8)!ῆ(% &'ὶ /'#%39##)!% 6,#!:+*,. 01!$+,. ;,-#'. ἐ/7&+<8*! “The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Plutarch claimed Cicero personally led each of the five men to the Tullianum naming Lentulus 
first, then Cethegus, then &ὕ$5 $ῶ! ἄ++5! ἕ&'8$,! &'$'('(ὼ! ἀ/1&$%*!%! ‘In this manner he 
led each of the others down to be executed’ (Plut. Cic. 22.2).  
94 Cf. nn.79 and 93. 
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creatures of Catiline who had been left behind in the city were brought together 
and encouraged by Cornelius Lentulus, surnamed, Sura” (Cic. 17.1). 
Dio used a similar arrangement four times in his work: i) when describing 
the intentions to burn Rome and murder its leading citizens, Dio explained that 
the plans would be executed $,ῦ 0%!$,-+,)… ἐ#(98'83'* µ%$9 $% $ῶ! ἄ++5! 
$ῶ! 8)!,µ5µ,&4$5! “by Lentulus…with the aid of [the others in the affair]” 
(37.34.1), ii) when recounting that Lentulus and the others had been placed in 
custody after their confession, Dio stated that it was ὁ 01!$,)+,.… µ%$ὰ $ῶ! 
ἄ++5 $ῶ! 8)++<231!$5! “Lentulus…along with the others arrested” (37.34.2), 
iii) when describing the attempt of certain slaves and freedmen to free Lentulus 
and the others from the places they were kept in custody, Dio claimed these 
clients were there to help $,ῦ $% 0%!$,-+,) &'ὶ $ῶ! ἄ++5! “Lentulus and the 
rest” (37.35.3) and iv) when commenting on the reasons why four years later in 
58 the tribune P. Clodius Pulcher passed specific legislation against Cicero for 
his illegal executions of Roman citizens during his consulship, Dio referred to 
the five who were executed as $,ῦ 0%!$,-+,) &'ὶ $ῶ! ἄ++5! “Lentulus and the 
others” (38.14.5).  However, as mentioned, Lentulus was the only participant 
supporting the affair in Rome mentioned in Dio’s work.  Perhaps Dio singled out 
Lentulus because he believed Lentulus was the most prominent person 
supporting the affair in Rome and therefore the only participant worth 
mentioning among the reliqua coniuratorum manus. 
Appian’s Bella civilia, on the other hand, not only mentioned Lentulus but 
some of the other reliqua coniuratorum manus.  Cethegus is named alongside 
Lentulus three time in Appian’s work, but the latter always retained the foremost 
position (App. B Civ 2.3, 4, 5).95  Appian claimed Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, 
and Cassius were $,ῖ. ἄ#=,)8* $ῆ. ἐ/'!'8$98%5. “the chiefs of the affair” 
remaining in Rome (2.4).96  When Appian described the attempt to solicit the 
Allobrogean envoys, he stated that they ἐ. $ὴ! 01!$+,) 8)!5µ,87'! 
ἐ/:=3<8'! “were solicited to join [the affair] of Lentulus” (2.4).  Although 
Appian had previously named Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius and Cassius as 
leaders of the affair in Rome, in this passage, Lentulus’ name occurs in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Appian was clearly mistaken to rank Cethegus as a praetor as well as Lentulus (App. B Civ. 
2.2).  See Appendix I, [no.12]. 
96 NB: Oddly Appian did not mention Gabinius in this list, who was also executed and who was 
also an equestrian like Statilius.  In addition, Appain mentioned Cassius, who, although a 
senator, had a less clear role and an uncertain fate compared with the two equites who were 
executed. 
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genitive suggesting that he had assumed leadership over the affair.  Therefore, 
similar to the other sources that present Lentulus as the foremost leader of the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus, Appian’s choice of syntax suggests that Lentulus’ 
influence on the affair was so significant that it was now $ὴ! 01!$+,) 
8)!5µ,87'!. 
As mentioned above, according to Sallust, Catiline realized that a 
significant component to the affair’s success had failed when Lentulus and the 
others in Rome were apprehended and executed.  Catiline knew he could 
expect no more reinforcements from Rome or from Gaul.97  Catiline and 
Manlius’ army was surrounded by the armies of the co-consul, C. Antonius, and 
the praetor, Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, and eventually defeated in January of 
62.  If Cicero and other leading citizens had been murdered and the Allobroges 
had assisted the army in Etruria then perhaps the affair would have been 
successful.  When Lentulus and the others were executed, the affair’s ultimate 
goal to gain power in Rome pratically died with them.98  Arguably, Lentulus’ role 
and his leadership in Rome were more crucial to the affair’s success than the 
army in Etruria.  However, there were other influential citizens in Rome that 
allegedly supported the affair, but were not convicted, because either the 
accusations against them were false or they ceased supporting the affair before 
it was exposed. 
Our sources implied that C. Antonius Hybrida, Cicero’s consular 
colleague, supported the affair because he was Catiline’s friend.99  The 
fragments of Cicero’s In Toga Candida, delivered when he was candidate for 
the consulship for 63, berated Catiline and Antonius accentuating their 
disreputable character.  Antonius had been expelled from the Senate by the 
censors of 70/69, but was able to quickly rehabilitate his political career.100  He !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Sall. B Cat. 58.4.  For the text of this passage, see p.79. 
98 Sall. B Cat. 57.1: sed postquam in castra nuntius pervenit, Romae coniurationem patefactam, 
de Lentulo et Cethego ceterisque quos supra memoravi supplicium sumptum, plerique, quos ad 
bellum spes rapinarum aut novarum rerum studium illexerat, dilabuntur “But when the news 
reached the camp that the plot had been discovered at Rome, and that Lentulus, Cethegus, and 
the others whom I mentioned had been done to the death, very many of those whom the hope 
of pillage or desire for revolution had led to take up arms began to desert.”  
99 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14; Mur. 49; Sest. 8; Sall. B Cat. 21.3, 26.4; Plut. Cic. 12.3-4; Dio Cass. 
37.39.3-4.   
100 Asconius explained the several reasons for Antonius’ expulsion including his massive debts 
and his rapacity in Greece (Asc. 84C).  Sulla put Antonius in command of some of his army and 
stationed him in Achaea while the former was returning to Rome in 84/83.  In 76, Antonius stood 
trial for his treatment of the Achaeans, but the trial was abandoned, cf. Gruen 1973; TLRR, no. 
142.  Cicero hinted that Antonius’ actions when governor in Macedonia from 62-60 were also 
disapproved of (Cic. Att. 1.12.1), see Shackleton Bailey 1965 Vol. I, 297-8. NB: Q. Curius, one 
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was Cicero’s colleague in the praetorship in 66 and then defeated the other 
candidates, including Catiline, for the consulship in 63.  Perhaps Antonius had 
enough influential support as son of the renowned orator M. Antonius, who was 
consul in 99 and censor in 97,101 to continue along the cursus honorum after 
being expelled from the Senate.102  On the other hand, he might have resorted 
to bribery to win the consulate.  Cicero insinuated that Antnoius and Catiline 
were bribing people for votes in 64 (Asc. 83C).  According to Asconius, 
Antonius and Catiline were working together to keep Cicero from being elected 
consul in 64.103 
Cicero knew that Antonius was friendly with Catiline and perhaps with 
some of the affair’s participants, but he applauded his colleague’s restraint to 
avoid any association with the participants after the affair was revealed (cf. Cic. 
Cat. 3.14; Sest. 8).  Sallust reported that Cicero was able to secure Antonius’ 
loyalty by offering him the governorship of Macedonia, which had been 
previously allocated to Cicero after he was elected consul (Sall. B Cat. 26.4).104  
The Senate sent Antonius to levy an army to oppose Catiline and Manlius’ 
forces in Etruria, but, according to Dio, Antonius feigned an illness so he didn’t 
have to face his friend Catiline on the battlefield (Dio Cass. 37.39.4).105  
Antonius was brought to trial in 59, which probably included an accusation that 
he supported the affair of 63.  However, Cicero defended his former colleague 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of the informers previously involved with the affair, and Lentulus were also purged from the 
Senate in 70/69.  For Lentulus’ expulsion and rehabilitation of his career, see 2.4.1.  Curius’ 
status in 63 is uncertain, see Appendix I, [no.18]. 
101 Asconius recorded that the influence as M. Antonius’ son helped C. Antonius surpass 
Catiline in votes as the second consul for 63 (Asc. 94C).  In the Brutus, Cicero portrayed M. 
Antonius as one of the greatest Roman orators, cf. Cic. Brut. 115, 138-44, 161, 163, 165, 186, 
189, 203, 214-5, 230, 296, 301, 333.  Cicero chose M. Antonius as one of the interlocutors in 
the De Oratore. 
102 C. Antonius was appointed censor in 42 most likely because he was Mark Antony’s uncle. 
103 Asc. 83C: coierant enim ambo ut Ciceronem consulatu deicerent…itaque haec oratio contra 
solos Catilinam et Antonium est. “For both had entered a pact to keep Cicero out of the 
consulship…For this reason, the speech is directed solely against Catilina and Antonius.” 
Translation from Kaster 2006, 187. Cf. Marshall 1985, 285. 
104 Antonius was allotted Cisalpine Gaul after he was elected consul.  Cicero took Antonius’ 
province in exchange and gave Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, who was praetor of 63, the post in 
Cisalpine Gaul, so Cicero could defend Rome from the reliqua coniuratorum (Cic. Cat. 4.23).  
See Allen 1952.  NB: Cicero expected a loan from Antonius during his governorhsip of 
Macedonia in 62-60, cf. Cic. Att. 1.13.6; 1.14.7; Fam. 5.6.3.  Cf. Shackleton Bailey 1965 Vol. I, 
297; Shatzman 1975, 133. 
105 Sallust claimed Antonius was ill before the battle (Sall. B Cat. 59.4).  In contrast, Appian 
recorded that Antonius led the army against Catiline (App. BC 2.7). Dio is the only source that 
suggested Antonius illness was feigned, however Dio later recorded that Antonius, regardless of 
his actions, was proclaimed imperator for overseeing the defeat of Catiline’s army (Dio Cass. 
37.40.2). 
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in court regardless of this allegation.106  Cicero’s Pro Antonio was unpublished, 
but perhaps he thought he could clear Antonius of the accusation by 
emphasizing Antonius’ role in its suppression.  Antonius was convicted and 
exiled despite Cicero’s advocacy.107  Antonius perhaps supported Catiline or the 
other participants before 63, but he certainly refrained from supporting them 
when he was consul. 
Sallust declared that M. Licinius Crassus would be the primary 
beneficiary if the affair were successful (Sall. B Cat. 17.7).  Plutarch recorded 
that Crassus received a letter warning him of the impending murders in Rome 
(Plut. Cic. 15.1).  According to Plutarch, Crassus duly gave Cicero the letter to 
avoid being suspected of supporting these plans due to his friendship with 
Catiline (15.3).108  Sallust’s Catilina continued to incriminate Crassus when 
describing the testimony of a certain L. Tarquinius.  On December 4, Tarquinius 
claimed he was ordered by Crassus to convince Catiline, regardless of the fate 
of the participants in Rome, to hurry towards the city with his army (48.4).  
Sallust stated that some believed the accusation (48.5).109  But Cicero and the 
Senate voted that Tarquinius’ testimony was false due to Crassus’ extensive 
support and influence in Rome (48.6).110  In his own authorial voice, Sallust said 
that he had once overheard Crassus remark that Cicero believed he was 
involved with the affair of 63 (48.9).111 
Caesar was also implicated in the affair of 63 along with Crassus.  
Sallust reported that the accusation against Caesar stemmed from Q. Lutatius 
Catulus, who was indignant over his defeat against Caesar in the election for 
pontifex maximus in 63, and C. Calpurnius Piso, who was facing prosecution by 
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106 In mid to late December 62, Cicero informally defended Antonius’ actions in Macedonia in 
the Senate (Cic. Fam. 5.6.3).  He defended Antonius formally in court in 59, however, neither 
defense speech was published.  On the speeches, cf. Settle 1962, 167-9; Gruen 1973; J. 
Crawford 1984, 97-8, 124-31. 
107 Cicero insinuated that Antonius had been convicted in 59 due to his complicity with the affair 
of 63 (Cic. Flacc. 95).  But we cannot be certain that Antonius was prosecuted for this reason.  
Instead, he might have been formally charged de repetundis from his stint as proconsul in 
Macedonia and only derided for his suspected complicity with the affair (Dio Cass. 38.10). Cf. 
Gruen, 1973; TLRR, no. 241. 
108 On Crassus involvement with the affair of 63, cf. Salmon 1935; Seager 1964, 345-6; 
Marshall 1974, 804-13.  See also Appendix I, [no.27]. 
109 Cf. Dio Cass. 37.35.1; Plu. Crass. 13.3 
110 Cf. Dio Cass. 37.35.2.  In contrast, Plutarch stated Crassus’ son, who was in Cicero’s care, 
convinced the two to eventually become friends (Plut. Crass. 13.5). 
111 Plutarch affirmed that Cicero incriminated Crassus along with Caesar in Cicero’s ,)#ὶ 0ῆ2 
ὑ,.0)7.2 “treatise upon his consulship” (Plu. Crass. 13.4). 
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Caesar for extortion that year (Sall. B Cat. 49.1-4).112  Sallust confirmed that 
Cicero was not swayed by either disgruntled party or by the hostility that was 
demonstrated against Caesar due to these allegations (49.4).113  On December 
5, when Cicero and the Senate were deciding the punishment for the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus, Caesar did not approve of their recommendations for 
capital punishment and instead suggested a less severe punishment.114  
Suetonius recorded that after Caesar’s speech against the capital punishment 
of the reliqua coniuratorum manus some thought he had offered a less severe 
sentence because he originally supported the affair.  These men purportedly 
attempted to physically attack Caesar when he emerged from the Senate-house 
(Suet. Iul. 14.2).    
According to Asconius and Plutarch, Cicero’s secret memoir of his 
consulship, which was most likely published after his death, professed that 
Crassus and Caesar were behind the supposed plan devised in 66 to murder 
the new consuls of 65 and the affair of 63.115  Suetonius went further, 
suggesting that if the affair were successful then Crassus would be appointed 
dictator, with Caesar as his master of the horse (Suet. Iul 9.1).  On the other 
hand, if Crassus was a participant, why did Cicero trust him to take custody of 
Gabinius after the latter had confessed to his involvement in the affair?  The 
same argument can be made for Caesar, who was entrusted with guarding 
Statilius before their arraignment.116  Furthermore, Plutarch, Dio, and Suetonius 
recorded that Crassus had initially informed Cicero of the massacre planned in 
Rome, which suggested that Crassus did not support the affair’s plans.117  The 
allegations of Crassus’ support of the affair primarily seem to be predicated on 
his rivalry with Pompey and from Cicero’s accusations in the secret memoir of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 C. Calpurnius Piso was governor of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul from 66-65.  Sallust 
stated that Caesar also accused Piso of illegally executing a Transpandane Gaul (Sall. B Cat. 
49.2). 
113 After Cicero did not pursue the accusation against Caesar, some equites made an attempt 
on Caesar’s life on December 4, cf. Sall. B Cat. 49.4, Plut. Caes. 8.2-3; Suet. Iul. 14.1-2. 
114 See n.342. 
115 Asconius and Plutarch claimed they used Cicero’s memoir as a primary source, cf. Asc. 83C; 
Plut. Crass. 13.2-4.  According to Cicero the expositio of his consulship was still unfinished in 
44, cf. Att. 14.17.6, 2.6.2; 16.11.3.  Dio claimed the expositio was not to be published until after 
Cicero’s death (Dio Cass. 39.10.3).  On the expositio, see Rawson 1991.  NB: Cicero’s 
expositio consiliorum suorum that our sources referred to does not survive and was different 
than the other memoirs of his consulship De Temporibus Suis and De Consulatu Suo, cf. Settle 
1962, 299; Harrison 1990; Rawson 1991.  
116 For the places of custody, see Sall. B Cat. 47.4. 
117 Cf. Plut. Cic. 15.1-4; Crass. 13.4; Dio Cass. 37.31.1; Suet. Iul. 17.  As mentioned in the main 
text, Plutarch claimed Crassus turned informer to avoid any suspicion of supporting Catiline 
(Plut. Cic. 15.3). 
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his consulship, which no longer survives.118  However, the rumors of Crassus 
and Caesar’s involvement in the affair in our later sources must be approached 
with caution due to the odium both men received when recalling the two 
triumvirs’ manipulative political careers and the civil wars that erupted due to 
Caesar’s actions while alive and after his murder.119 
The political cooperation between Crassus and Caesar during the 60’s 
has garnered sufficient attention in modern scholarship120, but the fact that 
neither was ever officially prosecuted for their suspected suuport of either the 
plan to murder the consuls of 65 or the affair of 63 is sufficient to consign the 
allegations against Crassus and Caesar as hearsay.121  Both men may have 
been political supporters of Catiline, but proving political alignments in Roman 
History is often a maze of contradictions.  After the violent intentions of the affair 
were divulged, if Crassus and Caesar did support it then they wisely withdrew 
their support before any concrete evidence could be produced against them.  
Regarding Crassus and Caesar’s involvement in the affair of 63, we should only 
make positive use of the genuine evidence we have; therefore, we are left to 
choose which source to believe as the evidence remains circumstantial and, at 
times, contradictory. 
On the other hand, Cicero was able to obtain tangible evidence (i.e., the 
letters and confessions) supported by testimonies against Lentulus and the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus making their involvement indisputable.  In the 
Fourth Oration, Cicero focused on the sentencing of Lentulus in deference to 
his position as praetor and the respect due to an ex-consul of Rome.  The 
judgment of Lentulus dominates the debate in the Senate and his name is 
mentioned more than any other participant.  Lentulus’ name occurred fourteen 
times in the Fourth Oration.  In contrast, Catiline was mentioned five times and, 
most noticeably, the four other Roman citizens whose lives hung in the balance 
were named only five times between them.  Cicero did not name the four 
participants Cassius, Annius, Furius, and Umbrenus, who were sentenced to 
death in absentia.122  More surprising is the fact that Cicero did not mention 
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118 Cicero’s relationship with Crassus was complicated see, Gruen 1974, 68. 
119 On the later hatred of Crassus and Caesar in our sources, see Henderson 1950, 13-4.  
120 Cf. Salmon 1935; Stevens 1963; Seager 1964; Ward 1972; Marshall 1974. 
121 Cicero’s allegations that Crassus and Caesar were behind the conspiracies of 66/65 and 63 
in his memoirs should also give one pause due to the fluctuating political relationships that 
persisted between all three, see Gruen 1974, 66-82. 
122 See n.72. 
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either Statilius or Caeparius, who were both executed.  These men were not 
senators like Lentulus or Cethegus, but the eques Gabinius was mentioned 
unlike Statilius, who was of the same rank (Cic. Cat. 4.12).  Therefore, it was 
not Cicero’s concern to name only those involved with the affair who had 
senatorial status in the Fourth Oration.  Instead, the speech was primarily aimed 
at Lentulus because he was the highest ranking member and therefore the most 
controversial member of the affair.  Because Lentulus was a current magistrate, 
Cicero probably felt he needed to convince the Senate that Lentulus deserved 
the death penalty despite the fact he was currently holding a political office. 
The passages in the Fourth Oration that are most suggestive regarding 
Lentulus’ influence in the affair are those in which he is mentioned in the same 
breath as Catiline.  Twice Cicero explicitly proposed that the leadership of 
Rome would fall to Lentulus, not to Catiline.  First, Cicero painted an apocryphal 
picture of what would have been the final outcome if the affair were successful: 
Cum vero mihi proposui regnantem Lentulum, sicut ipse se ex fatis sperasse confessus 
est, purpuratum esse huic Gabinium, cum exercitu venisse Catilinam, tum 
lamentationem matrum familias, tum fugam virginum atque puerorum ac vexationem 
virginum Vestalium prehorresco. 
  
Whenever I have pictured Lentulus as potentate, as he admitted was his hope of what 
fate held for him, with Gabinius as his grand vizier, and Catiline there with his army, I 
shudder when I think of the mothers weeping, the boys and girls fleeing, the violation of 
the Vestal Virgins (Cic. Cat. 4.12) 
 
Cicero claimed that Lentulus would emerge as the ruler in Rome alluding to 
Lentulus’ prophecy, which is examined in detail in section 2.4.5.  In contrast, 
Cicero claimed Catiline’s sphere of influence was merely over the exercitus, 
alluding to the army in Etruria.  The second example distinctly characterized 
Lentulus as the leader of the affair and to whom all the plans in Rome were 
entrusted: 
Hic ad evertenda fundamenta rei publicae Gallos arcessit, servitia concitat, Catilinam 
vocat, atrribuit nos trucidandos Cethego et ceteros civis interficiendos Gabinio, urbem 
inflammandam Cassio, totam Italiam vastandam diripiendamque Catilinae. 
  
His [Lentulus’] grandson, however, summons Gauls to overthrow the foundations of the 
Republic, urges the slaves to rise, sends for Catiline, assigns us to Cethegus to be 
slaughtered, the other citizens to Gabinius to be killed, the city to Cassius to be burnt, 
the whole of Italy to Catiline to be sacked and laid waste (Cic. Cat. 4.13). 
 
Again, Catiline is relegated from the primary protagonist to the leader of the 
army outside of Rome.  It is left to Lentulus to delegate the principal tasks of the 
affair to his subordinates in the city.  Having thoroughly considered the 
terminology in Cicero’s Orations that are associated with Lentulus, one can 
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argue these speeches were filled with rhetoric suitable to an invective.123  
However, the context of the passages examined suggests that a reevaluation of 
Lentulus’ influence on the affair is necessary to understand why the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus continued supporting the affair a month after its initial 
discovery.  The text certainly implies a contentious hierarchy between Catiline 
and Lentulus, but can we affix perhaps a less biased trope to Lentulus’ 
representation by examining Cicero’s other speeches and letters that referred to 
Lentulus? 
There is a dearth of letters that survive in Cicero’s epistolary corpus that 
directly discuss the affair of 63 and no existing letters written during 63 that we 
can examine in order to judge what Cicero may have felt about Lentulus or the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus.  Yet the few letters that directly refer to the affair or 
its participants are illuminating and help to ascertain Cicero’s perception of the 
importance of the actions specifically occurring inside of Rome.  In mid-January 
of 62, Cicero wrote a letter to Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, propraetor of 
Cisalpine Gaul, to praise his efforts for preventing any retreat by Catiline’s 
forces from Etruria into the adjoining province (Cic. Fam. 5.2).124  In the letter, 
Cicero initially ascribed the defense of the city to himself and the defense of the 
rest of Italy to Metellus Celer and his army (5.2.1).  However, the letter primarily 
concentrated on the affront shown to Cicero by Celer’s brother Q. Metellus 
Nepos, the tribune for 62.  Nepos had barred Cicero from making the customary 
address to the people after he completed his tenure as consul.  Cicero claimed 
that Nepos’ primary reason for opposing his consular address was because of 
the five Roman citizens executed without a trial under Cicero’s watch (5.2.7-
8).125  Cicero’s perception of the affair is demonstrated in the following passage 
from the letter: 
Qui, qua poena senatus, consensus bonorum omnium, eos affecerat, qui urbem 
incendere, et magistratus ac senatum trucidare, bellum maximum conflare voluissent, 
eadem dignum iudicaret eum, qui curiam caede, urbem incendiis, Italiam bello 
liberasset. 
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123 On identifying Ciceronian invective, see Craig 2007. 
124 The date of the letter med. m. Ian. an. 62 is vague and whether it was sent before or after 
the defeat of Catiline and Manlius’ forces is debatable, see Shackleton Bailey 1977 Vol. I, 276.  
Cicero did not explicitly congratulate Celer’s victory over the army in Etruria, so perhaps the 
army had yet been defeated.  However, Catiline and Manlius’ army fought against Antonius’ 
forces not Celer’s forces.  
125 Cf. Cic. Mur. 81, 83; Fam. 5.2.6-8; Dio Cass. 37.38.  Plutarch claimed it was the tribune 
Bestia, who barred Cicero from his consular address (Plut. Cic. 23.2).  
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For, in his [Nepos’] judgment, the man who had delivered the Senate-house from 
massacre, the City from incendiarism, and Italy from war, deserved the same 
punishment as that inflicted by the Senate, with the unanimous approval of all honest 
men, upon those who had purposed to fire the City, butcher the magistrates and the 
Senate, and fan the flames of a devastating war.” (Cic. Fam. 5.2.8) 
 
Cicero perceived that his suppression of the disturbances in Rome was the 
more significant conflict than the disturbances occurring outside of the city.  
Although one could argue that Cicero was referring to the army in Etruria 
because of the rhetorical claim that he had saved Italy from war, the passage 
only makes sense if Cicero was referring to those remaining Rome.  Cicero is 
clearly describing those who were executed on December 5 and the 
seriousness of their plans, which were to support all facets of the affair. 
In a letter to Atticus Cicero compared P. Clodius Pulcher’s acquittal in the 
Bona Dea scandal of 61 to the earlier acquittals of Catiline and Lentulus in the 
same contemptuous tone.126  Cicero implied that Clodius had bribed the jury, 
like Lentulus and Catiline before him, or he would have been convicted.  Cicero 
proclaimed that Clodius was hunc tertium iam esse a iudicibus in rem publicam 
immissum “the third criminal let loose on the country by a jury” (Cic. Att. 1.16.9).  
In 58, when Clodius was tribune part of the legislation he passed was aimed 
directly at Cicero by revising the previous laws concerned with the capital 
punishment of citizens.127  Fearing that he might face prosecution for his illegal 
execution of Lentulus and the others, Cicero voluntarily went into exile.128  
Cicero often linked Clodius with the metaphorically corrupt Catiline in some of 
his speeches delivered after the Senate had recalled him from voluntary exile 
the following year.129  Hence there was no reason for Cicero to discuss Lentulus 
or the others who were illegally executed during his consulship, which could 
only remind his audience why he was compelled to leave Rome in the first 
place.  However, in a letter to his closest confidant, Cicero did not avoid 
mentioning Lentulus and instead implied that Lentulus’ criminal record was 
equal to Catiline’s. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Lentulus and Catiline had been acquitted twice (Cic. Att. 1.16.9). 
127 On the lex Sempronia and the lex Porcia and leges Clodii, cf. Cic. Pis. 14.1-4; Dom. 4-7; Dio 
Cass. 38.14.4-6. 
128 Dio explicitly claimed Clodius’ legislation was directed at Cicero due the executions of 
Lentulus and the other 38.14.4-6.  Cicero stated that Cato’s advice was that he go into voluntary 
exile before he was harmed, cf. Cic. Att. 3.15.2; Plut. Cat. min. 35.1 
129 Cicero compared Clodius to Catiline often, cf. Cic. Mil. 37, 63; Dom. 13, 61; Har. resp. 5.  
NB: In 65, Clodius prosecuted Catiline de repetundis (TLRR, no. 212). Cicero insisted the case 
was a farce and Catiline was acquitted, cf. Cic. Pis. 23; Har. resp. 42.   
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In the Pro Sulla delivered before the consular elections of 62130, Cicero 
defended P. Cornelius Sulla, the nephew of the dictator Sulla, who was accused 
of supporting the affair of 63 and charged under the lex Plautia de vi.131  One of 
Cicero’s tactics to convince the jury that his client did not support the affair was 
to vilify the criminal actions of Catiline, Lentulus, Cethegus, Cassius, Cn. 
Calpurnius Piso and primarily P. Autronius Paetus, who was consul-designate 
for 65 with P. Sulla, in order to downplay his client’s association with these men, 
who were known supporters of the affair.  In 66, the defeated consular 
candidates L. Manlius Torquatus and L. Aurelius Cotta charged the victorious 
candidates Autronius and Sulla with electoral corruption.  Both men were 
convicted de ambitu and stripped of the consulship.  New elections were held 
and Torquatus and Cotta were elected in their place.132  According to the Pro 
Sulla, the prosecution alleged that Sulla and Catiline had plotted to murder the 
new consuls when they entered the office on January 1, 65 (Cic. Sull. 68).  The 
so-called “First Conspiracy of Catiline” has been summarily debunked by 
modern scholarship generally concluding that Catiline was more likely to have 
been involved with the violent demonstrations occurring during the trial of C. 
Manilius in December of 66 than those occurring after Torquatus and Cotta 
began their term as consuls.133  However, Cicero’s primary aim in the Pro Sulla 
was to defend his client by discussing the violent nature of the men, other than 
Sulla, involved in the seditious plans of 66/65 and 63. 
Lentulus is categorically represented as one of the chief members of the 
affair of 63 in the Pro Sulla.  Cicero frequently associated Lentulus’ involvement 
with Catiline’s and Autronius’ actions (cf. Cic. Sull. 16, 33, 53, 75, 76).  
However, Cicero especially emphasized Autronius’ criminal nature over both 
Lentulus and Catiline.  Cicero claimed Autronius was a member of the affair of 
63.  Autronius purportedly approached the Allobrogean envoys (17, 36, 38), 
sent arms to the army in Etruria (17, 53), and sent the assassins to Cicero’s 
house (18).  Cicero remarked that only due to Lentulus’ execution did Autronius 
decide to withdraw his support (17).  Another of Cicero’s tactics in his defense 
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130 For the date of the Pro Sulla, cf. Berry 1996, 14; Marinone 2004, 89.  
131 For the charges against P. Sulla, see Berry 1996, 20-1.  On the lex Plautia di vi, cf. Hough 
1930; Lintott 1968, 107-124; Gruen 1974, 224-7; Labruna 1975, 166-74, Robinson 1995, 78-9. 
132 Cic. Sull. 17, 50. Cf. Berry 1996, 4-5 n.21.  
133 For the reasons why the label of “The First Catilinarian Conspiracy” is imprecise, cf. Syme 
1964, 87-102, Seager 1964; Gruen 1969; Ramsey 1984, 125-31.  On the trial of Manilius, see 
Ward 1970, 545-54. 
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was to indict those whose guilt was manifest in the affair of 63 in comparison to 
the circumstantial evidence against P. Sulla.  Cicero stressed that he had 
suppressed the disturbances in Rome and was defending P. Sulla against the 
accusation that he was a member of said affair.  This fact surely carried weight 
with the jury’s eventual acquittal.134  Clearly, we should be wary of Cicero’s 
account of Autronius’ activities, as Cicero used P. Sulla’s old colleague as a foil 
to heap most of the blame upon Autronius, who criminal actions had led to two 
convictions in 66 de ambitu and in 62 de vi (7, 15).135 
Cicero also stressed the criminal nature of the others who were involved 
in the affair in the Pro Sulla.  The most suggestive passage in the speech 
regarding Lentulus’ influence with the affair occurred when Cicero explicitly 
labeled Lentulus as a dux and not Catiline.  The passage reads:  
cum exercitus perditorum civium clandestine scelere conflates crudelissimum et 
luctuosissimum exitium patriae comparasset, cum ad occasum interitumque rei 
publicae Catilina in castris, in his autem templis atque tectis dux Lentulus esset 
constitutus  
 
“An army of abandoned citizens had been scraped together in a secret plot and had 
prepared for their country the most cruel and grievous destruction, Catiline had been 
placed in command of the camp to destroy and annihilate the Republic and Lentulus in 
command among our temples and homes”  (Cic. Sull. 33). 
 
Once again, Catiline was located in castris, alluding to the army in Etruria, and 
Lentulus was located inside Rome.  I believe the translation cited from the Loeb 
edition of the Pro Sulla by MacDonald does not place enough emphasis on the 
positioning of the term dux next to Lentulus’ name instead of Catiline’s name.  
Clearly, both the singular dux and esset constitutus refer to Catiline and 
Lentulus in the clause.136  However, MacDonald ignores translating the word 
autem, which is contextually significant.  In addition, Lentulus’ name is 
emphatically positioned next to dux.  Therefore, I propose an alternate and 
more suitable translation due to the context of when this passage occurred in 
the speech, which I will explain below. 
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134 According to Berry (1996, 34-9), P. Sulla was perhaps guilty under the lex Plautia de vi but 
not as a Catilinarian per se.  There were many political and financial advantages for Cicero to 
defend P. Sulla, cf. MacDonald 1977, 308-9; Berry 1996, 26-33.  Berry (38) questions, “Is it 
really credible that any consideration could have induced Cicero, who regarded his suppression 
of the affair as his greatest achievement, to defend a Catilinarian conspirator?”  According to 
Cic. Sul. 18, Autronius, who was a colleague of Cicero’s as a quaestor of Lilybaeum in 75, 
begged Cicero to defend him in 62 and Cicero refused. 
135 On Autronius’ two convictions, see TLRR, nos.200 and 229. 
136 Berry (1996: 204) states that the names Catilina and Lentulus “are considered as acting in 
isolation grammatically” due to the singular verb esset constitutus. 
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Cicero had taken umbrage at the prosecution’s accusation that his 
consulship was similar to a tyranny (Cic. Sull. 21-25).  He then proceeded to 
defend his actions as consul.  The passage that referred to Lentulus as a dux 
occurred during Cicero’s rebuttal against the prosecutors’ claim that he had 
acted with unreasonable severity towards Lentulus and the other four citizens 
who were executed (21-35).  Perhaps Cicero could assuage the odious charges 
of his fateful decision to sentence Lentulus and four other Roman citizens to 
death without a formal trial, if Lentulus were ascribed the leadership of the affair 
instead of Catiline.  Therefore, Cicero placed dux next to Lentulus’ name to 
stress that he was a leader in the affair as well as Catiline. 
In light of the context, I offer an alternate translation of the subordinate 
clause highlighting Cicero’s emphasis that the affair in Rome was more serious: 
‘Catiline had been placed in the military camp to ruin and eliminate the res 
publica, but Lentulus had been placed in command among our own temples 
and homes.’  This translation is analytically and contextually more suitable due 
to the circumstances of when this passage appeared in the Pro Sulla.  Directly 
after this passage, Cicero rhetorically argued that he had saved the res publica 
without resorting to armed force - sine tumultu, sine dilectu, sine armis, sine 
exercitu “Without any state of emergency, without a levy, without use of arms, 
without an army” (33).  Cicero had nothing physically to do with defeating the 
army in Etruria, therefore he stressed his suppression of the disturbances in 
Rome, and consequently emphasized the importance of preventing those 
remaining in the city planning arson and murder.  Regardless of the rhetoric in 
the Pro Sulla, according to the evidence presented in this section, it is 
conclusive that Lentulus was a leader of the affair’s activities inside of Rome, 
which were at the very least as significant as the activities of Catiline, whose 
primary role was leading the army in Etruria. 
 
2.4.1  Lentulus’ political career 
It is not surprising that our sources represent Lentulus as the leader of 
the reliqua coniuratorum manus because he was an ex-consul and was 
currently serving as a praetor for a second time in 63.  Therefore, Lentulus was 
the highest-ranking member of the affair.  He steadily rose up the cursus 
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honorem, first becoming quaestor by 81 during Sulla’s reign.137  According to 
Plutarch, Lentulus had misappropriated funds when he was quaestor (Plut. Cic. 
17.2-3).  When Sulla questioned him about his financial impropriety, Plutarch 
proclaimed that Lentulus flippantly pointed to his leg, insinuating that he had 
“missed the ball.”  Plutarch explained that this was how Lentulus supposedly 
received the agnomen (‘nickname’) of sura (‘the calf of the leg’).138  Lentulus 
probably was tried for misconduct, but was acquitted of the charge.139  He was 
elected praetor for 75 and served as governor of Sicily the following year.  
When Lentulus returned to Rome, he was accused of extortion in the region.140  
He was eventually charged de repetundis, but was acquitted by a slim margin of 
two votes.  The jury was apparently bribed.  According to Plutarch, Lentulus 
quipped that he had overpaid the jury since he only needed a majority of one 
vote to be acquitted not two (Cic. 17.4).141 
Lentulus’ popularity was unaffected despite these allegations of 
misconduct as a magistrate and promagistrate and he was elected consul for 
71.142  Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Poplicola, the ex-
consuls of 72, were elected censors for the following year.  The censors 
expelled sixty-four senators from the Senate including Lentulus in 70/69 (Liv. 
Per. 98).143  The reasons for his expulsion are vague.  Plutarch’s Life of Cicero 
is our only source that explicitly suggests the reasons why Lentulus was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 On Lentulus’ normal progression along the cursus honorem, see RE IV 1 (Cornelius) no. 
240, 1399.49-55.  
138 Plut. Cic. 17.2: ἐ' 0&!2 $.0" <*11.' =#-'&%2 0.µ%)*:' 34='" 0#' +>µ&37:' =#>µ"0:' 
$,?1)3) $.% +%/89)%#)'. $6.'.$0&&'0&2 +' 0&& <*11. $.% 1-6&' $,.%0&&'0&2 (' 0) 
346$1@0*, ,#&)19+' ,1%6?#:2 ,"'4 $.% $.0.8#&'>0%$#2 1-6&' µ'' &-$ .8> +%+-'.%, 
,.#/=)%' +' 0/' $'@µ>' 03,)# )1?9)%3.' &2 ,.!+)2 30.' (' 04 38.%#75)%' 5µ"#0:3%'. “In 
Sulla’s time he was quaestor and lost and wasted large amounts of the public funds.  Sulla was 
angry at this and demanded an accounting from him in the Senate, whereupon Lentulus came 
forward with a very careless and contemptuous air and said that he would not give an account, 
but would offer his leg, as boys were accustomed to do when they were playing ball and made a 
miss.  On this account he was surnamed Sura, for “sura” is the Roman word for leg.” 
139 Cicero confirmed Lentulus had been acquitted twice and implied that the juries in both trials 
had been bribed (Cic. Att. 1.16.9).  One of the acquittals Cicero was alluding to was most likely 
Lentulus’ misappropriation of funds.  Regarding the probable charge de peculatu and the 
approximate date of Lentulus’ trial, see TLRR, no. 130. 
140 C. Verres was Lentulus’ successor in Sicily in 73.  Lentulus probably returned to Rome some 
time that year and then stood trial, see RE IV 1 (Cornelius) no. 240, 1400.14-26. 
141 The exact date of Lentulus’ trial de repetundis is unknown, see TLRR, no. 219. 
142 NB: Our sources are silent regarding Lentulus’ consulship. 
143 C. Antonius (Asc. 84C) and Q. Curius (Sall. B Cat. 23.1; App. B Civ. 2.3) were also expelled 
from the Senate in 70/69.  For arguments regarding whether the censors performed the lustrum 
in 70/69, cf. Tibiletti 1959, 96; Pieri 1968, 182; Wiseman 1969, 69-70.  The consensus is that 
the census of 70/69 was, at the very least, completed, cf. MRR II, 127. NB: Appian (BC 2.3) 
incorrectly stated the sixty-four men were expelled five years later but the censors did not 
complete their duties in 64, cf. Plut. Crass. 13.1, Dio 37.9.4. 
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praeteritus (‘omitted’).144  According to Plutarch, Lentulus was expelled not only 
because he had misappropriated funds when he was quaestor and bribed the 
jury in another trial, but also due to his licentious lifestyle (Plut. Cic. 17.1).145 
The censor Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus was an adopted member 
of the Cornelii Lentuli, the same gens and stirps as Lentulus Sura, but how or if 
they were blood relatives remains inconclusive.146  However, it was not 
uncommon that those from the same gens were opposed to each other, e.g. the 
violent struggles between supporters of L. Cornelius Cinna and L. Cornelius 
Sulla in the 80’s147, or even between blood relatives like Romulus and Remus.  
Smith demonstrates that a shared nomen and cognomen might have no 
bearing whatsoever on the relationship between two Romans.148  Smith implies 
that the Roman gens was, at the best of times, a manufactured institution.149  
Romans sometimes would take on famous nomina from influential gentes to 
heighten their own status.  One example is P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus who 
was born into the gens Cornelia but then adopted by the gens Aemilia.150  
Scipio therefore took on both nomina as his own, which were passed down 
generation to generation due to the heightened status that was inherited by 
belonging to both families.  The acquisition of new nomina occurred primarily 
through marriage or adoption, but manumission also played a part.  
Traditionally, slaves were allowed to use their master’s nomen when they were 
freed.  These libertini were considered a part of the extended family, clearly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 The noun praeteritus is a cognate of the verb praetereo meaning ‘passed over’.  The noun is 
used for one who had failed to be selected for an office, i.e. being omitted by the censors from 
the list of senators and expelled from the Senate, see OLD (praetereo) s.v. 6.  
145 Plut. Cic. 17.1: ;);%:$?2 +' 8.*1:2 $.% +%' $3/16)%.' (A)1>1.µ/'&2 0)2 ;&41)2 ,#-0)#&' 
“Bne who had led a low life and for his licentiousness had formerly been expelled from the 
Senate.” Dio did not record reasons for Lentulus’ expulsion (Dio Cass. 37.30.4).  Cicero alluded 
to Lentulus’ former insaniam libidinum “insane passions”, but whether Cicero was alluding to his 
crimes before his involvement with the affair of 63 is not explicit (Cic. Sull. 70).  Cicero also 
alluded to Lentulus’ largatio (Cat. 3.10). 
146 Clodianus was perhaps a member of the plebeian Claudii Marcelli and adopted by Cn. 
Cornelius Lentulus (cos.97), see RE IV (Cornelius) no. 216, 1380.18-49.  We know for certain, 
who Lentulus Sura’s grandfather was, according to Cic. Cat. 3.11, but who Sura’s father was 
remains unknown.  Although in the Brutus, Clodianus and Sura were mentioned in the same 
passages (Cic. Brut. 230, 308, 311) or one after the other (234-5), Cicero was not specific about 
their familial relationship.  The editors of the Loeb edition of Brutus, most likely misled by the 
often pairing of the two Cornelii Lentuli by Cicero, erroneously lists them as brothers (1962, 
516).  There is no evidence that Sura and Clodianus were related. 
147 NB: There is no evidence that the two Cornelii were related. 
148 Smith 2006, 12-20 and 32-44.  Smith’s study is primarily concerned with defining and 
identifying the difference between patrician and plebeian gentes and their significance in 
regards to the Roman historical tradition. 
149 Ibid.1-7.   
150 See RE IV (Cornelius) no. 335, 1439.49-68. 
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making Roman onomastics a perplexing field of study.151  Therefore, without the 
corresponding literary or non-literary evidence, we cannot conclude whether 
those with similar nomina were related.152 
It is probable that Romans with the same nomina would claim to be 
descendants of those who had distinguished themselves and the gens in 
service to the res publica.  The typical Roman practice of saving and honoring 
imagines of famous men in their gens and stirps supports this argument.  
Whether one was a blood relative of the famous ancestor or not, he could 
technically claim to be a kinsman within the gens.  For example, Suetonius 
implied the people of Rome expected D. Junius Brutus to live up to his ancestor 
L. Junius Brutus’ example.  In 509, L. Junius Brutus expelled his uncle the last 
king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, therefore, Suetonius implied that the 
current Brutus should dispose the ‘tyrant’ Caesar in 44 (Suet. Iul. 80).153 
Instead, Plutarch stated that the people of Rome exhorted M. Junius Brutus, not 
Decimus, to follow his ancestor’s example (Plut. Brut. 9.5-7, 10.1-6).  Whether 
either of Caesar’s murderers, Decimus or Marcus Junius Brutus, was a blood 
relative of the legendary L. Junius Brutus that lived almost five centuries earlier 
is improbable.154  However, this example demonstrates that one’s nomen and 
cognomen could be used to define one’s character in Roman society regardless 
of whether kinsmen with the same nomina were actually related.  Lentulus 
apparently considered himself a successor of L. Cornelius Cinna and L. 
Cornelius Sulla, who had a stranglehold on the consulship during the 80’s.  The 
fact that these men were all Cornelii is important when Lentulus’ prophecy is 
examined in section 2.4.5.  However, there is no literary or non-literary evidence 
that explicitly discusses the relationship between Lentulus and the censor 
Clodianus.  I have explained that their common nomen and cognomen did not 
specifically mean they were blood relatives.  However, we cannot be certain 
they were not distant relatives.  Perhaps Clodianus, an adopted Cornelius !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 On naming libertini, see Radin 1914, 242-3.  Appian claimed Sulla freed 10,000 slaves and 
incorporated them into the gens Cornelia (App. B Civ. 1.100).   
152 For the problems regarding Roman onomastics in general cf, Botsford 1907, 665-9; Radin 
1914, 242-7; Douglas 1958; Saller 1984, 341-2; Smith 2006, 15-20.  For a comprehensive 
review on scholarship on the Roman gens from the 16th century A.D. onwards, see also Smith 
2006, 65-113. 
153 For the expulsion of the last king of Rome, see Liv. 1.56-60.  
154 Plutarch reviewed the arguments whether M. Junius Brutus’ was a relative of the famous L. 
Junius Brutus or not (Plut. Brut. 1.1-5).  Decimus and Marcus were most likely distant cousins, 
see RE Suppl. 4-5 (Iunius) no. 55a, 369.49-370.2.  Whether M. Junius Brutus felt any 
psychological pressure due to having the same nomina as one of the traditional founders of the 
Republic, see Africa (1978).  
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Lentulus, was against expelling a member of the same gens and it was instead 
the censor Gellius who recommended Lentulus should be expelled.  Cicero 
stated that the censors Clodianus and Gellius sometimes disagreed over who 
and why someone should be removed from Senate (Cic. Clu. 132).  Of course, 
as stated above, kinsmen could share different views regardless of how closely 
they were related. 
One aspect of the political agenda that featured during the consulship of 
Pompey and Crassus in 70 was the restoration of powers to the tribunate and 
the censorship, both of which the Sullan legislation had curtailed a decade 
earlier.155  As someone who was accused of having illegally profited as 
quaestor during Sulla’s reign, Lentulus was perhaps vilified in 70, and his 
exclusion by the censors becomes more understandable.  However, the censor 
Clodianus also had connections with Sulla, so this reason regarding Lentulus’ 
expulsion is hypothetical.156  The censors might simply have been bribed to 
expel Lentulus.157  Our sources are not explicit, and therefore we are left only 
with Plutarch’s suggestion that Lentulus was expelled because of the two earlier 
questionable acquittals and his immoral character (Plut. Cic. 17.1).158 
Regardless of the actual reasons behind Lentulus’ expulsion and the ignominy it 
might carry, his political career was perhaps back on course only a year or two 
later.159 
There is numismatic evidence that suggests Lentulus might have been a 
quaestor in L. Julius Caesar’s entourage in Macedonia after L. Julius Caesar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Our sources generally focus on the full restoration of powers of the tribunate, and the 
reinstatement of judicial powers for the equestrian class during Pompey’s and Crassus’ 
consulship, cf. Cic. Verr. 1.44-5; Liv. Per. 97; Plut. Pomp. 22.3.  Gabba (1956, 135-8) argues 
Sulla did not abolish the censorship, but only curtailed its powers by not holding elections for the 
office during his reign. Cf. Wiseman 1969, 65; Astin 1985, 176.   
156 Cicero’s works perhaps imply that Clodianus was a legate of Sulla (Cic. Leg. Man. 58) and 
returned to Italy from the campaigns with Sulla in 83 (Brut. 308).  Badian (1958, 54-55) agrees 
Sulla’s veterans were his primary supporters and beneficiaries, but does not list Clodianus.  
Keaveney (1984, 123) lists Clodianus as a Sullan “Tribune of the soldiers”, but explains the 
evidence from Cicero is not specific.  NB: During his consulship, Clodianus attempted to pass 
legislation to recover some of the money from the Sullan confiscations but was unsuccessful 
(Sall. Hist. 4.50).  Whether Clodianus’ proposal was to distance himself from Sulla, however is 
inconclusive. 
157 For censors taking bribes, see Cic. Clu. 127, 129. 
158 See nn.138-9. 
159 Cicero argued that being expelled by the censors did not carry as much disgrace as a 
conviction in court (Cic. Clu. 119).  He explained that some of those recently expelled by 
Clodianus and Gellius in 70/69 had been restored to the Senate (120).  Cicero discussed the 
expulsion of C. Licinius Geta.  Geta was a consul in 116 and was expelled from the Senate in 
the following year.  In the successive elections for the censorship of 110, Geta was voted 
censor regardless of the judgment of the previous censorship five years earlier (119).  On Geta, 
see Wiseman 2009, 33-57.  
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served as praetor approximately in 69.160  A coin from a Macedonian hoard 
dating from the early first century has the name “Q. Suura” struck on the 
reverse.161  Scholars argue over both the date and the name on the reverse of 
the coin.  The praenomen on the coin is a “Q.” not a “P.”  Furthermore, the 
cognomen is misspelled adding an extra “u” to Sura.  The coin was clearly a 
misstrike considering the misspelling of the cognomen.162  The praenomen on 
the reverse might refer to a certain Q. Braetius Sura, who was in the entourage 
of C. Sentius, governor of Macedonia circa 90.163  Another problem with 
identifying whom the coin might name is the 90-degree lowercase “q” also on 
the reverse.  This letter usually indicates the person’s rank on the coin.  
However, there is no evidence that either Sura held the rank of quaestor when 
they were in Macedonia. 
Lewis and Mattingly argue that the date of the coin was more likely 
around 70, not 90.164  Therefore, the coin might refer to P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Sura instead of Q. Braetius Sura.  Lentulus was the second husband of Julia, L. 
Julius Caesar’s sister.165  As his brother-in-law, Lentulus’ inclusion in L. Julius 
Caesar’s entourage in Macedonia is plausible, but remains indeterminable.  
When Cicero was debating the appropriate sentence for Lentulus and the 
others who had confessed to participating in the affair, he claimed L. Julius 
Caesar supported the death penalty (Cic. Cat. 4.13).166  The relationship 
between the brothers-in-law had undoubtedly soured due to Lentulus’ 
involvement with the affair.  L. Julius Caesar was consul in 64, so his opinion 
carried weight in the Senate.  Cicero also mentioned L. Julius Caesar’s opinion 
about Lentulus’ sentence to demonstrate that even his relatives thought death 
was an appropriate punishment.167  However, the coin was a misstrike and 
remains unique, so any conclusion regarding the numismatic evidence that 
suggests the coin refers to Lentulus Sura must be approached with caution. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 L. Julius Caesar was consul in 64, but the exact year of L. Julius Caesar’s praetorship 
remains indeterminable.  The RE states he was praetor some time between 74 to 67 [(RE X 
(Iulius) no. 143, 469.14-6)].   
161 For a reproduction of the coin, see Mattingly 2004, 176 Plate 1 Coin 2. 
162 NB: There is no evidence of a Roman cognomen spelled “Suura”. 
163 Mattingly 2004, 155. 
164 Cf. Lewis 1962, 275-300; Mattingly 2004, 152-68. 
165 On Julia, see RE X1 (Iulius) no. 543, 892.34.  NB: Lentulus’ marriage to Julia made him 
Mark Antony’s stepfather by default. 
166 Cf. Cic. Phil. 2.14; 8.1 
167 Cic. Cat. 4.13.  See Dyck 2008, 228. 
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Therefore, how soon Lentulus’ political career was rehabilitated after his 
expulsion is contentious.  However, by 64, just five or six years after his 
expulsion from the Senate, Lentulus was allowed to stand for a second 
praetorship.  His candidacy was a success and as praetor, he was reinstated 
into the Senate the following year.  The rehabilitation of political careers after 
suffering expulsion from the Roman senate was not unheard of, but it was not a 
common occurrence either.  Of the twenty-three individuals we can identify by 
name who were expelled from the Senate during 318-50, about half were later 
elected to some office.168  A contemporary example was C. Antonius Hybrida, 
Cicero’s colleague in the consulship, who was expelled by the censors the 
same year.  C. Antonius was a quaestor in 70 and despite being made 
praeteritus was able to secure the position of praetor in 66 and consul in 63.169  
Q. Curius was another contemporary of Lentulus, who was purportedly one of 
the sixty-four senators expelled in 70/69.  Curius is named in Sallust’s list of 
participants from the senatorial order (Sall. Cat. 17.3).  However, whether 
Curius was still a senator in 63 is debatable, but evidently Lentulus and 
Antonius’ status as praeteriti did not hinder their future political careers.170 
Nevertheless, Romans who had suffered any form of capitis deminutio 
would have found it difficult to rehabilitate their political careers, both for 
themselves and their kinsmen.  Securing an election for a top magisterial 
position was no ordinary feat.  Evidently, Lentulus had superior family 
connections as part of one of the largest families in Rome, the gens Cornelia.171  
The earliest record of the Lentuli branch of the gens Cornelia is found in Livy’s 
Ab Urbe Condita (Liv. 9.4.7-16).  L. Cornelius Lentulus was consul in 327BC 
and an officer of the Roman army, who was trapped by the Samnites in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 See Moore 2012 (forthcoming).  The numbers of rehabilitated senators are from personal 
communication with Moore in December 2009. 
169 See Appendix I, [no.2]. 
170 For Q. Curius’ rank in 63, see Ryan 1994, 259-60.  Ryan (256-7) argues that several of 
those listed by Sallust ex ordo senatu (Sall. B Cat. 17.3) were not senators due to previous 
convictions including P. Autronius Paetus, L. Vargunteius and Q. Curius.  Regarding C. 
Cornelius Cethegus’ status as a senator in 63, Ryan is less certain.  Cf. Linderski 1963, 511-2 
contra Robinson 1947, 138-43.  These scholarly arguments beg the question what the 
requirements were for Sallust’s list of senators at 17.3.  Did Sallust’s list, include those who: a) 
were once senators or b) were current senators?  Vretska (1976, 282) assumes both were 
included.  NB: Clearly, Roman equites could be senatores, e.g., Cicero.  However, the latter 
class had more authority, so was prized over the former.  L. Vargunteius is another example of 
a citizen from both classes.  However, Linderski (1963, 512) argues that the eques Vargunteius 
was no longer a senator in 63 due to a conviction de ambitu in 66.  Cf. Berry 1996, 141. 
171 On the gens Cornelia, see RE IV (Cornelius), 1249.  The Cornelii Lentuli was the most 
substantial branch of the gens, see RE IV (Cornelius) no. 172ff., 1355-57. 
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Caudine Forks.  Livy described him as virtute atque honoribus (Liv. 9.4.8).  
Further representations of the Cornelii Lentuli in our sources are as clarissimi 
viri (‘the most illustrious of men’).172  Cicero called P. Cornelius Lentulus, 
Lentulus Sura’s grandfather, a clarissimus vir because he had been wounded 
fighting against the seditious adherents of C. Gracchus (Cic. Cat. 3.10).173  The 
sources regarding the affair of 63 also characterized Lentulus Sura, despite his 
ignominious fate, as a man of talent from an illustrious family.174  Fourteen out 
of the twenty-six recorded Cornelii Lentuli to hold magistracies in the Roman 
Republic attained the office of consul including the consecutive consulships in 
72 by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and in 71 by Lentulus Sura.175 
Wiseman and Astin suggest that the military relevance of the census had 
ceased by 167.176  The census during the Late Republic was primarily 
concerned with voting privileges and an individual’s financial standing.177  
Therefore, perhaps a different reason for Lentulus’ expulsion from the Senate 
was that he had lost the fiscal requirements required for enrollment.  If this 
assumption is correct, then Lentulus had also recovered financially by 64 in 
order to stand for the praetorship a second time.  Running for any magisterial 
office in Rome required recourse to substantial funds in order to secure votes.  
Lentulus was purportedly one of these debtors, so how he was able to obtain 
the funds necessary to stand for the praetorship in 64 is uncertain.  Perhaps he 
was able to recuperate his finances in L. Julius Caesar’s entourage in 
Macedonia, but that hypothesis is speculative due to the contention over the 
numismatic evidence discussed earlier.  Again we have to return to the 
hypothesis that his political and financial rehabilitation was most likely due to his 
influential familial connections.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Cic. Cat. 3.10, Clu. 120.  In these instances, Cicero called P. Cornelius Lentulus (Sura’s 
grandfather) and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus clarissimi viri respectively. Cf. Val. Max. 
5.3.2. 
173 Cic. Cat. 3.10: imago avi tui, clarissimi viri “C portrait of your [Lentulus Sura’s] illulstrious 
grandfather.” Cf. Brut. 108. 
174 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 55.6: ille patricius ex gente clarissuma Corneliorum “Dhat patrician of the 
illustrious stock of the Cornelii; Plut. Cic. 17.1: $''# 6/'&42 µ'' ('+-A&4 “C man of illustrious 
birth.”  
175 The recorded numbers of consuls is my own count from the MRR.  Five Cornelii Lentuli were 
consuls between 72 and 49.  Gruen (1974, 59) argues a sixth consul from the gens “was a near 
miss.” 
176 Wiseman1969, 60; Astin 1985, 176.  Cf. Gell. NA 6.13.1 
177 Cf. Pieri 1968; Wiseman 1969.  
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As mentioned, Cicero and Sallust claimed one reason for the widespread 
support of the affair in 63, by patricians and plebeians alike, was debt.178  
Shortly after the affair in Rome was overcome in 62, Cicero wrote to P. Sestius 
stating that he was considering starting a coniuratio because he was deeply in 
debt, no doubt due to his extensive campaigning for the consulship and his 
recent purchase of a house on the Palantine Hill from Crassus.179  As previously 
reviewed in section 2.2, many debtors were attracted to join the affair due to 
their supposedly desperate financial situation (cf. Cic. Cat. 2.18-21; Sall. B Cat. 
24.3-4, 25.4, 33.2).  Cicero explained that the wealthy indebted citizens pined 
for political dominatio (Cic. Cat. 2.19).180  Dyck suggests this group of indebted 
supporters included both Catiline and Lentulus.181  Cicero proclaimed in the 
Second Oration that many of the wealthy (locupletes) supporting the affair could 
relieve their debts by selling off their estates (Cat. 2.18).182  Cicero was not 
explicit if Lentulus was a part of the group of supporters who were unwilling to 
pay back their debt.  Again, we are left to speculate if Lentulus had rehabilitated 
his financial woes along with his political career.  Perhaps Lentulus’ financial 
condition was not a hindrance at all.  This begs the question of why someone 
from such an illustrious family who had recently restored his and his family’s 
dignitas would join a plot to overthrow the current regime that he was a 
representative of and that had just awarded him imperium due to his successful 
election as praetor. 
Whether debt was the overriding factor for Lentulus’ willingness to 
support the affair remains a matter of conjecture.  Our sources also imply that 
there was an esoteric reason for Lentulus’ participation in the epsiode.  Cicero 
declared Lentulus’ hope was that regnum huius urbis atque imperium pervenire 
esset necesse “The rule and dominion of Rome was fated to come [to him]” 
(Cic. Cat. 3.9).183  Cicero was citing a prophecy, which purportedly predicted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 For debt as a factor regarding the affair of 63, cf. Giovanni 1963; Yavetz 1963, 485-99; 
Frederiksen 1966, 128-41; Shaw 1975. 
179 Cic. Fam. 5.6.2: tantum habere aeris alieni, ut cupiam coniurare, si qui recipiat “I am so 
heavily in debt, that I am eager to join a affair, if anybody would let me in”. The letter also 
discussed his purchase of the house from Crassus. 
180 Cic. Cat. 2.19: alterum genus est eorum qui, quamquam permuntur aere alieno, 
dominationem tamen exspectant, honores quos quieta re publica desperant perturbata se 
consequi posse arbitrantur. 
181 Dyck 2008, 150. 
182 Sallust wrote Catiline thought he could pay off his debts if he sold his estates (Sall. B Cat. 
35.3). 
183 Cf. Cic. Cat. 4.2: Etenim si P. Lentulus suum nomen inductus a vatibus fatale ad perniciem 
rei publicae fore putavit, cur ego non laeter meum consulatum ad salutem populi Romani prope 
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that in the year 63, twenty years after the burning of the Capitol and ten years 
after the defilement of the Vestal Virgins, there would be a third Cornelius, after 
Cinna and Sulla that would rule Rome.184  Cicero implied that Lentulus believed 
that the prophecy inferred that the third Cornelius was none other than himself 
(cf. Cat. 3.9, 4.2).185  A further reappraisal of Lentulus’ participation in the affair 
is necessary to understand his complicity, especially after the rehabilitation of 
his political career as praetor and his restoration to the Senate.  I continue to 
examine the prophecy and the other evidence that was used to incriminate 
Lentulus to further explain why he was sentenced to death on December 5 in 
the following subsections. 
 
2.4.2  The evidence against Lentulus 
This section will discuss the letter that Lentulus wrote to Catiline, which 
Cicero obtained after the capture of the messenger T. Volturcius and the 
Allobrogean envoys on December 3.186  Cicero used the letter as proof that 
Lentulus, the other reliqua coniuratorum manus remaining in Rome, and their 
seditious plans were linked with Catiline and Manlius’ army in Etruria.  Due to 
the almost simultaneous reports of sedition in Etruria and reports of planned 
murder in Rome on October 20-21, the Senate passed the SCU giving the 
consuls the power to use any means necessary to protect the res publica.187  
When Catiline left Rome to join Manlius, the Senate declared them hostes rei 
publicae.188  If Cicero intended to severely punish the affair’s participants, who 
had not left Rome with Catiline, Cicero needed to prove the disturbances inside 
and outside the city were connected.  The testimonies given by the informers 
Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys are examined to demonstrate Lentulus’ 
association with the Allobrogean envoys and Catiline.  However, the letter 
Lentulus wrote to Catiline was the only piece of concrete evidence that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
fatalem exstitisse?  “If Publius Lentulus was persuaded by the soothsayers to think that his 
name was destined by fate for the destruction of the Republic, why should not I rejoice that my 
consulship has been destined by fate, as I might put it, for the salvation of the Roman people?”; 
Sall. B Cat. 47.2: regnum…se tertium esse, cui fatum foret urbis potiri “that he [Lentulus] was 
the third [Cornelii] who was destined to be master of the city.” 
184 The burning of the Capitol occurred in 83 during Sulla’s march on Rome (Plut. Sull. 27.6). 
The defilement of the Vestal Virgins occurred in 73, cf. Sall. Cat. 15.1; Plut. Crass. 1.2; Cat. 
Min. 19.3; Asc. 91C; Oros. 6.3.1. In contrast to the specific prophetic timeline listed at Cic. Cat. 
3.9, Sallust only refers to the twentieth year after the burning of the Capitol (Sall. B Cat. 47.2).  
See further section 2.4.5. 
185 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 47.2; Plut. Cic. 17.5.  
186 See Appendix II. 
187 See Chapter 3.3. 
188 See Chapter 3.3. 
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connects the two men.  The text of the incriminating letter that Lentulus wrote to 
Catiline, which Cicero and Sallust similarly reproduced, is examined below.  The 
different grammatical construction of Cicero and Sallust’s versions of the letter 
is analyzed to demonstrate that Lentulus’ status was at the very least equal to 
Catiline’s.  Other relevant letters sent between those of equal status are 
examined to support this hypothesis.  In addition, I discuss the suggestion that 
the opening sentence of Lentulus’ letter might indicate Lentulus was initially 
acting independently of Catiline.  Finally, the section discusses Lentulus’ 
mandata that he also intended to send to Catiline, which reiterated that Lentulus 
considered Catiline should heed his advice because Lentulus was the highest-
ranking participant supporting the affair left in Rome.   
First, we should summarize again Cicero and Sallust’s accounts 
regarding the seizure of the letters from those remaining in Rome and their 
subsequent arrest.189  Sometime in 63, the tribe of Allobroges sent envoys from 
Gaul to Rome to address the Senate regarding certain grievances.190  The 
Senate refused to receive the Allobrogean envoys and their complaints were 
ignored.191  Lentulus instructed a libertinus named P. Umbrenus, who had 
business connections in Gaul, to approach the Allobrogean envoys.192  He 
arranged a meeting between the envoys and those involved with the affair in 
Rome.193  The envoys met with several of those involved with the affair and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 The synopsis on the following pages is a fusion of Cicero and Sallust’s accounts regarding 
the events on December 3-5, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.4-8; Sall. B Cat. 44.1-47.4.  Discrepancies in their 
accounts are cited in the footnotes. 
190 Although the Senate normally received the beginning of the year to receive foreign envoys, 
in emergencies, they were received anytime during the year if permitted, see Pina Polo 2011, 
77-8. When the Allobrogean envoys arrived in 63 is unknown.  The most probable hypothesis is 
that the envoys came after Catiline left Rome because Cicero did not mention the affair’s plan to 
solicit their support until December 3. 
191 Sallust claimed the Allobroges had amassed a great amount of public and private debt due 
to the rapacity of the local Roman magistrates in the region (Sall. B Cat. 40.1-2).  The Senate 
refused the Allobrogean envoys’ entreaty (40.3). Cicero did not mention the reason why the 
envoys were in Rome.  NB: In 61, the Allobroges went to war against Rome and were defeated 
(Dio Cass. 37.47-48).  However, the war might have no connection with the envoys’ mission in 
63.  Cf. Cic. Prov. cons. 32. 
192 Cicero called Umbrenus a libertinus (Cic. Cat. 3.14).  There are contradictory claims in the 
Third Oration regarding who of the reliqua coniuratorum first approached the envoys.  Cicero 
claimed Lentulus was first to approach the envoys at Cat. 3.4 (cf. 4.13), but stated Umbrenus 
first introduced the envoys to Gabinius instead at 3.14.  Sallust did not comment on Umbrenus’ 
status, but claimed he had influence in Gaul (Sall. B Cat. 40.2).  Sallust claimed that Lentulus 
instructed Umbrenus to approach the envoys (40.1).  The envoys met with Gabinius later (40.6) 
and then Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Cassius (44.1).  
193 Sallust placed the meeting at the house of D. Junius Brutus, consul in 77.  Sallust remarked 
Brutus was absent from the city but his wife Sempronia was not (Sall. B Cat. 40.5).  Sepmronia 
was perhaps sympathetic to the affair (25.1-6), see Appendix I, [no.34].  Pagan (2004, 42) 
suggests D. Junius Brutus was “induced” into the affair by Sempronia.  However, there is no 
evidence Brutus was involved with the affair of 63 only that the meeting might have occurred at 
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were told the names of other influential citizens supporting the affair to attempt 
to convince them to join.194  Apparently, those attending the meeting wanted the 
Allobroges to send military support to Catiline and Manlius’ forces in northern 
Etruria.195  Presumably, if the Allobroges agreed to support the affair’s goal to 
overthrow the current regime then their grievances would be resolved after the 
affair was successful.  The Gallic envoys and those at the meeting took a 
mutual oath.  Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, and Statilius wrote letters for the 
envoys to bring back to Gaul to confirm their alliance in writing. T. Volturcius 
was chosen to escort the envoys to Gaul.  On the way, Volturcius was 
instructed to meet the army in Faesulae and inform them of the verbal and 
written pledges of support between the Allobroges and those supporting the 
affair in Rome.  He was also supposed to deliver Lentulus’ personal letter and 
verbal message to Catiline. 
However, the Allobroges were unsure of their decision and approached 
their patron in Rome, Q. Fabius Sanga, who notified Cicero of the envoys’ 
meeting with the participants.196  After Cicero was informed, he planned to 
ambush Volturcius and the envoys as they were leaving the city.  Cicero 
ordered two current praetors, L. Valerius Flaccus and C. Pomptinus, to confront 
Volturcius and the envoys on the Mulvian Bridge a few miles outside Rome.197  
The praetor’s men blocked both sides of the bridge to prevent their escape, and 
when Volturcius initially balked, the envoys offered no resistance.  Volturcius 
surrendered without a struggle.  He and the envoys were detained and brought !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
his house.  Again, Brutus was not in Rome when the meeting occurred (Sall. B Cat. 40.5).  
Cicero did not mention D. Junius Brutus or Sempronia’s involvement in the affair.  Instead, 
Cicero placed the meeting at L. Cassius Longinus’ house (Cic. Sull. 39) Cassius had been 
sentenced to death in absentia but his ultimate fate was unclear (cf. Cat. 3.14; Sull. 36-39).  
Cassius’ connection with the Gauls was probably elaborated in Pro Sulla to clear the accusation 
made by the prosecution that the Allobroges’ mentioned Cicero’s client P. Sulla by name, see 
Berry 1996, 210-15.   
194 Cicero mentioned Lentulus (Cic. Cat. 3.4, 11, 4.13), Cethegus, Cassius, Statilius, (3.9; re: 
Cassius cf. Sull. 39), Gabinius, Q. Annius Chilo, P. Furius, and Umbrenus were involved in 
soliciting the envoys (Cat. 3.14). On the other hand, Sallust only specified that Umbrenus and 
Gabinius actually met the envoys (Sall. B Cat. 44.1).  NB: M. Caeparius was the only participant 
sentenced to death for his involvement with the affair of 63 who was not reported to solicit the 
envoys.   
195 Cic. Cat. 3.9: equitatum in Italiam quam primum mitterent “To send cavalry as soon as 
possible into Italy.”  Sallust did not specifically mention cavalry, but the implication is analogous. 
Sall. B Cat. 40.1: si possit, impellat ad societatem belli “If possible, entice them [the Allobroges] 
to an offensive alliance.” 
196 Sallust mentioned Q. Fabius Sanga was the patron of the Allobroges and informed Cicero of 
the plan (Sall. B Cat. 41.4-5).  Cicero does not mention Q. Fabius Sanga or name any other 
informers except the witnesses Volturcius and the Allobroges.  Cf. Dyck (2008), 170. 
197 The Mulvian Bridge on the Via Flaminia leading north to Etruria and Umbria crosses the 
Tiber a few miles outside of Rome’s walls. 
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to Cicero’s house, so the consul could assess the situation.198  After Volturcius 
and the envoys told Cicero who had given the Allobrogean envoys letters and 
pledges documenting their alliance, he summoned the praetor Lentulus, the 
senator Cethegus, and the knights Gabinius and Statilius to his house.199  
Cicero then convened the Senate so they could hear the testimonies of 
Voturcius and the Gallic envoys.200  Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, and Statilius 
confessed that they had attempted to solicit support from the Allobroges and 
that they had written the letters that were seized. 
 As mentioned, Cicero had continually proclaimed that the affair within 
the city was more widespread than the Senate realized.201  The threat of those 
remaining in the city supporting the affair was not taken seriously because the 
evidence that there were citizens in Rome actively supporting the affair 
remained circumstantial.202  Lentulus and the others’ confessions in the Senate 
regarding the written pledges they gave to the envoys was the crucial piece of 
concrete evidence that Cicero needed to convince the Senate of the extent of 
the affair’s threat.  Armed with the eyewitness testimonies of Volturcius and the 
Allobroges, the letters and confessions from four participants supporting the 
affair in Rome, and most importantly the letter from Lentulus to Catiline, Cicero 
was able to connect these men and their seditious plans in Rome with the 
hostes Catiline and Manlius, and their seditious activities in northern Etruria.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 In order that Cicero was not accused of tampering with the evidence (Cic. Sull. 45), he 
claimed the letters were left sealed and unopened (Cat. 3.6, 12) and copies of the evidence 
were distributed to the Roman people (Sull. 42).  Cf. Sall. B Cat. 46.6, 47.2. 
199 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 50.4.  The domi nobilis M. Caeparius was captured trying to 
leave Rome and then executed (Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 47.4).  See n.72. 
200 Volturcius only testified after he was promised immunity (Cic. Cat. 3.8; Sall. B Cat. 47.1). 
201 Cicero claimed many others were involved before Lentulus and the others were 
apprehended, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.5, 27; Mur. 79. See also Chapter 1.4.  Cicero and Sallust 
metaphorically represented the proliferation of the affair of 63 like a disease (pestis: Cic. Cat. 
1.31; Mur. 52, 85; Sull. 76; morbus: Cic. Cat. 1.32; Sull. 53, 76; contagio: Mur. 78, Sul. 6); or a 
madness (furor: Cic. Cat. 1.31, 2.16, 25, 4.6; Mur. 85; Sull. 53, 76; Cael. 15; amentia: Cic. Cat. 
1.8, 2.11, 25; dementia: 4.22).  NB: I note the instances when these terms are used to refer to 
the affair as a whole or a ‘state of being’ not when the term are used to specifically refer to 
Catiline’s character and his individual actions.  For further discussion regarding medical 
metaphors in Cicero’s works, cf. Fantham 1972, 128-9; Berry 1996, 286-7; Dyck 2008, 120. 
202 Cic. Cat. 1.30: Quamquam non nulli sunt in hoc ordine, qui aut ea, quae inminent non 
videant aut ea, quae vident, dissimulent; qui spem Catilinae mollibus sententiis aluerunt 
coniurationemque nascentem non credendo corroboraverunt “Yet there are some in this body 
who either cannot see what threatens us or pretend they cannot, who have fed Catiline’s hopes 
by there feeble decisions and put heart into the growing affair by refusing to believe that it 
exsisted; cf. Mur. 51: nam partim ideo fortes in decernendo non erant, quia nihil timebant “Some 
senators were disinclined to take firm measures because they saw nothing to fear.” Cf. 
Genovese 1974, 176; Price 1998; Dyck 2008, 118-9.   
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Volturcius and the Allobroges divulged what they knew about the affair, 
and, most importantly, named those who were supporting it.203  Cicero claimed 
Lentulus initially approached the Allobrogean envoys charging them cum litteris 
mandatisque ad Catilinam “with letters and verbal messages for Catiline” (Cic. 
Cat. 3.4).  Similarly, Sallust recorded that Lentulus instructed Umbrenus to 
approach the envoys (Sall. Cat. 40.1).204  Both authors claim that it was 
Lentulus’ plan to solicit the Allobroges in order to obtain a promise of military 
support (Cic. Cat. 3.4, 9; Sall. Cat. 40.1).  On the other hand, Sallust stated 
earlier that Lentulus was sicuti Catilina praeceperat “following Catiline’s 
directions,” but in the same passage contradictorily stated that Lentulus aut per 
se aut per alios sollicitabat “was working, personally or through others” (Sall. 
Cat. 39.6).  It follows that it was Lentulus’ idea to approach the envoys because 
Catiline could not have known that the Allobroges were in Rome regardless of 
Catiline’s instructions to Lentulus.  Although Cicero and Sallust claimed the 
Allobroges were solicited to lend military support to the affair205, what the true 
nature of the Allobrogean support would entail and how it would assist the affair 
as a whole is not conclusive.  Nevertheless, there remained in the Roman 
populace a long-established fear of the Gauls since the sacking of the city 
c.390, and most of the region had yet to be subdued.206  The rhetorical potential 
of a union between Gauls and the participants in Rome to assist in their efforts 
to overthrow the Republic would not be lost on such an accomplished orator 
attempting to expose a plot against the city he had sworn to defend.207  This 
was a bold move that Lentulus initiated to garner more support for the affair and 
one Cicero would emphasize. 
The letters that Cicero obtained contained critical evidence of the 
cooperation between the affair’s participants in Rome and the army in northern 
Etruria.  Both authors record the envoys’ affidavit that they had sworn an oath 
(ius iurandum) and were given letters (litterae) from Lentulus, Cethegus, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203 Cicero recorded Volturcius named Lentulus (Cic. Cat. 3.8) and the Allobroges named 
Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Cassius (3.9) and Gabinius (3.12).  Cicero was not specific who 
named Caeparius, Furius, Annius Chilo, or Umbrenus (3.14).  In 62, Cicero claimed the 
Allobroges also named P. Autronius Paetus (Sull. 17, 36).  Sallust was not specific if either 
Volturcius and/or the Allobroges named Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius (Sall. B Cat. 46.3). 
Volturcius specifically named Gabinius and Caeparius as well as P. Autronius Paetus, Ser. 
Cornelius Sulla, and L. Vargunteius (47.1). 
204 See n.192. 
205 See n.80. 
206 Cicero played on these traditional fears at Cic. Cat. 3.22.  The Allobroges are called barbaris 
(Cic. Sull. 36). See also Dyck 2008, 227. 
207 MacKendrick 1995, 100-3.  
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Statilius to confirm their alliance (Cic. Cat. 3.9, Sall. B Cat. 46.1).208  When the 
letters were produced in the Senate, each man individually confessed to writing 
them. The letters were written in their own hand, manus suas, and they 
recognized their own seals, signa sua (Cic. Cat. 3.10, 13; Sall. B Cat. 47.2).  It 
was their manifest guilt that consigned them to their ultimate fate.209 
Apparently, only Lentulus initially denied the testimonies of Volturcius 
and the Allobroges.  The envoys then exclaimed that they had often been to 
Lentulus’ house, where he informed them that he was in possession of a 
prophecy, which predicted that he would rule Rome specifically in 63 (Cic. Cat. 
3.11; Sall. B Cat. 47.2).210  He had already confessed to swearing the oath and 
writing a letter to the Allobroges, and under mounting pressure from the envoys’ 
assertion regarding the prophecy, Cicero remarked that “To everyone’s surprise 
[Lentulus] suddenly confessed,” repente praeter opinionem omnium confessus 
est (3.11).211  The men, who met the Allobroges, wrote letters for the envoys to 
take back to Gaul, but only Lentulus wrote a letter to be given specifically to 
Catiline.212  This letter was read out to the Senate, which further confirmed his 
association with a hostis rei publicae.213  If Cicero wanted to condemn Lentulus, 
who was immune to prosecution until his praetorship was over214, then Lentulus’ 
letter to Catiline was the concrete evidence he needed to convince the Senate 
to force Lentulus to resign from the praetorship, forfeit his rights as a citizen due 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 Although Cicero claimed Cassius suggested that the Allobroges send cavalry to support the 
army in Etruria (Cic. Cat. 3.9) and later in the Pro Sulla that the meeting between the envoys 
and those remaining in Rome occurred at Cassius’ house (Sull. 39), there is no explicit 
evidence he swore an oath or gave a letter to the envoys.  Cf. Dyck 2008, 178; Appendix I, 
[no.8]. 
209 Cic. Cat. 3.13: Ac mihi quidem, Quirites, cum illa certissima visa sunt argumenta atque 
indica sceleris, tabellae, signa, manus, denique unius cuisque confessio, tum multo certiora illa, 
color, oculi, voltus, taciturnitas “In my view, citizens, completely convincing as were the letter, 
seal, handwriting and confession of each man as arguments and proofs of their guilt, still more 
so were their pallor, eyes, expression and their silence.” 
210 See further section 2.4.5. 
211 cf. Cic. Fin. 1.50: multi etaim, ut te consule, ipsi se indicauerunt 
212 Cic. Cat. 3.12: litteras…sibi a Lentulo ad Catilinam datas esse “The letter…had been given 
him [Volturcius] by Lentulus for Catiline; cf. Sall. B Cat. 44.4: Volturcio litteras ad Catilinam dat 
“He [Lentulus] gave Volturcius a letter to Catiline.”  
213 See Chapter 3.3. 
214 Weinrib (1968, 46) argues that only the consuls and tribunes were immune from prosecution 
during their time in office due to their sacrosanctitas. Weinrib (46-8) admits that most serving 
magistrates were rarely prosecuted.  See also Weinrib 1971.  NB: A case was brought against 
P. Clodius Pulcher when he was quaestor.  He was acquitted see TLRR, no. 236.  However, 
prosecuting incumbent Roman magistrates seemingly was frowned upon and clearly it was 
difficult to win a case against them, so it was best to wait until their term was over or file the 
case before the citizen entered office, e.g., M. Aemilius Scaurus was tried before he entered 
office as consul and was eventually convicted, see TLRR, nos. 300 and 319. 
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to his connection with the hostes Catiline and Manlius, and secure the death 
sentence as Lentulus’ appropriate punishment.215 
 
 
2.4.3 Lentulus’ letter to Catiline and epistolary comparisons 
Lentulus’ letter to Catiline is reproduced in Cicero’s Third Oration and 
Sallust’s Catilina using different language, but conveying analogous meanings.  
The text of the letter by both authors is compared below: 
“Quis sim scies ex eo quem ad te misi.  Cura ut 
vir sis et cogita quem in locum sis progressus.  
Vide ecquid tibi iam sit necesse et cura ut 
omnium tibi auxilia adiungas, etaim infimorum.” 
 
 
“You will know who I am from the man whom I 
have sent you.  Be resolute and take stock of 
your position.  See what you must now do and 
take care that you get the support of everyone, 
even the lowest.” (Cic. Cat. 3.12) 
“Quis sim ex eo quem ad te misi cognosces.  Fac 
cogites in quanta calamite sis, et memineris te 
virum esse.  Consideres quid tuae rationes 
postulant.  Auxilium petas ab omnibus, etiam ab 
infimis.”  
 
“Who I am you will learn from my messenger.  
See to it that you bear in mind in what peril you 
are, and remember that you are a man.  
Consider what your plans demand; seek help 
from all, even the lowest.” (Sall. B Cat. 44.5) 
 
Scholarship is divided regarding which author more faithfully replicates the 
exact wording of the letter.  Some scholars contend that Sallust wrote the letter 
in accordance with his periodic style due to the modifications of the 
colloquialisms found in Cicero’s version.216  On the other hand, others argue 
that Sallust’s version is most likely the closer reproduction of Lentulus’ letter.217  
Gejrot (2004), the most recent scholar to examine Lentulus’ letter, concludes 
that Sallust’s version is closer to the original text because of the clause Sallust 
uses to introduce the letter, quarum exemplum infra scriptum est (Sall. B Cat. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Cicero claimed the Senate ordered Lentulus to resign, see n.86.  On the other hand, Sallust 
indicated Lentulus was still praetor on December 3 (Sall. B Cat. 46.5), and recorded that Cicero 
personally escorted Lentulus on December 5 to the place of execution perhaps suggesting that 
the latter retained his rank (55.2). 
216 The colloquial expressions in Cicero’s version of the letter are: scies ex eo and cura ut, cf. 
Vretska 1976, 469; McGushin 1977, 220-1; Ramsey 1984, 181; contra Gejrot 2004, 23. For 
debates whether Cicero’s version of the letter was more authentic, cf. Earl 1961, 94; Syme 
1964, 72, 261; Vrestska 1976, 469; McGushin 1977, 220-1; Ramsey 1984, 181; Gejrot 2004; 
Dyck 2008, 183.   
217 Ahlberg (1924, 89) states that Cicero’s version was “in an elaborated style”.  Hamblenne 
(1981, 69) is more certain due to Sallust’s use of the term exemplum arguing, “l’original (de la 
lettre) est reproduit (ou recopié)” (‘The original letter is reproduced or recopied [by Sallust]’).  
Vretska (1976, 469) is less convinced and argues, “Trotz sehr geringenem Sprachmaterial und 
der Möglichkeit, einem Grossteil der Argumente umzudrehen (Sallust habe briefmässige 
Stilismen vermieden und umgeformt)” [(‘Despite a very small amount of linguistic material and 
the possibility to alter the arguments, (Sallust tried to avoid transforming the letter.)’]  NB: The 
translation of Ahlberg’s commentary is from Gejrot 2004, 22.  The translation of the statements 
in Hamblenne and Vretska are my own. 
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44.4) compared with Cicero’s introduction using only the word ita (Cic. Cat. 
3.12).  Gejrot, following Hamblenne’s study concerning the term exemplum, 
explains that the clause suggests that Sallust may have used a transcript of the 
exact letter.218  Gejrot admits that Sallust changed some of the language, but 
argues that the terminology found in Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ letter is similar 
to Cicero’s epistolary style found in his personal letters.  This indicates that 
Cicero relied on his own memory when publishing the text of the letter in the 
Third Oration, three years after it was delivered from the rostra, whereas Sallust 
would have had a copy of Lentulus’ letter when he wrote his monograph over 
twenty years later.219  
Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ letter displays a hurried style of writing, 
which he uses for comic effect.  Earlier in the speech, Cicero remarked that 
Lentulus was the last to arrive of the participants summoned to his house 
because credo quod in litteris dandies praeter consuetudinem proxima nocte 
vigilarat “Contrary to his [Lentulus’] usual practice, he had stayed up late the 
previous night to write his letter.” (Cic. Cat. 3.6).220  When Cicero read out the 
text of the letter later in the Third Oration his audience would note its brevity and 
probably provoked laughter if they recalled the earlier statement that Lentulus’ 
tardiness to Cicero’s summons was because he was tired from writing such a 
letter.221  
Gejrot and other scholars, who conclude that Sallust changed some of 
the language in the letter for stylistic reasons, seem most plausible.  But I doubt 
Cicero faithfully reproduced Lentulus’ letter either.  The way Cicero used the 
letter for ironic effect suggests he had no intention of publishing the actual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
218 Hamblenne 1981, 69. 
219 Cicero claimed he ordered the Senate to record the evidence procured on December 3, 63 
and distributed the written record to the Roman people (Cic. Sull. 42). 
220 Dyck (2008: 176) remarks that the term credo indicated that Cicero was being ironic. 
221 Cic. Cat. 3.11: ingenium illud et dicendi exercitatio qua semper valuit “The native wit and 
verbal facility in which he [Lentulus] always excelled failed him”. This backhanded complement 
referred directly to Lentulus’ confession, but we can assume the passage also implied the 
brevity of his letter. Cf. Cic. Brut. 235: P. Lentulus, cuius et excogitandi et loquendi tarditatem 
tegebat formae dignitas, corporis motus plenus et artis et venustatis, vocis et suavitas et 
magnitudo “Publius Lentulus [Sura] covered up his slowness of thought and speech by dignity 
of bearing; his action was full of art and grace, and possessed a strong and pleasing voice.” On 
the contrary, the elder Pliny recorded that Surae quidem proconsulis etiam rictum in loquendo 
intractionemque linguae et sermonis tumultum, non imaginem modo, piscator quidam in Sicilia 
reddidit. “A fisherman in Sicily not only resembled the proconsul Sura in appearance but 
actually reproduced his gape while speaking and his tongue-tied stammering voice.” (Plin. NH 
7.55).  Sura was governor in Sicily after his praetorship in 75.  However, Pliny might be referring 
to another Sura contra Münzer, see RE IV (Cornelius) no. 240, 1400.22-27. 
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words in the letter.222  Clearly, we cannot be certain whose version was more 
accurate, and the argument, although important to review, is not the most 
interesting aspect of the letter.  The letter’s meaning and the grammatical 
construction are more significant because both elements suggest Lentulus’ role 
was more influential than the others remaining in Rome.  Therefore, the 
following examination focuses on the syntax and the meaning of the letter 
instead of debating which writer replicated the letter more accurately. 
Both Cicero and Sallust’s versions of the letter convey an analogous 
sentiment.  However, the meaning of the first sentence is debatable because it 
might suggest that Catiline had not met Lentulus before the former left Rome.  
The opening sentence of the letter is examined further below.  In contrast, the 
rest of the letter’s meaning is clearer.  Lentulus was urgently requesting that 
Catiline increase the numbers of the army in Etruria by any means necessary in 
order to help the affair’s chances of success.  The grammatical construction of 
the letters differed slightly, however, the grammar in both versions of the letter 
suggest Lentulus’ status in the affair was at least equal to Catiline’s status.  In 
order to support this suggestion, I examine the language and grammatical 
construction Cicero and Sallust used in other epistolary examples regarding 
requests and how these elements can determine the status of the sender and 
the recipient.  
The meaning of the first sentence of Cicero’s version of the letter is not 
entirely clear.  The opening sentence might simply suggest that the messenger 
T. Volturcius would tell Catiline that Lentulus wrote the letter.  On the other 
hand, the opening sentence of Cicero’s version fit his implication that Catiline 
would know who sent him the letter not by recognizing Voturcius, but by 
recognizing Lentulus’ well-known signum.223 As discussed, Cicero continually 
claimed Lentulus and the reliqua coniuratorum manus were connected with 
Catiline, Manlius, and the army in Etruria.  Therefore, Cicero used the vague 
meaning of the opening sentence of the letter to his advantage.  Firstly, he 
rhetorically used the image of Lentulus’ grandfather to stress Lentulus’ 
criminality.  Cicero exclaimed quae quidem te a tanto scelere etiam muta 
revocare debuit “Surely, this seal, even though it cannot speak, should have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 Cicero’s oratorical derision was effective, but also made him enemies (cf. Plut. Cic. 24.1, 25-
28.1).  
223 Cic. Cat. 3.10: ‘est vero’ inquam ‘notum quidem signum, imago avi tui, clarissimi viri’ “’It is 
indeed,’ I said, ‘a well-known seal, a portrait of your illustrious grandfather.”  See n.172. 
 109 
called you back from such a heinous crime” (Cic. Cat. 3.10).  Secondly, Cicero 
used the phrase ex eo in the opening sentence of the letter perhaps to suggest 
that Catiline would know Lentulus sent the letter from the seal bearing the face 
of Lentulus’ grandfather, not from the messenger Volturcius.  This further 
implied that Lentulus and Catiline knew each other and the seditious activities 
inside and outside Rome were linked.  Cicero was not entirely concerned with 
the specifics regarding Volturcius’ role.  In Cicero’s point of view, Volturcius’ 
connection with the affair was less important than his testimony. Most 
importantly for Cicero, Volturcius could confirm that those remaining in Rome 
had not only attempted to solicit support for the affair from the Gauls but also 
were continuing Catiline’s initial failure to murder the leading citizens in Rome 
and burn the city.  
Although, Lentulus confessed his letters were written in his hand and 
sealed with his seal, Cicero also claimed Lentulus did not sign his letter to 
Catiline.224  If Lentulus wanted to send an anonymous letter to Catiline to 
protect his identity, why he sealed the letter using his family signum, especially 
one he perhaps always used in normal correspondence, is counterintuitive.  
However, it is dubious that if the letter was anonymous, as the opening 
sentence suggests, it would bear the seal of the man who sent it.   It is 
inconsequential to try to defend Lentulus’ sealing an anonymous letter with his 
known signum.  Cicero had stated that Cethegus and Statilius also 
acknowledged their handwriting and seals on their letters written to the 
Allobroges (Cic. Cat. 3.10).  Perhaps Lentulus only sealed his letter to the 
Allobroges and not his anonymous letter written to Catiline.  Therefore, the 
phrase ex eo could instead refer to the messenger Volturcius, not Lentulus’ 
family seal. 
 According to Sallust, Gabinius and Caeparius recruited Volturcius into 
the affair paucis ante diebus “a few days before” (Sall. Cat. 47.1), and Lentulus 
instructed Volturcius to act as messenger and escort the envoys (47.3).225  
Therefore, it was possible that Catiline did not meet Volturcius before the former 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 Cic. Cat. 3.12: atque ibi vehementissime perturbatus Lentulus tamen signum et manum 
suam cognovit. erant autem sine nomine “Then, although he was badly shaken, Lentulus 
nevertheless identified his seal and handwriting.  The letter was unsigned.”  Cf. n.223. 
225 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.12: Voltrucius vero subito litteras proferri atque aperiri iubet quas sibi a 
Lentulo ad Catilinam datas esse dicebat “Volturcius, however, suddenly demanded that the 
letter which he said had been given him by Lentulus for Catiline should be producd and 
opened.” 
 110 
left Rome.  The translation in Sallust’s version of the letter for ex eo as “from my 
messenger” implies that Volturcius would let Catiline know Lentulus wrote the 
letter.  If this was the case, then perhaps Catiline did not know Lentulus had 
joined the affair.  Catiline might have recognized Lentulus’ family seal, but, like 
Volturcius, Lentulus might not have supported the plan to gain power in Rome 
before Catiline left the city to join the army that Manlius had assembled in 
Faesulae.  Seager argues that Catiline did not know Volturcius or Lentulus, 
otherwise there is no explanation for the opening sentence of the letter.226 
However, Volturcius might not have been Lentulus’ associate.  Syme 
suggests that Volturcius gave up so easily when he was confronted on the 
Mulvian Bridge because he was a patsy or an agent working for Cicero from the 
beginning.227  However, the opinion that Cicero used Volturcius to infiltrate the 
inner circle supporting the affair in Rome is clearly a matter of conjecture.228  
Cicero recorded that the praetors who ambushed Volturcius and the envoys on 
the Mulvian Bridge had multos fortis viros “ a good number of stout fellows” with 
them and compluris delectos adulescentis…cum gladiis “a strong detachment of 
picked young men armed with swords” of Cicero’s clients from Reate (Cic. Cat. 
3.5).  Therefore, that Volturcius gave up without a fight is reasonable, especially 
if the Allobroges were cooperating with Cicero after their patron Sanga told him 
of the attempts to solicit the Gaul’s support, as Sallust claimed.229  If Cicero and 
Volturcius were in collusion then surely Lentulus and the others would have 
argued against Volturcius’ affidavit before they so readily confessed.  
Furthermore, Cicero probably would not have had four Senators record exactly 
what Volturcius and the Allobroges testified if Cicero had orchestrated their 
testimonies.230  Although Sallust wrote that the Allobroges were cooperating 
with Cicero (Sall. Cat. 41.5), there is no implication in any source that Volturcius 
was Cicero’s agent.  We should, therefore, discard this suggestion and focus on 
the little Cicero and Sallust said about Volturcius to attempt to explain his role. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 Seager 1973, 244-5. 
227 Others follow Syme’ opinion (1964, 82 n.89) that Volturcius was a double agent: cf. Waters 
1970, 214; Seager 1973, 245 n.21; McGushin 1977, 220; contra Phillips 1976, 446. 
228 Waters (1970) argues the only real threat in 63 was the army in northern Etruria and 
suggests that the activities in Rome were largely Cicero’s invention.  Waters’ study is too 
subjective to be cogent.  The flaw lies in believing Sallust’s version of events over Cicero’s 
version, which achieves nothing.  If the affair of 63 were primarily fiction, surely some ancient 
source would have mentioned it. 
229 Sallust claimed Sanga told Cicero about the attempted solicitation of the envoys.  Cicero 
used them to infiltrate the affair by ordering them to pretend to support it (Sall. B Cat. 41.5).  
Therefore, the envoys did not resist capture on the Mulvian Bridge (45.3). 
230 Cic. Sull. 41-42. 
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Sallust recorded that Lentulus instructed T. Volturcium quondam 
Crotoniensem “a certain Titus Volturcius of Crotona” to escort the Allobroges to 
Catiline and the army’s camp in northern Etruria (Sall. Cat. 44.3).  Croton was 
an ancient Greek colony located on the coast of Bruttium, and Sallust reported 
that disturbances were occurring in this region in 63 (42.1).231  Because we 
know where Volturcius was from, perhaps he was one of the unnamed domi 
nobiles Sallust claimed was involved with the affair (17.4).232  Cicero was silent 
regarding Volturcius’ rank or his ethnicity.  Forsythe explains that the name 
Volturcius was most likely an Etruscan name that had been Latinized.233  
Forsythe’s study contends that either Sallust was mistaken about Volturcius’ 
origin or the manuscript tradition of the Catilina was erroneous from the 
beginning mistaking Crotoniensem for Cortonensem.234  Forsythe’s argument is 
cogent.  Catiline and Manlius’ army might be on the move, so some knowledge 
of the region was paramount.  Cortona, a town in Etruria, was only fifty miles 
from Faesulae whereas Croton was over five hundred miles away.  Admittedly, 
Volturcius may have been a native of Croton who had knowledge of northern 
Etruria, but Forsythe’s conclusions regarding the historical possibility that 
Volturcius was from Cortona makes the reason he was sent to the region more 
understandable.  However, explaining Volturcius’ origin and why Lentulus sent 
him to Etruria does not help us conclude the meaning of the first sentence in the 
letter.  This depends on whether you believe or disbelieve that Catiline and 
Lentulus were associates before the former left Rome on November 9.   
However, to what extent we should believe either insinuation that Catiline 
would recognize the sender of the letter from Lentulus’ family seal or that 
Volturcius would tell Catiline that Lentulus wrote the letter does not diminish the 
significance that Lentulus was the only one from Rome to attempt to contact 
Catiline.  Lentulus had assumed the leadership of the activities in Rome and, as 
the highest-ranking participant, felt he was the only participant in Rome with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 Cf. Oros. 6.6.6-7; Suet. Aug. 3.1.  See also Chapter 3.4.  
232 Vretska (1976, 467) and McGushin (1977, 120) concur that T. Volturcius was probably a 
domi nobilis.  See also Appendix I, [no. 44].  
233 Forsythe 1992 410-12. 
234 Plutarch (Cic. 18.6) and Appian (B Civ. 2.4) also claim Volturcius was from Croton. Forsythe 
(1992, 408-9) argues that this misrepresentation begins with Sallust.  Forsythe (411) surveys 
sixty-five editions of the Catilina spanning two hundred years and discovers that only three of 
these editions attached a note regarding the adjective Crotoniensem.  The three sources are 
ambiguous whether Sallust was referring to the town in Etruria or Bruttium.  Forsythe (411) 
argues that the source of these editions’ confusion is a passage from Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
1.26.1, in which the Cortona in Etruria was discussed, but was also misspelled as Croton.      
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influence and authority to advise Catiline.  Excluding the opening sentence, the 
grammatical construction and meaning of the other sentences in both versions 
imply that Lentulus was not merely Catiline’s accomplice but was at the very 
least his equal. 
In Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ letter, the verbs are in the imperative 
except for the last verb in the subjunctive mood.  Both grammatical 
constructions can carry an authoritative tone.235  The imperatives were used to 
convey Lentulus’ requests of Catiline.  Lentulus requested Catiline to cura “be 
resolute” and to cogita “take stock” about the position he was in.  Lentulus was 
doubtlessly referring to Catiline’s status as hostis rei publicae, which, as 
mentioned, was declared after he joined Manlius, who was also declared a 
hostis, in mid-November.236  As Catiline was already a hostis, Lentulus thought 
Catiline’s only option was to strengthen the army in Etruria by enlisting anyone 
willing to support the affair.  The imperatives in Cicero’s version of the letter 
persist in the final sentence.  Lentulus continued to request Catiline to vide 
“see” and cura “take care” of the levy.  In order to enlist as many soldiers as 
possible, Lentulus advised that Catiline omnium tibi auxilia adiungas etaim 
infimorum “get the support of everyone, even the lowest.”  Lentulus was clearly 
worried about the numerical strength of Catiline and Manlius’ forces.  Therefore, 
he insisted that Catiline enlist the support of the infimi (‘the poor and/or 
slaves’).237 
Sallust’s version of Lentulus’ letter used verbs in the subjunctive mood to 
convey a similar sentiment.  The second sentence in Sallust’s version also 
implied that Lentulus advised Catiline that his situation as a hostis rei publicae 
demanded appropriate action.  If Catiline either decided to surrender or proceed 
into voluntary exile due to the hostis declaration, then Lentulus and the others’ 
designs in Rome would be compromised.  Lentulus requested that Catiline 
should memineris te virum esse “remember to act as a man.”  Dyck explains 
that this statement is often given from a father to a son.238  Lentulus was most 
likely older than Catiline, presuming the former had attained the consulship suo 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
235 H-B, 256-8.  See also Risselada 1993.  
236 See Chapter 3.3. 
237 OLD (infimus) s.v. 1-2.  For the estimates of the size of Catiline and Manlius’ forces, see 
n.59. 
238 Dyck 2008, 183. 
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anno in 71 and the latter’s first attempt at the consulship was not until 66.239  
The age difference was marginal and, as Lentulus and Catiline were both 
senators in 63, the phrase bears more of an authoritative than a patriarchal 
disposition.  However, the phraseology Lentulus chose certainly implies that he 
believed his rank as current praetor and the highest-ranking member among the 
supporters in Rome awarded him the right to request that Catiline heed his 
advice.  Basically, Lentulus wanted Catiline to complete the task that the affair’s 
participants expected of him, which included recruiting an ample force to 
intimidate the leaders in Rome in order that they react and, most importantly, to 
be capable of attacking Rome before the plans for the city commenced.240  
Sallust’s version of the letter claimed Lentulus advised that Catiline should 
consideres tuae rationes postulant “Consider what your plans demand.”  Similar 
to Cicero’s version, the language implied that Lentulus was worried that Catiline 
would fail to enlist a force capable of threatening Rome.  Sallust reproduced the 
same request in the final sentence of Lentulus’ letter to Catiline.  Lentulus 
requested that Catiline should enlist the infimi.  The tone of Sallust’s version of 
the letter is arguably more polite in register than Cicero’s version because 
Sallust used verbs in the subjunctive instead of the imperative.  Nevertheless, 
Lentulus was not only making a polite request of an equal, but also advising 
Catiline what Lentulus felt was necessary for the affair to succeed.241 
In order to further prove the argument that Lentulus’ influence on the 
affair was at least equal to Catiline’s, we can compare the language of some 
other letters of asking between men of equal status that appear in Cicero and 
Sallust’s other works.  A letter from Pompey to Cicero in February 49, which 
asked Cicero to meet him in Brundisium to join his other supporters in the 
Roman Senate during the beginning of his conflict with Caesar, was couched in 
polite terms.  Pompey wrote:  
magno opere te hortor pro tuo singulari perpetuoque studio in rem publicam ut te ad 
nos conferas, ut communi consilio rei publicae adflictae opem atque auxilium feramus. 
censeo via Appia iter facias et celeriter Brundisium venias.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
239 In usual circumstances, a Roman citizen was at least 43 years old before he was allowed to 
stand for the consulship.  Catiline was either rejected or withdrew from standing for the 
consulship in 66 due to his impending trial de repetundis or that his nomination was too late; cf. 
Sall. B Cat. 18.2-3; Asc. 89C.  Cf. Sumner 1965; Marshall 1976-77. 
240 According to Appian, this simultaneous attack outside and inside Rome was the affair’s 
preferred plan (App. B Civ. 2.3). 
241 On politeness and register, see Dickey 2002, 13-8.  Cicero used imperatives in phrases such 
as fac ut and cura ut valeas that appear in his epistolary corpus 19 and 51 times respectively, 
but these phrases are used differently in Lentulus’ letter.  A BTL search was conducted for the 
numbers of occurrences on July 2010.  
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“I strongly urge you, in view of your outstanding and unwavering patriotism, to make 
your way over to us, so that in concert we may bring aid and comfort to our afflicted 
country.  I advise you to travel by the Appian Way and come quickly to Brundisium” 
(Cic. Att. 8.11C). 
 
Pompey expressed his request to Cicero primarily using verbs in the 
subjunctive mood, like Sallust’s version of Lentulus’ letter.  The verbs in the 
subjunctive found in purpose clauses stress the urgency Pompey wanted to 
convey.242  The force of this letter is parallel to the tone of Lentulus’ letter.  It is 
implicit that Pompey, who no doubt considered himself of superior rank to 
Cicero for many reasons, was not politely asking Cicero to join him, but was 
ordering him.243  
The letters from Cicero to Q. Tullius Cicero, his younger brother, when 
Quintus was governor of Asia in 61-58 are filled with gubernatorial advice.  
Although Cicero had only been a quaestor in Lilybaeum for one year, the letters 
he sent to Quintus regarding his promagistracy were laden with political advice 
on how to proceed in certain situations in which the older brother considered he 
was more experienced.  The following is one passage from a letter sent to 
Quintus, in late 60 or in the beginning of 59: 
quapropter hoc te primum rogo, ne contrahas ac demittas animum neve te obrui 
tamquam fluctu sic magnitudine negoti sinas contraque erigas ac resistas sive etiam 
ultro occurras negotiis; 
 
“Well then, this is the first thing I ask of you: let there be no inner withdrawal or 
discouragement.  Don’t allow yourself to be submerged beneath the flood of great 
responsibility.  Stand up and face it, contend with the business as it comes or even go 
out to meet it.” 
(Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.4) 
 
Throughout the letter Cicero used verbs in the subjunctive mood in order to 
stress that his advice should be followed.  We can presume that Cicero was 
making a polite request to one of equal status and not an explicit order to a 
subordinate because of the verb rogare (‘to ask’).  Risselada explains the verb 
rogo is polite because it tends to soften a request by making it more seem 
optional.244  Of course, following the grammatical rules concerning a verb of 
‘asking’ indicating an indirect command, the verbs after rogare are in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
242 H-B, 261. 
243 Cicero was the same age as Pompey, but the latter’s political career was arguably vastly 
superior.  Pompey was consul three times and celebrated three military triumphs.  On Cicero’s 
complicated friendship with Pompey, see Gruen 1974, 44ff. 
244 Risselda 1993, 252. 
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subjunctive mood.245  Regardless whether rogo indicated a polite request does 
not diminish the fact that Cicero expected Quintus to follow his advice, and what 
followed can be considered commands.  Seemingly, this was not just brotherly 
advice. 
 Cicero used the imperative construction in his own correspondence, 
especially when he overtly needed help from a close friend.  An example is a 
letter sent to Cicero’s friend Atticus in 64.  Cicero wanted the support of Atticus’ 
friends and clients in Rome during his campaign to become consul.  Cicero 
requested that Atticus qua re Ianuario mense, ut constituisti, cura ut Romae sis 
“So mind you are in Rome by the beginning of January as you arranged” (Cic. 
Att. 1.2.2).  The imperative used here can be considered of a more demanding 
register than using the alternate subjunctive construction in previous examples 
and is similar to the grammatical construction of Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ 
letter.  Cicero made this request because he was concerned his bid for the 
consulship would be hindered if Atticus and his clients were not in Rome to lend 
their support to his candidacy.  Similarly, Lentulus knew that the affair would be 
less potent if Catiline did not recruit a substantial force to march on Rome.  
Therefore, in both cases, Cicero perhaps felt the usage of imperatives was 
necessary to convey the gravity of their requests to those of equal status. 
A fragment of Sallust’s Historiae recorded a letter sent from Mithridates, 
the King of Pontus, to Arsaces, the King of Parthia in 69 (Sall. Hist. 4.69). The 
purpose of Mithridates’ letter was to ask Arsaces for an alliance against the 
Romans.246  In this instance, Sallust chose to use other verbs of ‘asking’ than 
rogare that conveyed the polite register you would expect from a letter sent to a 
person of equal status.  Sallust used the verbs orare (‘to beg’), petere (‘to seek 
after’) and quaesare (‘to ask’) throughout the letter to stress Mithridates’ hope 
that he would receive a favorable response from Arsaces.  Mithridates wrote ni 
egregia fama, si Romanos oppresseris, futura est, neque petere audeam 
societatem “If to crush the Roman power would not bring you glorious fame, I 
should not venture to sue for your alliance” (4.69.2).  Later in the letter, 
Mithridates reiterated that he wanted an answer to his request for an alliance 
from Arsaces: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
245 G-L, 296-7. 
246 The letter was written after Mithridates had been forced to withdraw into Armenia after a 
costly defeat at Cabira against the Roman army led by L. Licinius Lucullus in 69, cf. Sall. Hist. 
4.69.15; Plut. Luc. 17.2-19.1.   
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nunc, quaeso, considera nobis oppressis utrum firmiorem te ad resistundum, an finem 
belli futurum putes?  Scio equidem tibi magnas opes virorum armorum et auri esse; et 
ea re a nobis ad societatem ab illis ad praedm peteris. 
 
“I pray you, then, to consider whether you believe that when we have been crushed you 
will be better able to resist the Romans, or that there will be an end to the war.  I know 
well that you have great numbers of men and large amounts of arms and gold, and it is 
for that reason that I seek your alliance and the Romans your spoils.” (Sall. Hist. 
4.69.16) 
 
Dickey’s recent discussion of Cicero’s usage of the verb petere in his epistolary 
corpus explains that Cicero most often used the term to ask a favor from a 
friend.247  In contrast, Cicero used the verb quaesere more frequently when he 
was asking the recipient for a certain response to his request.248  Dickey 
proposes that based on the type of request made we can determine the 
importance for both sender and recipient based on the term used to make the 
request.  Dickey’s initial research of our epistolary corpora in Latin concludes 
that the terms used to make a request in order of importance from lowest to 
highest were velim, quaesere, rogare, and petere.249  The verbs used in the 
letter convey the importance of the Mithridates’ request and his expectation that 
Arsaces would respond.  The letter makes it clear that the former hoped the 
latter reacted favorably to his request.  Therefore, Mithridates tried to avoid 
language in his letter that implied it was necessary Arsaces heed his request for 
a beneficial alliance, in contrast to the more authoritative tone of Lentulus’ 
requests to his equal Catiline.250 
Sallust recorded a private letter sent from Catiline to Q. Lutatius Catulus 
(Sall. B Cat. 35). Catulus, the ex-consul of 78 and princeps senatus in 63251, 
had lent his support to Catiline during his trials de repeduntis in 65 and de 
sicariis et veneficis in 64.252  He had also most likely presided as a judge during !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
247 Dickey “’Please’ and related expressions in classical and later Latin” South West Classical 
Association seminar (15 Jan. 2008), Exeter.  Cf. Dickey “How to say ‘Please’ in Latin” CQ 
forthcoming 2012. 
248 Dickey (2008, 2) demonstrates that Cicero used petere to ask for a favor 46 out of the 47 
times the term appeared.  Cicero used quaesere 27 out of the 28 times when Cicero wanted a 
certain response from his request. 
249 Dickey 2008, 3.  
250 NB: Sallust, however, does use the verb hortari (‘to urge’) twice, exhorting Arsaces to join 
Mithradates.  However, the subjunctive was avoided in both instances, cf. Sall. Hist. 4.69.4: 
hortabuntur, 4.69.23: moneo hortorque.  Therefore, the mood of the verb does not imply an 
authoritative tone, see n.245.   
251 See Appendix I, [no.28]. 
252 Catiline was formerly acquitted from both perhaps due to his support from ex-consuls like 
Catulus and other influential citizens.  On the trial de repetundis, cf Cic. Att. 1.1.1, 1.2.1; Cat. 
1.18; Sull. 81; Cael. 10, 14; Har. resp. 42; Pis. 23; Comment. pet. 10; Asc. 85C, 89C, 92C.  On 
the trial de sicariis et veneficis, see: Cic. Att. 1.16.9; Sul. 81; Pis. 95; Asc. 91-92C; Suet. Iul. 11; 
Dio Cass. 37.10.3.  See also TLRR, nos. 212, 217. 
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Catiline’s trial and acquittal regarding the defilation of a Vestal Virgin in 73.253  
Presumably, Catulus had supported Catiline for a long time.  However, due to 
Catiline’s actions in 63, Catulus was keen to remove any suspicion against him.  
Therefore, according to Sallust, he read out Catiline’s letter to the Senate 
(35.3).  The letter implied Catiline was not going into voluntary self-exile in 
Massilia, but was joining Manlius in northern Etruria (35.2,4).254  By informing 
the Senate of Catiline’s true intentions perhaps Catulus removed any suspicion 
that he still supported Catiline or the affair.255 
 Sallust used a verb in the subjunctive in the final sentence of Catiline’s 
letter to Catulus: eam ab iniuria defendas, per liberos tuos rogatus “Protect her 
[Catiline’s wife, Orestilla] from insult, I beseech you in the name of your own 
children” (Sall. B Cat. 35.6).  Although Catiline’s political career was inferior, he 
and Catulus were both senators.  The verb defendere is a jussive subjunctive, 
which can act as an imperative.256  This construction implies a request similar in 
tone to Sallust’s version of Lentulus’ letter to Catiline.  Although Catiline’s letter 
to Catulus was written in the polite tone we would expect of a letter sent to one 
of equal status, the jussive subjunctive in the final sentence stressed the 
urgency of Catiline’s instructions to Catulus. 
In sum, the language used in Cicero and Sallust’s versions of Lentulus’ 
letter to Catiline is indicative of one addressing an equal.  Furthermore, the 
tone, which can be ascertained from the grammatical construction of Lentulus’ 
letter to Catiline, implied that Lentulus was not Catiline’s subordinate.  In 
addition to his letter, Lentulus wanted Volturcius to deliver a mandata (‘oral 
message’) to Catiline to reiterate the importance that Catiline heeded his 
advice.  As Lentulus was in Rome, he clearly felt he better understood the 
gravity of Catiline’s situation than Catiline himself. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
253 Reference to Catiline’s defilation of the Vestal Fabia, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.9; Att. 1.16.9; Pis. 95; 
Brut. 236; Comment. pet. 10; Sall. Cat. 15.1, 35.1; Asc. 91C; Plut. Cat. min. 19.5; Oros. 6.3.1.  
Cf. Lewis 2001; Cadoux 2005. Lewis (2001, 144) explains trials regarding Vestal Virgins and the 
men who were accused of defiling this sacred institution were most likely presided over by the 
pontifex maximus.  In 73, the pontifex maximus, Q. Metellus Pius, was in Spain fighting against 
the adherents of Q. Sertorius.  Therefore Catulus, the next most senior pontiff in Rome (MRR II, 
114), might have presided over Catiline’s trial or just lent his influence to obtain Catiline’s 
acquittal.  Lewis (2001, 144) agrees Catulus may have presided over the trial, but disagrees 
that Catulus intervened on Catiline’s behalf (146).  Cf. nn.308-10. 
254 Sallust claimed that Catiline had sent other letters to other notable citizens before he left 
Rome stating that he was leaving for Massilia into voluntary self-exile (Sall. Cat. 34.2).  See 
Chapter 3 nn.39-41. 
255 NB: There is no concrete evidence that Catulus supported the affair of 63. 
256 H-B, 259. 
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2.4.4 Lentulus’ mandata to Catiline 
Lentulus also instructed Volturcius to orally deliver mandata 
(‘instructions’) to Catiline (Cic. Cat. 3.4; Sall. B Cat. 44.6).  In a similar manner 
to Lentulus’ letter to Catiline, Cicero and Sallust reproduced versions of 
Lentulus’ mandata.  Cicero claimed Volturcius divulged that Lentulus’ mandata 
to Catiline reiterated the requests in Lentulus’ letter.  According to Cicero’s 
version of the mandata, Lentulus was urging Catiline ut servorum praesidio 
uteretur, ut ad urbem quam primum cum exercitu accederet “to rally the slaves 
to his standard and march on Rome with his army as soon as possible” (Cic. 
Cat. 3.8).  In contrast to Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ letter to Catiline requesting 
he find support among the infimi, which can refer to the poor and slaves alike, 
Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ mandata to explicitly enlist servi into the army in 
Etruria.  But Cicero’s version of the letter and mandata similarly implied that 
Lentulus’ advice to Catiline was to start a slave revolt.  Clearly, Cicero could use 
the implication of Lentulus’ requests to use slaves to further condemn his role in 
the affair.  The second clause in Cicero’s version of the mandata implied that 
the participants in Rome were waiting for the army in Etruria to march on the 
city before they commenced their plans to cause panic within the city by setting 
fires and murdering the leading citizens.  Therefore, Lentulus’ mandata, more 
explicitly than the opening sentence of Lentulus’ letter, supported Cicero’s claim 
that the events occurring inside and outside of Rome were concerted efforts of 
the same affair with the same seditious aims. 
Of course, Catiline never received Lentulus’ letter or his verbal message, 
which Cicero claimed advised Catiline to enlist the infimi and servi to increase 
the numbers in the army in Etruria and then march towards Rome.  In the First 
Oration, Cicero remarked that Catiline was evocatorem servorum “the recruiter 
of slaves” (Cic. Cat. 1.27).257  On the other hand, Sallust’s Catilina was adamant 
that Catiline continually refused to use slaves in the army (Sall. B Cat. 44.6, 
46.3) even before the final battle when he was facing a larger force (56.5).  The 
contradictory claims in Cicero and Sallust beg the question of whether those 
involved with the affair of 63 solicited support from the slaves.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 Sallust recorded that Catiline sent Manlius to Etruria, but also Septimius to Picenum and C. 
Julius to Apulia Sall. B Cat 27.1.  He was vague what these men were to do other than help the 
affair in some regard.  But if Manlius was asked to raise an army then perhaps Septimius and 
Julius were to raise armies as well.  If this included the slaves we cannot be certain.  Cf. nn.258-
60; Chapter 3 n.168. 
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Yavetz argues that slaves were perhaps willing to join Catiline because if 
they participated they might be manumitted if the affair was successful.258  On 
the contrary, Annequin argues that slaves were not interested in the affair’s 
aims, which were clearly to improve the positions of Catiline, Lentulus, and 
others in the higher classes.259  Bradley, following Annequin, agrees that it was 
not clear if the slaves did support the affair whether it would improve their 
financial condition.  Bradley concludes that the slaves might have supported the 
affair for several reasons (plunder, etc.), but refutes Yavetz’s suggestion 
regarding manumission, as our sources never claimed that if the affair was 
successful then the slaves who supported it would be freed.260 
Sallust’s version of the mandata explicitly evinced that it was Lentulus’ 
idea to recruit slaves.  Sallust remarked that Lentulus’ mandata included a 
question to Catiline asking cum ab senatu hostis iudicatus sit, quo consilio 
servitia repudiet?  “What his idea was in refusing the aid of slaves, when he had 
been declared a rebel by the Senate” (44.6).  According to Sallust, Catiline was 
adamantly against recruiting slaves and presumably would have rejected 
Lentulus’ advice if he had received it (56.5).  Sallust’s version of the mandata, 
like Cicero’s version, included Lentulus’ urgent request that Catiline ne 
cunctetur ipse propius accedere “Should not himself hesitate to come nearer 
the walls [of Rome]” (44.6).  Therefore, Sallust’s version of the mandata 
expressed the same requests found in Cicero’s version, i.e. Lentulus’ requests 
of Catiline to recruit slaves and march on Rome.  Furthermore, Sallust’s version 
of Lentulus’ mandata explicitly connected Lentulus with Catiline, unlike his 
version of Lentulus’ letter.  Sallust claimed Lentulus’ mandata would inform 
Catiline that in urbe parata esse quae iusserit “The preparations which he 
[Catiline] had ordered in the city had been made.”  Lentulus’ question of Catiline 
regarding the use of slaves in the army in Etruria implied that the two might !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 Yavetz 1963, 494. 
259 Annequin 1972, 204.  NB: Sallust claimed Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptionem 
locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia quae bellum atque lubido victorum fert. 
“Catiline promised abolition of debts, the proscription of the rich, offices, priesthoods, plunder, 
and all the other spoils that war and the license of victors can offer” (Sall. B Cat. 21.2).  Catiline 
often rhetorically compared the situation of those willing to join the affair to servitude and 
promised libertas, but nowhere was it implied that Catiline promised freedom to the slaves.  On 
the other hand anyone who informed the Senate about the affair were rewarded (Cic. Cat. 
4.10).  Slaves were also offered a reward if they informed (Sall. B Cat. 29.6-7, cf. 36.5).  Cf. 
n.259. 
260 Bradley 1978, 329 n.5 contra Yavetz 1963, 498-9.  Yavetz’s conclusions ignore Sallust’s 
claim that Catiline refused enlisting the support from slaves because suis rationibus existumans 
videri causam civium “He thought it inconsistent with his designs to appear to have given 
runaway slaves a share in a citizens’ cause” (Sall. B Cat. 56.5). 
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have had an argument before the latter had left Rome.  The statement in the 
mandata that Lentulus and the others were following Catiline’s orders more 
explicitly linked the two men as well as the actions occurring inside and outside 
Rome than Lentulus’ letter.  Therefore, the presumption that Lentulus was 
acting independently of Catiline due to the vague opening sentence in the letter, 
which perhaps suggests that Catiline did not know Lentulus, remains 
contentious.  It is indeterminable whether Lentulus was present at the meeting 
at Laeca’s house with Catiline on November 6 when the plans were supposedly 
meted out to those leaving Rome with Catiline and those remaining in the 
city.261  Lentulus might have joined with the others supporting the affair 
remaining in Rome after Catiline had left the city.  We cannot prove with 
certainty that Lentulus and Catiline were initially cooperating before December 
3, but we can demonstrate that Lentulus’ leadership in Rome was as crucial as 
Catiline’s role in Etruria to achieve the ultimate goal to overthrow the current 
established authority in Rome.    
After Catiline had left the city, Sallust claimed those remaining in Rome 
were sicuti Catilina praeceperat “following Catiline’s directions” (Sall. B Cat. 
39.6).  However, both Cicero’s and Sallust’s reproductions of Lentulus’ letter 
and mandata, regardless of either author’s grammatical preference, imply that 
Lentulus was not Catiline’s subordinate but his equal.  Furthermore, although 
the imperative construction in Cicero’s version of Lentulus’ letter and the 
subjunctives used in Sallust’s version indicate Lentulus was making requests of 
one of equal status, the tone is more authoritative than polite.  Lentulus’ letter 
and message to Catiline emphasized that the former was comfortable 
requesting the latter to follow his advice.  Lentulus also demonstrated that he 
would act on his own initiative when deciding to meet with the Allobrogean 
envoys.  If Catiline were the indisputable leader of the affair we would assume 
the wording of Lentulus’ letter and mandata to be more subservient in its tone.  
Furthermore, we would expect that the letter or the mandata would explain how !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 Seager (1973, 241-3) challenges the validity the meeting at Laeca’s due to the varied way 
Cicero altered the details of what was planned in the meeting to suit the purpose of his 
speeches, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.-8, 2.6, 4.13; Sull. 18, 52.  NB: Cicero did not specifically name anyone 
present at Laeca’s house other than Catiline in 63.  In 62, he only named C. Cornelius as one of 
the two men sent to assassinate Cicero on the morning after the meeting at Sull. 52.  On the 
other hand at Sull. 18, Cicero claimed Autronius sent C. Cornelius to assassinate Cicero, which 
implied that at least Autronius was at meeting.  However, Cicero seemed to exagerrate 
Autronius’ role in the affair to lessen the suspicion against his client P. Sulla, see n.134.  On the 
several meetings of the participants, see Appendix I n.29. 
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Lentulus and the others in Rome were faring.  Instead, his letter and mandata to 
Catiline included his apprehensions about the situation of the army in Etruria. 
Lentulus certainly believed his influence on the affair permitted him to 
request that Catiline consider his advice.  He perhaps also expected Catiline to 
follow it, as he was a praetor of Rome.  It remains unknown if Catiline attempted 
to contact Lentulus or the other participants in Rome with advice regarding the 
affair’s plans in the city.  In addition, we have no evidence that anyone else but 
Lentulus attempted to contact Catiline personally.  The analysis of Lentulus’ 
letter and mandata demonstrates that his influence was at least equal to 
Catiline’s influence on the affair and further demonstrates that Lentulus was 
considered the leader of those who continued to participate in the affair after 
Catiline had left Rome.  Nevertheless, Lentulus’ letter and mandata implicitly 
connected the disturbances occurring inside Rome with those in northern 
Etruria regardless wheteher Lentulus acted independently of Catiline, which, as 
mentioned, the vague opening sentence of the letter might suggest.  We can 
initially conclude that both Lentulus and Catiline wanted to gain power in Rome, 
but disagreed over how this would be achieved. 
  
2.4.5  The prophecy of 63  
This section analyzes the prophecy Lentulus possessed that foretold he 
would rule in Rome specifically in the year 63.  It is worth examining this topic in 
some detail because the prophecy suggests that Lentulus might have been 
motivated to support the affair of 63 for an entirely independent reason than any 
of its other supporters.  Moreover, the prophecy challenges our sources’ 
contention that Lentulus was following Catiline’s orders although the latter was 
absent from Rome.  If we scrutinize the way the prophecy was recorded in our 
sources, primarily examining the language Cicero and Sallust used to recount it, 
we can attempt to answer how Lentulus was connected with the prophecy and 
why our sources chose to record such a fundamental religious element in their 
narratives of the affair.262 
The historicity behind the prophecy of 63 remains contentious, but the 
accounts of the prophecy cannot be ignored not only because of its religious 
importance, but also because the prophecy perhaps was the reason for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
262 The prophecy is recorded in most of the accounts of the affair, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.9; Sall. Cat. 
47.2; Plut. Cic. 17.5; App. BC 2.4; Fl. 2.12.8.  See nn.305 and 319. 
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Lentulus’ participation.  The prominent and intimate connection between Roman 
religion and politics are manifest.263  The examples discussed in this section 
regarding prodigies, prophecies, and how Roman religion was affected by the 
Sibylline books and the responses of the haruspices, men steeped in the 
Etruscan art of divination, are admittedly a simplified account of a much more 
complex topic.  It is not my primary purpose to explain the nuances between 
prodigy, prophecy, and divination or simplify the complexity of Roman Religion.  
However, it is important to briefly review the relevant religious elements that 
underpin the prophecy to further comprehend the gravity of the subject and to 
further attempt to explain the motives behind the prophecy’s documentation.  
The evidence of the prophecy should not be discarded as inconsequential just 
because our sources claimed or implied it was false.  Instead, a thorough 
examination of the prophecy, as it appears in our sources, yields significant 
suggestions regarding Lentulus’ involvement and the affair of 63 as a whole. 
In the Third Oration, delivered from the rostra, Cicero declared Lentulus 
had told the Allobrogrean envoys that he was in possession of a prophecy.  
According to Cicero’s account, the prophecy stated the following: 
Lentulum autem sibi confirmasse ex fatis Sibyllinis haruspicemque responsis se esse 
tertium illum Cornelium ad quem regnum huius urbis atque imperium pervenire esset 
necesse: Cinnam ante se et Sullam fuisse.  eundemque dixisse fatalem hunc annum 
esse ad interitum huius urbis atque imperi qui esset annus decimus post virginum 
absolutionem, post Capitoli autem incensionem vicesimus. 
 
Lentulus had assured them [the Allobroges] that the Sibylline books and soothsayers 
had declared that he was that third Cornelius to whom the rule and dominion of Rome 
was fated to come: before him there had been Cinna and Sulla.  He also said that this 
was the year, the tenth after the acquittal of the Vestal Virgins and the twentieth after 
the burning of the Capitol, fated for the destruction of Rome and her empire. (Cic. Cat. 
3.9) 
 
Cicero proclaimed that the prophecy was ex fatis Sibyllinis haruspicemque 
responsis, affirming that the prophecy had originated from both the Sibylline 
books and the responses of the Etruscan haruspices.  Upon initial inspection, 
the phrase is not explicit that the prophecy originated from the libri Sibyllini.  
Cicero used the word fata instead of the word libra; the latter being what we 
would normally expect to appear in reference to the Sibylline books.  Cicero 
used the prepositional phrase ex fatis two other times in his works.  In the 
Fourth Oration, he alluded to Lentulus’ wish to rule Rome, proclaiming that 
regnantem Lentulum, sicut ipse se ex fatis sperasse confessus est “Lentulus as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
263 Polyb. 6.56.6-9 
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potentate, as he admitted was his hope of what fate held for him” (Cat. 4.12).  
The second instance of the phrase ex fatis occurs in a passage from Cicero’s 
De Divinatione.  The passage described the tradition of the prophet from Veii, 
who warned the Romans that while Lake Albanus was flooded they would be 
unable to capture Veii unless it was drained.  According to Cicero, the prophet, 
turned informer, had come to this conclusion ex fatis, quae Veientes scripta 
haberent  “According to the prophecies of the Veientian books” (Div. 1.100).  
Therefore, upon closer examination, perhaps the phrase ex fatis Sibyllinis 
implicitly refers to the Sibylline libra, which was concerned with the fate (fatum) 
of Rome. However, Cicero did not state that Lentulus’ prophecy was specifically 
written in the Sibylline books by using the verb, scribo, as he did in the passage 
from the De Divinatione.  Perhaps, this was intentional.  Therefore, if pressed, 
Cicero could claim that he stated Lentulus’ prophecy was not exactly “written” in 
the Sibylline books or infer that Lentulus altered what was “written.”  Although 
Cicero did not explicitly claim the prophecy was a fake, he most likely avoided 
the exact phrase ex libris Sibyllinis to imply that in his estimation the prophecy 
was spurious. 
Before returning to the account of the prophecy, first I will briefly review 
the history and religious function of the Sibylline books.  According to tradition, 
L. Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome, originally obtained the libri 
Sibyllini from the Cumaen Sibyl in the late sixth century.264  Basically, the books 
contained a collection carmina (‘prophetic songs’)265 from renowned Sibyls from 
several areas in the Mediterranean.266  The Senate consulted the libri Sibyllini 
and the carmina Sibyllina when it considered certain natural catastrophes (i.e., 
earthquakes, active volcanoes, etc..); or supernatural (i.e., a rain of fire, stones 
falling from the sky, statues bleeding etc…); or unnatural events (i.e., the birth 
of a hermaphrodite) needed to be explained in order to protect Rome.  The task 
of consulting the Sibylline books and deciphering the carmina Sibyllina fell to 
the decemviri sacris faciundis, a college of ten Roman priests,267 and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 For the story of L. Tarquinius Superbus and the Sybilline books, cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
4.62.1-4. Dionysus of Halicarnassus recorded that it was the Sibyl of Erythrae not the Cumaen 
Sibyl who gave Tarquinius Superbus the books (4.62.6).  Cf. Lact. Ira 2.23; Div. Inst. 2.5. On the 
Cumaen Sibyl, see Parke 1988, 137-40. 
265 For an explanation of the term carmina, see Wiseman 2008, 39-48. 
266 Cicero mentioned four different Sibyls (Cic. Div. 2.110-2; cf. 1.34, 79).  Lactantius recorded 
ten different Sibyls and their locations (Lact. Div. Inst. 1.6.9; cf. Div. Inst. 2.5. 
267 Cic. Div. 1.4.  Beard, North, and Price (1998, 18 n.45) explain that there was originally two 
priests in this college, which was later expanded to ten in 367 and then to fifteen by 51.  NB: 
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haruspices, men who practiced the art of divination.  From their consultation, 
these men diagnosed what was required and then prescribed the appropriate 
remedia in order to avert the crisis.268  Clearly, the Romans took these prodigies 
seriously.  In certain cases, if the remedia required that the Romans adopt 
foreign religious customs to expiate Rome from whatever upset the gods to 
cause the prodigies to occur, then they would do what was proscribed.  It 
should be noted, before we delve any further into the complex machinations of 
Roman religion, that prophecy and prodigy are two separate categories.269  
However, the latter often spawns from the former therefore, I do not distinguish 
between the two terms in the examination that follows.  
 When the Sibylline books were consulted due to certain prodigies, the 
remedia that were recommended sometimes had an impact on Roman religious 
traditions.270  In 295, three years of plague and famine ravaged Rome (Val. 
Max. 1.8.2).  After consulting the Sibylline books, it was recommended that the 
cult of Aesculapius, the Greek god of healing, should be brought to the city (Liv. 
10.47.6-7).271  The senate agreed and legates were sent to Epidaurus in the 
Peloponnese.  They returned with a personification of the god in a form of a 
snake and the Romans built a temple to the god.  After the temple was 
consecrated around 291 on the island in the Tibur River next to Rome, the 
plague and famine ceased (Ov. Met. 15.622-745).272 
Another example was the introduction of the Phrygian mother goddess in 
Rome during the Second Punic War in 204.  Livy recounted that there were 
many meteor showers that year therefore in libris Sibyllinis…inspectis “An 
inspection of the Sibylline Books had been made” (Liv. 29.10.4).  The 
suggested remedia were for the Romans to travel to Phrygia and return with the 
Idaean Mother, the goddess Cybele, and then Rome would be able to defeat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
When the term decemviri appears alone in this section it refers to the college of the decemviri 
sacris faciundas.  
268 Usually the Senate consulted both the haruspices and the quindecemviri to decipher the libri 
Sibyllini (Cic. Div 1.97).  Cf. Ridley 2005, 277. 
269 On the distinction in Roman religion between prodigy and prophecy, see Rosenberger 1998, 
7-16. 
270 For an index of prodigies and where they occur in our sources, see MacBain 1982, 82-112.  
Julius Obsequens’ summary of the prodigies from Livy Ab Urbe Condita start at Book 19 
beginning in the year 190.  Of course, prodigies had occurred previous to the date of 
Obsequens work, but I follow the arguments in Beard, North and Price (1998, 38-9), who 
speculate that records of prodigies from the second century were more readily available than 
others.  Regarding the reliability of these lists, how they were complied and whether prodigies 
outside of the ager Romanus were recognized by the Roman State, see Rawson 1971.  
271 Cf. Val. Max. 1.8.2. 
272 See Wiseman 2008, 75-77.  
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any hostis alienigena “foreign foe” and drive their enemy out of Italy.273  The 
hostis alienigena that year was Hannibal and the censors of 204 ordered a 
temple to the Phygian goddess to be built on the Palatine (29.39.2).  A year 
later Hannibal and his forces had to abandon their campaign in order to defend 
their homeland from Scipio’s forces in Africa (30.7.5-20.9).  In 191, Livy 
recorded that the temple was consecrated to the Magna Mater, (as the goddess 
was called in Rome), and the Megalesia, a religious festival with annual games, 
became a Roman tradition (36.36.3-4).274 
These examples demonstrate that the religious leadership in Rome 
considered the Sibylline books an integral part of the religion.275  Cicero 
remarked about the numerous times that the Senate consulted the Sibylline 
books.276  The leadership in Rome apparently believed a consultation of the 
Sibylline books was necessary to placate the gods when unnatural prodigious 
events occurred, and the Senate would comply in the implementation of 
whatever remedia the decemviri and haruspices recommended, i.e., the 
building of temples, holding games, etc. 
The prophecy in connection with the affair of 63 referred to the 
conflagration of the Capitol twenty years earlier.  During Sulla’s march through 
Italy in 83, Plutarch recorded that a prophet forewarned Sulla that if he did not 
hurry to Rome a fire would break out on the Capitol.  Apparently, on the specific 
day predicted by the prophet, the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the 
Capitol burned down (Plut. Sull. 27.6).  The Sybilline books, which had been 
stored in the temple since the time of its foundation by the Roman King 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
273 Liv. 29.10.4: ciuitatem eo tempore repens religio inuaserat inuento carmine in libris Sibyllinis 
propter crebrius eo anno de caelo lapidatum inspectis, quandoque hostis alienigena terrae 
Italiae bellum intulisset eum pelli Italia uincique posse si mater Idaea a Pessinunte Romam 
aduecta foret. “Owing to the unusual number of showers of stones, which had fallen during the 
year, an inspection had been made of the Sibylline Books and some oracular verses had been 
discovered which announced that whenever a foreign foe should carry war into Italy he could be 
driven out and conquered if the Mater Idaea were brought from Pessinus to Rome.” Cf. Cic. 
Har. resp. 24; Ov. Fast. 4.293. 
274 Cf. Ov. Fast. 4.179-372.  On the Magna Mater and the Megalesia, see Wiseman 2004, 174-7 
and 2008, 169. 
275 On the Sibylline books, cf. Gagé 1955, 432-61; Parke 1988, 190-215.  For the effects of the 
Sibylline books on Roman religion in general, cf. Beard, North and Price 1998, 61-73; Rüpke, 
2007, 86-116. 
276 Cic. Div. 1.97: quotiens senatus decemviros ad libros ire iussit! “How many times the Senate 
has ordered the decemvirs to consult the Sibylline books!” 
 126 
Tarquinius Superbus, were also destroyed in the fire (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
4.62.5-6; App. B Civ. 1.83).277 
The writers Tacitus, Dionysus of Halicarnassus, and Lactantius all 
describe the mission of decemviri sacris faciundis in 76 to replace the libri 
Sibyllini that were lost in the conflagration of the Capitol seven years earlier.278  
The envoys were instructed to search the places in the Mediterranean known to 
have a Sibyl.279  The mission was a success and they returned with a collection 
of new carmina Sibyllinae to replace the original verses that were lost.  The 
decemviri of 76 apparently accepted the new collection as genuine carmina, 
however, the authenticity of the new collection of verses was scrutinized over 
sixty years later.  After the death of the pontifex maximus in 12, Augustus 
assumed the office that year.  According to Suetonius, Augustus gathered 
together all of the prophetic verses that had been disseminated into the public 
sector and those from the Sibylline books.  He burned more than two thousand 
verses that he deemed were false, including some of the verses collected in the 
Sibylline books.280  The collection of verses Augustus kept was moved to the 
temple of Apollo on the Palatine, so he could guarantee that only authorized 
Roman priests could consult them (Suet. Aug. 31.1).281 
The new temple of Jupiter was not completed on the Capitol until 69, so 
where the Sibylline books were stored until then is unknown.282  However, as 
one of the duties of the decemviri was to make sure the verses in the books 
remained secret, we can presume that either the pontifex maximus when in 
Rome, or the praetor urbanus, or a senior member of the decemviri would have 
been charged with their possession until the temple was completed.283  This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277 According to Livy, the construction of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus began under 
the reign of the Tarquin kings (Liv. 1.55.2), but was not consecrated until the first years of the 
Roman Republic (2.8.5-6).  Cf. Wiseman 2008, 169. 
278 Cf. Tac. Ann. 6.12.4; Dion. Hal. Rom. Ant. 4.62.6; Lact. Ira 1.22; Inst. Div. 1.6.14. 
279 On the identity of the Sibyls in Antiquity, see Parke 1988, 23-50. 
280 On Augustus’ decree to purge certain verses from the Sibylline books, cf. Parke 1988, 138; 
Ridley 2005, 285-6; Wiseman 2008, 46-7. 
281 Cf. Dio Cass. 54.17.2. NB: Lactantius claimed only the verses of the Cumaen Sibyl were 
kept hidden from the public because they were expressly concerned the fates of Romans (Lact. 
Ira 2.23).  The verses of other Sibyl were in common use (Lact. Inst. Div. 2.5).  
282 For Q. Lutatius Catulus’ consecration of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the 
Capitol, cf. Cic. Verr. 2.4.69; Liv. Per. 98; Val. Max. 6.9.5; Lact. Ira 2.22. 
283 The duties of the pontifex maximus were primarily ceremonial, see Plut. Num. 9.4, 10.4.  
Unlike other pontiffs, the pontifex maximus did not have to remain in Rome at all times other 
pontiffs would take over his ceremonial responsibilities until he returned.  My suggestion that the 
praetor urbanus might have housed the Sibylline books comes from Augustus’ motion to have 
them housed with this magistrate (Dio Cass. 54.17.2).  The latter suggestion that they were 
housed with a senior member of the college of the quindecemviri is manifest.  On the duties of 
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leads us to the first of three hypotheses concerning how Lentulus came into 
possession of the prophecy of 63. 
Livy recorded two specific Cornelii Lentuli who were pontiffs in the late 
third century.  L. Cornelius Lentulus was pontifex maximus in 217 (Liv. 22.10.1).  
Livy reported that the pontifex maximus died along with several other priests 
four years later and listed another L. Cornelius Lentulus in the college of the 
decemviri sacris faciundis (25.2.1-2).  The practice of co-optation in some of the 
priestly colleges remained in effect in Late Republican Rome therefore existing 
pontiffs chose who was elected into the college.284  When someone was 
conferred or elected into the Roman priesthood, it was a lifelong 
appointment.285  Although our sources recorded two Cornelii Lentuli who were 
priests due to the practice of co-optation, we can assume that an influential 
gens would continue to be conferred with priesthoods.  However, as mentioned, 
it is a mistake to perceive that every Cornelii Lentuli was related or that they 
always supported each other politically or religiously.286  On the other hand, as 
mentioned, the veneration of familial ancestors by the Romans was a common 
practice, so it would be of interest for any Roman elite to associate their lineage 
with one from their gens who was a pontiff of Rome.  There is no evidence that 
P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura or any of his known relatives were priests.  
However, Lentulus had held the premier magistracies in Rome, so he certainly 
had opportunities to converse and interact with those who were.  Theoretically, 
Lentulus might have familial connections or friendships within the Roman 
priesthood who informed him of the prophecy secondhand. 
The second hypothesis of how Lentulus might have come into 
possession of the prophecy stems from our sources’ record of a mission of 
decemviri in 76.  Lactantius recorded the names of three decemviri, a M. 
Otacilius, a L. Valerius, and a P. Gabinius, who were sent to retrieve a new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the pontifex maximus in general, cf. Smezler 1971;Beard, North, and Price 1998, 19-21, 55-8, 
and 99-100; Ridley 2005.  NB: Although the pontifex maximus was ranked under the rex 
sacrorum and the three principal flamines by Festus (199L), the pontifex maximus was the chief 
pontiff of Roman religion, see Ridley 2005, 280-4.  
284 The practice of co-optation in certain priestly colleges continued until the Late Republic, cf. 
Szemler 1971, 114-5; Beard, North, and Price 1998, 99-110. At least in certain colleges 
elections from outside the colleges became the norm according to a law passed in 104 by the 
tribune Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, cf. Cic. Deiot. 31; Liv. Per. 67; Val. Max. 6.5.5.  Sulla 
repealed this law in 81, but by 63 it was certainly reestablished, i.e. Caesar’s election as 
pontifex maximus through a public vote (cf. Taylor 1942, 421; Ridley 2005, 282.) 
285 Roman priests were conferred with a lifelong appointment, cf. Szemler 1971, 113; Beard, 
North, and Price 1998, 18 n.46. 
286 See nn. 148 and 152. 
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collection of Sibylline verses (Lact. Div. Inst. 1.6.14).  The decemvir P. Gabinius 
was most likely the praetor of 89, and it is through his gens that a possible 
connection to Lentulus can be suggested.287  Recall that a Gabinii was 
executed along with Lentulus because of his involvement in the affair.  Perhaps 
the eques, P. Gabinius Capito, acquired the prophecy through his familial 
connections and informed Lentulus, his partner in crime, of its existence.  
However, whether P. Gabinius Capito was related to the praetor and decemvir 
P. Gabinius remains unknown.  These two hypotheses are conceivable, but 
they are both contingent on speculative familial or professional relationships 
that are not attested.  We must exercise caution when speculating how Lentulus 
obtained the prophecy; still, another hypothesis can be suggested after we 
examine the role of the haruspices interpreting the Sibylline books and the 
responses they gave regarding the prophecy of 63. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 4.62.6) and Cicero (Div. 2.111-2) 
explained that the carmina Sibyllina were acrostically composed of Greek 
hexameters.288  The obscure manner in which the verses were written 
demonstrates that they were not designed for interpretation without specific 
training in the divine arts.289  Cicero’s De Divinatione offered a debate between 
Stoic and New Academics, in Book One and Book Two respectively, concerning 
their diametric philosophical precepts about various forms of divination.  Cicero 
did not explicitly express his own opinion in the work, but instead explains the 
differing opinions of divination in the treatise.290  Cicero, playing the part of the 
New Academic in Book 2 of De Divinatione, asked:291  
quid autem volunt di immortales, primum ea significantes quae sine interpretibus non 
possimus intellegere, deinde ea quae cavere nequeamus?…quae si signa deorum 
putanda sunt, cur tam obscura fuerunt? Si enim ut intellegeremus quid esset 
eventurum, aperte declarari oportebat; aut ne occulte quidem, si ea sciri nolebant.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287 RE XII (Gabinius) no.13, 430. 
288 Cic. Div. 2.111: non esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poema declarat (est enim 
magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationes et motus), tum vero ea, quae >&#,8$*=7. dicitur, cum 
deinceps ex primis primi cuiusque versus litteris aliquid connectitur “Moreover, that this poem is 
not the carmen of frenzy is quite evident from the quality of its composition (for it exhibits artistic 
care rather than emotional excitement), and is especially evident from the fact that it is written in 
what is termed ‘acrostics’, wherein the initial letters of each verse taken in order convey a 
meaning.”  Cf. Parke 1988, 139. 
289 For more on acrostic verses, see Parke 1988, 200-1. 
290 In the De Divinatione Cicero did not explicitly indicate which philosophical argument the 
Romans generally thought was more acceptable or observed.  On the philosophical debate in 
the De Divinatione, cf. Denyer 1985; Beard 1986; Schofield 1986.  
291 Beard (1986, 45-46) concludes that Cicero’s ultimate philosophical stance on divination 
remains ambiguous in the De Divinatione.  For a survey of Cicero’s philosophical views 
concerning Roman religion, see Goar 1978, 114-20. 
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 “In the first place, why do immortal gods see fit to give us a warning which we cannot 
understand without the aid of interpreters?...If these signs you speak of are to be 
considered as sent by gods, why were they so obscure?  For, if we had the right to 
know what was going to happen, it should have been stated clearly: or, if the gods did 
not wish us to know, they should not have told us - even in riddles.” (Cic. Div. 2.54-55) 
Cicero generally implied that the New Academic would argue that the 
interpretation of the carmina Sibyllina and what the verses predicted or the 
remedia the verses recommended were often too puzzling to be certain the 
interpretation was accurate.  Throughout Book 2, Cicero described various 
examples of well-known prodigies and prophecies that the New Academic 
would argue were either intentionally and vaguely interpreted, or were 
interpreted to fit the ultimate outcome, or were interpreted entirely 
inaccurately.292  Regardless of the philosophical debate regarding divination, 
Cicero implied that one could question the veracity of the interpretations 
because they were not always sound.  In addition, the interpreters of the 
Sibylline books seemingly had the opportunity to alter their interpretations later 
to apply to the specific outcome or simply offer a vague interpretation so that its 
meaning was ambiguous.293 
Most of our sources that report a consultation of the Sibylline books 
never specifically quote an actual acrostic verse.294  The De Divinatione 
provided some examples, but we cannot be sure if Cicero’s record of the 
Sibylline verses were exact reproductions.295  Lactantius also extracted certain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
292 E.g. Cic. Div. 2.110: quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu 
putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi 
esse vellemus. hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? callide enim, qui illa 
composuit, perfecit ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur, hominum et temporum 
definitione sublata. “Recently there was a rumor, which was believed at the time, but turned out 
to be false, that one of the interpreters of those verses was going to declare in the Senate that, 
for our safety, the man whom we had as king should be made a king also in name. If this is in 
the books, to what man and to what time does it refer? For it was clever in the author to take 
care that whatever happened should appear foretold because all references to persons or time 
had been omitted.” Div. 2.111: adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in 
aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur “He also employed a maze of obscurity so that the 
same verses might be adapted to different situations at different times.” 
293 E.g. Cic. Div. 2.12: est quidam Graecus vulgarisin hanc sententiam versus: ‘bene qui 
coniciet, vatem hunc perhibebo optumum’ “There is a much quoted Greek verse to this effect: 
‘The best diviner I maintain to be; The man who guesses or conjectures best.’” Div. 2.121: iam 
ex insanorum aut ebriorum visis innumerabilia coniectura trahi possunt, quae futura videantur. 
quis est enim, qui totum diem iaculans non aliquando conliniet? “By applying conjecture to the 
countless delusions of drunk or crazy men we may sometimes deduce what appears to be a 
real prophecy, for who, if he shoots at a mark all day, will not occasionally hit it?”  
294 Parke (1988, 139) explains the acrostic pattern as, “the letters forming the first line of the 
oracle are identical with the initial letters of the first and following lines, so that the same words 
can be read horizontally and vertically.” 
295 E.g. Cic. Div. 1.45, 67, 81, 99, 114; 2.112, 115-116.  Wiseman (2008, 47) claims a Sibylline 
verse that appears at Dio 57.18.4-5 was quoted “verbatim”, but the Greek text that survives was 
not written acrostically.  Instead it was the interpretations of the prophecies Dio was quoting not 
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Sibylline verses suitable for his purpose to prove the connection between the 
‘pagan’ oracles and their prediction of the Christian god.296  Phlegon of Tralles 
in his Book of Marvels, written in the early second century A.D., supposedly 
quoted an acrostic oracle of the Sibyl of Erythrae.  The verse in Phlegon’s work 
revealed the correlation between several ancient methods of divination: the 
carmina of the Sibyl, the inspection of the entrails of sacrificial animals by the 
haruspices, and the examination of the flight of birds by the augures.297  This 
demonstrates that when the Sibylline books were consulted, several priestly 
colleges, as well as those outside of the official religious collegia, like the 
haruspices, would all be involved with the interpretation of the oracles. 
The method of divination called haruspicy, which includes extispicy (the 
reading of the entrails of sacrificed animals), had a long tradition within Roman 
religion.298  The tradition was that Numa, the Sabine-born King of Rome, 
introduced this religious practice to Rome in the seventh century.299  The 
haruspices were an unofficial but ubiquitous part of Roman religion as they had 
distinct duties in several religious areas.300  This typically anonymous group of 
soothsayers was also consulted to interpret the Sibylline books.  The political 
and religious leaders in the Senate took their interpretation of the carmina 
Sibyllina as serious as the interpretations by the decemviri.301  Cicero explained !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the actual carmen itself, which were from an oral tradition and spoken when the prophet was 
supposedly in a fervent state, cf. Cic. Div. 1.114-5 contra 2.111; Ov. Fast. 6.537-40. 
296 Lactantius recorded examples of Sibylline verses, but recorded the interpretation of the 
verses in Latin not the original text cf. Lact. Ira 2.23; Inst. Div. 2.17, 4.6, 15. For the supposed 
relationship of the verses with Christianity, cf. Inst. Div. 2.13, 4.6, 7.13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24. 
297 Hansen (1996, 56) translates the verse into English, but indicates it was acrostically written 
in the original Greek text. “But why, lamentable for the sufferings of others,/Do I prophesy 
oracles, holding onto my own mad fate/And experiencing my own painful gadfly?/Now in my 
tenth life-span I possess a grievous old age,/Raving among mortals, speaking the 
incredible,/Foreseeing in vision all the trying cares of humankind./At that time glorious Leto’s 
son, resenting/My power of divination, his destructive heart filled with/passion,/Will release the 
soul imprisoned in my mournful/Body, shooting my frame with a flesh-smiting arrow,/Whereupon 
my soul, fluttering into the air/And commingling with the wind, will send to mortals’ ears/Omens 
woven together with shrew riddling./But my body will lie shamefully unburied on/Mother earth, 
for no mortal will heap a mound for me/Or conceal me with a tomb.  My dark blood/Will sink 
down into the wide-wayed earth, in the withering/of time./Thence it will produce shoots of 
abundant grass/That will enter the livers of grazing sheep and/Reveal the will of the gods by 
means of divination,/And when the feather-clad birds feed on my flesh,/They will occupy 
themselves with true prophecy for/mortals.” 
298 On haruspicy in general cf. North 1990; Schied 2003, 123-4. 
299 On the impact of Pythagorean philosophy on Numa’s religious innovations, cf. Liv. 1.20.1-
21.5; Plut. Num. 8.3-16.2.  Cicero stated the art of haruspicy originated in Etruria (Cic. Div. 1.3). 
300 North (1990, 53) claims the reading of exta was reserved for “lower-class haruspices” as 
compared to the haruspices who were consulted regarding prodigies. 
301 Cicero certainly professed to take the responses of the haruspices seriously, e.g., Cic. Har. 
61.  Goar (1978, 72-5) argues that Cicero’s genuine attitudes towards religion due to his usual 
rhetorical usage of religious matters are ambiguous in Cicero’s De Haruspicum Responso.  
 131 
that the interpretations of the haruspices and the decemviri were typically 
congruous (cf. Cic. Div. 1.4, 97-98; 2.11).302  Therefore, it was not unusual for 
Cicero to mention in his version of the prophecy of 63 that it was confirmed ex 
fatis Sibyllinis haruspicumque responsis (Cat. 3.9).  If, as Cicero implied, the 
decemviri and the haruspices had interpreted the prophecy from the Sibylline 
books, then the prophecy was further legitimized because both religious orders 
had given a similar response.303  
In Sallust’s account of the prophecy, he mentioned that the haruspices 
predicted bellum civile would breakout due to the prodigies occurring in 63, but 
was not explicit whether the haruspices had confirmed the prophecy’s 
interpretation.  He wrote that the prophecy came ex libris Sibyllinis (Sall. B Cat. 
47.2).304  Sallust probably assumed his audience understood the custom that 
the haruspices, the decemviri, and other priests were involved in interpretating 
the verses of the Sibylline books.  Therefore, in contrast to Cicero’s account that 
the prophecy was explicitly confirmed by the haruspices, perhaps Sallust felt the 
expression ex libris Sibyllinis, which is arguably more specific than the 
expression ex fatis Sibyllinis Cicero chose to use, was sufficient to imply the 
haruspices would be involved in its interpretation.  Sallust’s account of the 
prophecy similarly records that a third Cornelii would have power in Rome.  
However, regarding the timeline of the prophecy, Sallust only mentioned the 
burning of the Capitol, not the extra chronological element in Cicero’s account 
concerning the defilation of the Vestal Virgins in 73.305  
Asconius recorded an allegation that Catiline was inappropriately 
involved with a Vestal named Fabia, who was a close relative of Cicero’s wife !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
302 Rawson (1978, 142) suggests that the decemviri were “probable” supervisors over the 
haruspices after Sulla.  
303 On the importance of the haruspices in the Late Republic see, Rawson 1978, 140-6.  See 
also nn.299 and 301. 
304 Sall. Cat. 47.2: ex libris Sibyllinis, regnum Romae tribus Corneliis portendi; Cinnam atque 
Sullam antea, se tertium esse, cui fatum foret urbis potiri.  Praeterea ab incenso Capitolio illum 
esse vigesumum annum, quem saepe ex prodigiis haruspices respondissent bello civili 
cruentum fore “In the Sibylline books the rule of Rome by three Cornelii was foretold; that there 
had already been Cinna and Sulla, and that he was the third who was destined to be master of 
the city.  Furthermore, that this was the twentieth year since the burning of the Capitol, a year 
which because of the portents the haruspices had often declared would be stained with the 
blood of a civil war.” 
305 Plutarch’s account of the prophecy mentioned the three Cornelii, but neither chronological 
event of the conflagration or defilation was imparted.  Instead, Plutarch implied 63 by claiming 
Lentulus was $#7$? "@ +,*/A 6,#!<+7? B&%*!? “The third and remaining Cornelius” (Plut. Cic. 
17.4).  Appian’s account of the prophecy also did not mention any timeline, but implied the year 
63 claiming that Lentulus %C/,* /,++9&*. “often said” the third Cornelii referred to him (App. B 
Civ. 2.4). 
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Terentia, in 73 (Asc. Tog. Cand. 91).306  Asconius implied that Catiline was 
acquitted of the crime, but whether Catiline and/or Fabia were formally tried is 
debatable.307  In a letter to Atticus, Cicero mentioned Catiline was acquitted 
twice (Cic. Att. 1.16.9: bis absolutum…Catilinam).  However, which of Catiline’s 
two acquittals Cicero was referring to is debatable.  Scholars suggest Cicero 
was probably referring to Catiline’s acquittals from de repetundis in 65 and de 
veneficiis et sicariis in 64.308  We can assume Cicero would have mentioned a 
third acquittal to Atticus if there were one in 73.  Perhaps Catiline was able to 
avoid a trial in 73, therefore, Cicero did not mention three acquittals.309  Cadoux 
suggests Cicero only referred to Catiline’s two recent acquittals in his letter to 
Atticus because Cicero most likely thought the charges against Fabia were 
false, and thereby Catiline by default.310  If the trials of the Vestal Virgins in 73 
did occur, according to Cicero’s timeline of the prophecy, then presumably 
Catiline and Fabia were found not guilty, as they did not suffer capital 
punishment in accordance with this sacrilegious crime.311  Of course, Catiline 
was still alive in December 63 and when Cicero went into self-imposed exile in 
58, he advised his family to seek sanctuary in the Temple of Vesta, which 
perhaps implied that his family stayed with Terentia’s relative Fabia (Cic. Fam. 
14.2.2).312  It is interesting that Cicero mentioned the defilation of Vestal Virgins 
when he recounted the prophecy as it might remind some in the audience of his 
own family member’s accusation in a scandalous and sacrilegious affair.  Any 
association with the impiety and criminality of the affair of 63 was something 
Cicero doubtlessly wanted to avoid.  Yet, he clearly felt that describing the 
timing of Lentulus’ prophecy was more important than any gossip regarding his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
306 Fabia’s exact relationship to Terentia is debatable.  Both Asconius and Plutarch recorded 
that Fabia was Terentia’s sister (Asc. 91: haec Fabia quia soror erat Terentiae Ciceronis; Plut. 
Cat. min. 19.3 (' &62 $.% E.;%. D)#)'07.' $+)18/). Cf. Marshall 1985, 309-10; Lewis 2006, 
300-1.  However, the RE suggests Fabia was most likely Terentia’s half-sister (RE VI (Fabius) 
no. 172, 1885.67: “Halbschwester”). 
307 Cf. Asc. 91C: Fabia virgo causam incesti dixerat, cum ei Catilina obiceretur, eratque 
absoluta; Oros. 6.3.1: eodem anno apud Romam Catilina incesti accusatus, quod cum Fabia 
virgine Vestali commisisse arguebatur, Catuli gratia fultus evasit. 
308 Due to Orosius’ usage of evadere (see n.308) instead of the more frequent absolvere to refer 
to being acquitted, Cadoux (2005, 171-3) suggests Catiline was able “to avoid” ever standing 
trial in 73.  Cf. Lewis 2001, 143-7.  
309 Orosius claimed Catiline was acquitted or avoided the trial through favors from Q. Lutatius 
Catulus (Oros. 6.3.1: Catuli gratia fultus evasit).  See nn.252-3. 
310 Cadoux 2005, 171. 
311 Vestal Virgins found guilty were buried alive and their male paramours were condemned to 
death, cf. Plut. Num. 10; Suet. Dom 8.3; Plin. Ep. 4.11; Oros. 4.2.8; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.67.3-
5.  For the trials and punishments concerning Vestal Virgins, cf. Cornell 1981; Lewis 2001; 
Ridley 2005, 142-3; Cadoux 2005.   
312 Shackleton-Bailey 1977 Vol. I, 287.  
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family’s connection with the trials in 73.313  Perhaps Cicero thought the specific 
timeline of the prophecy lent more credence to explain to his audience why 
Lentulus, a current praetor of Rome, was involved with the affair.   
However, why Sallust does not include the date regarding the defilation 
of the Vestal Virgins in the chronology of Lentulus’ prophecy is not as clear.  
Sallust had another opportunity to explicitly assassinate Catiline’s character.  
His character had already been substantially described in the monograph (Sall. 
B Cat. 5.1-8), and Sallust had referred to Catiline’s intrigue with a Vestal Virgin, 
but failed to give a specific date (15.1).  Sallust decided to eschew another 
digression about Catiline’s background when recording the prophecy to resume 
the narrative describing Volturcius and the Allobroges’ testimonies concerning 
the actions of those participating with the affair in Rome.  Sallust, in contrast to 
Cicero, did not explicitly record as specific a chronology in direct connection 
with the prophecy.  Instead, we can infer the timeline of the prophecy from 
Sallust’s account of the haruspicum responsa. 
Sallust wrote that twenty years after the burning on the Capitol had 
passed the haruspices often predicted that a bellum civile “a civil war” would 
occur.  Sallust implied that the responsa was declared ex prodigiis “from the 
portents” that were occurring in 63 (Sall. Cat. 47.2).314  Julius Obsequens 
recorded the specific prodigies occurring in 65 and 63 and claimed ab his 
prodigiis Catilinae nefaria conspiratio coepta “With these portents the 
abominable conspiracy of Catiline began” (Jul. Obs. 61).315  Similar to Sallust’s 
account of the haruspicum responsa, Cicero claimed that they declared the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
313 Cicero used the plural virginum in his text regarding the prophecy, which infers more than 
one Vestal Virgin was defiled (Cic. Cat. 3.9).  Plutarch recorded that Crassus was also accused 
of criminal behavior with a Vestal Virgin, stood trial, and was acquitted (Cf. Plut. Crass. 1.2; 
Mor. 89e).   
314 For Sallust’s text, see n.305. 
315 Jul. Obs. Prod. 61: M. Cicerone C. Antonio coss. Fulmine pleraque decussa. Sereno 
Vargunteius Pompeiis de caelo exanimatus.  Tarbis ardens ab occasu ad caelum extenta. 
Terrae motu Spoletum totum concussum et quaedam corruerent. Inter alia relatum, biennio ante 
in Capitolio lupam Remi et Romuli fulmine ictam, signumque Iovis cum columna disiectum, 
aruspicum responso in foro repositum. Tabulae legum aeneae caelo tactae litteris liquefactis. 
Ab his prodigiis Catilinae nefaria conspiratio coepta; “Consulship of Marcus Cicero and Gaius 
Antonius [in 63].  Several things were overthrown by lightning. Vargunteius was struck dead 
from a clear sky at Pompeii. A fiery timber stretched up into the sky from the west. In an 
earthquake all Spoletum was shaken and some buildings collapsed. It was reported among 
other things that two years before [in 65] on the Capitol, the she-wolf of Remus and Romulus 
had been struck by lightning, and the statue of Jupiter with its column had been broken apart, 
but had been replaced in the Forum in accordance with an answer of the soothsayers.  Bronze 
tablets containing laws were struck by lightning and the letters melted.  With these portents the 
abominable affair of Catiline began.” 
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prodigies in 65 and 63 foretold that caedis atque incendia et legum interitum et 
bellum civile ac domesticum et totius urbis atque imperi occasum 
appropinquare “Murder and arson, the end of the rule of law, rebellion and civil 
war, the total destruction of the whole city and our empire were upon us” (Cic. 
Cat. 3.19).  Cicero explained that the remedia the haruspices advised were: i) 
ten consecutive days of games should be held; and ii) the construction of a 
larger statue of Jupiter, which was broken by lightning in 65, should be placed in 
his temple facing in the opposite direction, east, so his divine gaze could 
observe the forum in order to recognize any subterfuge occurring in the city 
(3.20).  The statue of Jupiter was erected, conveniently for Cicero, on 
December 3, the same day he exposed the plans of Lentulus and the others 
remaining in Rome.  Cicero used the occasion of the account of the prophecy 
and the prodigies in the Third Oration to amplify the impiety of the affair and its 
participants.  In addition, Cicero emphasized the divine providence and 
assistance from the gods in his discovery and suppression of the affair by 
recording the story of Jupiter’s statue (3.21).316  This manner of religious 
rhetoric was used often in the Third Oration therefore, the account of the 
prophecy did not seem out of place.317  However, the prophecy’s exact 
chronology and that it referred to a specific gens is remarkable.    
Cicero’s account of the prophecy states that in 63 “the third Cornelii” 
would have “the rule and dominion of Rome”, regnum huius urbis atque imperi 
(Cat. 3.9).  Sallust uses similar terminology stating regnum Romae tribus 
Corneliis portendi “the rule of Rome by three Cornelii was foretold” (Sall. Cat. 
47.2).  Later sources that recount the prophecy of the third Cornelii use similar 
terminology concerning the prediction that Lentulus would be a ‘king.’  Florus 
also used regnum, and the Greek sources of Plutarch and Appian also report 
that the prophecy predicted Lentulus would be a µ&'"#=&42 of Rome.318  It is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
316 Cicero also recorded the story of the erection of the statue on December 3 in the De 
Consulato Suo.  This text survives in fragments and the story of the statue’s erection appears in 
De Divinatione (Cic. Div. 1.17-22; 2.45-47).  Cf. Chapter 1 n. 42.   
317 On the religious rhetoric in the Third Oration, see Chapter 1 n.41. 
318 Florus recorded Lentulus destinatum familiae suae Sibyllinis versibus regnum sibi vaticinans 
(Flor. 2.12.8).  Appian wrote the Allobrogean envoys had tesitified 72 8 F&#'@1%&2 (/'01&2 
)9,&% ,&11"$%2 )2µ"#9.% 0#)!2 F&#'>17&42 6)'/39.% ::µ.7:' µ&'"#=&42, ;' <+> F7''.' $.% 
<*11.' 6)6&'/'.% “that Cornelius Lentulus had often said that it was written in the book of fate 
that three Cornelii should be monarchs of Rome, two of whom, Cinna and Sulla had already 
been such.” (App. B Civ. 2.4).  Plutarch claimed the prophecy 72 ($ 0#' <%;411)7:', 
,#&+>1&&'0.2 )2µ.#µ/'&42 )='.% 0> :?µ? F&#'>17&42 0#)!2 µ&'"#=&42 “Purporting to come 
from the Sibylline books, which set forth that three Cornelii were fated to be monarchs in Rome” 
(Plut. Cic. 17.4).  Cf. n.306. 
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clear that the concept of kingship was an anathema to Republican Rome.319  
Therefore, it is erroneous to think that the prophecy predicted, or Lentulus 
believed, he would be a monarch.  The affair of 63 did not have these aims at 
its core.  It is extremely unlikely that if the affair were successful then those who 
had participated would attempt to enact such a drastic change in the 
established polity of Republican Rome.  Yet the affair’s aims were not myopic. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Sallust claimed that Catiline offered his 
associates belli spolia magnifica “the splendid spoils of war,” which included 
libertas, divitiae, decus, gloria “freedom, riches, honor, and glory” (Sall. Cat. 
20.14-15).  Catiline further promised tabulas novas, proscriptionem locupletium, 
magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas “abolition of debts, the proscription of the rich, 
offices, priesthoods, and plunder” (21.2).320  It should be noted that Catiline’s 
promises, according to Sallust’s chronology of events, were declared to his 
followers before his defeat in the consular election of 64.321  Perhaps Lentulus 
also hoped to achieve these goals when he ruled in Rome, but pronouncing 
himself rex could cause tension between the others supporting the affair and 
turn the people of Rome against him due to the term’s negative connotation.  
Lentulus might have had delusions of grandeur, but it was unlikely that he 
thought the term regnum meant he was destined to be king of Rome.  Instead, it 
was more likely that Lentulus believed the regnum that was predicted would be 
similar to the reign of the other two Cornelii before him, Cinna and Sulla, the 
most influential leaders of the Republic in the decade following the Social War. 
L. Cornelius Cinna held the consulship for four consecutive years from 
87-84 until his death, and L. Cornelius Sulla, who was consul in 88 and in 80, 
was also appointed dictator in 82 until he decided to vacate the office in mid-
79.322  Before Sulla, a dictator had not been appointed in Rome since C. 
Servilius Geminus in 202.  Most dictators voluntarily abdicated from the position 
after the traditional maximum six-month tenure, or immediately after they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
319 E.g. Liv. 2.1: Omnium primum auidum nouae libertatis populum, ne postmodum flecti 
precibus aut donis regiis posset, iure iurando adegit neminem Romae passuros regnare. “His 
[L. Junius Brutus’] first act was to make the people, while the taste of liberty was still fresh upon 
their tongues, swear a solemn oath never to allow any man to be king in Rome, hoping by this 
means to forestall future attempts by persuasion or bribery to restore the monarchy.”; 2.9: ut 
regium nomen non summi magis quam infimi horrerent “that the poorest in Rome hated the very 
name ‘king’ as bitterly as did the great.” Cf. Cic. Rep. 1.65.  
320 See also Chapter 3 n.13. 
321 On antedating in Sallust, see Chapter 1 n.129. 
322 For Cinna, see RE IV (Cornelius) no. 106, 1282-7.  For Sulla, see RE IV (Cornelius) no. 392, 
1522-66. 
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completed their extraordinary duty.323  However, Sulla argued that it was 
necessary that he hold the office of dictator indefinitely, due to the recent 
tumultuous affairs after his civil war against Marius, until he deemed the 
Republic had been properly stabilized.  Sulla convinced L. Valerius Flaccus, 
who was the princeps senatus and newly appointed interrex after the recent civil 
war, to award him dictatorium imperium, which gave him power over all the 
other magistrates that held imperium in Rome.324 According to Cicero’s letter to 
Atticus (Cic. Att. 9.15.2), the lex Valeria was passed, which appointed Sulla 
dictator and Valerius his magister equitum.  Sulla would be allowed to continue 
his reforms to the Roman constitution unhindered.  This was an unprecedented 
event in Roman history.325 
Sulla set the precedent therefore it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
Lentulus thought that the libra Sibyllinis and the haruspicum responsa foretold 
he would be able to appoint himself dictator in 63.  But the end of the year was 
fast approaching.  Cicero intimated that Lentulus had planned to enact the 
affair’s plan of overthrowing the current regime during the Saturnalia, the 
festival dedicated to Saturn, which began on December 17 (Cic. Cat. 3.10).326  If 
Lentulus were able, like Sulla, to restructure the Roman constitution and 
authorize proscriptions when bestowed with the extraordinary powers as 
dictator, then the others involved with the affair would doubtlessly be the ones 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
323 On the six-month tenure of the dictatorship, cf. Cic. Leg. 3.9; Liv. 3.29.7, 9.34.12, 23.23.2; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.70.2; App. BC 1.3; Plut. Cam. 31.3; Dio Cass. 36.34.1. 
324 On the office of dictator in general see Pina Polo 2011, 188-91. 
325 On the unprecedented power conferred to Sulla through the lex Valeria, cf. Cic. Agr. 3.5-6; 
Verr. 2.3.82.  See also Vervaet, 2004.  On Sulla and the dictatorship, cf. Keaveney 1982; Hurlet 
1993; CAH2 IX, 282-5; Santangelo 2007, 83.  
326 Dyck (2008, 180) suggests Cicero chose the Saturnalia because he thought his audience 
would understand that the plan to commit murder and arson would be easier during the 
confusion of a popular festival.  On the popularity of the Saturnalia, see Scullard 1981, 205.  
Sallust reported that the tribune-designate L. Calpurnius Bestia was to complain against 
Cicero’s actions as consul in a contio and this would be the signal to commence the actions in 
Rome the following night.  But Bestia failed to act (Sall. B Cat. 43.1).  The Senate were not 
allowed to meet during the Saturnalia and McGushin (1977, 218) suggests that perhaps the 
date that Sallust implied was when Bestia would have entered office as a tribune on December 
10.  However, according to Sallust, the signal was supposed to occur simultaneously with 
Catiline’s arrival in Faesulae, which had already occurred no later than mid-November.  Clearly, 
Sallust’s chronology is faulty.  McGushin concludes that the plan to commence the actions in 
Rome during the Saturnalia on December 19, as recorded in Cicero, is debatable.  Cicero never 
mentioned Bestia’s task.  Sallust never mentioned the Saturnalia. Cicero and Sallust both 
recorded that Cethegus complained about the delay, but that is the only similarity in their 
accounts (Cic. Cat. 3.10; Sall. B Cat. 27.4, 43.4).  Therefore, their accounts regarding the date 
for the start of the planned murder and arson in Rome differ too much to conclude when they 
were exactly planned to occur only that for those involved with the affair of 63 the date was too 
late.  Plutarch followed Cicero’s dating suggesting that the actions in Rome would occur during 
the Saturnalia at night (Plut. Cic. 18.2). 
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who profited in the future, similar to the way Lentulus had when Sulla was in 
power.327  However, whether Catiline or the others involved with the affair 
supported the prediction that Lentulus would ‘rule’ Rome in 63 and whether the 
prophecy would create any tension between Lentulus and the others is 
debatable. 
All of the accounts of the prophecy occur when our sources recount the 
Allobrogean envoys’ testimony in the Senate.  As mentioned earlier, Cicero 
rhetorically used the affidavit from the Gallic envoys to condemn Lentulus’ 
attempt to solicit Gallic support.328  The account of the prophecy could only 
further condemn Lentulus’ actions.  Perhaps Cicero recounted the prophecy in 
order to persuade his audience that Lentulus’ belief that he was the third 
Cornelii revealed his impious motives.  It is indeterminable whether the majority 
of Cicero’s audience thought Lentulus’ gullibility was sacrilegious and laughable 
or whether they also believed in the prophecy and were frightened by the 
haruspicum responsa.  Cicero would certainly be content with either reaction as 
long as he was able to persuade the Senate and the people of Rome about the 
serious nature of the crimes those involved with the affair were planning to 
commit within the city.  Cicero wanted to convince them that a current praetor 
and his accomplices should be sentenced accordingly. 
In the Third Oration, Cicero rhetorically used the account of the prophecy 
to his advantage, but did not state that the prophecy was false.  In the Fourth 
Oration, Cicero insinuated that Lentulus was suum nomen inductus a vatibus 
fatale ad perniciem rei publicae fore putavit “Persuaded a vatibus to think that 
his name was destined by fate for the destruction of the Republic” (Cic. Cat. 
4.2).  According to the OLD, the term vates usually defined someone in touch 
with the divine (s.v. 1 and 2).  Wiseman explains that the term is difficult to 
accurately define, but demonstrates that the vates were involved with the type 
of prophecy called vaticinatio.329  Cicero argued that vaticinatio was part of what 
he called naturale (‘natural’) divination in opposition to artificiosa (‘artificial’) 
divination primarily practiced by the augures and haruspices (cf. Cic. Div. 1.11-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
327 See n.138. 
328 See sections 2.2-4. 
329 Wiseman (1992, 281) also suggests that the term vates corresponds to the Greek term 
µ9!$*..  Similar to the various definitions of vates in the OLD, µ9!$*. could refer to a diviner, 
seer, or prophet (LSJ s.v. 1-3). 
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12, 72).330  Cicero linked this ‘natural’ type of divination with those who were 
overcome by prophetic dreams similar to the carmina Sibyllina.331  Although the 
term vates has a variety of meanings depending on the context in which it 
occurs, Wiseman explains that due to their connection with the vaticinatio they 
had a role in interpreting prophecies.332  Subsequently, the vates are seemingly 
justified regarding their involvement in prophetic carmina.333  However, Cicero 
sometimes compared the vates with the harioli (‘public fortune-tellers’).334  He 
questioned the credibility of the harioli, placing them in the realm of 
superstitio.335  Cicero explained that the New Academic believed any religious 
endeavor not executed by the appropriate religious authorities in Rome was 
generally considered superstitio (Cic. Div. 2.148-9).336   Therefore, the vates 
lose some of their legitimacy as compared to the more established forms of 
interpreting prodigies. 
Cicero did not qualify what kind of vates was implied by the phrase a 
vatibus in connection with the interpretation of the prophecy of 63 (Cic. Cat. 
4.2).  Perhaps the phrase indicated that Cicero thought the prophecy’s 
interpretation was less valid compared to a prophecy confirmed ex fatis 
Sibyllinis haruspicumque like he claimed in the Third Oration (3.9).  It is clear 
from Cicero’s contrasting phraseology in the Third and Fourth Oration that he 
altered his representation of the prophecy’s legitimacy to suit his aims in each 
speech.  As mentioned, the account in the Third Oration and the manner in 
which Lentulus used the prophecy’s interpretation to persuade the Allobroges 
that the affair was destined to succeed in 63 were emphasized to stress 
Lentulus’ impiety.  In the Fourth Oration, the phrase a vatibus suggested that 
the prophecy and its prediction that Lentulus was the third Cornelii were 
spurious (4.2).  Later in the speech, Cicero implied that Lentulus actually 
believed in the prophecy.  Cicero exclaimed that he had a vision of regnantem 
Lentulum, sicut ipse se ex fatis sperasse confessus est “Lentulus as potentate, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
330 For discussions regarding ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ divination in Cicero’s De Divinatione, cf. 
Linderski 1982, 12-38; Denyer 1985; Beard 1986; Schofield 1986. 
331 Cicero often connected the terms vaticinatio or vates with the Sibyl or with the interpretation 
of the Sibylline verses, cf. Cic. Div. 1.34, 67-8, 71, 113-4, 116; 2.70, 100, 108, 112. 
332 Wiseman 1992, 276. 
333 See n.330. 
334 Cf. Cic. Div. 1.4, 66, 132. 
335 Cf. Cic. Div. 1.66, 132.  On the terms superstitio and religio, cf. Grodzynski 1974; Schied 
2003, 22-3.  Beard, North, and Price (1998, 216-7) argue that superstitio has a close 
relationship with all forms of divination.  Cf. Cic. Nat. Deo. 1.117, 2.71-2. 
336 Cf. Cic. Nat. Deo. 1.55.  In this passage, Cicero relegated all types of divination from the 
haruspices, vates, augures, and harioli believed by followers of Stoicism as superstitio. 
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as he admitted was his hope of what fate held for him”  (4.12).  In this instance, 
Cicero did not qualify fatum with the adjective Sibyllinum.  As mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, Cicero used the phrase ex fatis to refer to the Sibylline 
books in De Divinatione.337  Cicero’s rare usage of the phrase, however, 
indicates that the context is our only indicator to understand the phrase’s 
implications. 
The absence of any reference to the Sibylline books in the two instances 
when Cicero recounted Lentulus’ belief in the prophecy in the Fourth Oration 
was perhaps intentional.  Cicero’s purpose in the Fourth Oration was to 
convince the Senate that Lentulus and the four others, who had confessed to 
exchanging oaths and letters with the Allobroges, should be put to death.  
Therefore, perhaps Cicero used the phrases a vatibus and ex fatis to repudiate 
the legitimacy of the prophecy and to further establish Lentulus’ belief in 
supersition.  Cicero once referred to the prophecy in the Pro Sulla recalling 
Lentulus perversam atque impiam religionem “perverted and godless 
superstition” (Sull. 70).  Although Cicero used the term religio in this passage, 
the adjectives perversa and impia not only stressed Lentulus’ impiety, but also 
implied the prophecy’s questionable religiosity.  Cicero was clearly careful about 
questioning a divine prophecy that might have been genuine.  Therefore, Cicero 
implied that the prophecy’s interpretation was a human error and Lentulus’ 
belief in its prediction was superstition instead of questioning the prophecy’s 
divine derivation. 
Cicero declared that divination was practiced both in public and private 
(Cic. Div. 1.3).  As demonstrated above, the haruspices were consulted 
publically in regards to certain Roman religious matters, but Roman elites were 
known to consult them privately as well.338  For example, the Gracchi employed 
a private haruspex in their household and Caesar consulted the haruspices on 
military campaigns.339  We are not certain whether Lentulus had familial or 
personal connections with the decemviri sacris faciundis, but it was not unusual 
that Roman elites would privately employ those who practiced the art of 
divination.  Therefore, we can finally suggest a third and final hypothesis - that 
Lentulus knew of the prophecy of 63 through his own personal seer.  Yet, 
however uncertain we are about how Lentulus obtained the prophecy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
337 On the term ex fatis, see pages 123-4. 
338 Cf. Rawson 1978; Ripat 2006, 165-6. 
339 Cf. Plut. Caes. 43.3-4, 52.4-5.  
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whether its interpretation was considered false, our sources imply that Lentulus 
believed in it. 
Sallust did not offer his opinion of whether the prophecy was genuine or 
fake.  He leaves the matter for his audience to decide.  Florus and Appian’s 
account of the prophecy also suspend judgment regarding its validity.  On the 
other hand, Plutarch claimed that Lentulus’ prophecy was proclaimed by 
G)4+&µ"'0)%2 0%''2 $.% 6->0)2 “False prophets and jugglers” (Plut. Cic. 17.4). 
Plutarch continued to suggest that Lentulus ,#&3+%/89)%#.' (1,73% $)'.!2 
“was further corrupted by vain hopes.”  Plutarch’s account of the prophecy 
differs from the others because he explicitly stated the reason Lentulus joined 
the affair.  According to Plutarch, it was Lentulus’ belief in the unreliable 
interpretation of 0%''2 $.% 6->0)2, which spurred Lentulus to join the affair.  
Furthermore, Plutarch opined that if the prediction that Lentulus would rule 
Rome was genuine then $.% +)!' ,"'0:2 +/=)39.% $.% µ/ +%.89)7#)%' 
µ/11&'0. 0&@2 $.%#&@2, 03,)# F.0%17'.2 “He must by all means accept, and not 
ruin his opportunities with delay, like Catiline.”  Therefore, Plutarch’s account of 
the prophecy differed from Cicero, Sallust, and Appian’s accounts because 
Plutarch stated that Lentulus specifically joined the affair because he believed in 
the prophecy.  Plutarch further suggested that Lentulus wanted to act before the 
prophetic year of 63 came to a close.  However, Catiline and Manlius’ forces in 
Etruria were ill-equipped and not entirely prepared to march on Rome by early 
December.340  Hence, Lentulus’ letter requesting that Catiline to enlist every 
able bodied person and his mandata urgently instructing that Catiline and 
Manlius’ army no longer delay their march on Rome. 
Cicero had enough hard evidence to convict Lentulus and the reliqua 
coniuratorum manus through their letters, oaths, and, most significantly, their 
manifest admission of guilt.  Four of them were executed along with Lentulus 
regardless of what his prophecy alleged.  It is understandable that when the 
affair’s plans were initially divulged in early November those supporting the 
affair, who remained unnamed, would distance themselves from Catiline and 
Manlius.  They had been declared hostes rei publicae and you would expect 
that those citizens, who had recently rehabilitated their political careers and 
were currently magistrates of Rome like Lentulus, would especially avoid the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
340 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 56.3. 
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affair.341  C. Antonius, Cicero’s consular colleague, was coaxed into rejecting 
consorting with anyone supporting the affair.342  Q. Lutatius Catulus also 
avoided accusations of supporting the affair by divulging the private letter 
Catiline wrote to him in the Senate (Sall. Cat. 34.3), and voting for the execution 
of Lentulus and the others (Plut. Cic. 21.4).343  M. Licinius Crassus also 
distanced himself from Catiline by initially warning Cicero of the impending 
affair.344  C. Julius Caesar presumably did the same.345 
In contrast to these other politicians, Lentulus did not abandon the affair’s 
cause.  He defiantly went about his business of trying to recruit more support for 
the affair by disclosing the prophecy to the Allobroges.  The reliqua 
coniuratorum manus did not stay inactive until the army in Etruria was ready to 
march on Rome or wait for Cicero’s tenure as consul to elapse.  Perhaps the 
prophecy was the impetus that led Lentulus, and whoever else believed in 
Lentulus’ prophecy, to continue participating in the affair a month after the 
affair’s initial discovery. 
Cicero might have recorded the prophecy only to strengthen his claim 
that it was through divine providence, as well as his assiduousness, that he was 
able to suppress those supporting the affair remaining in Rome.346  
Furthermore, the prophecy might have been recounted because it gave Cicero 
further reason to condemn Lentulus.  As examined above, Lentulus was a 
praetor, and to dissuade those who thought the capital punishment 
recommended by Cicero and the Senate was too severe for someone of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
341 According to Cicero, all of the intended criminal activities of those remaining in Rome were 
known before the arrests on December 3, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.1, 6, 10, 24, 27, 30; 2.1, 5-6, 13-14, 26, 
28.  
342 Cic. Cat. 3.14. 
343 See pp.116-7. 
344 Plut. Cic. 15.1-3.  See nn.108-11. 
345 Caesar recommended the confiscation of the affair’s participants property and life 
imprisonment in towns outside of Rome, cf. Cic. Cat. 4.7-10; Sall. B Cat. 51.43; Plut. Cic. 21.1-
3, Caes. 7.7-9; Cat. min. 22.4-5; App. B Civ. 2.6; Dio Cass. 37.36.1-2; Suet. Iul. 14.1.  Sallust 
recorded that Ti. Claudius Nero was swayed by Caesar’s advice and believed the participants 
should be kept in custody until more evidence was produced, cf. Sall. B Cat. 50.4; App. B Civ. 
2.5.  Plutarch stated that Caesar proposed that the guilty should be placed in custody until 
Catiline’s army had been defeated and then to reexamine the evidence (Plut. Caes. 7.9).  
However, Pelling (1985, 314-5) speculates that Plutarch confuses Caesar’s proposal with that of 
Ti. Claudius Nero. According to Cicero (Cat. 4.7), it was D. Junius Silanus, the consul-designate 
for 62, who had recommended the death penalty from the start; cf. Sall. B Cat. 50.4; Plut. Cic. 
20.4; Cat. min. 22.4; App. B Civ. 2.5.  Most of our sources recorded that the majority of the 
Senate voted for the death penalty, cf. Sall. B Cat. 53.1; Plut. Cic. 21.4, Caes. 7.7, Cat. min. 
23.3; Dio Cass. 37.36.3.  In contrast, some accounts remarked that some senators were unsure 
about the sentence after Caesar’s proposal until Cato’s speech for the death penalty changed 
their minds. cf. Sall. B Cat. 52.1, 53.1; Plut. Cic. 21.3; Caes. 8.1; Cat. min. 22.5; App. B Civ.  
2.6; Dio Cass. 37.36.1-2. 
346 Cicero refers to divine providence at: Cat. 2.29; 3.1, 3.18-22; 4.2.  See also, n.32. 
 142 
Lentulus’ status, Cicero not only described Lentulus’ confession of writing a 
letter to Catiline and soliciting the Allobrogean envoys, but Cicero also 
described Lentulus’ impious belief in the prophecy.347   
Cicero wanted to connect the threat outside of Rome, represented by 
Catiline’s and Manlius’ forces, and the threat inside the city, represented by 
Lentulus and the reliqua coniuratorum manus, as parts of the same attempt to 
overthrow the current regime in Rome.  Both threats are conceivably linked with 
the common desire for regime change, but they perhaps had different motives 
at their core.  Therefore, it is most revealing that Cicero identified the exact year 
when Lentulus’ prophecy was to be fulfilled.  Most records of the interpretations 
of prophecies are usually quite vague not only in substance, but also 
chronologically.348  Lentulus’ prophecy apparently had none of the usual 
vagaries, instead the prophecy of 63 was quite specific.  Although it may have 
been spurious as Plutarch contended, all the other ancient authors never 
explicitly stated their opinion.349 
Evidently, the prophecy existed, but clearly its validity is debatable.  
However, the serious reaction by the senate to the advice communicated by the 
haruspices regarding the portents of 65 and 63, examined above, lent the 
prophecy a particular expediency as well as a religious and political bond.  
Therefore, the suggestion that the prophecy was perhaps the reason why 
Lentulus and the others in Rome continued supporting the affair regardless of 
Catiline and Manlius’ activities in Etruria is justifiable.  Unfortunately our sources 
do not imply that the army in Etruria was aware of Lentulus’ prophecy.  If 
Catiline and Manlius were aware of the prophecy they probably would have 
intensified their efforts preparing the army so that Rome could be attacked 
before the end of the year.  Perhaps the army did not act because either they 
did not know of the prophecy, or did not believe in its timing, or perhaps the 
prediction that Lentulus would rule Rome caused tension between him and the 
others supporting the army.  However, the prophecy did not state that Lentulus 
would be the sole ruler and clearly Lentulus would reward those who supported 
him.  Yet, there is no evidence if Catiline believed in Lentulus’ prophecy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
347 See Chapter 1.3. 
348 Cf. Parke 1988, 1-22; Ripat 2006, 158-66. 
349 NB: Logically, any prophecy that was not fulfilled would be claimed to be false to suit the 
purpose of Plutarch’s individual narratives.  For example, in Plutarch’s other biographies of 
Romans, prophecies that were fulfilled were considered genuine predicitions, cf. Plut. Mar. 36; 
Sull. 17, 27, 37; Crass. 8, 19; Pomp. 25, 31; Caes. 44, 52, 60, 63. See Pelling 1985. 
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whether the timing of the prophecy was the reason behind Catiline’s choice to 
join Manlius’ army in Etruria to lead it to Rome.  As mentioned, Sallust admitted 
that Lentulus and the others’ execution in Rome was a setback that Catiline and 
the army in Etruria could not recover from (Sall. Cat. 57.1, 58.4).  After the 
suppression of the affair in Rome, Catiline and his army were forced to 
reevaluate their options.  The army was defeated in January 62 marching away 
from Rome around Pistoria, only approximately 20 miles from the original camp 
at Faesulae.350 
On the other hand, we can argue that the agency for action in 63 due to 
Lentulus’ prophecy was equal to or perhaps even more legitimate than the other 
reasons our sources contend were the causes for the affair.  Catiline had 
supposedly become inexorably desperate after spiraling into enormous debt 
and being defeated for the consulship twice.351  The sources imply that violence 
was Catiline’s only option, and therefore he joined Manlius’ army that was 
openly in revolt in Etruria.  We also examined how our sources suggested that 
most of the people who supported the affair came from those who saw no 
respite from their financial burden without a regime change.352  However, in light 
of the evidence of the prophecy examined in this section, Lentulus perhaps had 
an entirely separate motive to support the affair.  Lentulus might have joined the 
affair not out of desperation, but instead because he believed it was his destiny 
to rule Rome in 63.  Therefore, it behooved Lentulus to support Catiline and 
Manlius’ army in Etruria and the other seditious plans against the current 
established authority occurring either inside or outside Rome to achieve his goal 
before the end of the year.  
 
2.5 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has shown that it is possible to reconsider the hierarchy in 
the affair by examining the terminology in our sources specifically associated 
with the disturbances occurring in Rome and those involved with them.  This 
was explored to validate our sources’ contentions that the affair in Rome was 
serious and that Lentulus and the reliqua coniuratorum manus were a more 
immediate threat than Catiline and Manlius’ army camped approximately one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
350 Catiline and the army was defeated around Pistoria (Sall. B Cat. 57.1).  The army was 
probably not defeated until late January 62, see n.134.  See also, Sumner 1963. 
351 Catiline was defeated in 64 and 63 and denied to stand as a candidate in 66.  See Chapter 
3.1. 
352 See section 2.2. 
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hundred and fifty miles from the city’s gates.  Despite all the evidence and 
rumors of other influential Romans involved in the affair, our sources did not 
alter their characterization of Catiline as the initial protagonist of the affair, nor 
should we expect them to.  However, our sources did confer the leadership of 
the critical endeavors in Rome upon Lentulus not only because he was the 
highest-ranking member of the affair left in the city, but also because the 
sources imply that Catiline’s forces in Etruria were dependent on the success of 
those remaining in Rome under Lentulus’ guidance.  The claim that Catiline was 
behind all the plans of the affair cannot be disproved.  However, after Cataline’s 
departure, it is undeniable that Lentulus’ role was considered as or more 
important than Catiline’s role due to the significance of the designs within the 
city which Catiline was physically unable to fulfill because of his absence.  
According to the terminology examined, Lentulus was contextually the most 
important member of the affair in Rome.  
The preponderance of evidence confirming the plurality of the affair and 
the significance of the actions in Rome proves that Catiline cannot be presumed 
the sole leader and instigator of the affair.  When Lentulus and the others in 
Rome failed to act, were captured, and executed, the rest of the participants 
surely realized their plan to gain power in Rome was seriously compromised.  
As examined, scholars argue that the vague opening sentence of Lentulus’ 
letter suggested he was perhaps acting independently of Catiline.353  We can 
speculate that Lentulus, even if he was ordered by Catiline to lead the affair in 
Rome, was acting on his own initiative when he sought the support of the 
Allobrogean envoys, which was demonstrated by Lentulus’ letter to Catiline 
discussed in the previous section.  It was left to Lentulus to try to extend the 
affair’s potential threat, although this effort was eventually its undoing.  
Moreover, the accounts of Lentulus’ prophecy not only suggested that perhaps 
Lentulus was acting independently but also suggested a transcendental reason 
why Lentulus was involved. 
This chapter briefly demonstrated that Catiline was usually portrayed as 
the leader of the army in Etruria.  However, Catiline’s position as the leader of 
the army in Etruria can also be challenged which will be explored in more detail 
in the following chapter.  It will be shown that the Catilina recorded a mandata 
sent by Manlius, the Sullan veteran from Faesulae, delivered by delegates from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
353 See section 2.4.3. 
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the army in Etruria to Q. Marcius Rex, an ex-consul, which explained the 
reasons why they were in open revolt against Rome.  The verbal message 
insinuated that the army in Etruria would withdraw if their grievances were 
addressed.  Furthermore, the reports that an army had assembled in Etruria 
came before Catiline had left Rome to be the army’s leader.  In addition, there 
were many other regions in Italy that allegedly supported the affair, further 
demonstrating the extent of the threat facing Rome.  These disturbances 
occurring outside of Rome and those involved with them are the focus of the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The disturbances outside of Rome: An examination of C. Manlius, the 
army in northern Etruria, and the disturbances throughout Italy  
 
This chapter discusses our sources’ portrayal of the disturbances outside 
Rome allegedly connected with the affair of 63.  Most of our sources, with some 
discrepancies that will be noted below, claim that the affair’s participants 
attempted to incite many regions throughout Italy to help achieve their ultimate 
goal of gaining power in Rome.  It is recorded that an army composed of 
various disgruntled citizens led by a Sullan veteran named C. Manlius was 
gathering in northern Etruria.1  After Catiline left Rome on the night of 
November 8, he eventually arrived in the town of Faesulae in northern Etruria 
where Manlius and his army were encamped.2  In the hills near the northern 
Etruscan town of Pistoria, Manlius and Catiline’s army were defeated and both 
men died in the battle.3  As most of the narratives concerned with the affair 
follow the movements of Catiline, we know more about Manlius and the 
situation in northern Etruria than about the disturbances in the other regions in 
Italy.  However, this chapter also provides an examination of the other regions 
our sources claimed were targeted by the affair’s participants and explores the 
reasons why these regions were willing to support them. 
First, I discuss the historical background of the consular elections of 63.  
I examine Catiline’s support in his candidacy from C. Manlius and the veterans 
of Sulla, as well as the people who Sulla had dispossessed in section 3.1.  I 
explore the reasons why Catiline was defeated in the elections, his choice to 
join Manlius’ army in Etruria, and why he sent other members to other regions in 
to enlist further support for the affair.  In section 3.2, I review the historical 
evidence that connects Catiline to Manlius and his army.  I investigate Catiline’s 
relationship with Manlius, the army, and the region of Etruria using literary and 
non-literary evidence.  In addition, the section describes the composition of the 
army in Etruria, which further demonstrates the various groups of people willing 
to support the affair. 
                                                
1 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.7; Sall. B Cat. 30.1; Liv. Per. 102; Plut. Cic. 15.5; Dio Cass. 37.31.2 
2 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.1-6, 13-14; Mur. 84; Sall. B Cat. 32.1, 36.1; Plut. Cic. 16.6; App. B Civ. 2.3; Dio 
Cass. 37.33.1; Flor. 2.12.7-8 
3 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 59-61; Vell. Pat. 2.35.5; Plut. Cic. 22.8; App. B Civ. 2.7; Dio Cass. 37.40.1-2. 
 147 
Our sources consistently connect the disturbances inside and outside of 
Rome.  The report of armed men in Faesulae was partly the reason the Senate 
declared the SCU in late October.  Catiline’s connection with Manlius also led to 
the hostis rei publicae declarations soon afterwards.  The legitimacy of the two 
declarations are discussed in section 3.3 to explain the extralegal 
countermeasures the res publica took to defend against the disturbances 
reported to be occurring outside of Rome.  Section 3.4 continues to consider the 
individual disturbances reported in parts of northern Etruria, Latium, Umbria, 
Picenum, the ager Gallicus, Apulia and Campania.  The section investigates the 
connections between these regions and the groups of people our sources 
claimed were supporting the affair. 
Compared to the other disturbances outside Rome rumored that year, 
the disturbance in northern Etruria was the only region in Italy that was most 
likely connected to the plan to gain power in Rome.  Consequently, this chapter 
primarily focuses on the disturbance in this region.  After the Senate learned of 
the disturbance occurring at Faesulae in northern Etruria, Sallust recorded that 
they ordered the general Q. Marcius Rex to monitor the activities reported in the 
region (Sall. B Cat. 30.1-4).4  Our sources reported that Manlius and his army 
were in open revolt in late October, weeks before Catiline arrived at the army’s 
camp in Faesulae.5  In order to connect Catiline and Manlius, the accounts 
claimed the latter’s army in Etruria were levied, supplied, and reinforced by the 
combined efforts of the former and perhaps others remaining in Rome.6  
However, Sallust’s Catilina records a mandata, or verbal message, that was 
supposedly sent from Manlius’ army to Q. Marcius Rex, which suggests that 
Manlius and his army might have initially revolted for independent reasons and 
before Catiline’s arrival in the camp (33). 
We can use the evidence of the so-called mandata Manliana found in 
Sallust’s Catilina to question whether the disturbances in Etruria, and perhaps 
those in the other regions of Italy, were actually connected to the disturbances 
occuring in Rome.  The inclusion of the mandata suggests that the 
simultaneous disturbances occurring inside and outside of the city were 
perhaps initially separate events.  Section 3.5 examines the mandata Manliana 
                                                
4 See n.137. 
5 See n.1. 
6 In the Pro Sulla, Cicero claimed P. Autronius Paetus also sent arms to Catiline and Manlius’ 
camp in Faesulae (Cic. Sull. 17). Sending arms: Cic. Cat. 1.24, 2.13; Sall. B Cat. 36.1.  Sending 
money: App. B Civ. 2.3.  Sending both: Sall. B Cat. 24.2, 27.4. 
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and how it has been interpreted by modern scholarship.  The veracity of the 
mandata Manliana remains contentious, as it only appears in Sallust’s account 
of the affair.  Furthermore, the term mandata indicated a verbal message, which 
suggests that Sallust was not citing a written source unlike the other letters he 
reproduced in the Catilina. 
Whether we should believe our sources' portrayal that the disturbances 
outside of Rome were connected to those inside the city is a matter of 
conjecture.  Our sources doubtlessly link the activities inside and outside of 
Rome to increase the perception of the threat facing the res publica in 63.  
Subsequently, the connection between these activities makes the affair of 63 
harder to classify.  Therefore, the chapter concludes with a brief examination of 
the terms used to identify the disturbances outside Rome.  These external 
disturbances were described using different terminology than those occurring in 
the city.  Instead, the disturbances occurring outside of the city are identified 
primarily using military language associated with war, which will be further 
explored in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1  The consular elections of 63 
A few days before the consular elections of 63, Cicero remarked that a 
large group of people supporting Catiline’s candidacy were in Rome.7  
Apparently, Catiline’s retinue included those who had suffered during Sulla’s 
reign.  Cicero described them in the following manner:8 
stipatum choro iuventutis…colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu…turbam 
dissimillimo ex genere distinguebant homines perculsi Sullani temporis calamitate 
 
                                                
7 Sallust does not comment on the size of Catiline’s support during the elections of 63.  Dio 
stated Catiline: !"#$% &#'( )($(*+",%*(- “was preaparing a small band of men” (Dio Cass. 
37.29.2).  NB: The word !"#$% defines things associated with the ‘hand’ (LSJ s.v. I-IV).  The 
Greek term can also define “a number, band, body of men, esp. of soldiers” (s.v. V); similar to 
the Latin term manus referring to an ‘armed band of men’ (OLD s.v. 22).  Without a qualifying 
adjective the Greek term !"#$% does not have to indicate only a handful or “small” amount of 
men, as Cary’s translation of Dio’s words implies.  Instead, the term implied that the men 
supporting Catiline were armed and of a noticeable size, as Dio continued to report that their 
actions led to the exposure of the affair (37.29-2-5).  On the other hand, Plutarch stated 
Catiline’s support during the elections of 63 came from Sullan veterans “found in all parts of 
Italy.”  Plutarch implied that Catiline’s support was numerous in 63, but does not specifically 
comment on the size of the entourage at the elections except that Manlius and other Sullan 
veterans mainly from Etruria were present (Plut. Cic. 14.2-3). 
8 The phrase dissimillimo ex genere could refer to any of the various groups of debtors or 
criminals willing to join the affair that Cicero discussed in the Second Oration (Cic. Cat. 2.18-
23).  For a detailed description of the groups willing to support the affair, see pp.67-8.  Perhaps 
the term referred to those who had lost their land after Sulla had set up colonies for his 
veterans.  Cf. MacDonald 1969, 112. 
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“A bodyguard of youths…an army of colonists from Arretium and Faesulae [in northern 
Etruria]…a crowd of other types of men devastated by misfortune at the time of Sulla." 
(Cic. Mur. 49) 
 
This description of Catiline’s supporters occurs during Cicero’s defense speech 
for the consul designate for 62, L. Licinius Murena, whose trial occurred 
sometime in November after Catiline had left Rome and before the arrest of 
Lentulus and the others on December 3.9  Cicero had previously claimed in the 
first two Orations delivered before the Pro Murena that Catiline was traveling to 
Faesulae to join the army that was encamped there.  The types of men who 
supported Catiline’s candidacy mentioned in the Pro Murena were the same 
types of men that Cicero reported made up the army in Etruria in the Second 
Oration (Cat. 2.5).10  Cicero’s specificity in the former speech regarding the 
origin of the colonists supporting Catiline’s candidacy earlier that summer was 
clearly no coincidence. 
We can explain why those who suffered under Sulla supported Catiline’s 
bid for the consulship in 63.  According to our sources, the Sullan veterans 
settled in the viritane colonies created in the late 80’s and early 70’s had 
apparently squandered much of their gains and were in debt.  The original 
inhabitants of the areas earmarked for the settlement of Sulla’s soldiers who 
were dispossessed or negatively affected by arrival of the colonists faced 
similar financial woes.11  Cicero later implied in the De officiis that the debt crisis 
in the res publica was extreme in 63 (Cic. Off. 2.84).12  In the consular elections 
of 64, one of Catiline’s campaign promises supposedly was to alleviate the debt 
problem by instituting tabulae novae (‘new accounts’).13  It is not known whether 
Catiline proposed economic legislation, which would have devalued the 
currency, in order to: i) reduce the monetary value owed on debts similar to the 
                                                
9 For the date of the Pro Murena, see Chapter 2 n.1. 
10 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.20 
11 For passages regarding the debt of Sulla’s veterans, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.20; Sall. B Cat. 16.4, 21.4, 
33.1; Plut. Cic. 14.2; App. BC 2.2.2; Dio Cass. 37.30.5.  For passages regarding the debt of 
those Sulla dispossessed, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.20; Sall. B Cat. 28.4, 33.1.  In the De Officiis, Cicero 
discussed the injustice of property confiscations by indebted elites sometimes from areas that 
were previously occupied for generations.  He was most likely alluding to the colonies 
established for the veterans of Sulla’s army and later for the armies of Pompey and Caesar 
(Cic. Off. 2.54, 79).   
12 The passage in the De Officiis emphasized the problem of debt during Cicero’s consulship 
(cf. Cic. Catil. 2.8), but stated the problem reached its peak during the early 40’s, explaining 
Caesar’s legislation abolishing interest in arrears and applying monies paid on interest to be 
deducted from the loan’s principal (Suet. Iul. 42). See Fredericksen 1966, 132-5. 
13 Cf. OLD (tabula) s.v. 7b. Sallust emphatically placed tabulae novae foremost in the list of 
Catiline’s promises if he was elected consul in 64 (Sall. B Cat. 21.2).  Cicero claimed those who 
supported Catiline’s candidacy in 63 were hoping for tabulae novae if Catiline was elected (Cic. 
Cat. 2.18). 
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lex Valeria of 86, or ii) to address the abuse of interest rates like the lex 
Cornelia Pompeia of 88, or iii) to abolish all debts.14  Regardless of the specifics 
of the promised legislation, any proposal to alleviate debts doubtlessly attracted 
support from many of the indebted throughout the res publica.  However, Cicero 
used Catiline’s promise for tabulae novae to emphasize his “popular” agenda, 
which may have alienated him from the established ruling elite who were 
content with the status quo in 64.15  A year later, Catiline campaigned for the 
consulship, again promising some form of tabulae novae.  But yet again 
Catiline’s bid for the consulship failed, however, his promise to address the 
extreme levels of debt was certainly an attraction for those reported to have 
supported him in the elections of 63. 
As a consul, it was Cicero’s duty to manage the magisterial elections for 
the following year.  He claimed that Catiline’s entourage assembled in the 
Campus Martius was armed (Cic. Mur. 52).  Fearing for his safety, Cicero 
procured a strong bodyguard to oppose Catiline’s supporters, who were 
purportedly creating a disturbance.16  These violent demonstrations induced the 
Senate to agree to Cicero’s proposal to postpone the elections until order was 
restored (Cic. Mur. 51; cf. Plut. Cic. 14.7).17  How long the postponement of the 
consular elections lasted remains contentious.  Some scholars suggest the 
postponement lasted only a few days.  Others argue that the elections were 
held some months later.18  If the latter occurred, then Catiline’s support from 
                                                
14 See Chapter 2 n.47. Also cf. Barlow 1980, 214-7; Drummond 1999, 136-47; Brennan 2000 
Vol. I, 388-402.  
15 Catiline had influential support from many leading citizens during his trial for extortion in 65, 
cf. Cic. Sull. 81; Asc. 89C. See also, TLRR (1990), no. 212.  Cicero even considered defending 
Catiline that year (Cic. Att. 1.2.1; cf. Cael. 14).  However, in 64, Cicero was voted as consul 
prior factus unanimously by all 193 voting centuries and C. Antonius narrowly beat out Catiline 
as the second consul (Asc. Tog Cand. 94).  Catiline’s support from his trial in 65 had apparently 
abandoned him when he needed it most in 64.  Whether Catiline’s defeat was partly due to 
Cicero’s emphasis on Catiline’s apparent populares leanings remains contentious.  It may have 
been a piece of brilliant electioneering on Cicero’s part or just typical political propaganda to 
diminish any candidate’s support among the elite.  On the political usage of the term populares, 
cf. Hellegouarc’h 1963, 518-22; Archard 1982, 794-800.  
16 Cicero wore a breastplate under his toga during the violent demonstrations in the Campus 
Martius during the elections of 63, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.11; Mur. 52; Plut. Cic. 14.7; Dio Cass. 37.29.4.  
17 Plutarch also mentioned the postponement occurred because of several ‘bad’ omens (Plut. 
Cic. 14.4). 
18 For arguments for a short postponement in July, cf. Stockton 1971, 336-7; MacDonald 1977, 
14, 171; Benson 1986, 242-3.  For a long postponement until late October, cf. Rolfe 1921, 49 
n.2; Madden 1977-8, 277.  For the most recent discussion and comprehensive review of the 
prevailing scholarly arguments concerning the uncertain date of the elections of 63, see Benson 
1986.  
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Etruria would have been hard-pressed to stay that long in Rome19, which would 
have been detrimental to his chances in the election.20  On the other hand, if the 
elections were postponed only a few days, then Catiline’s Etruscan supporters 
could still have an effect on the elections.  Benson states that, “Their presence 
[Manlius and the Sullan veterans] provoked fears of intimidation at the least and 
perhaps rebellion should Catiline lose.”21  I do not entirely agree with Benson’s 
statement because there were clearly other groups of people at the consular 
elections from both inside and outside Rome who could provoke fear on par 
with Catiline’s supporters, such as, the soldiers and crowds from Cisalpine Gaul 
supporting the consular candidate L. Licinius Murena in the same election.22  
However, the postponement certainly hurt Catiline’s chances because the main 
reason for the delay was the reports of Catiline and his supporters’ murderous 
intentions.23 
According to Cicero, before the elections were held Catiline made some 
scurrilous remarks in the Senate against his personal enemies and the res 
publica.  After Cato had threatened to prosecute Catiline, Cicero claimed 
Catiline made a rebuttal against the accusation.24  According to Cicero, Catiline 
warned that si quod esset in suas fortunas incendium excitatum, id se non aqua 
                                                
19 Havas (1984, 31) and Benson (1986, 237) explain those from outside Rome would have to 
leave the city during the harvest season. 
20 Canvassing for votes outside of Rome was important for a consular candidate, cf. Cic. Att. 
1.1; Comment. pet. 24, 50-1, 53; Sall. B Iug. 86.3.  See further, Morstein-Marx 1998, 260-1.  
Cicero campaigned in Cisalpine Gaul a year before his victory in the consular elections of 64 
(Cic. Att. 1.1.2) and owned villas among six different voting tribes, see Taylor 1966, 67.  But the 
influence on elections from those outside Rome was probably minimal, cf. Taylor 1960, 122 and 
1966, 64-70; Millar 1998, 100; Yakobson 1992, 42 and 228-31; contra Tibiletti 1959, 122-5. 
21 Benson 1986, 236. 
22 The crowds of people supporting Murena were one of the charges against him in his trial de 
ambitu, see Cic. Mur. 67-73.  In his defense of Murena, Cicero of course only states that 
Catiline’s supporters were violent, but the influx of those from the countryside surely made 
Rome a more intimidating place during the elections. See Lintott 1968.  NB: Dio argued that 
Cicero’s legislation against electoral bribery passed in 63 was a direct threat to Catiline’s 
candidacy and a reason why he planned to murder Cicero (37.29.1-2). Asconius reported that 
Cicero’s spontaneous speech In Toga Candida was instigated in part by the recent tribunal veto 
against a proposal to make the current punishment under the leges de ambitu stricter (Asc. 
83C, 85-6C).  Clearly, Cicero reacted this way in 64 because he believed Catiline and perhaps 
C. Antonius were guilty of bribery; however, no candidate was prosecuted that year.   
23 In the Pro Murena, Cicero reminded his audience of the fear that omnes boni (‘all of the loyal 
citizens’) felt on the day of the elections (Cic. Mur. 50).  In addition, he claimed omnes boni 
came to his defense when Catiline’s supporters appeared armed in the Campus Martius (52).  
On the political usage of the term boni, see Helleguarc’h 1963, 484-9. 
24 What charge Cato brought against Catiline is unknown.  Sometime after the SCU was passed 
on October 21, Sallust reported that L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus charged Catiline under the lex 
Plautia de vi for his involvement with the seditious activities reported in Etruria and suspected in 
Rome (Sall. B Cat 31.4).  Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.19; Vatin. 25; Dio Cass. 37.31.3. Catiline may have 
been charged in absentia after he fled Rome.  Of course these planned prosecutions never took 
place, cf. TLRR, nos. 222-223.   
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sed ruina restincturum “He would put out any fire set to his property not with 
water but by destroying everything” (Cic. Mur. 51).  Catiline threatened that if he 
was attacked with incendium, then he would restinctere (‘extinguish’) such a 
‘fire’ not with water but with destruction.25  Perhaps Catiline’s statement was a 
metaphorical warning to Cato, or anyone else for that matter, that he would fight 
“fire with fire.”26  
Catiline also derided the res publica, questioning the consuls’ ability to 
run the government effectively.  According to Cicero, Catiline stated that duo 
corpora esse rei publicae, unum debile infirmo capite, alterum firmum sine 
capite “The [res publica] had two bodies, one frail with a weak head, the other 
strong with no head at all” (Cic. Mur. 51).27  The metaphor, on the one hand, 
criticized Cicero as a poor representative of the ruling faction in the Senate.  On 
the other hand, the metaphor alluded to Catiline’s determination to lead the 
other “corpus” in the res publica represented by the common people.  Cicero 
consistently compared Catiline’s political ideology to that of a popularis.28  He 
had declared Catiline would be dux et signifer calamitosorum “The standard-
bearer and leader of ruined men” (Cic. Mur. 50).  Cicero’s representation of 
Catiline as a leader of the disgruntled masses was clearly a tactic to harm 
Catiline’s bid for the consulship in 63.  Doubtlessly, this representation 
damaged Catiline’s support among the elite.  As in the previous election, 
Catiline was in danger of alienating the most influential voting bloc in Rome, 
(those in the top centuries of the comitia centuriata), due to his “popular” 
platform.29 
Catiline’s supposed remarks in the Senate, his representation as a 
leader of the poor, and the postponement of the elections might have been 
some of the reasons for his defeat in the consular elections of 63.  In addition, 
the allegation that he was planning to murder Cicero and other leading men 
                                                
25 NB: MacDonald 1977, 253 translates sed ruina restincturum as “by destroying everything”.  
No term in the passage indicates “everything,” but the sentiment is implied. Cf. MacDonald 
1969, 113. 
26 Cicero might have used the metaphor to remind his readers that he and the other participants 
were planning to set fires in Rome, e.g. Cic. Cat. 1.9.  
27 Plutarch recorded Catiline’s remark in oratio recta in similar terms (Cic. 14.6). 
28 For Cicero’s usage of the term populares in his political speeches, see Seager 1972.  For a 
comprehensive examination of Cicero’s usage of the term populares, cf. Wood 1988, 193-9; 
Morstein-Marx 2004, 207-28. 
29 For the prevailing view that the influence of the upper class in the comitia centuriata was 
essential, cf. Taylor 1949, 57; Meier 1966, 314; Wiseman 1971,125; Gruen 1974, 122; 
Vanderbroeck 1987, 163; Sandberg 1993, 84-5.  In contrast, cf. Yakobson 1999, 43-54 and 
211-25; Morstein-Marx 1998, 266-8. 
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during the elections reiterated his unstable character.  The fact that he had a 
more violent and disreputable past than the other consular candidates was 
certainly no advantage either.30  The suspicion of violence compounded with 
the other reasons mentioned above contributed to his defeat.  Our sources 
implied that this second defeat in the consular elections was the reason Catiline 
was forced to resort to violent and subversive methods to gain power.31  
Apparently, one of these methods included inciting areas outside of Rome to 
take up arms against the established authority of the res publica. 
 
3.2  The historical evidence for Catiline’s connection with C. Manlius, the 
Sullan veterans, and the disturbances outside of Rome 
 
According to Plutarch, a certain C. Manlius was the leader of the Sullan 
veterans from Etruria who came to Rome to support Catiline in the elections of 
63.32  Although Catiline had lost the consulship, Plutarch claimed it was the 
Sullan veterans who, µ%.#*&( /ὲ &ὸ' 0(&#.1'(' ἐ23$45#67' “were most of all 
urging Catiline on to action” (Plu. Cic. 14.2-3).  Cicero introduced Manlius as 
Catiline’s satelles atque administer ‘accomplice and supporter’ (Cic. Catil. 1.7), 
and stated he was a former centurion in Sulla’s army (2.14) and a Sullan 
colonist (2.20).33  Whether Manlius attended the elections of 63 remains 
uncertain, but our sources consistently claimed Manlius’ activities in northern 
Etruria were planned and coordinated with the seditious activities in Rome.34 
It was reported in the Senate that Manlius and his supporters at 
Faesulae had taken up arms on October 27 (Cic. Cat. 1.7; Sall. B Cat. 30.1).35  
According to the First Oration, Cicero predicted the exact day Manlius’ forces 
would take the field.  Cicero wanted to demonstrate that he was aware of all the 
plans both inside and outside the city (1.9, 2.6), but most significantly to prove 
                                                
30 The other consular candidates with Catiline that stood for election in 63 were D. Junius 
Silanus, L. Licinius Murena, and Ser. Sulpicius Rufus.  None is reported to have a violent past.  
Silanus and Murena won the election.  In the Pro Murena, Cicero pointed out what he deemed 
were the flaws in Sulpicius’ campaign and the reasons why he was defeated that year (Cic. Mur. 
15-53). 
31 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.11-12, 23, 27, 2.1-2, 8, 13-16; Mur. 78; Sall. B Cat. 26.5; Plut. Cic. 14; Dio 
Cass. 37.30.1; App. BC 2.1.2.  NB: Catiline was also barred from standing for the consulship in 
66, see Chapter 2 n.239. 
32 Plutarch reported Manlius was !'/$( &"' #)#8('"- $)% 9:..& *&$(&",*(µ4';' “One of the 
men who had a served with distinction under Sulla”.  He was the '<"µ=' (‘leader’) of the Sullan 
veterans who supported Catiline (Plu. Cic. 14.3). 
33 Dio (37.30.5) also described Manlius as a centurion.  In the same passage, Dio implied 
Manlius was in a more desperate financial condition than Catiline and Lentulus.  
34 For an exception, see section 3.5 below. 
35 Plutarch did not give a specific date for the revolt (Plut. Cic. 15.5). 
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that Manlius’ activities were linked with these plans.  Cicero often made the 
claim that Manlius’ army was waiting for Catiline and that he would take over 
the leadership from Manlius when he arrived.36  Cicero, therefore, attempted to 
coerce Catiline to leave the city in order to demonstrate to the Senate and the 
people of Rome that he was involved with Manlius and the military camp in 
Etruria.  Catiline fled Rome later that night, and, according to Sallust, in 
Manliana castra profectus est “left for the camp of Manlius” (Sall. B Cat. 32.2).37  
However, there are reports of conflicting opinions among the Senate as to 
whether Catiline left Rome to go into self-imposed exile in Massilia or was 
instead heading for Manlius’ camp in Faesulae.38  Cicero repeatedly ordered 
Catiline to leave Rome in the First Oration (cf. Cic. Cat. 1.10, 12, 17-20, 32-33) 
and intimated that some people reproached him for apparently forcing Catiline 
into self-imposed exile (cf. 1.22, 2.12, 15, 3.3).39  Cicero refuted these rumors, 
declaring that tamen latrocinantem se interfici mallet quam exsulem vivere “He 
[Catiline] would rather die a bandit than live an exile” (2.16).40  Cicero claimed it 
was always Catiline’s intention to leave the city after Cicero was murdered.41  At 
this point, Cicero had only delayed the affair of 63 by exposing it and avoiding 
assassination.  He maintained that the original plan was for Catiline to take 
                                                
36 For Cicero’s representation of Manlius’ forces waiting for Catiline’s leadership, e.g. Cic. Cat. 
1.5: castrorum imperatorem ducemque hostium, 1.10: nimium diu te imperatorem tua illa 
Manliana castra desiderant, 1.23: confer te ad Manlium, 1.27: quem ducem belli futurum vides, 
quem exspectari imperatorem in castris hostium sentis, 1.30: quo intendit, in Manliana castra 
pervenerit, 2.14: illa castra…ducem expectant, 2.20: Manlius cui nunc Catilina succedit. Cf. Cat. 
2.1, 13; Mur. 78, 84-5; Sull. 17, 33. 
37 Cicero implied Catiline left Rome in a hurry.  He left the city with only a few followers, cf. Cic. 
Cat. 2.4; Sall. B Cat. 32.1.  In contrast, see n.46. 
38 Catiline may have sent letters to his friends declaring he was voluntarily going into exile at 
Massilia (Cic. Cat. 2.14, 16; cf. Sall. B Cat. 34.2).  Sallust recorded a letter sent from Catiline to 
Q. Lutatius Catulus read out in the Senate after Catiline left Rome (Sall. B Cat. 35). In the letter, 
Catiline insinuated he was forced to leave Rome to preserve what was left of his dignity (35.4: 
reliquae dignitatis conservandae). At the time of writing the letter, whether Catiline would go into 
voluntary exile or join Manlius’ army remains ambiguous, cf. Syme 1964, 71-2; Vretska 1976, 
409-11; McGushin 1977, 194 and 199-200; Ramsey 1984, 160; Dyck 2008, 142-7. 
39 Dio (37.33.1) claimed that the Senate voted to exile Catiline from Rome. 
40 Cicero claimed Catiline asked the Senate to vote whether he should go into exile after Cicero 
disclosed his plot (Cic. Cat. 1.20).  He consistently argued exile was never Catiline’s intention 
(1.22-27).  Cf. n.41. 
41 Cic. Cat. 1.9: confirmasti te ipsum iam esse esiturum, dixisti paulum tibi esse etaim nunc 
morae, quod ego viverem “You confirmed that you were on the point of departure yourself, but 
said that you still had to wait a little longer because I was alive.”; cf. 2.16: nunc vero, cum ei nihil 
adhuc praeter ipsius voluntatem cogitationeque acciderit, nisi quod vivis nobis Roma profectus 
est “As it is everything has so far gone according to plan and just as he wished – except that I 
was still alive when he left Rome.”  Cf. 2.1: L. Catilinam…ex urbe vel eiecimus vel emisimus vel 
ipsum egredientem verbis prosecuti sumus “We have expelled Lucius Catilina, or, if you prefer, 
sent him off, or followed him on his way with our farewells as he left Rome of his own accord.” 
Dyck 2008, 127 explained the term ipsum in this passage implied that Catiline’s plan was to 
leave Rome regardless whether the affair’s plans had been exposed or not. 
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command over Manlius’ army in Etruria while the other participants remaining in 
Rome continued to plan arson and murder within its walls (cf. 1.9, 2.6, 3.8).  But 
there were evidently others in Rome who believed that Catiline had left for 
different reasons. 
Our sources concur that Catiline purportedly had sent arms and money 
to aid Manlius’ army prepare for war.42  Cicero declared that Catiline had 
already sent Manlius the aquila argentum, a well-known signum militare 
(‘military standard’) of C. Marius used in his victory against the Cimbri in 10243, 
before the affair’s plans were disclosed in the First Oration (Cic. Cat. 1.24).  In 
the Second Oration, Cicero claimed that Catiline had also sent ahead other 
signa militaria to Manlius’ forces including arma (‘arms’), secures (‘money’), 
tubae (‘trumpet’s), and the fasces before he had left the city (2.13).  Manlius’ 
forces were furnished with equipment indicating their battle-readiness.  
Furthermore, the report that Catiline and Manlius’ army was carrying the fasces 
was especially offensive to the established authority in Rome.  The fasces were 
allowed only to accompany current consuls, praetors, and provincial governors 
to signify their senatorial conferment of imperium.44  Catiline was praetor in 68 
and was governor of Africa for two years after his praetorship.45  Therefore, 
Catiline’s imperium had elapsed, so Cicero’s implication that he had falsely 
assumed the auspices of a magistrate with imperium demonstrated the factious 
motives of Catiline and Manlius’ army.  Sallust claimed that after Catiline’s 
meeting with C. Flaminius at Arretium he traveled to Faesulae cum fascibus 
atque aliis imperi insignibus “with the fasces and other emblems of authority” 
(Sall. B Cat. 36.1).  Other narratives also report that Catiline had assumed the 
consular insignia.46 
According to these reports, Catiline’s actions before and after he left 
Rome indicated that he intended to join Manlius’ army at Faesulae and threaten 
the res publica with this armed force.  Furthermore, our sources suggest that 
                                                
42 See n.6. 
43 Only Cicero claimed the aquila was sent to Manlius before Catiline left Rome (Cic. Cat. 1.24).  
Sallust reported that the forces in the center of the battle line led by Catiline carried Marius’ 
aquila (Sall. B Cat. 59.3).  On Marius’ introduction of the aquila as his army’s preferred 
standard, see Plin. NH 10.16.  Also, Keppie 1984, 67. 
44 For the fasces as a symbol of imperium, cf. Nippel 1995, 12-5; Hölkeskamp 2011, 166-71. 
45 Cic. Cael. 10; Asc. 66C, 85C, 89C. 
46 Plutarch claimed Catiline left Rome accompanied by 300 followers and lictors carrying the 
fasces (Plut. Cic. 16.6).  Appian reported Catiline assumed the consular insignia while traveling 
to Faesuale (App. B Civ. 2.3).  Dio reported this event occurred after Catiline reached Faesuale 
(Dio Cass. 37.33.2). 
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Lentulus and the other participants, who remained in Rome, were waiting for 
Catiline and Manlius’ forces to storm the gates of the city before they 
commenced with the arson and murder they had planned.  Therefore, according 
to the literary evidence, Catiline coordinated the disturbance in northern Etruria 
with Manlius as his subordinate.  Catiline’s presumed leadership of Manlius’ 
army is recorded, despite the accounts that Catiline had not left Rome for 
Faesulae until after Manlius’ army was reported in arms and after the plot and 
his specific role as leader of this army was divulged.  Our sources consistently 
present the events occurring outside and inside Rome as part of the same 
overall plan.  
There is other literary evidence we can examine that connects Catiline 
with Manlius and the Sullan veterans in his army.  Our sources record Catiline’s 
close association with Sulla.47  Catiline’s military career began with the Social 
War.  His name appears on the list of those serving under the general Cn. 
Pompeius Strabo at Asculum in 89 during the conflict. Catiline, like many 
nobiles, had military experience from a young age.48  There is no epigraphic 
evidence that Catiline fought under Sulla’s command during the Social War, 
however, according to a fragment of Sallust’s Historiae, he served as Sulla’s 
legatus when besieging an anonymous Marian stronghold still holding out 
against Sulla in 82 (Sall. Hist. 1.46).  Although the location of the siege remains 
uncertain, Catiline’s role as a leader of men is evident as the fragment in the 
Historiae stated that he held the rank of legatus.49  In addition, although Manlius 
might have held the rank of centurion in Sulla’s army, Catiline’s ability as a 
leader of men was also testified.  Cicero and Sallust both regaled Catiline 
commenting on his remarkable ability to endure hunger, cold, and hardship.  
Certainly these were important qualities during a military campaign and for a 
                                                
47 App. B Civ. 2.2: 9:..( 81.7- &" +((*&(*#=&3- +(( 63.;&)- µ%.#*&( <"<7'=- “He [Catiline] 
had been a friend and zealous partisan of Sulla.” 
48 In 89, Catiline was approximately nineteen years old.  It was an important experience for 
young nobiles to join a military entourage to form relationships that might be beneficial for their 
later military and political career, see Rosenstein 2007, 44. On the list at Asculum, cf. Criniti 
1970, 160-2; Mattingly 1975, 263. 
49 Sall. Hist. 1.46M: magnis operibus perfectis obsidium cepit per L. Catilinam legatum “When 
the great siege works had been completed, he appointed his legatus Lucius Catilina to conduct 
the siege.”  Cf. Keaveney and Strachan 1981, 363ff.  Keaveney and Strachan argue against the 
hypothesis that the town Catiline besieged was Praeneste or Volaterrae and that he was too 
young to be a legatus.  Following Keaveney and Strachan, McGushin (1992, 110-2) suggests 
the town of Aesernia was a more likely site for the siege. 
 157 
commander of men.50  Therefore, our sources’ depiction of Catiline as the 
leader of Manlius’ army is understandable.51 
In addition, there is evidence that Catiline was involved in murdering 
those proscribed by Sulla.  Asconius commented that Cicero claimed Catiline 
killed four men named Q. Caecilius, M. Volumnius, L. Tanusius, and M. Marius 
Gratidianus during the proscriptions (Asc. 84C).52  Cicero’s brother Quintus 
recorded that Catiline murdered five men (Cic. Comment. pet. 9-10).53  Nearly 
twenty years later, Catiline was brought to trial under the lex Cornelia de sicariis 
et veneficis for the murders during the Sullan proscriptions after he was 
defeated in the consular election of 64.  The same year L. Annius Bellienus, a 
praetor in 10554, and L. Luscius, a centurion55, were convicted of murder due to 
their involvement in the proscriptions, however, only Catiline was acquitted.56 
Whether Catiline was guilty of the murders during Sulla’s reign is not as 
significant as our sources’ consistent presentation of Catiline as a man blinded 
with ambition to be another Sulla.  According to Sallust, it was Catiline’s 
association with Sulla that first inflamed his desire to overthrow the res 
                                                
50 Cic. Cat. 1.26: habes ubi ostentes tuam illam praeclaram patientiam famis, frigoris, inopiae 
rerum omnium “You have an opportunity to show your famous ability to endure hunger, cold and 
deprivation of every necessity”; 2.9: adsuefactus frigore et fame et siti et vigiliis ‘accustomed to 
cold, hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep’; 3.16: frigus, sitim, famem ferre poterat “He could endure 
cold, thirst, hunger.” Cf. Sall. B Cat. 5.3: corpus patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae supra quam 
cuiquam credibile est “His body could endure hunger, cold, and a want of sleep to an incredible 
degree”.  Sallust also invented a speech for Catiline delivered to Manlius and the army worthy of 
a competent commander instilling courage in his men before the final battle (58).   
51 McGushin (1977, 280) states that Catiline’s claim that he was an imperator is “a lie.” Although 
Catiline was never officially hailed imperator, he was a seasoned soldier, therefore, Sallust 
should not be disparaged for using the term imperator imprecisely.  For all intents and 
purposes, Sallust’s depiction of Catiline as the imperator of Manlius’s army is consistent with 
Cicero’s representation, cf. Cic. Cael. 12: vigebant etiam studia rei militaris ‘He [Catiline] was 
known for his vigilance and military skill’.  Badian (1959, 95) suggests Catiline might have also 
served under Pompey in Spain or in Cilicia in the 70’s. 
52 Catiline’s murder of M. Marius Gratidianus was portrayed by our sources as particularly 
gruesome, e.g. Sen. Ira 3.18.1-2.  It was reported that he brought Gratidianus’ freshly severed 
head into the Forum (Asc. 84).  Gratidianus was probably a distant relative of the Tullii 
Cicerones and Marii.  All three families hailed from Arpinum, Cicero’s hometown, and Cicero’s 
father was a brother-in-law of a Gratidi, see Marshall 1985, 291-2.  
53 The list of victims in the Commentiarolum Petitionis included two men from the Titinii and 
Nannii and excluded only the name Volumnius from Asconius’ list in his commentary of Cicero’s 
In Toga Candida. 
54 Asconius reported that L. Annius Bellienus was a cousin of Catiline, but this claim cannot be 
cross-referenced in any other source (Asc. 91C).  See Marshall 1985, 307. 
55 RE XIII 2 (Luscius) no. 1, 1865.  
56C. Julius Caesar was the quaesitor (‘court president’) of all three trials in 64, see TLRR 1990, 
nos. 215-17.  Because Catiline was the only one acquitted accused of the same crime, Caesar’s 
role as court president was depicted with suspicion, cf. Suet. Iul. 11.1; Dio Cass. 37.10.2-3.  Cf. 
Salmon 1935, 308; Marshall 1985, 307-8. 
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publica.57  Sallust proclaimed that all manner of vice among the Romans was at 
its peak after Sulla seized power in Rome through violent means.58  Sallust’s 
depiction of Catiline as another Sulla clearly helped him explain to his readers 
why Catiline reacted with such seemingly apoplectic rage to seek power 
through similar violent means in 63.  Catiline’s close association with Sulla 
reiterated his connection with Manlius’ army amassing in Faesulae and 
Arretium.59  
There is also evidence that suggests Catiline had a connection with the 
regions of Etruria, Umbria, and among the Paeligni, who reportedly supported 
the affair in 63.60  As a member of the gens Sergia and the tribus Tromentina, 
Catiline might have had a longstanding tribal connection with these regions.  
According to Livy, the gens Sergia played an active role in southern Etruria as 
far back as the late fifth and early fourth centuries.  L. Sergius Fidenas was 
consul twice in 437 and 429 and military tribune with consular powers in 433, 
424, and 418. 61  L. Sergius Fidenas might have received his cognomen due to 
the wars he conducted against the southern Etruscan towns Fidenae and Veii 
during these years (Liv. 4.17.7, 30.5).  His grandson M’. Sergius Fidenas62, a 
military tribune with consular powers in 404 and 402, and Manius’ son L. 
Sergius Fidenas63, a military tribune with consular powers in 397, were also 
active against the Veientes (Liv. 5.8.1-13, 16.1, 28.2).  The territory near 
Fidenae was perhaps incorporated into the tribus Sergia in 426 as a reward for 
the tribe’s activities in the area.64 
                                                
57 Sall. B Cat. 5.6: hunc post dominationem L. Sullae lubido maxuma invaserat rei publicae 
capiundae “After the domination of Sulla the man [Catiline] had been seized with a mighty 
desire of getting control of the government.”  
58 See Sall. B Cat. 11.4-13.5.  11.4: sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica bonis initiis 
malos eventus habuit, rapere omnes “But after Sulla, having gained control of the state by arms, 
brought everything to a bad end from a good beginning, all men began to rob and pillage.”  
Sulla’s bad example first affected the army (11.6), then the young men (12.2), and then the 
nobility (12.5-13.5). Cf. Cic. Off. 3.87 
59 Sulla punished both towns for their support of the Marians. 
60 Orosius claimed L. Vettius informed Rome that the Marcelli had instigated the revolt among 
the Paeligni (6.6.5).  Orosius reported that the Paeligni were punished for their support of the 
affair of 63 (6.6.6). 
61 RE IIA2 (Sergius) no. 25, 1711-2. 
62 RE IIA2 (Sergius) no. 27, 1712. 
63 RE IIA2 (Sergius) no. 26, 1712. 
64 Taylor (1960, 37 n.7) explains the conquered territory north of Fidenae was most likely 
incorporated into the tribus Claudia and the territory to the south into the tribus Sergia in 426.  
Livy reported L. Sergius Fidenas was on a three-man commission to investigate disturbances in 
Fidenae in 428 (4.30.5).  Taylor (40) speculates he was also on the commission to protect his 
property around the town.  
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The name L. Sergius L. f. Tro(mentina tribu) appears on the inscription 
from Asculum of those in the consilium of the general Cn. Pompeius Strabo 
after he subdued the town during the Social War in 89.65  It is accepted that the 
name on the list refers to Catiline, and the tribe he represented at the consilium 
was the tribus Tromentina.  The tribus Tromentina was one of four new tribes 
organized in 387 for the people who were settled on the ager annexed by Rome 
after the fall of Veii in 396 (Liv. 6.4.4, 5.8).  The territory around the towns of 
Perusia in Etruria and Veii were reorganized into the tribus Tromentina after the 
Social War.66  The proximity of the towns Perusia and Veii (from the tribus 
Tromentina) to Asisium in Umbria and Fidenae (from the tribus Sergia) perhaps 
indicates the two tribes’ connection.67  Regardless of the close proximity 
between the territories that were incorporated into either tribe, the inscription 
from Asculum indicated that Catiline, originally from the tribus Sergia, also had 
connections with the tribus Tromentina during his lifetime.68  Owing to the 
activity of the gens Sergia and Catiline’s membership in the tribus Sergia and 
the tribus Tromentina, it has been suggested he still owned land in Etruria.69  
However, as mentioned, our sources concur that the bulk of Catiline’s support in 
63 came explicitly from Faesulae and Arretium, which are located in northern 
Etruria.  They do not report that any town in southern Etruria supported the 
affair and we cannot be certain that the Sergii Catilinae still held influence in 
southern Etruria more than three centuries after the Sergii Fidenates were 
active in the area.  Therefore Catiline’s connection with southern Etruria 
remains tenuous.70 
Catiline’s connection with northern Etruria is attested in the literary 
sources.  The affair’s participants were supposedly inciting disturbances in other 
                                                
65 On the inscription of the consilium of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, see CIL I2 709=ILS 8888; cf. RE 
IIA2 (Sergius) no. 12, 1691.49-54. 
66 Taylor 1960, 115 
67 Taylor (1960: 275) lists the towns incorporated into the tribus Sergia and Tromentina. 
68 Taylor (1960: 284) examines the evidence for people from one gens represented in more 
than one tribus. 
69 Havas 1984, 34. 
70 On Catiline owning property in Etruria, cf. Shatzman 1975, 398; Havas 1984, 34.  I do not 
completely agree with Havas’ arguments regarding Catiline’s ownership of land around Fidenae 
generally due to the extreme length of time between the actions of the Sergii Fidenates, who 
may or may not be blood relatives of the Sergii Catilinae.  On the other hand, Havas’ 
hypotheses regarding Catiline’s ownership of land around Veii is more cogent due to his 
membership in the tribus Tromentia. NB: Sallust reported that Catiline claimed in a letter to Q. 
Catulus that he owned enough possessiones (‘estates’) to pay of his debts (Sall. B Cat. 35.3).  
Cicero also reported that some impoverished nobles attracted to the affair of 63 were not willing 
to sell their estates to pay off their debts (Cic. Cat. 2.18).  Cicero is not explicit whether he 
included Catiline in this category, cf. Cic. Comment. pet. 9. 
 160 
regions throughout Italy, including Umbria and among the Paeligni.  As 
mentioned above, the territory around the town Asisium in Umbria was part of 
the tribus Sergia.  Taylor explains that the towns of the Paeligni were entirely 
incorporated into the tribe after the Social War.71  Therefore, Catiline perhaps 
also had a connection with the Paeligni and a town in Umbria, two areas 
reported to be supporting the affair of 63.72 
There was typically animosity between the Sullan colonists and the 
original inhabitants of the towns, which I examine further in section 3.4 below.  
The territory near some of the towns in northern Etruria was earmarked for 
colonization to settle the veterans of Sulla’s army.73  A fragment attributed to 
Granius Licinianus alludes to an attack on the Sullan veterans settled in 
Faesulae by the original inhabitants of the town, which most likely occurred in 
78.74  The Faesulans probably attacked the Sullan veterans to recover the land 
that was apportioned to the colonists or land that was confiscated from them 
when the colony was founded.  The affair the fragment most likely described 
immediately preceded the seditious actions by M. Aemilius Lepidus in 78/77. 
Lepidus was consul in 78 and was sent to quell the disturbances reported in 
Etruria.75  Instead of suppressing the revolt, Lepidus took advantage of the 
tumultuous situation and returned with an army of the aggrieved Etruscans to 
the gates of Rome demanding an unauthorized consecutive consulship in order 
to rescind Sulla’s laws.76  His army was perhaps a peculiar mix of both Sullan 
colonists as well as those who were victims of the Sullan colonization.77  
Lepidus failed in his attempt to gain power in Rome and he and his army fled to 
Sardinia where Lepidus later died (Plut. Pomp. 16.6).78 
                                                
71 Taylor 1960, 111. 
72 Reported disturbances in Umbria: Cic. Cat. 2.6, 26; Sull. 53. Among the Paeligni: Oros. 6.6.5-
6. See further Section 3.4.  
73 For a summary of these colonies, cf. Harris 1971: 259-67; Santangelo 2007, 147-57. 
74 Gran. Lic. F36.36-7: Faesulani irruperunt in castella veteranorum Sullanorum ‘The Faesulans 
broke into the Sullan veterans’ stronghold.’ Scardigli (1983, 129-31) argues the fragment refers 
to the year 78. 
75 Disturbances in Etruria were reported before Lepidus arrived in the region. Sall. Hist. 1.67.6: 
a principio, cum Etruriam coniurare “At the very outset, when I saw Etruria conspiring.”  See 
McGushin 1992, 129-31.   
76 Lepidus claims he had raised an army in order to free the people of Rome from Sulla’s 
tyranny (Sall. Hist. 1.48.27).  For the reasons for Lepidus’ actions, cf. Hayne 1972, 661-8; 
Labruna 1975, 46-51 and 156-8. 
77 On the composition of Lepidus’ forces, cf. Sall. Hist. 1.48.23, 67.7.  Sallust stated the army 
loyal to the Republic that opposed Lepidus’ forces consisted of colonized Sullan veterans as 
well (Hist. 1.67.21: ad hoc coloniae veterum militum.) 
78 On the so-called “Lepidan Revolt,” see esp. Labruna 1975. 
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Manlius’ army gathering in northern Etruria was of a similar composition 
to Lepidus’ army.  A variety of inhabitants from the region were reported to have 
joined Manlius’ forces.  Certainly Manlius and the Sullan veterans composed a 
significant group who reportedly supported the affair’s designs in 63, but 
Manlius also attempted to solicit support from those who had been 
dispossessed due to Sulla’s colonization.79  Manlius reportedly added latrones 
cuiusque generis (‘bandits of other nations’) throughout Etruria to the 
heterogeneous army who, according to Sallust, were all desirous for a change 
in the government.80 
This assortment of various disgruntled groups that comprised Manlius’ 
revolutionary army suggests how desperate Manlius was to enlist anyone willing 
to revolt against Rome.  The claim that those who had been dispossessed by 
Sulla would fight alongside those who had benefited from their misfortunes, at 
first glance, seems inexplicable.  However, Cicero and Sallust did not raise any 
issues concerning the diversified groups of people who were eager to join the 
ranks of Manlius’ army in Faesulae.  Instead both authors stressed the similar 
dire financial condition of those in the army.81  Therefore, they were able to 
eschew discussing the incongruence of the opposing grievances these groups 
might have had against the established regime.82  Cicero depicted the men 
willing to support the affair often using the term perditus (‘financially ruined’), or 
its cognates, to rhetorically stress their current penury while at the same time 
implying an analogous reason why they joined the affair (e.g., Cic. Cat. 1.23).83  
The impoverished Sullan veterans and those that were dispossessed by the 
                                                
79 For the reasons Manlius and his army were in revolt, see Section 3.5 below.  Another Sullan 
veteran from Faesulae was a P. Furius (Cic. Cat. 3.14: P. Furium qui est ex eis colonis quos 
Faesulas L. Sulla deduxit “Publius Furius, who is one of the colonists whom Lucius Sulla settled 
at Faesulae.”  Furius was sentenced to death in absentia on December 5, linking him with 
Lentulus and the others who were still in Rome (Sall. B Cat. 50.4). The occurrence of the term 
Faesulanum at Sall. B Cat. 59.3 might refer to Furius; cf. McGushin 1977, 284; Ramsey 1984, 
197.  If this is the case, Furius must have left for Faesulae immediately after Lentulus and the 
others were arrested or Cicero would not have discussed his sentence (Cic. Cat. 3.14). See 
also Appendix I [no. 23]. 
80 Sall. B Cat. 28.4: egestate simul ac dolore iniuriae novarum rerum cupidam “who were 
already ripe for revolution because of penury and resentment at their wrongs.” 
81 The term is used to specifically refer to the extreme poverty of the various groups targeted by 
the conspiracy to join Manlius’ army in Etruria, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.24, 25; Sall. B Cat. 28.4.  Cicero 
and Sallust used other related adjectives to describe the extreme poverty of Manlius’ army: 
egens (Cic. Cat. 2.20; Sall. B Cat. 33.1); inops (Cic. Cat. 2.24; Sall. B Cat. 33.2); tenuus 
‘meagre’ (Cic. Cat. 2.20).  Sallust also described those in the army as miseri (Sall. B Cat. 33.1, 
2, 5). 
82 For the composition of Manlius’ army, cf. Harris 1971, 289-94; Santangelo 2007, 188.  
83 OLD (perditus) s.v.1.  The term perditus also had a sacrilegious meaning (s.v. 4), cf. 
Hellegourac’h 1963, 532-4. 
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Sullan settlements in northern Etruria, who composed Manlius’ army, had 
nothing to lose.  Their current financial situation could not get worse.  Therefore, 
their homogeneous penury was apparently the reason behind the 
heterogeneous composition of the army in Faesulae.  These depictions of the 
army’s poverty further linked them with the indebted participants involved in the 
affair remaining in Rome. 
 
3.3  The SCU and hostis declarations of 63  
The reasons why Cicero consistently linked Catiline with Manlius’ army 
are clear.  It was important for Cicero to associate the intended violence in 
Rome with the reports of disturbances in Faesulae, so he could persuade the 
Senate that the res publica faced a “dual-threat” from both inside and outside 
Rome.  This connection supported Cicero’s claim and apparently convinced the 
Senate that the threat was genuine and imminent.  Our sources report that the 
Senate made the executive decision to award the consuls supreme power to 
defend the res publica by any means available. 
According to Cicero’s chronology of the affair of 63, it was October 21 
when he reported in the Senate that Manlius’ insurrection would take place on 
October 27 (Cic. Cat. 1.7).84 The Senate declared the Senatus Consultum 
Ultimum (SCU) after the report of Manlius’ insurrection was heard.85  In sum, 
the SCU was an ambiguous decree that gave the consuls extraordinary powers 
to protect the res publica using any means available until the threat to its 
stability was suppressed.86  However, it should be noted that the narratives 
                                                
84 Settle (1962, 136) explained Cicero probably made several speeches in the Senate before 
the First Oration on November 8, including the speech on October 21; cf. Cic. Mur. 51.  Sallust, 
in contrast to Cicero’s timeline, claimed the report of Manlius’ insurrection occurred post paucos 
dies “a few days later” after they were in arms October 27 (Sall. B Cat. 30.1).  The other 
narratives did not mention specific dates for Manlius’ insurrection or the declaration of the SCU. 
85 Cicero stated the SCU was decreed 20 days before the date of the First Oration on 
November 8 (Cic. Cat. 1.4).  This chronology does not match with Cicero’s report in the Senate 
of Manlius’ insurrection on October 21 (1.7). Asconius stated the SCU occurred 18 days before 
the First Oration, demonstrating that the SCU was passed on October 21 or 22 (Asc. 6C).  Dyck 
(2008, 73) claims Cicero simply rounded the days up.  On the other hand, Sallust’s timeline of 
events claimed the report of the insurrection occurred after October 27, see n.84.  Sallust dated 
the declaration of the SCU in November after Cicero’s First Oration (Sall. B Cat. 29.1-3).  
However, Sallust was not always concerned with the exact date of events for narratological 
reasons, see McGushin 1977, 296-7. 
86 The SCU typically occurred due to a certain and clear threat of violence against the res 
publica instigated by Roman elites.  For a description of the extralegal powers bestowed to the 
consuls by the SCU, cf. Cic. Rab. perd. 20-21; Cat. 1.3-4; Leg. 3.8; Caes. B Civ. 1.5.3, 7.5; Sall. 
B Cat. 29.2; Asc. 6C; Plut. Cic. 15.5; Dio Cass. 37.31.2.  On the ambiguity of the SCU, cf. Last 
1932, 85; Medner 1966; Lintott 1968, 152; Mitchell 1971; MacDonald 1977, 567-74; McGushin 
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written by Plutarch and Dio claimed the SCU of 63 was declared not only due to 
the report of Manlius’ insurrection, but also due to the report that Cicero had 
received anonymously written letters warning several of the Roman elite about 
the imminent violence planned to occur in Rome.  Both writers claimed the 
letters were first sent to Crassus, who then gave them to Cicero (Plut. Cic. 15.2-
4; Cras. 13.3; Dio 37.31.1).87  The letters were read out in the Senate and the 
almost simultaneous report of Manlius’ forces amassing in northern Etruria led 
to the declaration of the SCU (Plut. Cic. 15.4-5; Dio 37.31.2). Plutarch and Dio’s 
narratives most likely included these almost simultaneous reports of violent 
threats both inside and outside Rome to explain to their readers why the Senate 
decided to award the consuls extralegal means to suppress the affair.88   
On the other hand, Cicero’s explanation of why the Senate declared the 
SCU is more intricate.  Cicero did not mention the letters from Crassus.89  As I 
noted earlier, he consistently claimed that all the affair’s designs were 
discovered through his own diligence.90  When Cicero delivered the First 
Oration on November 8, although the original speech was most likely revised 
later91, the report of the army in Faesulae was the only documented threat to 
the stability of the res publica.  In the First Oration, Cicero, referred to an earlier 
speech he delivered in the Senate on October 21 after the report of the army 
amassing in Etruria.  Cicero reiterated that in his earlier speech he had correctly 
predicted that Manlius’ forces would take up arms on October 27 and professed 
that this was the reason the SCU was declared after his speech on October 21 
(Cic. Cat. 1.6-7).  However, to further defend that the passage of the SCU was 
                                                                                                                                          
1977, 304-8; Vanderbroeck 1987, 156-60; Ansuategui 1990; Drummond 1995, 88-94; Lintott 
1999, 89-93; Morstein-Marx 2004, 226-9. 
87 Plutarch suggested Crassus gave Cicero the letters to allay any suspicion that he was 
involved with the affair of 63 (Plut. Cic. 15.3).  NB: Plutarch made a contradictory claim in his 
Life of Crassus, stating Cicero believed the letters Crassus gave him divulging the plot did not 
allay suspicion but incriminated Crassus instead (Plut. Cras. 13.3).  See also n.89. 
88 Plutarch and Dio did not give a specific date for the SCU. 
89 Plutarch explained that although Cicero’s Greek memoir on his consulship was his source for 
the anecdote about Crassus and the letters, the speech was not published until after both 
Cicero and Crassus were dead and is now lost (Plut. Cras. 13.3).  Cf. Chapter 2 n.115.  
Plutarch remarked that Cicero’s memoir claimed Crassus (and Caesar) supported the affair of 
63, but Cicero apparently refrained from publishing the speech due to his later friendship with 
Crassus (13.4). Cf. Pelling 1985, 311.  On Cicero and Crassus’ capricious relationship, see 
Chapter 2 n.118.  
90 Cf. Chapter 2 n.32.  MacKendrick (1995, 65 and 97-8) notes the preponderance of Cicero’s 
usage of ego and first person singular verbs in the four Orations.  On the other hand, Sallust 
reported Q. Curius through his lover Fulvia informed Cicero of the affair’s plans (Sall. B Cat. 
23.4, cf. 28.2).  Appian’s narrative follows Sallust (App. BC 2.1.3).  Plutarch also mentioned 
Fulvia’s role as an informer but not Curius (Plut. Cic. 16.2).  See Appendix I, [nos. 18 and 20].  
91 On the debate concerning the possible revision of the Orations, see Introduction nn. 4-5. 
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a necessity, Cicero recalled several other hostile actions apart from the 
insurrection reported in Faesulae that were attempted before the First Oration 
was delivered (1.3-4). 
Cicero declared that he knew Catiline and his associates planned to 
murder many leading citizens and that he took the appropriate precautions to 
defend the Senate and the planned assassinations were postponed (Cic. Cat. 
1.7). Cicero also proclaimed that on the night of November 1 Catiline and his 
associates planned to occupy Praeneste, a town 23 miles east of Rome in 
Latium.  Cicero was aware of the planned attack and ordered the town to be 
defended.  Again, Catiline and his associates’ plans were prevented due to 
Cicero’s countermeasures (1.8).92  Lastly, Cicero claimed Catiline had 
persuaded two men to assassinate Cicero on the morning of November 7, 
which he was able to prevent.  He implied that the application of the extralegal 
powers of the SCU would spell disaster for the participants’ plans (1.9).93 
Cicero depicted Manlius’ insurrection as a connected event to the 
aborted plans by Catiline and the others in Rome to murder the leading citizens 
on October 28, to assault Praeneste on November 1, and to murder Cicero on 
November 7.  Although Manlius’ forces had taken the field before these plans 
were thwarted, Cicero insisted the insurrection in northern Etruria was a part of 
the original plan to threaten the res publica in 63.  The SCU was decreed 
initially due to the report of Manlius’ army at Faesulae, but according to Cicero, 
the armed revolt was Catiline’s plan.  Cicero proclaimed habemus senatus 
consultum in te, Catilina, vehemens et grave “We have a decree of the Senate 
against you, Catiline, a decree of power and authority” (Cic. Cat. 1.3).  As 
mentioned, the same people reported to be in Manlius’ army purportedly 
supported Catiline during the consular elections of 63, so Cicero’s claim that the 
two events were associated was reasonable.  He recounted earlier precedents 
when the SCU was declared against Roman citizens that threatened the 
stability of the res publica (1.3-4). 
The SCU was first decreed in 121 against the supporters of the ex-
tribune C. Sempronius Gracchus who were armed on the Aventine.  L. Opimius, 
the consul of 121, ordered an attack on these citizens, and Gracchus, the ex-
                                                
92 Cicero is the only source to mention the night attack on Praeneste.  Praeneste was the site of 
a Sullan colony, therefore an area where those involved in the affair of 63 expected to find 
support, see section 3.4. 
93 Cicero claimed Catiline had wanted him killed earlier during the elections of 63, cf. Cic. Cat. 
1.11; Mur. 52.  
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consul M. Fulvius Flaccus, his sons and others were killed in the affray.  Those 
of Gracchus’ supporters who were captured or surrendered were executed on 
Opimius’ orders (App. B Civ. 1.25-26).  A year later, Opimius was charged with 
the murder of these citizens without allowing them a proper trial, but was 
acquitted because he operated under the SCU (Liv. Per. 61).  Cicero also 
recounted the occupation of the Capitol by armed supporters of the tribune L. 
Ampuleius Saturninus and the praetor C. Servilius Glaucia in 100.  
Subsequently, the Senate declared the SCU.  The consuls C. Marius and L. 
Valerius Flaccus armed those who remained loyal to the res publica and 
attacked Saturninus and Glaucia’s supporters (App. B Civ. 1.32).  The two 
magistrates Saturninus, Glaucia, and other influential citizens died in the 
assault, but Marius and Valerius were never tried for their actions.  Apparently 
the consuls were exculpated because the SCU gave them the right to protect 
the res publica by any means (Cic. Rab. perd. 20-4, 26-8).94  Cicero used these 
examples to explain that the SCU practically gave him the power to execute 
those who were threatening the res publica, specifically Catiline (Cic. Cat. 1.4).  
Clearly, Cicero believed the SCU gave the consuls the ability to protect the res 
publica with impunity and, if necessary, he was willing to exercise the 
extraordinary authority that was awarded to him.95 
If Cicero was correct about Catiline’s intention to join Manlius, then the 
consul could act against any action, or anyone, he thought were connected with 
the affair under the SCU.  However, when the First Oration was delivered, the 
accusations against Catiline and the other anonymous members were based on 
unsubstantiated evidence, except for Manlius’ forces that were openly 
threatening Rome.  Cicero had to wait until Catiline was confirmed to be 
heading for Manlius’ camp after November 8 and Lentulus and the others 
confessed to their association with Catiline and Manlius’ forces on December 3.  
Therefore, Cicero’s primary concern was connecting Catiline with Manlius’ 
forces in the First Oration.  In this way, he linked the subversive activities 
reported to be occurring inside and outside of Rome.  He wanted to explain to 
                                                
94 Tyrrell 1978, 79-81. 
95 The SCU might have been declared against Sulla’s march through Italy in 83.  Appian 
suggested that Sulla was declared a hostis rei publicae and the consuls C. Norbanus and L. 
Scipio and the ex-consul Carbo levied armies to protect Rome (App. BC 1.81-2).  Gabba (1967, 
217-9) argues the language in these passages implies the SCU had also been declared.  The 
SCU was most likely passed against Lepidus’ insurrection in 78/77 (Sall. Hist. 1.67.22).    
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his readers why the SCU was a necessary measure to defend the res publica 
from the “dual-threat” to its stability.96  
The Senate’s decision to declare the SCU apparently led the Senate to 
declare Catiline and Manlius hostes rei publicae (‘enemies of the Republic’).  
Once a Roman citizen was officially declared a hostis, he would be deprived of 
his rights as a citizen of the res publica.97  Both Cicero and Sallust frequently 
used the term hostis when referring to Manlius or his army, implying that 
anyone associated with the disturbance in Faesulae was perceived to be hostes 
rei publicae.98  In the First Oration, Cicero called Manlius’ cantonment in 
northern Etruria a castrorum hostium “a camp of enemies” and stated that 
Catiline would be imperatorem ducemque “the general and leader” of this camp 
(Cic. Cat. 1.5).99  Cicero continued to imply Catiline was a hostis rei publicae100, 
and ended the First Oration proclaiming that all the affair’s supporters were 
acting like hostis patriae “public enemies of their native land” (1.33).  Sallust 
wrote that when Catiline left Arretium for Manlius’ camp in Faesulae cum 
fascibus atque aliis imperi insignibus “with the fasces and the other emblems of 
authority”, the Senate then declared them hostes (Sall. B Cat. 36.1-2). 
According to Sallust’s timeline of events, the hostis declarations occurred 
after the declaration of the SCU.  On the other hand, Cicero only implied that 
Catiline and Manlius were declared hostes rei publicae and was not exact as to 
when these declarations might have occurred.101  After Catiline left Rome to join 
                                                
96 NB: Cicero made a contradictory statement in the Second Oration and the Pro Sulla claiming 
there was no tumultus (‘commotion’) formally declared in 63 (Cic. Cat. 2.26, 28; Sull. 33).  But 
surely this was rhetoric and did not explicitly refer to the SCU, cf. Berry 1996, 204; Dyck 2008, 
160.  The formal declaration of a tumultus before a bellum (‘war’) was perhaps not a 
prerequisite for the declaration of the SCU; cf. Cic. Leg. 3.9; Phil. 5.34.  For the usual 
declaration of a tumultus before the declaration of bellum cf. Cic. Phil. 8.2-3, 12.17.  See further, 
Jal 1963c.  On the other hand, perhaps, there was no tumultus declared because the threat in 
63 was not entirely identifiable, see Drummond 1995, 81-8. 
97 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.27, 3.15, 4.10, 13, 22.  Jal 1963b, 55-6. 
98 Cicero and Sallust used the term hostis to refer to: i) Catiline: Cic. Cat. 1.5, 13, 27, 2.1, 3, 4, 
12, 17, 3.17, 4.16; Mur. 83; Sall. B Cat. 31.8, 36.2, 52.25, 35; ii) Manlius: Cic. Cat. 2.1; Sall. B 
Cat. 36.2; iii) Manlius’ army: Cic. Cat. 1.5, 27, 2.1, 2.15 ; Sall. B Cat. 48.4, 52.25, 35, 60.2, 5, 
61.4, 8; iv) those remaining in Rome: Cic. Cat. 2.11, 27, 3.22, 27, 28, 4.13, 15, 16; Mur. 84; Sull. 
15 (Autronius), 19; Sall. B Cat. 52.25, 30, 35 and v) implicitly to everyone involved: Cic. Cat. 
1.31, 2.27, 3.25, 27, 28; 4.13, 15, 22; Mur. 84, Sull. 32, 76, 88; Sall. B Cat. 52.10.  For Cicero’s 
usage of hostis concerning the affair of 63, cf. Jal 1963b, 65-6; Drummond 1995, 81-8; Vasaly 
1996, 51-3. On the political use of the term in general, cf. Hellegourac’h 1963; Jal 1963b 53-4; 
Bauman 1973, 270. 
99 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.15: L. Catilinam ducere exercitum hostium ‘Lucius Catilina is leading an army 
of enemies’. 
100 Cic. Cat. 1.13, cf. 1.27. 
101 Catiline left Rome on the night of November 8 by the via Aurelia (Cic. Cat. 3.6).  Cicero 
reported that Catiline stopped at the Forum Aurelium, about sixty-five miles from Rome, to 
collect more arms and men (2.24).  Apparently, he did not stay long.  In the Second Oration 
 167 
Manlius, Cicero claimed palam iam cum hoste nullo impediente bellum iustum 
geremus “We shall now wage open war without hindrance upon a public 
enemy” (2.1).102  Later in the speech, Cicero remarked that Catiline admitted his 
public enemy status by joining Manlius’ army.  Cicero questioned sed cur tam 
diu de uno hoste loquimur et de eo hoste, qui iam fatetur se esse hostem, et 
quem, quia, quod semper volui, “Why, though, am I talking so long about one 
enemy, an enemy at that who now admits that he is an enemy” (2.17).  These 
statements imply that since Catiline chose to join Manlius, both citizens and 
their army were now considered hostes rei publicae and had forfeited their 
citizenship.  When Catiline and Manlius’ army met the armies loyal to the res 
publica on the battlefield, Cicero emphasized the legitimacy of the engagement 
because it was aimed against recognized hostes under the auspices of SCU.  In 
the Pro Murena delivered some time after the Second Oration, perhaps in late 
November, Cicero insinuated that Catiline was officially adjudged a hostis rei 
publicae (Cic. Mur. 83).103 
Cicero reminded the people that the SCU and the hostis declarations of 
63 were aimed against hostes, tamen quia nati sunt cives ‘enemies who, 
however, were born citizens’ (Cic. Cat. 2.27).  He quoted the lex Sempronia de 
capite civis Romani passed by C. Sempronius Gracchus in 123, which 
reiterated that a Roman citizen was allowed to appeal to the public before being 
punished.  However, one of the stipulations of the Sempronian law stated that 
qui autem rei publicae sit hostis eum civem esse nullo modo posse “an enemy 
of the Republic cannot in any respect be regarded as a citizen” (4.10).104  
Although these statements implicitly referred to the citizens remaining in Rome 
involved with the affair, the army in northern Etruria and the people of other 
regions outside the city that were reported to be supporting the affair were 
                                                                                                                                          
delivered on November 9, Cicero claimed triduum (‘three days’) later Rome would be receiving 
news of Catiline’s arrival in Faesulae (2.15).  On the other hand, Sallust claimed after Catiline 
left Rome he stopped for a paucos dies in Arretium with C. Flaminius to collect arms and men 
then went on to Faesulae (Sall. B Cat. 36.1).  Which route Catiline took to travel the 
approximately 150 miles from Rome to Faesulae remains debatable. However, by late 
November Catiline must have been reported at Faesulae for the authors to claim he was 
decalred a hostis rei publicae (Cic. Mur. 83; cf. Sall. B Cat. 36.2), see n.103. 
102 Cf. Chapter 4.4. 
103 Cf. Cic. Mur. 83: hostis rei publicae iudicaret; Sall. B Cat. 36.2: senatus Catilinam et Manlium 
hostis iudicat.  The verb iudicare most likely refers to the official ‘verdict’ of Catiline and Manlius’ 
hostes declaration, see OLD (iudico) s.v. 2-4. On the date of the Pro Murena, see Chapter 2 
n.1. 
104 Cf. Cic. Rab. perd. 12; Sest. 61; Clu. 151, 154. See Lintott 1999, 92. 
 168 
Roman citizens as well.  Therefore, any citizen who supported the affair of 63 
was considered an “enemy” by extension. 
Clearly, it was important legally for Cicero to prove that Catiline was in 
Manlius’ army, just as it was for Cicero to prove that Lentulus and those 
remaining in Rome were connected with Catiline and Manlius’ army by 
revealing Lentulus’ letter to Catiline discussed in the previous chapter.  Cicero 
needed to portray the disturbances occurring inside and outside Rome as 
connected activities.  Therefore, under the authority awarded by the SCU, he 
took the appropriate precautions to protect Rome and Praeneste.  He also took 
further precautions against the regions outside the city, which he believed were 
supporting the affair, examined in the following section.  Consequently, the 
“enemies” in Rome and the “enemies” emerging in many regions throughout 
Italy could also be attacked with impunity under the authority of the SCU and as 
hostes rei publicae.105  Cicero’s countermeasures of ordering subordinates to 
levy armies to suppress Catiline and Manlius’ forces in northern Etruria and the 
other disturbances outside Rome were perhaps legally justified due to the SCU 
and hostis declarations of 63.106 
 
3.4  The disturbances outside of Rome 
All of our sources concerning the affair of 63 reported disturbances 
occurring in many regions throughout Italy that year.  Disturbances were 
reported not only in northern Etruria, but also in parts of Latium, Umbria, 
Picenum, Apulia, Campania, Bruttium, Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul.107  Our 
                                                
105 Cicero admitted others believed his actions against the affair of 63 were severe and 
boardered on tyranny, cf. Cic. Cat. 4.9; Sull. 21-33.  Caesar clearly thought the death sentence 
of Lentulus and the others on December 5 without a trial was considered illegal, cf. Cic. Cat. 
4.10; Sall. B Cat. 52.40-42.  See, Drummond 1995, 95-114.  Cicero never formally stood trial for 
his actions in 63, but the odium he received due to the executions forced him into voluntary 
exile and persisted for the rest of his life, e.g. Cic. Phil. 7.4. 
106 This explained how Cicero was allowed to bestow imperium on certain magistrates without 
military jurisdiction to subdue the areas in Campania, Apulia, and Umbria.  See, Stewart (1995), 
62-4. 
107 Except for the disturbance in northern Etruria, there are discrepancies in our sources where 
the other disturbances took place.  Cicero reported other disturbances at Praeneste in Latium 
(Cic. Cat. 1.8), Apulia, Picenum, Umbria (2.5-6, 3.14; Sull. 53), and Capua in Campania (Cic. 
Sest. 9).  Sallust reported other disturbances in Apulia (Sall. B Cat. 27.1, 30.2-3, 42.1), Picenum 
(27.1, 30.5, 42.1), Capua (30.2, 5, 7) and included Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul and Bruttium 
(42.1).  Plutarch reported disturbances in Cisalpine Gaul (Plut. Cic. 10.5) and in general among 
the Sullan veterans throughout Italy (14.2).  Appian reported disturbances in Apulia, Picenum, 
and in general among the Sullan coloniae throughout Italy (App. BC 2.2).  Suetonius reported 
connected disturbances in Bruttium (Suet. Aug. 3.1).  Dio reported disturbances in Cisalpine 
and Transalpine Gaul (37.33.4) and after 63 throughout anonymous areas (37.41.1). Orosius 
reported disturbances in Bruttium and among the Paeligni after 63 (Oros. 6.6.5-7). 
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accounts echo Cicero and Sallust’s versions of the events, which depict all of 
the disturbances occurring outside of Rome as connected actions planned by 
those originally associated with the affair inside the city.  As demonstrated 
above, we are told that Manlius was Catiline’s client and that Catiline ordered 
Manlius to raise an army in Faesulae.  The other elites involved in the affair 
probably had connections outside Rome, too.  They perhaps sent their clients or 
associates to other regions to solicit support for the affair.  For example, 
Lentulus and the other participants in Rome most likely sent M. Caeparius, a 
domus nobilis from Terracina, to Apulia.108  Moreover, other Sullan veterans, 
like Manlius, were claimed to be enlisting support for the affair in Sullan 
coloniae in other parts of the peninsula.109 
However, the reports of the disturbances outside Rome except for the 
one in northern Etruria are generally unsubstantiated.  This section explores the 
reasons why these regions, listed above, were perhaps more susceptible to 
supporting the affair’s aim of overthrowing the current established authority in 
Rome than others.  Some of the towns in these regions had supported the 
Marians in their struggle against the Sullans in the late 80’s.  After Sulla’s 
victory, he confiscated land and property from some of these towns as 
punishment.  As a reward for their service, he settled his veterans in coloniae 
on the disputed land.110  The Sullan colonists and the original inhabitants of 
Faesulae came to blows not long after the colony was founded.111  However, as 
explained above, Manlius’ army in Faesulae was composed of Sullan colonists 
and those who had been dispossessed by the foundation of the colony brought 
                                                
108 Whether M. Caeparius was originally ordered by Catiline to solicit support in Apulia before 
the latter left Rome is unknown.  Cicero claimed he knew who Catiline had sent to Apulia (Cic. 
Cat. 2.6), but does not mention Caeparius’ by name until the Third Oration (3.14).  Therefore 
Caeparius was still in Rome on December 3, which suggests that Lentulus and those remaining 
in the city ordered him to go to Apulia to perhaps help C. Iulius (Sall. B Cat. 27.1), or whomever 
Catiline might have sent to the region before Caeparius.  Caeparius’ influence in Apulia is 
indeterminable.  See Appendix I, [no. 5]. 
109 Sallust reported Catiline sent Manlius to Faesulae, Septimius to Picenum, and C. Iulius to 
Apulia.  Catiline sent other anonymous Sullan veterans praeterea alium alio, quem ubique 
opportunum sibi fore credabat “others too to other places, wherever he [Catiline] thought that 
each would be serviceable to his project” (Sall. B Cat. 27.1).  Perhaps Septimius and C. Iulius 
were Sullan veterans because they were mentioned besides Manlius.  However, Septimius was 
from Camerinum, which was not a site for Sullan colony.  See Appendix I, [nos. 25 and 35]. 
110 Sulla’s veterans were not the only group who benefited from the division and confiscation of 
land.  The elites from Rome and the local domi nobiles that supported Sulla also benefitted, cf. 
Cic. S. Rosc. 20-1; Leg. Agr. 3.3; Plut. Crass. 6.7; Liv. Per. 89. See also, Keaveney 1982, 533-4 
and 1984, 149-50 and 2005, 153-5.  For the impact of colonial settlement on the economy, cf. 
Wulff Alonso 2002, 276-9; De Ligt 2004, 753-5. 
111 See n.74.  For the reaction to the Sullan colonies specifically in Etruria and Umbria, see 
Harris 1971, 271-89.  
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together by their poor financial situation.  Cicero and the other authors, who 
reported the disturbances in other regions outside Rome, chose areas that had 
similarly been disrupted by the Sullan settlement.  Our sources implied that the 
disturbances outside Rome had different causes and reasons than the 
disturbances in northern Etruria.  Therefore, when our sources chose to depict 
the disturbances inside and outside of Rome as connected, it sounded more 
plausible if the disturbances outside the city were located in regions that 
contained the two groups willing to support the affair in 63 outside Rome, i.e., 
the Sullan veterans and the people dispossessed by Sulla.  However, these 
were not the only two groups of people that those involved with the affair were 
allegedly soliciting, as we shall see when I examine the disturbances in Apulia 
and Capua in Campania later in this section. 
According to Appian, Sulla settled around 120,000 veteran soldiers 
throughout Italy.112  Although Appian’s estimate was most likely high,113 Sulla 
established about twenty coloniae throughout Italy offering the veterans and 
their families plots of land as a reward for their service.114  The typical soldier in 
the Late Republican Roman army was from the lower classes of society.115  The 
stipendium and the chance for booty were reasons for some to enlist116, but the 
opportunity to receive an allotment of land within the territory they conquered or 
on the ager publicus in Italy after their military service was something wholly 
more tangible.117  By the time of Sulla’s settlement, unoccupied land that was 
                                                
112 App. B Civ. 1.104; cf. Liv. Per. 89.  Harris 1971, 260 speculates if each Sullan veteran 
received at least ten iugera each then approximately 1,162 square miles of land was distributed 
to Sullan colonists. 
113 Brunt (1971, 305) suggests the number of Sullan veterans was closer to 80,000.  
114 Appian reported Sulla promised rewards to his veterans (App. B Civ. 1.57). Patterson (2006, 
189) estimates Sulla established at least twenty colonies.  The number of Sullan coloniae 
established remains debatable, cf. Salmon 1969, 161-3; Santangelo 2007, 145-57. On the 
colonies in general, cf. Brunt 1971, 300-12; Patterson 2006, 205-6.  On land rewards in the 
Roman army, cf. Brunt 1962, 79-84; Keppie 1984; Broadhead 2007, 158-62. 
115 Especially after Marius’ reform of 107, which abolished the property requirements to join the 
Roman army, cf. Smith 1958, 12-3; Wiseman 1969, 61; Brunt 1988, 271; Goldsworthy 1996, 30-
1; Broadhead 2007, 159.  Gabba (1976, 30-1) argues that the composition of the Roman army 
was primarily from this class before Marius’s reform.  
116 On how land acquired by the Roman army was used, cf. App. B Civ. 1.7; Vell. Pat. 1.15.5.  
The stipendum alone was not enough to subsist on for a soldier of the Late Republic, cf. Smith 
1958; Watson 1958, 113ff; Brunt 1962, 77; Keppie 1984.   
117 The Sullan colonies were apparently located in forests and swamps (Sall. Hist. 1.67.23).  
This passage was surely rhetorical, as not all the Sullan land allotments were on undesirable 
land.  There is evidence that some of the towns where Sullan colonies were founded might have 
benefited the community as a whole, cf. Guidobaldi 2001, 85-90; Keaveney 2005, 155; 
Santangelo 2007, 66 and 191. 
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deemed ager publicus in Italy had certainly shrunk.118  However, Sulla, in part, 
established these viritane colonies to garrison his troops in case he needed to 
raise an army to check any further defection in Italy.119  Land was confiscated 
from those towns that opposed Sulla as punishment.120  Locals from the areas 
intended for settlements had no recourse to dispute the soldiers’ claim to the 
land, as these settlements were considered part of the ager publicus it was the 
decision of the Roman Senate who could claim ownership.121  Patterson 
explains that the mass enfranchisement of people after the Social War made 
the establishment of colonies in the peninsula more prone to conflict.122  The 
foundation of the Sullan colonies on disputed land understandably provoked 
tension between the colonists and the original inhabitants of these communities.  
Therefore, it is understandable why our sources reported that the army in 
Faesulae consisted of both these disgruntled citizens.  
Arretium, another town in Etruria, supported the affair of 63.123  Cicero 
had warned the Senate that castra (‘military camps’) were emerging in Etruriae 
faucibus “in the passes of Etruria” (Cic. Cat. 1.5).  Although Cicero specifically 
located the disturbance in northern Etruria at Faesulae, he had claimed other 
Sullan colonists from Arretium supported Catiline’s candidacy in the elections of 
63 (Mur. 49).  Sallust reported that before Catiline arrived in Faesulae he met 
with C. Flaminius at Arretium to gather more troops and weapons (Sall. B Cat. 
28.4).124  Similar to Faesulae, Arretium was disrupted by the Sullan colony 
founded on its territory.125  Arretium supported Marius in the civil war against 
Sulla.  After Sulla’s victory, Cicero reported in the Pro Caecina that Arretium 
was deprived of the ius civilis, its civil rights, and some of its land was 
confiscated for the Sullan colonia (Cic. Caec. 97).126  Cicero claimed there were 
                                                
118 On the availability of the ager publicus in Italy, cf. Howarth 1999, 283-4; Patterson 2006, 
208; Broadhead 2007, 158.  Rooselaar (2010, 284) states that since the Gracchi, the amount of 
ager publicus was inadequate for Sulla’s colonies. 
119 App. B Civ. 1.100; cf. Cic. Leg Agr. 2.73. See also, Keaveney 2005, 169. 
120 Cf. App. B Civ. 2.94.  Brunt (1971, 301-5) argues that the confiscation of land during the 
Sullan proscriptions was not assigned to Sulla’s veterans. 
121 Cf. Richardson 1980, 9-10; Drummond 1999, 141-52. 
122 Patterson 2006, 210. 
123 Arretium was in northern Etruria approximately 50 miles to the southwest of Faesulae and 
140 miles from Rome.   
124 C. Flaminius was perhaps either a Sullan veteran, domus nobilis, or a client of those 
involved with the affair of 63.  See Appendix I, [no. 19]. 
125 Plin. NH 3.52. Cf. Harris 1971, 261-3.  NB: There is no evidence that the Arretines attacked 
the colonists similar to what occurred in Faesulae. 
126 In 69, Cicero defended A. Caecina, an influential citizen from Volaterrae in northern Etruria, 
concerning a dispute over his inheritance of a farm from his late wife.  The prosecution attacked 
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disputes over the partition of confiscated land during Sulla’s settlement program 
in Arretium.127  Evidently, the establishment of Sullan coloniae had similar 
effects on several towns in northern Etruria.128  Therefore, Cicero and Sallust’s 
claim that Arretium supported the affair of 63 was logical.129   
I already mentioned Cicero’s claim that he defended the town of 
Praeneste in Latium from a planned assault by those involved with the affair on 
November 1 (Cic. Cat. 1.8).  Praeneste had had a long history of being both a 
close ally and an enemy of Rome.  After the Social War, the town was awarded 
the status of a municipium and probably given the ius civitatis.130  Praeneste 
was one of the final bastions for Marian support.  Marius’ son, C. Marius held 
out against a siege of the town led by the Sullan general Q. Lucretius Ofella.131  
After the town was besieged, Appian and Strabo reported that Sulla had most of 
the male population killed (cf. App. B Civ. 1.94, Strabo 5.4.11).  This massacre 
is probably overstated by our sources.132  Nevertheless, we can assume that 
the demography of Praeneste was altered dramatically by Sulla’s vengeance.  
Presumably, Sulla’s veterans were the primary beneficiaries of the punishment 
of the town.  Cicero confirmed that a Sullan colony was established on 
Praeneste’s territory, suggesting some land had been awarded to the colonists 
(Cic. Cat. 1.8).133  Therefore, Praeneste, according to Cicero, was a logical 
                                                                                                                                          
Caecina’s claim to the farm, reminding the jury that Sulla had stripped Volaterrae of its 
citizenship.  Cicero argued that Sulla’s action was illegal and defended Caecina’s right to an 
inheritance as a citizen of Rome, see esp. Cic. Caecin. 95-102.  At Caecin. 97, Cicero recalled 
his successful defense of an Arretine woman’s claim to citizenship while Sulla was alive, 
proving the illegitimacy of Sulla’s removal of the ius civitatis from towns that were enfranchised 
after the Social War. 
127 Cicero claimed Sulla confiscated land from the Etruscan towns Volaterrae and Arretium for 
the establishment of his coloniae (Cic. Att. 1.19.4). 
128 Sulla unconstitutionally stripped both Volaterrae and Arretium of the ius civitatis.  For 
Volaterrae: Cic. Caecin. 18; Dom. 79.  For Arretium: Caecin. 97.  Whether Faesulae was also 
stripped of its citizenship is inconclusive. 
129 Whether the Arrentines who supported the affair of 63, like the Faesulans, were a mix of 
Sullan veterans and those who Sulla dispossessed is debatable, cf. Harris 1971, 279-84; 
Santangelo 2007, 188.  
130 On Praeneste’s complex relationship with Rome up until Marius and Sulla’s civil war, see 
Santangelo 2007, 137-45.  
131 C. Cichorius (1922, 173) suggests Catiline was involved in the siege with Ofella at 
Praeneste, cf. n.49.  Marius’ son committed suicide when Praeneste was besieged, effectively 
ending the civil war (App. B Civ. 1.94). 
132 On Sulla’s treatment of Praeneste, see Santangelo 2007, 143-6. There is evidence that 
some local elites from towns that supported Marius in the civil war switched allegiance to Sulla 
and were spared punishment, see Jehne and Pfeilschifter, 2006. 
133 Cf. Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.78, 3.14. Cicero mentioned the profit Sullan veterans expected by selling 
their allotted land to the ten commissioners, who had the authority to buy their land if the law 
had passed, cf. Drummond 2000, 139-41. 
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place for the affair’s participants to attempt to seize.134 Furthermore, if 
Praeneste was captured, then those involved with the affair had a stronghold 
less than a day’s ride from Rome. 
Cicero doubtlessly thought it was advantageous to report his prevention 
of the attempted assault on Praeneste.  Firstly, due to its proximity to Rome, an 
army of Sullan colonists approximately twenty miles from the city was clearly 
more threatening than an army at Faesulae, which was approximately seven 
times further from Rome.  Secondly, Cicero’s report of the attempted assault of 
Praeneste supported his accusation that the threat was not only in Rome and 
northern Etruria, but also in other parts of the res publica as well.  Thirdly, the 
report highlighted that other Sullan coloniae were being solicited, not only those 
located in northern Etruria.  The last point was most significant for Cicero to 
prove to the Senate and the people of Rome that the SCU and hostis 
declarations were legitimate and necessary to effectively protect the res publica.  
Cicero ordered the current praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer to levy troops 
specifically in the ager Gallicus located in the vicinity of Umbria and Picenum 
(Cic. Cat. 2.5, 2.26; cf. Sall. B Cat. 30.5).135  Celer, who was on his way to his 
newly assigned province of Cisalpine Gaul, could then oppose Catiline and 
Manlius’ army in Faesulae with an army from these regions.136  In addition, 
Celer’s army would be able to block Catiline and Manlius’ forces from the north 
if they planned to retreat from Faesulae.137  However, Celer was not only sent to 
these regions to conscript an army, but also, according to Sallust and Cicero, to 
suppress reported disturbances in Umbria and Picenum supposedly connected 
with the affair of 63.138 
According to Sallust, Catiline sent a certain Septimius of Camerinum to 
Picenum to gather support for the affair. (Sall. B Cat. 27.1).  Septimius’ name 
appears alongside Manlius and C. Julius in the same passage, so perhaps 
Septimius was another Sullan veteran sent to enlist other Sullan colonists in 
                                                
134 Cicero implied Catiline was confident the Sullan colonists in Praeneste would support the 
affair of 63 (Cic. Cat. 1.8: esse confideres). 
135 Cicero mocked Catiline and Manlius’ forces compared to those in Metellus Celer’s army, cf. 
Cic. Cat. 2.5, 24. 
136 See Chapter 2 n.104. 
137 Cicero suggested Celer’s army would oppose the forces in Faesulae, cf. Cic. Cat. 26; cf. 
Plut. Cic. 16.1.  Celer moved his three legions from Picenum towards Cisalpine Gaul to block 
Catiline and Manlius’ forces from the north (Sall. Cat. 57.1-3).  See Sumner 1963.  In mid-
January 62, Celer’s army was conducting the war from Cisalpine Gaul, cf. Cic. Fam. 5.1, 5.2.1.  
However, see Chapter 2 n.124.  Sallust’s Catilina and the later accounts report that C. Antonius’ 
forces fought Catiline and Manlius’ forces in battle, not Celer’s legions. 
138 Sallust stated Celer was sent to Picenum to levy an army (Sall. Cat. 30.5).  
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Picenum.  However, we have no evidence of Sullan coloniae in Picenum, so 
why the region was targeted remains debatable.  We know Septimius was from 
Camerinum, so perhaps he was another of the domi nobiles reported to support 
the affair, and not a Sullan veteran.139  Camerinum was incorporated into the 
tribus Cornelia, so perhaps Septimius and/or others from the town were clients 
of the several Cornelii known to be involved with the affair.140  Regardless of 
Septimius’ status, the town of Camerinum in Umbria bordered on Picenum, 
perhaps supplying a reason why he was sent to the latter region.141  
In 89, the local population of Asculum in Picenum was still nominally 
independent from the res publica until the town was finally subdued and 
enfranchised after the Social War.  According to Appian, the people of Asculum 
had killed all the Roman citizens in the town during the war (App. B Civ. 1.38).  
Although there is no evidence, we can assume those responsible for the 
massacre were punished, as it was one of the origins of the Social War.  
However, most of Picenum had been in Roman hands by the first century.142  
Soldiers from the region served in Cn. Pompeius Strabo’s army while Asculum 
was being besieged in the Social War.143  Furthermore, during Sulla’s struggle 
against the Marians, Pompey, Cn. Pompeius Strabo’s son, levied a large army 
from the region to support Sulla.144 Therefore, it is unclear how the disturbance 
                                                
139 Cf. Sall. Cat. 17.4. McGushin (1977, 120) suggests that Septimius might have been a domus 
nobilis.  
140 Marius enlisted two cohorts of soldiers from Camerinum for his campaign against the Cimbri.  
After the war in 101, Camerinum was incorporated into the tribus Cornelia, see Cic. Balb. 46-50. 
Cf. Taylor 1960, 311; Harris 1971, 249.  
141 Münzer (RE IIa2 (Septimius) no. 1, 1560.43-5) offers another hypothesis.  He reports an 
inscription of a Septimius from Firmum, a town in Picenum, circa the first century.  Obviously, 
we cannot be certain that this was the same Septimius of 63, but the name was perhaps Picene 
in origin. 
142 Most of Picenum had slowly been ceded to Rome through warfare between the third and 
second centuries, see Vell. Pat. 1.14.7.  
143 Cn. Pompeius Strabo probably had a legion composed entirely of officers and soldiers from 
Picenum, cf. Taylor 1960, 177; Gabba 1976, 184-5 [n.50].  Concerning the usage of Picentes in 
the affair of 63, see Sirago 1982. 
144 Pompey raised armies from the region to help Sulla against the Marians in the late 80’s 
(App. BC 1.80) and initially levied armies in Picenum in 49 before the region went over to 
Caesar (Caes. B Civ. 1.15; cf. Cic. Att. 8.8.1; Suet. Iul. 34.1). NB: Seager (1973, 246-7) 
suggests the disturbances reported in Picenum might indicate that the Pompeians were 
connected with the affair of 63; contra Phillips 1976, 447-8. The suggestion rests on the 
proposal made by the Pompeian tribune Metellus Nepos to order Pompey to hasten his return 
to Rome in order to quell the disturbances occurring within Italy.  This would give Pompey a 
pretext to keep his army when he returned from the East.  In my opinion, Seager’s hypothesis is 
tenuous.  Pompey needed no excuse to keep his army because he intended to disband it when 
he returned to Italy.  He did not want or need to emulate his mentor Sulla at the height of his 
popularity. He had just defeated Mithridates, Rome’s greatest enemy for the last quarter 
century.  It was the crowning glory of his military career and apparently Pompey felt Cicero’s 
 175 
in Picenum was connected to the affair.  There were Sullan coloniae 
established in the neighboring region of Umbria perhaps at Interamna 
Praetuttiorum, Spoletium, and Forum Cornelii.145  However, Cicero only 
mentioned disturbances at Camerinum, which was not a site for Sullan 
settlement in Umbria.  Therefore, we cannot be certain whether the connection 
with Septimius or the tribus Cornelia condemned Camerinum and the 
neighboring regions of Picenum and the ager Gallicus to be associated with the 
affair of 63.146 
In the Pro Sulla, Cicero confirmed that Camerinum and the neighboring 
regions Picenum and the ager Gallicus were areas quas in oras maxime quasi 
morbus quidam illius furoris pervaserat “into which the infection of that mad folly 
had swept in its full violence” (Cic. Sull. 53).147  Cicero was not specific how 
Camerinum, Picenum, and the ager Gallicus supported the affair in the Second 
Oration or in the Pro Sulla.  Camerinum was only mentioned in the latter 
speech.  Perhaps Cicero specifically mentioned Camerinum because his 
defendant P. Cornelius Sulla had personal ties with the town as a Cornelii.148 
Cicero’s silence further complicates the identification of the type of disturbances 
occurring in these areas.  We could assume that those involved were soliciting 
support from the Sullan coloniae among these regions in order to assemble an 
army like the one in northern Etruria.  However, our sources did not mention a 
specific Sullan colonia from these regions, which makes the assumption that 
those involved with the affair were also preparing these specific regions for war 
less evident.149  Alternatively, perhaps they were planning to solicit support from 
other groups in these regions, similar to the disturbances reportedly occurring in 
parts of Apulia and Campania examined below.  
                                                                                                                                          
suppression of the seditious activities associated with the affair of 63 paled in comparison (Cic. 
Fam. 5.7.1-3). 
145 Florus reported that Sulla confiscated land from Interamna Praetuttiorum and Spoletium 
(Flor. 2.9.29).  But the evidence for a Sullan colony on these three sites remains debatable, see 
Santangelo 2007, 153-5.  On Interamna Pratuttiorum, see Guidobaldi 2001, 85-90. 
146 In 184, Q. Fulvius Nobilior was one of the three commissioners when coloniae were 
established at Pisaurum and Potentia in Picenum (Liv. 39.44.10).  A knight named M. Fulvius 
Nobilior was reported to be involved in 63 (Sall. Cat. 17.3), but there is no indication he had 
connections in Picenum.  See also Appendix I, [no. 22].  
147 NB: Cicero is our only source that mentioned there were disturbances explicitly in 
Camerinum.  Sallust might have mentioned that Septimius was from Camerinum, but he did not 
explicitly report the town’s participation in the affair. 
148 Instead Berry (1996, 239) suggests Cicero mentioned Camerinum, Picenum, and Umbria to 
avoid explicitly discussing the accusation of disturbances in Pompeii. 
149 NB: Appian reported that soldiers were being secretly recruited from Etruria, Apulia, and 
Picenum to support the affair (App. BC 2.2). 
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Apulia was another region where those involved with the affair allegedly 
sought support.150  Our sources are not specific where in Apulia the 
disturbances were located, but Cicero and Sallust claimed those involved were 
tampering with the lower classes in the region.  M. Caeparius, the only domus 
nobilis executed on December 5 for his participation with the affair, was 
supposed to encourage the pastores (‘shepherds’) in Apulia to rebel.  According 
to Sallust, Caeparius was from Terracina (Sall. B Cat. 46.3).  Terracina was a 
town in Latium, not in Apulia.  Nevertheless, Caeparius was given the specific 
task of going to the latter region to solicit more support, but he was 
apprehended as he was leaving Rome on December 3.151  Cicero explained 
Caeparius’ role, declaring that ad sollicitandos pastores Apuliam attributam 
esse “Apulia had been assigned for him to raise the shepherds there” (Cic. Cat. 
3.14).  The pastoral nature of northern Apulia is well attested and the region 
was both an important area militarily and economically.152  However, according 
to Sallust, it was not the rural population that was targeted in Apulia.  He 
claimed Caeparius in Apuliam ad concitanda servitia proficisci parabat “was 
making ready to go to Apulia and stir the slaves to revolt” (Sall. B Cat. 46.3-4). 
In Chapter 2.4.3-4, I discussed how Lentulus was less concerned about 
the implications of enlisting slaves to support the affair than Catiline.153  Cicero 
and Sallust’s specificity about Caeparius’ intentions emphasized another 
threatening scenario, which they could connect with the seditious activities 
occurring simultaneously inside and outside Rome.  If Caeparius had been 
successful in his mission, then the res publica would have perhaps been 
threatened by an army of shepherds and/or slaves from Apulia, in addition to 
the army of Sullan colonists in northern Etruria.  The pastores and servi in 
Apulia had revolted against the res publica before in 185 (Liv. 39.29.8-9).154  
Therefore, Cicero and Sallust’s inclusion of these two groups of people from 
                                                
150 For the reports of disturbances in Apulia, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.6, 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 27.1, 30.2-3, 
42.1, 46.3-4; App. BC 2.2. 
151 Sall. B Cat. 47.4.  Again, we must assume Caeparius had personal ties with Apulia or Cicero 
and Sallust would not have been specific about who was sent to the region. See Appendix I, 
[no. 5]. 
152 On the agricultural importance of Apulia and its small famers, cf. Varro Rust. 1.29.2; Strabo 
5.4.2. Caesar and Appian wrote about the military significance of Apulia, especially the ports, cf. 
Caes. B Civ. 3.2; App. B Civ. 5.56. 
153 See Chapter 2 nn.258-60. 
154 Livy identified the revolt in Apulia as magnus motus servilis…fuit (39.29.8). He reported that 
the pastores in Apulia were involved as highwaymen on the roads (39.29.9).  In 72, Crixus, one 
of the leaders of the Third Servile War, and 30,000 of his men were killed on Mount Garganus in 
Apulia (App. B Civ. 1.118). 
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Apulia supporting the affair of 63 was reasonable as the groups had a historical 
connection. 
According to Sallust’s timeline of events, Catiline sent Manlius to Etruria, 
Septimius to Picenum, and a certain C. Julius to Apulia after his defeat in the 
consular elections of 63 (Sall. B Cat. 27.1).  C. Julius was most likely another 
Sullan veteran.  His name appears alongside Manlius.  Furthermore, Sallust did 
not mention where Julius was from, making it less likely the latter was a domi 
nobilis like Septimius or Caeparius.155  It is not entirely certain where in Apulia 
Sullan veterans were settled,156 but Cicero implied there was land confiscated in 
the region (Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.66).  Apparently Rullus’ agrarian proposal in 63 
would provide some Sullan colonists the opportunity to sell their viritane 
allotments for a profit.  Cicero warned the colonists that only Rullus and those 
whom the bill conferred as commissioners would explicitly profit by dividing the 
Sullan allotments and reselling them (2.67-70).  Rullus’ bill was defeated and 
with its defeat perhaps the chance for some Sullan colonists to make a profit.  
However, it is doubtful that Cicero’s defeat of Rullus’ proposal in the beginning 
of 63 was a reason certain Sullan colonists supported the affair later in the 
year.157 
Sallust did not explicitly state why Julius was sent to Apulia; he only 
implied that Catiline thought Julius would be useful there (Sall. B Cat. 27.1).  
When the Senate heard the report of the disturbance in Faesulae in late-
October, Sallust stated there were other reports circulating in Rome of a servile 
bellum (‘slave war’) in Apulia and Capua (30.2).158  He later declared Apulia and 
the other regions in Italy were in revolt, which suggested that those who were 
sent ahead to these regions were somewhat successful (42.1-2).159  Sallust 
                                                
155 See Appendix I, [no .25]. 
156 Vibinum in Apulia may have been a site for Sullan settlement, cf. Gabba 1996, 177-81; 
Santangelo 2007, 150.  Santangelo (2007, 155-6) explains that Venusia in Apulia might have 
been a site for a Sullan colony, but admits the evidence is tenuous. 
157 Arguably, Rullus’ proposed agrarian redistribution would most likely benefit the urban plebs 
in Rome and the domi nobiles more than the Sullan veterans, cf. Drummond 2000, 126-32; 
contra Brunt 1962, 72. 
158 Cf. Sall. B Cat. 46.3.  The reports of a slave uprising in Apulia are largely unsubstantiated; 
perhaps it was suppressed before it escalated into an actual threat like at Capua (Cic. Sest. 9). 
Whether slaves in Apulia would be attracted to the plot, see Chapter 2 n.259. 
159 Sall. B Cat. 42.1: isdem fere temporibus in Gallia citeriore atque ulteriore, item in agro 
Piceno, Bruttio, Apulia motus erat “At about this time there were disturbances in both Hither and 
Farther Gaul, as well as in the Picene and Bruttian districts and in Apulia.” Sallust continued to 
claim that those sent to these regions were involved with armorum atque telorum portationibus 
“transportation of arms and weapons,” however, he admitted these efforts plus timoris quam 
perculi effecerant “caused more apprehension than danger” (42.2).  Cf. 30.2.  
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therefore implied that both Julius and Caeparius, although the latter never 
reached Apulia, were sent to the region to incite a bellum servile.  According to 
Sallust, Julius’ task was to organize a disturbance, not among the Sullan 
colonists, but among the slaves in Apulia.  The fact that Cicero and Sallust 
described the people Caeparius or Julius were attempting to solicit in Apulia as 
pastores and servi, respectively, clearly distinguished the people in Apulia from 
the Sullan colonists solicited in other regions to support the affair.160  However, 
our sources imply the disturbances occurring in these distinct regions among 
distinct groups of people were all connected with the affair’s ultimate goal. 161 
Cicero and Sallust also claimed those involved with the affair were 
tampering with the people from Capua in Campania.  The region was directly 
affected by the Sullan settlement.  There is literary and non-literary evidence 
that several towns in Campania were sites for Sullan coloniae.162  Evidently, 
disputes between the new Sullan colonists and the original inhabitants of these 
Campanian towns similar to those in Etruria.  In the Pro Sulla, Cicero alluded to 
the initial conflicts between the Sullan colonists and the original inhabitants of 
Pompeii in Campania.163  The prosecutors accused P. Sulla of rekindling the 
animosity between the colonists and the indigenous people of Pompeii by 
instigating the latter to support the affair of 63.  Cicero insisted that this charge 
must be false if both the Pompeians and the Sullan colonii were present in court 
to support P. Sulla.  He implied that P. Sulla’s influence as patronus of Pompeii 
and presence in Campania helped dissuade the town from supporting the affair 
(Cic. Sull. 60-62).164  However, those involved with the affair were allegedly 
attempting to solicit support in Campania, but perhaps not explicitly from the 
Sullan colonists in the region. 
In 56, Cicero recalled in his defense of P. Sestius, a quaestor in 63, that 
Sestius was ordered to levy an army to prevent the town of Capua from 
                                                
160 Bradley (1989, 332-3) explains the pastores of Apulia were mostly slaves. 
161 Appian, our only other source recording the alleged disturbances in Apulia, claimed those 
involved with the affair were “secretly enlisting soldiers” in Etruria and Apulia (App. B Civ. 2.2).  
But clearly Cicero and Sallust claimed those supporting the affair in Apulia were different than 
the army in Etruria, so Appian’s brief comments regarding the enlistment of soldiers in both 
regions are less reliable.  
162 Gabba (1976, 44-7) lists Nola, Pompeii, Urbana as certain colonies and perhaps Abellum in 
Campania.  Santangelo (2007, 153 [n.29]) argues that Abellum and the Campanian town of 
Suessula were probably Sullan colonies as well. 
163 For a bibliography of pertinent secondary sources on Pompeii, see Berry 1996, 252.  
164 Cicero claimed P. Sulla was in Naples throughout the affair of 63 (Cic. Sull. 17, 53). 
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supporting the affair (Cic. Sest. 9).165  The town was famous for its gladiatorial 
schools and infamous as the origin of the servile war of the late 70’s.166  Under 
the leadership of the gladiators Spartacus, Crixus, and Oenomaus, many slaves 
joined their army from all over Italy.167  Therefore, Capua’s reputation for 
treachery was well known and Cicero implied that Sestius’ presence was 
necessary to prevent the town from revolting.  P. Sulla’s prosecutors accused 
him of buying gladiatores to support the affair, but Cicero was able to furnish an 
excuse (Cic. Sull. 54).  However, the report that Capua was supporting the affair 
of 63 certainly reminded Rome of Spartacus’ war.  I mentioned above that 
Sallust claimed a bellum servile was allegedly occurring in Apulia and Capua 
(Sall. B Cat. 30.2), but whether this so-called slave war occurred in either region 
at the time of the affair of 63 remains uncertain.168  Sallust reported the Senate 
ordered the praetor Q. Pompeius Rufus to Capua to raise an army (30.5).  
Although the magistrate sent to Capua was different in Cicero and Sallust’s 
version of events, they both reported the magistrates had extraordinary 
appointments of imperium to levy an army.  This evidence implied that the 
disturbance in Capua was serious enough to take action. 
There was perhaps also a disturbance in the Campanian town of Puteoli.  
Cicero had apparently sent C. Vatinius, another quaestor in 63, to Puteoli to 
prevent the affair’s participants from using its port (Cic. Vat. 12).169  Sallust’s 
account and later sources did not mention Puteoli nor the efforts of C. Vatinius.  
Nevertheless, Gabba notes the dissatisfaction of Campanian elites with Rullus’ 
proposed plan to divide the ager Campanus by founding another colony at 
Capua.170  Sulla had already founded several colonies in Campania and 
Cicero’s warning of a colony in Capua in 63 apparently worried the Capuans 
(Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.84, 89).  Perhaps the Capuans had similar grievances 
regarding Rome’s motives over land ownership to others who supported the 
affair of 63.  The disturbances in Campania are well attested.  The Senate sent 
                                                
165 In 56, Cicero defended P. Sestius who was accused of several crimes.  Sestius was charged 
under the lex Plautia de vi and might have stood trial twice that year, cf. TLRR, nos. 270-1 and 
323; Kaster 2006, 14-22. 
166 On the tradition of gladiators in Capua, see Ville 1981, 1-8. 
167 App. B Civ. 1.116-120; cf. Plut. Crass. 8-9; Flor. 2.8. 
168 Bradley (1978, 332-4) examines the reasons it was believable that Apulia revolted in 63. 
169 Vatinius was supposed to prevent any monies from leaving the port, cf. Cic. Vat. 12; Flac. 
67. 
170 Cf. Gabba 1976, 57-59; Santangelo 2007, 158-171. 
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P. Sestius and/or Q. Pompeius Rufus to Capua and C. Vatinius to Puteoli.171  
Furthermore, P. Sulla’s influence in Pompeii was also required to cease any 
disturbance from occurring from this volatile region.172  
A slave revolt was doubtlessly an anathema to the Romans, and clearly 
Sallust attempted to associate part of the affair of 63 with the servile war of 
Spartacus a decade earlier.  By implying that those participating in the affair 
were also involved with a bellum servile, Sallust’s monograph emphasized the 
multifarious threats facing the res publica and heaped further odium on the 
affair.  In addition, Cicero’s works also implied that the disturbances outside 
Rome were not only from the regions negatively affected by the Sullan 
settlements.  The implication that a bellum servile was occurring among the 
pastores in Apulia and gladiatores in Capua demonstrates the willingness of 
those involved with the affair to solicit support from groups other than those that 
composed the army in northern Etruria.  Cicero sent magistrates to Etruria, 
Umbria, Picenum, the ager Gallicus, Apulia, and Campania with the 
extraordinary power to levy armies to suppress the disturbance identified in 
these regions.  This military posturing against the disturbances outside of Rome 
resembled more a state of war than the aspects associated with a coniuratio 
examined in Chapter 1 and the seditious intentions of those remaining in the 
city examined in Chapter 2.  However, we will never be certain if those involved 
with the affair in Rome instigated any of the disturbances outside the city.  
Perhaps these disturbances outside Rome were a coincidence and perhaps the 
people involved in these disturbances initially had separate motives from those 
involved with the affair in Rome.  This was perhaps the case for Manlius’ army 
in northern Etruria, as the following section details. 
 
3.5 The mandata of C. Manlius’ army  
Cicero never explicitly suggested that the revolt in Etruria started 
independently from the seditious activities being planned by Catiline and the 
others remaining in Rome.  After Catiline fled Rome, Cicero consistently 
claimed Catiline would lead the army in Etruria.173  The reasons why Cicero 
                                                
171 Sestius was a quaestor in 63 under Cicero’s colleague, C. Antonius (Cic. Sest. 8).  Vatinius 
was most likely a quaestor in 63, see Stewart 1995, 63 n.6. 
172 On the importance and worth of Campania, see Frederiksen 1984.  Many Roman elites in 
the Late Republic owned villas in Campania, see D’Arms 2003, 18-9. 
173 Cicero described the reasons why certain Sullan veterans were willing to join the plot and 
mentioned Manlius as an example, adding cui nunc Catilina succedit ‘from whom Catiline has 
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wanted to associate the army with Catiline were examined above.  He wanted 
to connect the activities occurring inside and outside of Rome, so that he could 
suppress both events under the extraordinary powers bestowed by the SCU.  In 
addition, I demonstrated that Sallust and the other later narratives concerned 
with the affair of 63 typically followed Cicero’s claim that all the events occurring 
outside and inside Rome were connected.  Cicero did not contradict himself by 
reporting that the revolt in Etruria began without instructions from either Catiline 
or the others remaining in Rome.174  On the other hand, Sallust’s Catilina 
included a dubious message from Manlius and his army, which suggests the 
possibility that the revolt in northern Etruria was independent from the 
subversive activities Catiline and the others were planning in Rome. 
After the army in northern Etruria was reported in the Senate in late 
October/early November, the general Q. Marcius Rex and his soldiers, who 
were awaiting a triumph outside Rome, were sent to Faesulae to oppose 
Manlius’ forces (Sall. B Cat. 30.1-4).  Sallust reported that Manlius sent a 
deputation of legati to Marcius Rex with a mandata explaining the reasons he 
and his followers had decide to take up arms.  Sallust introduced the mandata 
using the phrase huiusce modi, which implies that Sallust’s text was not an 
exact duplicate nor was he citing the original transcript, should he have had 
access to one.175  Most scholars assume the mandata was a letter due to its 
epistolary style.176  However, Williams (2000, 161-3) cogently argues that the 
Latin term mandata most often indicated that it was delivered orally not written.  
Regardless of the specific transmission of the mandata, the occurrence of 
                                                                                                                                          
now taken over’ (Cic. Cat. 2.20).  Waters (1970, 201) argues this passage might suggest that 
Manlius was unconnected with Catiline until he left Rome, arrived in Faesulae, and replaced 
Manlius as leader due to his higher rank.  Waters seemingly takes the verb succedere literally to 
indicate that Catiline ‘succeeded’ Manlius, [(see OLD (succedo) s.v. 5a)], which suggests the 
latter was the original leader of the army and therefore the original instigator of the revolt. 
However, the passage is not explicit regarding Catiline and Manlius’ relationship, only that the 
latter was of a lower rank. 
174 When Cicero reported that Autronius sent the weapons and military standards from Rome to 
Catiline and the army in Faesulae in the Pro Sulla (Cic. Sull. 17), he did not contradict the initial 
report in the First Orations that Catiline had sent weapons and military standards to Manlius 
before he left Rome (Cat. 1.24).  The passage insinuated Autronius sent the weapons to 
Catiline after he was in Manlius’ camp.  However, the passage did not say that Catiline had not 
sent weapons to Manlius earlier, see Berry 1996, 166-7. 
175 Sallust used huiusce modi to introduce invented speeches/letters: Sall. B Cat. 20.1, 32.3, 
50.5, 52.1, 57.6; B Iug. 9.4, 30.4, 32.1, 86.1, 102.4; Hist. 1.77.5.  In contrast to exemplum infra 
scriptum est when Sallust probably used a copy of the original letter: Sall. B Cat. 34.3, 44.4.  
Also, cf. Vretska 1976, 399-400; McGushin 1977, 189 and 195-6; Ramsey 1984, 119; Williams 
2000, 163-4. 
176 Williams (2000, 160-1 nn.1-6) comprehensively cites the differing scholarly opinions 
regarding the form of the mandata. 
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distinct Sallustian phraseology implied he altered the message.  The text of the 
mandata is as follows: 
Deos hominesque testamur, imperator, nos arma neque contra patriam cepisse neque 
quo periculum aliis faceremus, sed uti corpora nostra ab iniuria tuta forent, qui miseri, 
egentes, violentia atque crudelitate faeneratorum plerique patriae, sed omnes fama 
atque fortunis expertes sumus. Neque cuiquam nostrum licuit more maiorum lege uti, 
neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere: tanta saevitia faeneratorum atque 
praetoris fuit. Saepe maiores vostrum, miseriti plebis Romanae, decretis suis inopiae 
eius opitulati sunt; ac novissume memoria nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni 
volentibus omnibus bonis argentum aere solutum est. Saepe ipsa plebs, aut dominandi 
studio permota aut superbia magistratuum armata, a patribus secessit. At nos non 
imperium neque divitias petimus, quarum rerum causa bella atque certamina omnia 
inter mortalis sunt, sed libertatem, quam nemo bonus nisi cum anima simul amittit. Te 
atque senatum obtestamur: consulatis miseris civibus, legis praesidium, quod iniquitas 
praetoris eripuit, restituatis neve nobis eam necessitudinem inponatis, ut quaeramus, 
quonam modo maxume ulti sanguinem nostrum pereamus! 
 
"We call gods and men to witness, general, that we have taken up arms, not against our 
fatherland nor to bring danger upon others, but to protect our own persons from 
outrage; for we are wretched and destitute, many of us have been driven from our 
country by the violence and cruelty of the moneylenders, while all have lost repute and 
fortune.  None of us has been allowed, in accordance with the usage of our forefathers, 
to enjoy the protection of the law and retain our personal liberty after being stripped of 
our patrimony, such was the inhumanity of the moneylenders and the praetor.  Your 
forefathers often took pity on the Roman commons and relieved their necessities by 
senatorial decrees, and not long ago, within our own memory, because of the great 
amount of their debt, silver was paid in copper with the general consent of the nobles.  
Often the commons themselves, actuated by a desire to rule or incensed at the 
arrogance of the magistrates, have taken up arms and seceded from the patricians.  
But we ask neither for power nor for riches, the usual causes of wars and strife among 
mortals, but only for freedom, which no true man gives up except with his life.  We 
implore you and the senate to take thought for your unhappy countrymen, to restore the 
bulwark of the law, of which the praetor's injustice has deprived us, and not to impose 
upon us the necessity of asking ourselves how we may sell our lives most dearly.”  
(Sall. B Cat. 33.1-5). 
Whether the mandata was entirely Sallust’s invention remains contentious, but 
the argument that its inclusion was contradictory to Sallust’ usual presentation 
of Manlius as Catiline’s subordinate cannot be denied.177  From the final 
sentence of the mandata, the reader is left feeling that Manlius and his forces’ 
dire financial situation forced them to take up arms in order for the Senate to 
take their complaints seriously.  Most significantly, the final sentence insinuates 
that they were perhaps willing to consider laying down their arms if the Roman 
Senate agreed to address their particular grievances.  Sallust’s narrative 
reported Manlius sent his legates to Marcius Rex after Catiline left Rome and 
apparently before Catiline arrived in Faesulae.178  Philipps suggests that 
                                                
177 Williams (2000, 171) concludes that the mandata from Manlius’ army was primarily Sallust’s 
invention. 
178 Sallust reported Catiline spent several days with C. Flaminius in Arretium arming the locals in 
the vicinity before travelling to Faesulae (Sall. B Cat. 36.1: paucos dies commoratus apud C. 
Falminium in agro Arretino, dum vicinitatem antea sollicitatem armis exornat).  Cicero reported 
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Manlius sent the deputation perhaps as a ruse for Catiline and those with him to 
arrive at the army’s camp unhindered by Marcius’ forces.179  On the other hand, 
Manlius and his army begged (obtestamur) the Senate to uphold the law (legis 
praesidium) and take counsel (consulatis) concerning their grievances (Sall. B 
Cat. 33.5).  Therefore, taken in isolation, the mandata clearly indicates Manlius 
and his forces were willing to negotiate first before they completely resorted to 
armed violence to force the issue.  Marcius Rex replied that Rome would show 
compassion only if Manlius’ army surrendered (34.1).  Sallust was silent 
regarding the final outcome of this exchange.  Presumably, Manlius did not 
accept Marcius’ offer and awaited his next move.  After Catiline joined Manlius, 
the Senate declared them hostes rei publicae, so the army in Etruria could be 
fought without impunity (36.2).180  The Senate offered rewards to those who 
would betray the plot, but Sallust claimed no one came forward or deserted ex 
castris Catilinae (36.2-3, 5).  Significantly, Sallust referred to the army’s camp 
as Catiline’s camp demonstrating his leadership over Manlius.  Clearly, Manlius 
and the army in Etruria intended to proceed in preparing for war after Catiline 
arrived at Faesulae. 
McGushin suggests that the inclusion of the mandata indicated that 
Sallust believed that Manlius initially acted alone.181  McGushin states the goals 
in the mandata were different from those that Catiline and the others were 
hoping to achieve, which, he argues, reinforces the suggestion that the army in 
Etruria initially acted independently.182  Catiline promised divitiae (‘riches’), 
decus (‘honor’), gloria, and libertas (‘freedom’) to those in Rome (Sall. B Cat. 
20.14).  He made the same exact promise to the army in Etruria before the final 
battle (58.9).  The mandata claimed that Manlius and his army were not fighting 
for imperium or divitiae, instead they demanded libertas (33.4).  The mandata 
implied that the libertas Manlius and his forces sought were both economic 
‘freedom’ from their creditors and judicial ‘freedom’ from the local Roman 
praetor (33.1).  However, the mandata emphasized that Manlius’ army’s 
financial concerns were the primary cause for their revolt.  Others involved with 
                                                                                                                                          
that the army was made up of colonists from Faesulae and Arretium (Cic. Mur. 49), but did not 
mention a meeting between Catiline and C. Flaminius. 
179 Philipps 1976, 443. There is no evidence that the envoys were sent as a ruse to buy Catiline 
time to arrive in Faesulae. 
180 See Section 3.2. 
181 McGushin 1977, 162. 
182 McGushin 1977, 193-4. For the goals of those involved with the affair from Rome, cf. Sall. B 
Cat. 20.14, 58.9. 
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the affair from Rome clearly had similar concerns.  I have reviewed the 
evidence that suggested that everyone involved with the affair faced some sort 
of fiscal predicament and was attracted by the promise of alleviating their 
impoverished state.183  Therefore, in my opinion, the motives of Manlius’ army 
and the others involved were not at odds with the motives of the other people 
supporting the affair despite the claim made in the mandata that the former 
group did not desire divitiae. 
Seager argues that the mandata proved Manlius and his army initially 
acted independently for several reasons.  Firstly, Manlius’ army took the field 
before the meeting at M. Porcius Laeca’s house in Rome where those involved 
with the affair outlined their plan to solicit people from other regions outside of 
the city.184  Secondly, the mandata sent to Q. Marcius Rex occurred before 
Catiline had left Rome to take over command of Manlius’ army.  Seager notes 
that Manlius’ army even offered to lay down their arms before Catiline had 
arrived in Faesulae, indicating that the revolt in northern Etruria was a separate 
event.185  Although Cicero claimed Catiline had sent weapons and the aquilam 
argentum to Manlius earlier, the timing remains vague.186  Seager concludes 
that Cicero was lying and rejects the evidence “in favor of Sallust’s evidence for 
Manlius’ independence.”187  However, Seager’s argument is flawed because the 
mandata was most likely invented and contradicted other evidence in Sallust 
that connected the army in Etruria with the affair.  The army in Etruria was the 
affair’s last hope for success after those involved with the affair in Rome had 
been detected and summarily suppressed.     
On the whole, the mandata in Sallust’s Catilina may suggest that the 
Etrurian revolt initially occurred independently in 63.  On the other hand, we 
may reject this hypothesis because Sallust most often portrayed the 
disturbances in Rome and the other regions of Italy as a concerted attempt to 
overthrow the government.  Scholars argue about the veracity of the mandata, 
why Sallust included it in his narrative, and how its inclusion changes our 
                                                
183 See Chapter 2.2. 
184 According to Cicero’s timeline, Manlius’ forces were reported in arms on October 27 and the 
meeting at Laeca’s occurred on November 6 (Cic. Cat. 1.7-9).  NB: In contrast, Sallust claimed 
the plan to solicit people from outside Rome to support the affair was decided in a meeting in 
Rome a year earlier before the elections of 64 (Sall. BCat. 20-21).  On Sallust’s tendency to 
antedate events in 63 to 64, see Introduction nn. 4-5. 
185 Seager 1973, 241. 
186 Cf. Cic. Cat. 1.24, 2.13. 
187 Seager 1973, 241. 
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perception of the association between the revolt in Etruria and the activities 
Catiline and the others were planning in Rome.188  The appearance of the 
mandata in the Catilina will continue to be debated because both sides of the 
argument can more or less be defended.  Of course, it remains uncertain 
whether Manlius ever attempted to communicate with Marcius Rex.  
Regardless, the existence of the mandata continues to raise questions over the 
association between Manlius’ actions and the actions planned in Rome.  
Although the argument about whether Manlius and his forces initially acted 
independently remains a matter of conjecture, if Manlius and his forces initially 
acted separately from Catiline and the others in Rome then it would affect the 
usual perception of the entire affair.  If the revolt was coincidently occurring 
around the same time that the subversive activities in Rome were discovered, 
then our sources’ insistence that the events were connected can be challenged.  
Furthermore, like Chapter 2 demonstrated, the established view that Catiline 
was the sole mastermind of the affair can be questioned.  The perception that 
the affair of 63 threatened the stability of the res publica simultaneously from 
inside and outside Rome could also be consigned to rhetoric.  
The hypothesis that the mandata Sallust recorded was a genuine and 
practically unadulterated piece of evidence is tenuous at best.  The reasons 
Manlius and his forces took up arms were portrayed as similar enough to those 
who intended to violently attack the established authority of the res publica from 
within Rome.  The grievances Manlius and his forces highlighted in the mandata 
perhaps represented the situation in the other regions in Italy that Catiline and 
the others in Rome attempted to incite to join the revolt examined in previous 
section.  It is clear that Manlius’ armed forces were preparing to fight and the 
efforts of those who were reportedly soliciting support in regions other than 
Etruria were depicted in an analogous manner.  The Senate sent magistrates to 
these regions to levy armies seemingly to oppose the forces those involved with 
the affair were attempting to solicit in these regions.  Clearly, these actions 
suggested that the res publica was preparing for war as well.       
Evidently, certain scholars have suggested that Sallust included the 
mandata to demonstrate that the revolt in northern Etruria was initially a 
separate incident from the events occurring in Rome. Manlius and his army 
                                                
188 Williams (2000, 169) argues we know more about Sallust the historian from the mandata 
than the actual historicity of the speech. 
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might have joined forces with Catiline and the others involved with the affair of 
63 after they had decided to revolt on October 27.  This neatly answers the 
question of why our sources recorded that the army in Etruria was in open revolt 
before those involved in Rome had begun to act.  Despite Manlius, Semptimius, 
C. Julius, Catiline or any other anonymous citizens’ attempts to solicit support 
throughout Italy, the reported revolts in every region might have initially 
occurred separately from the activity occurring in Rome.  McGushin and Seager 
follow this line of argument.  This argument primarily stems from Sallust’s 
inclusion of the mandata from Manlius’ army, which implied they were prepared 
to reconcile their differences, in contrast to Catiline and the others remaining in 
Rome who continued to plot against the res publica long after the affair was 
initially discovered.  However, Williams cogently argues that the mandata 
followed a recognizable formula of a pre-battle speech, which further 
downgrades McGushin and Seager’s arguments that the disturbance in Etruria 
was initially independent.189  The mandata sent by Manlius’ army alluded to 
their hope for reconciliation; however, it also implied that if the established 
authority in Rome did not address their grievances then they planned to wage 
war against the res publica.  Whether the affair was more appropriately 
identified as a bellum (‘war’) due to the reported military operations occurring 
outside Rome is the focus of the following chapter. 
 
3.6  Chapter conclusions  
 This chapter began with an account of Catiline’s defeat in the consular 
elections in 63.  Our sources reported that those who suffered under Sulla from 
northern Etruria had supported Catiline’s candidacy perhaps attracted to his 
proposal to address the debt crisis through tabulae novae.  The second section 
continued to review the historical connection between Catiline and these 
supporters from outside of Rome.  I demonstrated that Catiline most likely found 
support from C. Manlius and other Sullan veterans due to the former’s earlier 
association with Sulla.  In addition, section 3.2 investigated Catiline’s familial 
link through his gens with Etruria, Umbria, and among the Paeligni, which were 
areas that purportedly supported the affair’s plans to gain power in Rome.  As 
shown in Section 3.3, the passage of the SCU resulted due to the simultaneous 
reports of planned murder and arson inside Rome from the letter Crassus gave 
                                                
189 Williams 2000, 167. 
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to Cicero and the reports from Faesulae that an armed band led by Manlius had 
taken the field.  What connected these disturbances was Catiline’s decision to 
join Manlius’ army after he left Rome when Cicero initially exposed the affair’s 
plans in the First Oration.  Catiline’s action was critical for Cicero to substantiate 
the link between these disturbances and to prove to the Senate that the 
passage of the SCU was justified.  Furthermore, Cicero used the connection 
between the disturbances inside and outside of Rome to persuade the Senate 
to declare Catiline and Manlius hostes rei publicae and by extension anyone 
else who attempted to support the army in Etruria, or who attempted to incite 
other areas in Italy to revolt, or who continued to support the affair within Rome. 
In Section 3.4, I examined the specific areas in Italy that our sources 
claimed were willing to support the affair.  I explored the reasons why our 
sources perhaps chose to highlight these particular areas that either had a 
history of enmity towards Rome or whose inhabitants had been disrupted by the 
foundation of Sullan settlements in their territory.  In addition, the reasons why 
these particular areas were perhaps willing to support a plan to gain power in 
Rome were suggested and their association with several of the affair’s 
participants was discussed.  However, section 3.4, also examined the claims 
that the affair’s participants were attempting to incite the slaves from certain 
areas.  Therefore, the disturbances occurring outside of Rome went beyond 
those areas associated with the Sullan veterans or those dispossessed by Sulla 
to create the feeling that the entire res publica was being threatened internally 
in Rome and externally throughout Italy.  However, as was mentioned, only the 
disturbance in northern Etruria can be proven without a doubt.   
Although the connection between Catiline and Manlius’ army was 
apparent when the latter joined the former in Faesulae, section 3.5 examined 
the evidence that suggested Manlius’ army might have initially acted 
independently of the affair being planned in Rome and might have assembled in 
armed revolt for their own specific reasons.  The unique appearance of the 
mandata Manliana in Sallust’s Catilina, once again questions Catiline’s 
leadership and influence, not only on the affair as a whole, but also his 
characterization as the instigator of the disturbances outside of Rome.  
Although most of the claims of disturbances outside of Rome throughout Italy 
and their inhabitants’ willingness to support the affair remain speculative, from 
the investigations made in this chapter we can conclude that our sources 
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implied, or used specific terminology to indicate that the affair’s participants 
planned to threaten the res publica by inciting these areas to go to war.  The 
following chapter will investigate the terminology associated with bellum and its 
usage in the accounts of Cicero and Sallust to interpret the affair’s activities. 
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Chapter 4 
Examining Cicero and Sallust’s usage of the term bellum and related 
terminology to identify the affair of 63 as a “war” 
 
 
In chapter 1, I examined the related terms that occurred when Cicero and 
Sallust represented the affair of 63 as a coniuratio and the conspiratorial context 
these terms identified.  The chapter demonstrated how these related terms 
conveyed a criminal, secret, and immoral aspects to describe the affair and the 
activities of the affair’s participants.  Cicero and Sallust also portrayed the 
plurality of a coniuratio by using terms that indicated that many people were 
involved in the affair along with Catiline.  The aspect of plurality was further 
demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3 that described the various groups of people 
that our sources claimed were allegedly supporting the affair both inside and 
outside of Rome respectively.  The second chapter focused on the actions and 
those involved with the actions of the affair remaining in Rome after Catiline had 
left the city to join the army in Etruria.  The third chapter described Manlius and 
the army in Etruria and the designs to incite other regions in Italy to support the 
affair outside of Rome.  Both chapters examined evidence that suggested that 
the praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura and the Sullan veteran C. Manlius, who, 
according to the terminology in our sources, were depicted as the two foremost 
members involved with the disturbances located inside and outside of Rome 
respectively.  In addition, both chapters examined evidence that suggested that 
Lentulus and/or Manlius might have acted independently of Catiline.  
Regardless of whether one chooses to believe that Lentulus and Manlius 
actually acted independently of Catiline, the suggestion that Manlius’ army in 
Etruria and the evidence that proved the influential role of Lentulus further 
demonstrates that Catiline should not be considered the sole mastermind or 
leader of the affair.  All of these aspects are indicative of a conspiratorial context 
and confirm that the affair fits the sort of characteristics associated with a 
coniuratio. 
The specific intended crimes Lentulus and the reliqua coniuratorum 
manuswere planning, examined in Chapter 2, included: i) the murder of Cicero 
and other leading members of the Senate, ii) the plan to burn parts of Rome, 
and iii) the attempt to gain the support of the Allobroges.  Chapter 3 discussed 
the intentions of the army in Etruria and the affair’s designs to gather support in 
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other regions outside of Rome.  In addition to these plans, Cicero and Sallust 
claimed that the affair’s participants also planned to wage a bellum (“war”).  In 
the Introduction, I discussed the titles of Cicero and Sallust’s published works 
regarding the affair.  I explained that although the preface of Sallust’s 
monograph explicitly states that it would examine a coniuratio (Sall. B Cat. 4.3), 
according to the manuscript tradition the work is conventionally entitled the 
Catilina.  Consequently, it is necessary to examine the term bellum and the 
other terms related to bellum and how they were used to interpret the actions in 
63.  Did either Cicero or Sallust believe the coniuratio in 63 should be perceived 
as a bellum?  Or was it a combination of the two?  Cicero and Sallust also use 
other various expressions to interpret the event.  This chapter demonstrates 
how these various expressions are used to interpret the affair of 63 and 
explores why both authors would chose this particular terminology. 
Both authors use the term bellum in different ways to explain the events 
of 63 in accordance with the medium in which they reported the event.  Cicero 
generally uses the term bellum for rhetorical effect in his speeches concerning 
the affair.  Sallust, in part, uses the term to support his moral theme in his works 
that bemoan the increasing instances of bellum between cives.1  Sallust’s 
Catilina culminated in the climatic battle of Catiline and Manlius’ forces against 
the loyal forces of Rome to emphasize his admonishment of these types of 
conflicts.  Both writers express that citizens who waged a bellum against their 
own countrymen were immoral.  However both rarely use the particular 
expression bellum civile to indicate that the bellum planned in 63 was in fact a 
full-scale “civil war.”  
The first section of this chapter reviews when the term bellum appears in 
Cicero’s Orations and the adjectives he uses to qualify bellum to persuade the 
Senate and the people of Rome that the affair’s participants were waging a 
‘war.’  The next section explores how Sallust uses the term bellum in reference 
to the affair.  Sections 4.3 and 4.4 relate how Sallust and Cicero tended to avoid 
the exclusive use of the expression bellum civile.  Subsequently, I investigate 
the various and distinct terminology Cicero and Sallust used that can imply a 
state of affairs akin to ‘war between citizens’ in sections 4.5 and 4.6 
respectively.  In these sections, I examine how these various expressions were 
used in reference to the affair and review how Cicero and Sallust interpreted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See the Introduction. 
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other earlier historical conflicts between citizens for comparison.  The final 
section in this chapter reviews Cicero’s interpretation of the event in his later 
works and letters to determine his perception of the affair after it was 
suppressed.  The conclusions of this chapter will sum up how Cicero and 
Sallust used the terms related to bellum to identify the affair.  I attempt to 
explain whether the term bellum was: i) a part of the coniuratio or vice-versa, ii) 
another way to identify the entire affair, or iii) a separate and parallel event from 
the coniuratio. 
 
4.1 The occurrences of bellum in Cicero’s Orations and its qualifying 
adjectives 
 
Cicero used the term bellum throughout the Orations to persuade the 
Senate and the people of Rome that the affair’s participants were waging a 
“war” against the res publica.  Cicero emotively used the term bellum in order to 
stress the hostile nature of the affair.  In the Orations, Cicero claimed that the 
bellum was widespread and that the participants planned to devastate tota 
Italia.2  His rhetorical depiction of the extensive bellum the res publica faced 
would surely help refute those who apparently initially doubted his accusations.3  
As the Orations were most likely revised three years after the events, it surely 
behooved Cicero to make the claim that the bellum was a serious threat to the 
res publica.  By accentuating the extent of affair’s threat, Cicero would not only 
be able to justify the acclaim he received after its suppression, but he would 
also be able to explain to his detractors why he needed to act with extreme 
severity and speed against its participants.4  Due to the odium that was 
increasing against Cicero because of the executions in 63, he clearly wanted to 
accentuate the seriousness of the threat in the most expansive terms in his 
speeches that refer to the affair.  Arguably, the intended crimes inside of Rome 
contained aspects more closely associated with a coniuratio than the actions 
outside of the city, which included military preparations indicative of a bellum.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For versions of the phrase tota Italia, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.12, 2.8, 4.2, 4.13.  See Chapter 1 n.93.  
Similar rhetorical passages stressing the extent of the affair include: hoc malum; manavit non 
solum per Italiam verum etiam transcendit Alpis et obscure serpens multas iam provincias 
occupavit “This evil has spread throughout Italy, it has even crossed the Alps, and it has now 
crept in unnoticed and taken hold of many provinces”(4.6).  Cf. Cat. 3.4. 
3 For the initial doubt concerning Cicero’s initial discovery of the affair’s plans, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.30; 
2.3. 
4 If the Orations were published in 60 then Cicero’s claim that the res publica faced a bellum 
planning the destruction of tota Italia is more understandable. See Introduction nn.4-5. 
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However, Cicero did not consistently use either term to identify the specific 
actions inside and outside of Rome.  As demonstrated in the previous chapters, 
Cicero changed his focus in the First Oration from Catiline and Manlius to 
Lentulus and the many others involved; therefore, Cicero chose terms to 
emphasize the threat of the affair in the Orations that followed.  This section 
examines the instances when the term bellum occurs in Cicero’s Orations.  He 
progressively used the term to rhetorically identify the affair as a whole instead 
of in reference to the military activities occurring outside of Rome. 
In the First Oration, Cicero used the term bellum six times in reference to 
Catiline’s role in the affair, which he claimed was to join Manlius and the army in 
Etruria.5  On the other hand, Cicero used the term coniuratio or its cognates 
eight times to refer to the affair or those suspected to be supporting the affair’s 
hostile intentions both inside and outside of Rome.6  Cicero reported that arms 
were sent to Manlius and the army in Etruria and insisted that when Catiline had 
joined the army they would inferre patriae bellum ‘bring war to the fatherland’ 
(Cic. Cat. 1.23).7  Cicero further stated that he was fortunate to defeat Catiline 
as consul in 63 to ensure that Catiline ut exsul potius temptare quam consul 
vexare rem publicam posses “would only be able to attack the res publica as an 
exile and not harry it as a consul” (1.27).  This passage suggested that Cicero 
was able to keep Catiline from being awarded imperium by becoming consul, 
which would give him the authority to raise an army in the name of Rome and 
be able temptare (‘to make an attack’).8  Instead, Cicero demonstrated that 
Catiline’s plan to join Manlius’ army was clearly an act of a hostis not a loyal 
citizen of Rome. 
Cicero explained when Catiline did join the army in Etruria that eum 
quem esse hostem comperisti, quem ducem belli futurum vides “This man 
[Catiline] who is, as you have discovered, a public enemy; who will, as you see, 
be a leader in war” (1.27).  This instance of bellum occurs in the part of the 
speech where Cicero invented an imaginary conversation between Cicero and 
the patria regarding the situation (1.27-29).  The fatherland rhetorically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For bellum, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.23, 25, 27 (bis), 29, 33. 
6 For coniuratio, cf. Cic. Cat. 1.1, 6, 12, 13, 27, 30 (bis), 31.  The concrete plural noun coniurati 
occurs only once to explicitly refer to those supporting the affair (1.12).  As the abstract noun 
coniuratio can also be used as a metonym for “a band of conspirators” (OLD s.v.3b), then some 
of the other instances of the noun could perhaps allude to either the representation of the affair 
or those involved with it, or both.  
7 For the passages regarding the sending of arms from Rome to Etruria, see Chapter 3 n.6. 
8 OLD (tempto=tento) s.v. 1.  On imperium in general, see Lintott 1999, 94-9.  
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challenged Cicero that if Catiline were acting like hostis and a dux belli, as 
Cicero had proclaimed, then why would he allow Catiline to leave Rome and 
join Manlius’ army in Etruria?  The patria asked whether Cicero was waiting for 
cum bello vastabitur Italia, vexabuntur urbes, tecta ardebunt “When Italy is laid 
waste by war, when her cities are destroyed, [or] her dwellings in flames” (1.29), 
before deciding that Catiline should be punished with death for his involvement 
with the affair.  The patria reminded Cicero of the historical precedents of 
citizens who were executed for threatening the stability of the res publica, but 
he responded that he would not pursue such severe methods (1.29-30).9  
Clearly, Cicero changed his mind later in the year, but when the First Oration 
was delivered his evidence regarding the affair’s plans was largely 
circumstantial – Catiline had yet to leave Rome, join Manlius, or be formally 
declared a hostis.10  In Chapter 3, I explained that it is uncertain whether the 
disturbances in Etruria and the actions in Rome were initially connected.  
However, in this case, Cicero had no qualms proclaiming that Catiline should 
proficiscere ad impium bellum ac nefarium “Go forth to your impious and wicked 
war” (1.33).  In Chapter 1, we demonstrated that the two adjectives impius and 
nefarius were used to identify the immoral aspects of a coniuratio.11  In the 
same manner, Cicero also used the adjectives to refer to the plan for bellum, 
which suggests he considered the bellum a wicked act equal to a coniuratio.  
Cicero opted to coerce Catiline to leave Rome and join Manlius’ army in Etruria 
in order to show the Senate that the affair’s plans included bellum.12 
Catiline left Rome directly after the First Oration and went to Etruria to 
join Manlius’ army.  Due to Catiline’s apparent bellicose motives, Cicero 
intensified the claim that the affair and part of the affair’s plan was to wage a 
bellum in the Second Oration.  The term coniuratio occurred only once in this 
oration to refer to the affair, whereas the term bellum was used twelve times to 
refer not only to the activities of the army in Etruria, like in the First Oration, but 
also to refer to the activities of those willing to support the affair both inside and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 NB: Cicero recalled the leading men who killed the supporters of Saturninus, the Gracchi, and 
Flaccus.  He had the patria describe Catiline as a parricida civium, which could either refer to 
the earlier murders that Catiline had allegedly committed during Sulla’s reign, or the future 
murders planned by the affair’s participants. 
10 See Chapter 3.3. 
11 See Chapter 1.3. 
12 See Chapter 3 n.36. 
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outside of Rome.13  Cicero perhaps intended to use the term bellum to stress 
the hostile intention of all the affair’s participants instead of the term 
coniuratio.14  Certainly, a coniuratio conveyed a more uncertain state of affairs 
than a bellum.15  Perhaps Cicero chose to use bellum more often to prove to the 
people of Rome, whom he was specifically addressing in the Second Oration, 
that the plans of the coniuratio were akin to a bellum.  Therefore, he avoided 
using the former term, which indicated a more clandestine state of affairs than a 
state of war.  However, we should use caution before we conclude that the 
affair of 63 was interpreted as a “war” more than as a “conspiracy” due to the 
predominance of the term bellum over coniuratio in the Second Oration.  Cicero 
wanted to accentuate the threat and increase the odium of those involved or 
willing to support the affair in the Second Oration.  Sometimes he used the term 
to literally refer to the actual battle that he foresaw between Catiline and 
Manlius’ army in Etruria and the forces loyal to the consul.  On the other hand, 
Cicero sometimes used the term bellum as a metaphor suggesting the “war” the 
res publica would have to figuratively fight against the various groups of people, 
which according to Cicero were also involved in the affair. 
In the Second Oration, Cicero referred to the claim made in the First 
Oration that Catiline and other anonymous key participants in the affair had met 
at Laeca’s house on November 6 to discuss their intended plans.  These plans 
included the parts of Italy that they would solicit to support their effort, who 
would accompany Catiline when he left Rome to join Manlius and the army, who 
would burn the city, and who would murder Cicero and other leading citizens 
(1.8-9).  Cicero reiterated that the meeting determined how Catiline ratio totius 
belli descripta edocui “had mapped out the plan for the whole war” (2.13).  In 
this instance, he avoided going into detail about the affair’s plans as he did in 
the First Oration delivered in the Senate.  Furthermore, he used the term bellum !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For bellum: cf. Cic. Cat. 2.1, 11, 2.13 (bis), 2.14 (ter), 15, 18, 24, 28 (bis).  For coniuratio: 2.6.  
NB: The term bellum occurs 15 times in the speech, but twice referred to the bellum Cicero 
would wage against the affair (2.1, 11) and once to the end of the bellum against Mithridates 
(2.11).  
14 NB: In all four Orations, the term bellum occurs 33 times specifically referring to the bellum 
planned or waged by the affair’s participants in comparison to coniuratio and its 18 occurrences.  
Individually: the term bellum occurs 6 times, coniuratio 8 times in the First; the term bellum 
occurs 15 times, coniuratio only 1 time in the Second (see also n.13); the term bellum occurs 10 
times, coniuratio 5 times in the Third; and the term bellum occurs 2 times, coniuratio 4 times in 
the Fourth.  
15 The various meanings of coniuratio are further examined in Chapter 5.  Pagan (2004, 19-24) 
explains that our sources tended to be either explicit or implicit to describe conspiratorial 
contexts to stress the uncertainty of the events and create suspense. 
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to explicitly refer to the affair instead of the terms amentia (‘madness’) and 
scelus (‘crime’), which he used in the First Oration to stress the irrationality of 
those involved with these criminal plans (1.8).16  In this case, it seems he used 
the term bellum in order to emphasize the hostility of the affair’s plans as well.  
Cicero continued in this vein to address those who were claiming that Catiline 
was driven into exile due to Cicero’s accusation of planning the affair, which 
was yet to be proved.17  He asked his doubters in exsilium eiciebam quem iam 
ingressum esse in bellum videram? “Was I driving him into exile when I had 
seen that he had already began operations [for war]?” (2.14).  Again, Cicero 
had already professed that Catiline had sent arms to Etruria and planned to join 
the army from the beginning.  Cicero dismissed the possibility that Manlius was 
conducting the bellum populo Romano suo nomine ‘war against the Roman 
people in his own name’ (2.14).  Finally, Cicero had explicitly qualified the target 
of the bellum, but what type of bellum did he envisage would occur?  
Cicero used the adjectives domesticus and intestinus in the Second 
Oration to describe how the planned bellum should be interpreted.  The term 
domus (‘home country’) is the root of the adjective domesticus and intestinae 
(‘intestines’) the root for intestinus.18  So, the former adjective can be literally 
defined as describing ‘something occurring within one’s house or on one’s 
native soil’ and the latter as describing ‘something occurring within one’s 
insides.’  Therefore, the expressions bellum domesticum or bellum intestinum 
are clearly suggestive of a more emotional and intimate bellum than when the 
term bellum occurred without any qualifying adjectives.  If Cicero wanted to 
represent what was occurring in 63 as a direct threat to the stability of the res 
publica, then using the phrase bellum domesticum or bellum intestinum 
emphasized that the bellum planned would be fought within the very fabric of 
the res publica.  Although the military activities of the affair were actually 
occurring outside of Rome, Cicero perhaps used these phrases to suggest that 
the bellum was occurring inside of the city as well.  If the bellum domesticum or 
bellum intestinum was occurring inside of Rome, then the phrases further 
suggest that the bellum was being fought between its citizens.  Cicero had 
every chance to identify the bellum as a bellum civile and certain hypotheses !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For Cicero’s representation of the affair as a ‘madness’, see Chapter 2 n.201. 
17 Cicero remarked that some people claimed that he drove Catiline into exile and believed 
Catiline was on his way to Massilia, see Chapter 3 nn.36-41. 
18 OLD (domus) s.v. 2; (intestina) s.v. 3. 
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regarding why he did not use bellum civile are examined in section 4.4 below.  
For now, I will examine the other adjectives Cicero used to qualify the type of 
bellum he proclaimed those participating with the affair were waging. 
Cicero used the adjective domesticum three times to describe bellum in 
the Second Oration.  Cicero referred to Catiline as unum huius belli domestici 
ducem ‘the one leader of this war on our home soil’ (2.1).19  The phrase occurs 
in the beginning of the speech, which was delivered the following day after 
Catiline had left Rome.  Therefore the bellum domesticum in this passage most 
likely alluded to the warlike intentions of the army in Etruria and not the entire 
affair.  The two subsequent instances of the expression bellum domesticum 
describe the actions of those supporting the affair remaining in Rome.  Cicero 
contended that domesticum bellum manet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum 
periculum est, intus est hostis “The sole remaining war is on our soil: the plots, 
the danger, the enemy are in our midst” (2.11).  Cicero clearly used the 
tricolonic construction of the term intus to stress that many involved with the 
affair had not left with Catiline, and to inform his audience that those in Rome, 
similar to the army in Etruria, were intent on bellum.20  Although the use of 
domesticus at 2.11, in contrast to the use at 2.1, did not refer explicitly to the 
bellum that the army in Etruria was preparing to wage outside the city walls, 
Cicero wanted to connect the bellum to the affair’s participants both inside and 
outside Rome, which the expression bellum domesticum seems to convey at 
2.11.  The bellum domesticum perhaps also referred to Etruria, as the region 
was considered part of the res publica by Cicero and therefore under his 
protection.  Brown in his recent study of the expression bellum civile argues that 
the expression bellum domesticum relates to an “internal war.”21  Brown’s 
opinion that bellum domesticum is a less political term than bellum civile, 
because the question of citizenship is avoided, is not entirely sound.22  Cicero 
was certainly keen to represent the threat that faced Rome as a bellum 
domesticum to heighten the immediate and homegrown danger to his audience 
in the Second Oration.  Therefore, I think a bellum domesticum could carry !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Dyck (2008, 127) mentions that Cicero used the expression bellum domesticum most often in 
the Orations, but does not discuss why Cicero uses this adjective in this instance over civile, 
which is clearly the more specific expression to indicate a ‘civil war’.  NB: I think translating 
bellum domesticum as a “civil war” like MacDonald (1977, 69) does is not as provocative as 
Cicero intended. 
20 Cf. Dyck 2008, 141. 
21 Brown 2003, 105. 
22 Ibid. 
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similar political ramifications to the expression bellum civile because the former 
analogously suggested that citizens were involved in this type of bellum as 
well.23 
The final instance of bellum domesticum in the Second Oration supports 
my argument.  Cicero boasted that he alone would act as the leader against 
bellum intestinum ac domesticum post hominum memoriam crudelissimum et 
maximum “The most bitter and widespread bellum intestinum ac domesticum 
within in the memory of man” (2.28).24  We can infer that the bellum he was 
describing in this instance was the entire affair that had yet been suppressed 
because he also qualified the term bellum with the adjective maximum, 
suggesting its significance and/or size.  However, the use of the conjunction ac 
instead of et or -que to join the two adjectives could also suggest that the 
adjectives domesticus and intestinus were separated for emphasis.25  Perhaps 
the bellum intestinum implied the continuing struggle against the remaining 
participants ‘inside’ of Rome, who at the time the Second Oration was delivered 
were still at large, and the bellum domesticum referred to the military activities 
occurring in Etruria and the other regions outside the city.  Therefore, taken 
together Cicero’s use of the expression bellum intestinum ac domesticum, in 
this instance, most likely referred to all the affair’s plans that the participants 
intended both inside and outside of Rome.  Furthermore, the expression implied 
that these participants were citizens despite the lack of the adjective civilis. 
In the Third Oration, Cicero used the term bellum to describe the 
persistent threat of the affair.  The term was used to identify the attempts by the 
reliqua coniuratorum manus to solicit support from the Allobroges and the affair 
as a whole.  The term bellum occurred twice as much as the term coniuratio.26  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Cicero warned that after Catiline had left for the 
army in Etruria those remaining in Rome were the leaders of the nefarium 
bellum ‘wicked war’ (3.3). In addition, Cicero claimed that Lentulus tried to enlist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.19: bellum civile ac domesticum.  See further section 4.4 below. 
24 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.25: in hoc autem uno post hominum memoriam maximo crudelissimoque bello 
“In this war, however, the most important and most savage within memory of man.” 
25 On the use of the conjunction ac as a shortened form of atque and the emphasis it imparts to 
both terms over the use of et and –que (Mountford 1938, 10).  
26 The term coniuratio occurs 5 times, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.3, 14, 15, 17, 21; the term bellum occurs 10 
times, cf. 3.3, 4, 15, 16, 19, 22, 25(ter), 27.  NB: The term coniuratio is used to refer to the affair 
three times and the cognate coniurati occurs at 3.3 and 3.21 to refer explicitly to Lentulus and 
the reliqua coniuratorum.  On the other hand, the term bellum explicitly referred to the affair 
eight times.  At 3.22 the term bellum is implicitly used to refer to the affair by claiming the Gauls 
were the only nation still willing to wage war on Rome.  At 3.27, bellum is also used implicitly to 
refer to the affair. 
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the support of the Allobroges belli Transalpini et tumultus Gallici excitandi causa 
“In an attempt to start a war on the other side of the Alps and a rebellion in 
Cisalpine Gaul” (3.4).27   Later in the speech, he described the bellum using the 
superlatives consceleratissimum periculosissimumque ‘the most criminal and 
most dangerous’ (3.16), and as maximum crudelissimumque ‘the most serious 
and most savage’ (3.25).28  These instances occur after Cicero had informed 
the people of Rome that Lentulus and the other reliqua coniuratorum manushad 
confessed and after Cicero demonstrated that they were trying to aid Catiline 
and the army in Etruria.  Therefore, in these cases, Cicero used the term bellum 
to refer all of the affair’s activities. 
The adjective domesticum occurs once in the Third Oration during 
Cicero’s explanation of the responsa haruspicum.  The haruspices had insisted 
that the portents that occurred in 65 and 63 foretold that caedis atque incendia 
legum interitum et bellum civile ac domesticum et totius urbis atque imperi 
occasum appropinquare “Murder and arson, the end of the rule of law, 
[domestic] and civil war, the destruction of the whole city and of our empire 
were upon us” (3.19).29  It was no coincidence that practically all of the affair’s 
designs were included in Cicero’s report of the interpretation of the portents – 
the caedes atque incendia intended in Rome and the preparations for bellum in 
Etruria.  Cicero inserted this passage in the Third Oration to rhetorically 
accentuate the sacrilegious character of the affair, as was examined in Chapter 
1.3.30  Significantly, the purported bellum that was predicted was qualified as 
domesticum ac civile.  The two adjectives qualifying the type of bellum 
emphasized that those supporting the affair were cives.  However, the 
meanings of the two adjectives do not have to refer to the same action, 
because, as mentioned above, the conjunction ac can imply a separation for 
emphasis.31  Therefore, the bellum domesticum ac civile might separately 
indicate the disturbances occurring inside and outside Rome despite the fact 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See Chapter 2.4.2-4. 
28 The term bellum appears in tricolon at Cic. Cat. 3.25.  The passage is further examined below 
in Section 4.5.  
29 NB: I have inserted the word “domestic” into MacDonald’s (1977, 123) translation for 
domesticum because I feel his choice to translate the adjective as “rebellion” is misleading. 
30 See also Chapter 2 n.21. 
31 See n. 25. 
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that all the participants named, except the Allobroges, were cives from various 
parts of Italy.32 
This hypothesis is supported by Cicero’s comparison of his suppression 
of the bellum occurring at home by citizens inside and outside of Rome to the 
bella great Roman generals had fought and won against a foreign foe (3.27).  
Cicero declared that the res publica was fortunate to have two men protecting 
Rome at the same time – Pompey, who expanded the frontiers of the res 
publica through his many victories outside of Rome; and Cicero, who imperi 
domicilium sedisque servaret “has preserved the home and seat of this empire” 
(3.26).  However, Cicero continued to explain that victories in externa bella 
(‘foreign wars’) could not be celebrated if there was no Rome to return to, which 
suggested that his suppression of the affair was the most important victory of all 
(3.27).33  Although Cicero did not specifically use the term bellum to refer to the 
affair in this passage, the language he used implied that his suppression of the 
affair of 63 was opposite of a bellum externum.  We can suggest that Cicero 
implied the entire affair was a bellum internum.  Again, it should be noted that 
an adjective, which conveyed something occurring internally did not necessarily 
refer only to actions that occur inside the walls of Rome, but could also refer to 
those occurring outside of the city against other “Romans.” 
 In the Fourth Oration, Cicero used the term bellum twice and coniuratio 
four times.  Both terms interchangeably refer to the affair as a whole.34  Cicero 
claimed that he had saved the lives, homes, and temples of Rome from murder 
and fire.  He declared that the people thanked him from saving totam Italiam ex 
bello et vastitate “all Italy from war and devastation” (4.2).  As noted in the 
beginning of this section, his representation of a bellum encompassing tota 
Italia was clearly a tactic to stress the extent of the affair’s threat.  Cicero 
increased the rhetoric in the peroration, proclaiming that qua re mihi cum 
perditis civibus aeternum bellum susceptum esse video “I realize, therefore, that 
there lies before me an unending war against evil citizens” (4.22).35  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Brown (2003, 105) argues instead that Cicero deliberately used the ambiguous expression 
bellum domesticum ac civile to avoid using only the latter adjective, which Brown argues had 
more specific political implications than the former.  Dyck (2008, 194) argues that the 
expression is more clear than ambiguous, but does not continue to explain what it clarifies.  
33 Cicero went further in the Fourth Oration comparing his victory as significant as those in the 
Punic Wars, the Macedonian Wars, and Marius’ victories against the Germanic tribes (4.20-24). 
34 For bellum, cf. 4.2, 22.  For coniuratio, cf. 4.5, 6, 18, 20. 
35 Cf. Cic. Sull. 28: cum mihi uni cum omnibus improbis aeternum videam bellum esse 
susceptum “For I see that I alone have on my hands an unending war against all traitors.”  
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expression aeternum bellum perhaps expressed Cicero’s feelings towards the 
affair of 63.  However, if the Orations were revised for publication later, the 
expression aeternum bellum more likely referred to the events occurring after 
63.  The expression might have referred to the defeat of the army in Etruria a 
month later in January of 62,36 or the prosecutions of those accused for 
supporting the affair later that year,37 or the purported ongoing suppression of 
the disturbances in other regions outside of Rome the affair’s supporters were 
attempting to incite.38  Another possibility was that the expression aeternum 
bellum foreshadowed Cicero’s future political troubles after his consulship, 
specifically due to the execution of Lentulus and the others that eventually led to 
his voluntary retreat into exile in 58.39 
Cicero used the adjective domesticus to qualify the bellum that the 
affair’s participants were preparing more often than any other qualifying 
adjective in the Orations.  In light of the evidence presented in this section, I 
demonstrated that Cicero used the adjective to refer to those involved with the 
actions of the affair inside and outside of Rome to stress both the internal and 
external facets of the threat facing the res publica.  Apparently, it was not 
Cicero’s intention to label the bellum that the affair’s participants would wage as 
a bellum civile or he probably would have used the expression more than once 
in the Orations.  The only instance of the expression bellum civile occurred in 
the passage regarding the haruspicum responsa to the portents, which occurred 
in 65 and 63 (3.19).40  However, Cicero also claimed the haruspicum responsa 
predicted a bellum domesticum.  As suggested above, perhaps both qualifying 
adjectives were used alongside bellum to refer to the bellum in Etruria and the 
rhetorical bellum against Rome that was being planned by those still remaining 
in the city.  There was doubtlessly increasing political pressure on Cicero due to 
the severity of his actions as consul.  So Cicero might have edited the published 
versions of the Orations to address the critics of his consulship and prove that 
the res publica was confronted with threats both externally and internally by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Cic. Fam. 5.2. 
37 In 62, Cicero identified some of those who were convicted for their involvement with the affair 
of 63 in the Pro Sullla (5-7).  On the date of the Pro Sulla, see Chapter 2 n.130.  In 59, Cicero 
defended his colleague Antonius from the same accusation, see Chapter 2 n.106.  In 56, Cicero 
defended M. Caelius Rufus, who the prosecutors claimed was a supporter of the affair in 63 
(Cael. 10-15).  
38 See Chapter 3 n.107. 
39 See Chapter 2 nn.127-8. 
40 For the portents, see Chapter 2 n.316. 
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using the varied expression bellum domestiucm, bellum intestinum, or bellum 
civile.  Therefore Cicero used both the terms coniuratio and bellum to refer to 
the affair, which could only increase the affair’s overall threat.  Cicero wanted to 
show that he was left with no option but to recommend that Lentulus and the 
others should be sentenced to death.41  In addition, as explained above, Cicero 
wanted to identify the affair of 63 as a bellum in order to compare his victory 
over the affair’s participants to those of the great Roman generals of the past.  
Therefore, Cicero used the instances of bellum strategically when he needed to 
accentuate the wicked nature of those planning to wage what clearly was a 
bellum civile.  However, the reasons why Cicero primarily avoids labeling the 
affair as a “civil war” the expression will be examined later in section 4, after first 
examining the way Sallust used the term bellum in reference to the affair. 
 
4.2  The use of the term bellum in Sallust’s Catilina 
Sallust used the term bellum 29 times to specifically refer to the affair of 
63 in the Catilina.42  Similarly, the term coniuratio or its cognates occurred 29 
times to identify the affair and its participants.  Sallust often used the term 
coniuratio in conjunction with terms that conveyed the aspects usually found 
when describing a conspiratorial context, as noted in Chapter 1.43  However, we 
should not overemphasize the coincidence that both terms occurred the same 
number of times in reference to the events associated with the affair of 63.  Of 
course, Sallust was not counting or concerned with the number of occurrences 
of either term in his monograph.  However, similar to Cicero, Sallust used both 
terms to demonstrate that the affair’s participants planned to achieve their aims 
not only through the subversive tactics related to a coniuratio, but also by 
preparing for bellum.  On the other hand, again in a similar manner to Cicero, 
Sallust sometimes used the term bellum not only to refer to the military 
preparations outside of Rome, but also in reference to the affair as a whole. 
Initially, Sallust claimed that Catiline persuaded others to join the 
coniuratio by enticing them with the magna praemia coniurationis “the great !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Concerning Cicero’s denial that he alone should be blamed for Lentulus and the others’ 
execution, see Robinson, 1994.  
42 The term bellum occurs 52 times throughout the Catilina and 29 instances refer to the affair of 
63, cf. Sall. Cat. 5.2, 16.4, 17.6, 20.15, 21.1, 2, 24.2, 26.5, 27.4, 30.2, 31.3, 32.1, 2, 33.4, 37.9, 
39.6, 40.1, 43.1, 47.2, 48.1, 2, 51.9, 52.3, 24, 34, 57.1, 5, 58.2, 58.16. 
43 For the instances of coniuratio in the Catilina, see Chapter 1 n.17.  
! 202 
prizes of affair” (Sall. B Cat. 17.1).  Conversely, in Sallust’s invented speech for 
Catiline, he reported that Catiline urged his supporters that the way to extricate 
themselves from their hopeless position was to win the belli spolia magnifica 
“splendid spoils of war” (20.15).  These men then questioned Catiline about 
what these belli spolia would be and quae condicio belli foret “the conditions 
under which war would be waged” (21.1).  As mentioned before, Sallust 
recorded that Catiline promised the participants in the affair tabulae novae, the 
proscription of the rich, magistracies, priesthoods, plunder and omnia quae 
bellum atque lubido victorum fert “all the other spoils that war and the license of 
victors can offer” (21.2).44  Sallust switched from praemia coniurationis to belli 
spolia probably to offer a stylistic variation, not to differentiate between the 
actions occurring inside and outside of Rome.  In these instances, the terms 
coniuratio and bellum clearly identified all of the affair’s activities regardless of 
where they physically occurred. 
Sallust’s narrative followed Cicero’s account that after Catiline fled Rome 
his primary role in the affair of 63 was to lead the army in Etruria.  Sallust 
sometimes used the term bellum to specifically identify the affair’s activities 
occurring outside of Rome three times.  After Catiline’s initial plan to murder 
Cicero in the Campus Martius during the elections of 63 was foiled and after 
Catiline failed to be elected consul, Sallust recorded that constituit bellum facere 
“He [Catiline] resolved to take the field” (26.5).  Sallust suggested that Catiline 
thought he would be more useful leading the army in Etruria and hoped those 
who were sent to the other regions in Italy initium belli facerent ‘to start a war’ 
were more successful than the initial failure of the murders planned in Rome 
(27.4).45  After Cicero was informed about the affair and delivered the First 
Oration divulging its plans, Catiline believed that their plans for murder and 
arson in the city were compromised for the time being.  Due to Cicero’s 
detection of these plans, Sallust claimed Catiline thought his best course of 
action was exercitum augere ac prius quam legiones scriberentur multa 
antecapere, quae bello usui foret “To increase the size of his army and secure 
many of the necessities of war before the legions were enrolled” (32.1).  The 
last instance of the term explicitly identifying the action in Etruria as a bellum !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 See Chapter 3 n.13. 
45 Sallust has Catiline blame the others in the affair for their ignavia (‘cowardice’) because they 
had failed to murder Cicero during the elections in 63 (Sall. Cat. 27.4).  Sallust continued to 
describe the second failed assassination of Cicero by C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius (28.1-3). 
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occurred after Catiline heard that Lentulus and the others had been executed 
and realized in urbe res advorsas ‘the plans in the city had failed’.  Sallust 
reported that the army in Etruria was surrounded, so Catiline had no choice but 
fortunam temptare belli ‘to try his luck in war’ (57.5). 
Sallust also described other people than Catiline supporting the affair 
who had a similar desire to start a bellum.  Sallust claimed that: i) the iuvenes 
nobilis were attracted to the affair because bellum quam pacem malebant ‘they 
preferred war than peace’ (17.6), ii) those who had suffered due to the 
proscriptions and confiscations during the reign of Sulla belli eventum 
exspectabant “looked forward…to the issue of a war” (37.9), and iii) the plebs 
who Sallust claimed had initially been also nimis bello favebat “too eager for 
war” (48.1).46  Sallust wanted to stress that people from all classes were 
attracted to the plan to wage bellum.  However, as noted, the plebeians in 
Rome were not in favor of the plan to set parts of the city on fire.47  Sallust’s 
narrative created a pervading sense that there were many in the res publica that 
were discouraged with their current lot in life to resort to violence. 
Sallust also identified the military preparations of the bellum using the 
phrase in agrum to express that the disturbances specifically occurring outside 
of Rome.  The following instances occurred outside of Rome and described 
military operations using other terms implying a state of “war.”  Sallust reported 
that: i) Catiline sent Septimius in agrum Picenum along with Manlius to Etruria 
and Julius to Apulia where, as mentioned above, they were initium belli facerent 
(27.1, 4); ii) the Senate sent Q. Pompeius Rufus to Capua and Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Celer in agrum Picenum…exercitum compararent “to the Picene 
district… to raise an army” (30.5); iii) C. Flaminius helped Catiline in agro 
Arretino dum vicinitatem antea sollicitatam armis exornat “in the vicinity of 
Arretium, where he supplied arms to the populace, which had already been 
roused to revolt” (36.1); iv) there were continuing disturbances in agro Piceno, 
Bruttio, Apulia (42.1); v) Lentulus and the other coniurati remaining in Rome 
were waiting to commence the hostilies in Rome cum Catilina in agrum 
Faesulanum cum exercitu venisset “when Catiline arrived in the region of 
Faesulae with his army” (43.1); and vi) the first and final battle against Catiline, 
Manlius, and the army in Etruria was fought in agrum Pistoriensem and this was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 NB: In the same passage, Sallust also claimed the plebs initially hoped for res novae (48.1). 
47 See Chapter 2 n.35. 
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where Catiline decided to, as mentioned above, fortunam belli temptare (57.1, 
5).  The majority of the military actions of the bellum were placed in agris 
specifically outside of Rome.  However, as examined above, Sallust 
demonstrated that many people believed a bellum would improve their position.  
Therefore, one can suggest that he used the term bellum to identify one of the 
actions of the affair.  As mentioned, Sallust’s monograph highlighted the decline 
of morals in the post-Sullan Rome and represented the affair’s participants as 
those who were specifically corrupted by the increase in vice.48  Therefore, the 
term further emphasized the wickedness of the affair by claiming that only the 
most immoral individuals were willing to fight against their own country. 
Sallust used the term bellum rhetorically, similar to Cicero, in order to 
persuade his readers that the res publica was also facing the threat of bellum 
beyond the localized plans of murder and arson in Rome.  This theme is also 
expressed when Sallust described the fears that a bellum can instill and the 
horrors that bellum can bring.  He recorded that when Cicero revealed the 
extent of the affair’s plans and set watches throughout the city (30.7), the 
citizens were overwhelmed with fear and concern whether their leaders would 
be able to protect them from timor belli “the terrors of war” (31.3).  Sallust wrote 
that Catiline urged the participants remaining in Rome to prepare aliaque belli 
facinora “the other horrors of war” (32.2).  However, in these two instances, the 
term bellum actually referred to the actions that were planned to take place 
inside of Rome.  Sallust has Caesar imply that the belli saevitia “the horrors of 
war” were conflated to increase the odium against Lentulus and the others who 
were being sentenced on December 5 (51.9).  No matter how earnestly 
Sallust’s monograph emphasized the danger of the affair by using the term 
bellum, the fact that all of the affair’s plans were either aborted or failed is 
obvious.  Instead, in these cases, Sallust used the term bellum in reference to 
the activities occurring inside of Rome planned by its own countrymen.49  
Sallust implied that the bellum being conducted in 63 was the most lamentable 
of all wars because it pitted citizen against citizen.  However, Sallust, like 
Cicero, generally avoided using an adjective to qualify the specific type of 
bellum that was waged. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 For the decline of morality in the Catilina after Sulla, cf. Laistner 1947, 52-5; Earl 1961, 42-7; 
Syme 1964, 66-7; Lintott 1972, 626-8; Vretska 1976, 203-6; McGushin 1977, 62-3 and 104-5; 
Levick 1982, 53-62; Levene 2000, 174-80.  
49 See Chapter 2.2. 
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Sallust used the adjective intestinus once when describing Catiline’s 
character.  Sallust said that ab adulescentia bella intestina…exercuit ‘Catiline 
was well versed in bella intestina from youth’ (5.2).  The expression bella 
intestina might refer to the armed conflicts where Catiline gained his early 
military experience.  As mentioned, there is evidence that Catiline fought under 
Cn. Pompeius Strabo during the Social War and under Sulla in his struggle 
against the Marians.50  Scholars continue to debate whether the Social War was 
appropriately named and whether it should be considered a civil war.51  On the 
other hand, the conflicts between the Sullans and Marians were certainly wars 
between citizens.  The adjective civilis most likely referred to those with citizen 
status, so perhaps the reason Sallust chose to use the adjective intestinus 
instead was to include both the Social War and the “civil war” between the 
Sullans and Marians.52  Sallust also included the terms caedes, rapinae and the 
expression discordia civilis, which were probably further allusions to Catiline’s 
actions during Sulla’s reign.53  If the expression discordia civilis was used to 
identify Catiline’s association with Sulla then it perhaps referred to the bella 
intestina between the Sullans and Marians.  Therefore, this instance of bella 
intestina suggested a bellum civile without Sallust having to explicitly use the 
latter expression. 
According to the Catilina, rumors proliferated throughout Rome after the 
Senate received the initial report in late October of the armed uprising in 
Faesulae.  One rumor was that a bellum servile was occurring in Capua and in 
Apulia (30.1).  The Senate adhered to the rumors and decreed that Q. Metellus 
Creticus was sent to Apulia and Q. Pompeius Rufus to Capua with instructions 
to raise an army (30.3-5).54  The alleged disturbances in Apulia and Capua and 
whether the servi were solicited to join the affair were discussed in Chapter 3.4.  
This section explained that, according to Sallust, Catiline had refused to enroll !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 See Chapter 3 nn.48-9. 
51 Although Appian included the Social War in his work on civil wars (App. B Civ. 1.34-53), 
however, so was the affair of 63 (2.2-7).  Still it is debatable that the Social War was a ‘civil war’ 
more than a war about citizenship as Appian claimed (1.34-39).  On the corresponding Greek 
term !"µµ#$%&ὸ' ()*+µ,' and other ways the so-called Social War was named, cf. 
Rosenberger 1992, 38; Brown 2003, 102. 
52 Our sources referred to the so-called Social War in various ways for various reasons, cf. Jal 
1962, 257-67; Rosenberger 1992, 35-6; Brown 2003, 96-102. 
53 The term caedes may refer to Catiline’s alleged murders during the proscriptions; cf. Asc. 84, 
87, 90; [Q.Cic.] Comm. Pet. 9; Plut. Sull. 32.  See Chapter 3 p.158.  The term rapinae may refer 
to his alleged siege of a town that opposed Sulla after his victory over the Marians; cf. Sall. Hist. 
1.46.  See also, Chapter 3 n.49. 
54 See further Chapter 3.4. 
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slaves into the army in Etruria, however, Lentulus had no reservations of 
enlisting slaves to help achieve the affair’s ultimate goal of gaining power in 
Rome (44.6, 56.5).55  Perhaps Catiline refused to use slaves, but the 
participants who were sent to the other regions throughout Italy to solicit support 
probably attempted to induce slaves to join the affair.  Sallust recorded that 
Catiline sent C. Julius into Apulia, but was not specific about his task (27.1).  On 
the other hand, Sallust claimed M. Caeparius was sent to Apulia ad concitanda 
servitia proficisci “to stir the slaves to revolt” (46.3).56  Whether the affair’s 
participants were successful in inciting the slaves to join the affair and start a 
bellum servile in Apulia remains uncertain.  In any case, the Catilina only 
describes the actions occurring in Rome and Etruria in great detail and instead 
portrays the actions in the other areas as an ancillary part of the affair or a 
coincidental occurrence. Perhaps it was not accidental that the expression 
bellum servile occurs in a conjectural context, as Sallust was primarily 
concerned with portraying the bellum in 63 as one fought between citizens.  
However, the expression bellum civile only occurs twice in the Catilina, which is 
examined in the following section. 
 
4.3  Sallust and the implied bellum civile of 63 
Sallust used the expression bellum civile during his account of the 
haruspicum responsa to describe the many portents that had occurred in 65 
and 63.57  He explained that the haruspices foretold that the year 63 bello civili 
cruentum fore “would be stained with the blood of civil war” (Sall. Cat. 47.2).  It 
should be recalled that when Cicero discussed the haruspicum responsa, he 
used the phrase bellum civile ac domesticum, whereas Sallust only used the 
former adjective to qualify the bellum that was predicted (Cic. Cat. 3.19).  
Another difference between Cicero and Sallust’s corresponding accounts of the 
haruspicum responsa and the way each author used the phrase bellum civile is 
that Sallust’s account occurs in his narrative while specifically describing the 
deposition by the Allobrogean envoys in connection with their disclosure of the 
supposed prophecy of 63; whereas Cicero’s account occurs when describing 
the serendipitous erection of the statue of Jupiter on the day of the capture of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 See Chapter 2 nn.257-60. 
56 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14: in M. Caeparium cui ad sollicitandos pastores Apuliam attributam “And of 
Marcus Caeparius to whom, as had been shown, Apulia had been assigned for him to raise the 
shepherds there.” 
57 See Chapter 2 n.316. 
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Lentulus and some of the others in the reliqua coniuratorum manus.  In Chapter 
2, I suggested that Lentulus most likely believed in the prophecy.  Although the 
expression occurs in an auspicious context, the timeline of when the bellum 
civile would erupt was specific and corresponded with the timeline of the 
prophecy.  Therefore, if the haruspices predicted that a bellum civile would 
occur in 63 then it follows that Lentulus and anyone else who believed he was 
the third Cornelii to rule Rome probably thought the prediction specifically 
referred to the type of bellum he would wage to fulfill the prophecy.  However, in 
this passage, Sallust was only reporting the haruspicum responsa, not 
expressing his personal opinion of the type of bellum the affair was planning.  
Therefore, we cannot determine from this instance alone whether Sallust felt the 
bellum in 63 was the bellum civile, which the haruspices foretold.  
 The second and final instances of the expression bellum civile in the 
Catilina occur when Sallust implied that one motive behind Catiline’s decision to 
overthrow the res publica was the willingness by the veterans of Sulla’s army to 
join the affair.  Sallust declared that the veterans usi rapinarum et victoriae 
veteris memores civile bellum exoptabant “now thought with longing of their 
former pillage and victories, were eager for civil war” (Sall. B Cat. 16.4).  Sallust 
explained that one of the reasons the veterans desired a bellum civile was due 
to their massive debts and their misuse of the land they were assigned after 
their service under Sulla.58  Sallust perhaps associated the bellum civile with the 
Sullan veterans alone in this instance because the expression recalled their 
involvement with the conflicts between the Roman citizens supporting Sulla or 
Marius.  After Sulla’s victory over the Marians, his veterans benefited in part 
from the ensuing proscriptions and confiscations of land from areas that 
supported the Marians, which was examined in Chapter 3.4.59  On the one 
hand, Sallust probably used the expression bellum civile to evoke contempt for 
these Sullan veterans and the wars they fought against other Romans during 
the late 80’s.  On the other, the expression might allude to Manlius and the 
veterans’ military preparations in Faesulae and perhaps alluded to the other 
Sullan veterans in different parts of Italy who supported the affair as well. 
Sallust had the Sullan veteran Manlius refer to the other Sullan veterans 
in his army as cives (33.5).  Presumably, most of the Sullan veterans had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.20; Sall. B Cat. 16.4, 33.1. 
59 See also Chapter 3 n.110. 
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citizen status or at least the opportunity to receive citizenship after they were 
settled in the coloniae.60  Although Sallust did not explicitly use the expression 
bellum civile to identify the hostile military actions the affair was preparing, the 
phrase suggested that those willing to wage the bellum, particularly the army in 
Etruria, were cives.  We could argue that due to the hostes declarations Catiline 
and Manlius’ army had lost their official status as cives.  However, I believe that 
Sallust was not concerned with such a technicality.  Sallust wanted instead to 
stress the horrific nature of a conflict that pitted Roman versus Roman.  
Therefore, the army’s official status as hostes does not, in my opinion, supply a 
reason that Sallust chose to avoid using the specific expression bellum civile, as 
who was fighting who in the Catilina is clearly understood. 
The climax of the Catilina described Catiline, Manlius, and their army’s 
last stand against the loyal forces of the res publica in an evocative and 
eloquent style (56.1-61.9).61  Sallust began the account by describing how the 
army of Catiline and Manlius was ill equipped and undermanned (56.3).62  The 
army decided to retreat to Gaul after the fate of the coniurati remaining in Rome 
was known (57.1).  Catiline, Manlius and their army found themselves 
surrounded in the mountains near Pistoria, from the north by the forces 
commanded by Q. Metellus Celer and the south by C. Antonius’ forces.63  With 
nowhere to turn, Sallust invented a valiant speech for Catiline typical of a 
commander rallying his troops.64  Catiline implored his troops not to desert and 
exhorted them to fight pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita “for country, for freedom, 
for life” (58.11).  Sallust continued to describe the order of battle and recorded 
that C. Antonius’ legate, M. Petreius, encouraged his troops by stating that they, 
too, were to fight in defense pro patria, pro liberis, pro aris atque focis suis “of 
his country, his children, his altars and his hearth” (59.5).65  Both Catiline and 
Petreius claimed that their armies were fighting for the patria, implying that both 
armies were composed of Roman citizens.  After Catiline and Manlius’ army 
was defeated, Sallust bemoaned that the victorious Roman army had defeated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 On the citizen status of Sulla’s veterans, cf. Brunt 1962; Gabba 1976, 24-6; Cagniart 2007, 
82-3. 
61 Cf. Syme 1964, 68; Vretska 1976, 643-8. 
62 On the various estimates of the size of the army, see Chapter n.59. 
63 On the perceived movements of both the army in Etruria and the forces loyal to the res 
publica, see Sumner 1963. 
64 On Sallust’s speech for Catiline as an example of the establish topos regarding a general’s 
speech to his army before battle, cf. McGushin 1977, 280-3; Batstone 2010, 227ff. 
65 Cf. Sall. Cat. 20.7-8. 
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an army comprised of amici (‘friends’), hospes (‘guests’), and cognati 
(‘relatives’) further indicating that the battle fought in Etruria was between 
people from the same country (61.8).  In the final sentence of the Catilina, 
Sallust lamented ita varie per omnem exercitum laetitia, maeror, luctus atque 
gaudia agitabantur “Thus the whole army was variously affected with sorrow 
and grief, rejoicing and lamentation” (61.9).  Sallust does not need to use the 
specific term bellum civile in the climax of his monograph because a “civil war” 
is understood.  One of Sallust’s aims as a historian was to demonstrate the 
despicable and melancholic qualities of a bellum civile in any period.  He 
described “civil war” using other expressions more often than bellum civile, 
which is investigated in section 4.5.  The next section will discuss Cicero’s use 
of the expression bellum civile, or lack of, to identify the affair of 63. 
 
4.4  Cicero’s avoidance of the expression bellum civile 
As shown in the first section of this chapter, Cicero used the expression 
bellum civile once in an oblique reference to the affair when recounting the 
haruspicum responsa in the Third Oration.  However, in all four Orations and 
the Pro Murena, Cicero continually stressed that the people supporting the affair 
were Roman citizens in order to magnify their traitorous intentions.  Conversely, 
Cicero also tried to demonstrate that the cives involved with the affair should be 
considered hostes.  I examined in Chapter 3 how Cicero connected the actions 
occurring inside and outside of Rome in order to portray that all the affair’s 
participants were hostes rei publicae; and in order that the SCU was passed so 
he could take extraordinary measures to punish these citizens turned enemies 
and effectively prevent their attempt to gain power in Rome.66  In addition to 
hostes, Cicero often represented the cives who were planning to wage bellum 
as latrones (‘mercenaries or bandits’) and the affair as latrocinium (‘banditry’) in 
the Orations and the Pro Murena.67 
The terms latrones and latrocinium occur ten times in the Orations and 
once in the Pro Murena.  Three instances refer to the affair as a whole (cf. Cic. 
Cat. 1.27, 2.1, 22), whereas the rest are used to deride Catiline or his and 
Manlius’ army in Etruria rather than indicating that latrocinium was a genuine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 See Chapter 3.3. 
67 OLD (latro) s.v. 1-2; (latrocinium) s.v. 1. 
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identification for the affair (cf. Cat. 1.23, 31, 33, 2.7, 16, 24, 3.17, Mur. 84).68  
Cicero claimed that Catiline’s plan to wage a bellum should susceptum 
latrocinium potius quam bellum nominaretur “go under the name of banditry not 
war” (1.27).  In this case, Cicero did not refrain from comparing the bellum and 
latrocinium however, he often used the former term to emphasize the threat 
facing Rome, as shown above, and the latter term primarily as an insult against 
the affair and those supporting it.  By comparing the bellum to latrocinium, 
Cicero had seemingly undermined his claim that the res publica faced a 
dangerous situation similar to a bellum.69  However, the reason Cicero made 
this comparison was most likely to increase the hostility towards the affair’s 
participants who, according to him, were acting like outlaws; and to accentuate 
the desperate measures they were employing to threaten the res publica.  In 
turn, Cicero wanted to decrease the resentment that may have arisen due to his 
decision to send armies against citizens throughout Italy that might be attracted 
to support the affair.  Therefore, he disparaged those involved by identifying 
them as lawless latrones and their actions as latrocinium.  In addition, Cicero 
highlighted the criminality of the affair’s participants because often labeling them 
hostes. 
Cicero uses the term hostes to identify the citizens involved with the 
affair to convince his audience that those involved were acting as ‘enemies’ not 
cives.  He continually emphasized this point in the Orations and the Pro 
Murena.  Again, I already explained that if Catiline and Manlius were formally 
declared hostes rei publicae then the other citizens associated with them were 
most likely considered the same.70  This was clearly Cicero’s tactic.  He used 
the term hostis 28 times in the Orations and three times in the Pro Murena to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 On Cicero’s usage of latrones or its cognates in relation to the affair, cf. Jal 1963b, 67-70; 
Burian 1984, 17-23, Habinek 1998, 69-87. Jal (1963b, 69) argues that the term was sometimes 
used with the intention to ridicule an opponent who was acting as a hostis.  Burian (1984, 17-
23) concurs, but his work focuses on the way the term was used as an insult in judicial contexts.  
Habinek (1998) concludes that Cicero used the term to suit the purpose of his individual 
speeches. NB: Sallust used the term latrones twice.  First, he claims that Manlius enlisted 
latrones into the army in Etruria (Sall. B Cat. 28.4).  Second, the term was used in Petreius’ 
speech to his army encouraging his troops who claimed the army in Etruria were composed of 
latrones inermis “unarmed highwaymen” (59.5).  
69 Cicero insulted the courage of the army in Etruria stating that verum etiam si edictum 
praetoris ostendero, concident “They will collapse if I show them the praeotr’s edict”  (Cic. Cat. 
2.5).  Jal (1963b, 68) insinuates that Cicero’s statement further degraded the threat of the army 
in Etruria.  However, this passage does not explicitly refer to the army as latrones instead 
Cicero claimed the army was composed of senses (‘old men’), surely an allusion to the Sullan 
veterans, and rustici (‘peasants’), which might allude to the inhabitants of areas dispossessed 
by the foundation of Sullan coloniae. 
70 See Chapter 3.3. 
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imply that the affair’s participants were enemies of Rome.71  Occasionally, these 
instances overlap as Cicero used the term hostis to refer to anyone attempting 
to support the affair.  In other cases, the term was used to refer to those who 
were explicitly involved with the affair either outside or inside of Rome.  I will not 
discuss each instance of the term hostis in the Orations and the Pro Murena 
because, regardless of whom the term referred to, the term hostis emphasized 
the criminality of the affair as a whole. 72  The instances of the term hostis I 
examine below occur in contrast with the term cives to show how Cicero 
stressed the hostile nature of the citizens supporting the affair. 
The reason Cicero frequently used the term hostis becomes clearer in 
each succeeding Oration, as evidenced in the following selected passages.  In 
the First Oration, Cicero explained that there was a legal precedent in Rome 
against those who were recognized as hostes.  He argued at numquam in hac 
urbe qui a re publica defecerunt civium iura tenuerunt “Never in this city have 
those who have rebelled against the State kept the rights of citizens” (1.28).73  
In the Second Oration, he explained that the cives involved with the affair both 
inside and outside of Rome should be treated like hostes.  When describing the 
situation to the people recalling the alienation Catiline received in the Senate 
during the First Oration, Cicero asked quis denique ita aspexit ut perdotum 
civem ac non potius ut importunissimum hostem? “Who treated him as a citizen, 
though a scoundrel, and not as the most dangerous of hostis?” (2.12).  In 
addition, he continued to warn the people in Rome to be vigilant against those 
who were supporting the affair remaining inside the city.  Regarding the 
members of the reliqua coniuratorum manus, Cicero reminded his audience that 
quamquam sunt hostes, tamen, quia nati sunt cives “Although they are 
enemies, still they were born citizens” (2.27).  It was clear that in Cicero’s 
opinion any civis inside of Rome who continued to support the affair was acting 
as a hostis similar to Catiline, Manlius, and the army in Etruria.  In the Third !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 NB: In the Orations the term hostis is used four additional times to refer to ‘non-Roman’ 
enemies (Cic. Cat. 1.3, 2.29, 3.27, 4.22) and once in reference to the affair’ enemies implying 
the people of Rome (3.25).  These occurrences in the Orations are excluded from my count.  
See also, n. 72. 
72 The term hostis is used in reference to Catiline fourteen times (cf. Cat. 1.13, 27, 2.1, 3, 4 
(bis), 12, 17 (ter), 29 3.17, 4.16, 22; Mur. 83); in reference to Manlius and the army nine times 
(cf. Cat. 1.5 (bis), 27, 33, 2.1, 4, 15, 29 4.22); and sixteen times to represent the citizens 
supporting the affair both inside and outside of Rome (1.5, 33, 2.4, 11, 27, 3.15, 22, 25, 28, 
4.10, 13, 15, 16, 22; Mur. 84 (bis). 
73 Cicero similarly declared that Lentulus had lost his right to be a praetor of Rome and his 
citizenship when he confessed to being involved in the affair (Cic. Cat. 3.15).  
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Oration, Cicero used the adjective domesticus to qualify the noun hostis three 
times to emphasize that the cives who had confessed to supporting the affair 
were not “non-Romans,” but fundamentally “native enemies” (3.15, 22, 28).74 
Cicero recast Caesar’s explanation of the lex Sempronia, which affirmed 
a Roman citizen’s right to appeal to the people, to suit his argument that those 
who had confessed to supporting the affair should face capital punishment in 
the Fourth Oration.  Cicero claimed the lex should not be applied in this case 
because: rei publicae sit hostis eum civem esse nullo modo posse “An enemy 
of the Republic cannot in any respect be regarded as a citizen” (4.10).  He 
maintained his opinion that those who had confessed neque in improborum 
civium sed in acerbissimorum hostium numero habendos “are to be classed as 
mortal public enemies, not just wicked citizens” (4.15).  Since Cicero was 
recommending that Lentulus and the others who had confessed to their crimes 
should be put to death without a trial, he was conscious of the enmity this action 
would bring.75  Therefore, Cicero needed to convince the Senate and the 
people of Rome that these cives were worse than the non-Roman hostes that 
threatened the res publica with bellum.  Cicero was determined in the Fourth 
Oration to equate the cives involved in the affair to hostes to accentuate the 
traitorous quality of the affair.  Ultimately, in the peroration of the speech, he 
declared that all the cives involved hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt “have 
once become traitors to their own country” (4.22). 
Jal, Rosenberger, and Brown in their studies of the expression bellum 
civile highlight its political and social ramifications, and the expression’s 
‘negative’ connotations.76  Perhaps the negative perception of the expression 
was the reason Cicero rarely used it to interpret any specific part of the affair.  
Again, if Cicero thought that the bellum that those supporting the affair were 
planning to wage was a bellum civile, then surely the expression would occur 
more than once and not only when describing what the haruspices predicted 
would supposedly occur in 63 (Cic. Cat. 3.19). Cicero perhaps avoided using 
the expression bellum civile because in his opinion the affair’s participants were 
no longer cives but hostes, as shown above.77  Therefore the magistrates, 
whom Cicero and the Senate sent to raise armies to battle the forces in Etruria !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 On the term hostis domesticus, see Jal 1963b, 58-60. 
75 See Chapter 3 n.105. 
76 Cf. Jal 1963a; Rosenberger 1992, 155-6; Brown 2003, 120. 
77 Brown 2003, 105. 
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and the other areas he claimed were supporting the affair, would be, in his 
words, fighting a bellum iustum (‘a just war’) against a legitimate hostis (2.1).  
As explained in the last paragraph, Cicero used the same tactic concerning the 
five cives that were acting as hostes in order to convince the Senate in the 
Fourth Oration that the cives should be executed.  Evidently, Cicero used the 
term bellum often without a qualifying adjective to refer to the actions of the 
affair both inside and outside of Rome. 
Cicero’s continually insisted that the affair’s participants planned to wage 
a bellum.  Although Cicero does not often define the type of bellum that would 
transpire, the seriousness of the implication is unaffected.  Instead, his 
ambiguity magnified the unique danger and complexity of the affair.  Cicero 
continually claimed throughout the Orations that he knew all of the affair’s plans 
in order to assuage the fears that his account of the extent of the affair might 
instill.  Whether he identified the affair as either a coniuratio, or a bellum, or 
sometimes as both situations occurring at once in the Orations, Cicero always 
professed that he was apprised of the affair’s plans, the number of people 
willing to support it, and the influential citizens who were involved.  However, 
the specific manner in which Cicero used the term bellum either literally or 
figuratively was significant in order to legitimize the severe measures he needed 
to take to prevent the affair.  Therefore, he used the term bellum to further 
establish that the participant’s ultimate goal to gain power in Rome included 
both seditious and violent measures.  
 
4.5  Dissensio civilis and Cicero’s representation of armed conflict 
The expression dissensio civilis or the alternative expression dissensio 
civium can define a “disagreement between citizens.”78  Cicero used the term 
dissensio without any qualifying adjective when he was explicitly referring to a 
“difference of opinion,” which is most often found in his philosophical works.79  
However, in the De Amicitia, Cicero explained that nothing is worse among 
friends than going to bellum over a dissensio (Cic. Amic. 77).80  Hellegouarc’h !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 dissensio: TLL V.1455.8-10. 
79 OLD (dissensio) s.v. 2.  For dissensio, cf. Cic. Brut. 185, 188, 264; Fin. 1.11, 2.49, 119, 3.44, 
4.32, 60, 75, 5.12, 16, 17, 76; Tusc. Dis. 1.18, 2.4, 5.22; Nat. Deo. 1.2, 14, 16; Div. 2.38, 83; 
Off. 3.56, 88; Leg. 1.8, 47, 52, 53, 55, 57, 2.32. 
80 Cic. Amic. 77: Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta 
erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit… cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae 
depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo 
bellum gerere quocum familiariter vixeris. ‘But if on the other hand, as usually happens, a mere 
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explains that the term dissensio frequently expresses disagreement between 
two individuals or groups, particularly in the political sphere.  Hellegourac’h 
argues that when dissensio is qualified with the adjective civilis, it roughly 
conveys a context akin to “revolution” in modern terminology.81  However, 
Cicero did not use the expression dissensio civilis to signify what we today 
would conclusively identify as a genuine “revolution,” which typically defines an 
attempt to change a government’s current political system.82  As shown below, 
Cicero most frequently used the expression dissensio civilis to signify the initial 
cause of a bellum civile or as an alternative phrase to express a bellum civile.  
Therefore, the expression dissensio civilis may signify a “revolt’ against those in 
power.  However, according to Cicero’s usage of the expression, it is debatable 
if a dissensio civilis corresponded with the often ambiguous and problematic 
modern term “revolution”, as Hellegouarc’h suggests.83 
Cicero used the expression dissensio civilis twice in the Verrines when 
he was prosecuting C. Verres on a charge de repetundis in 70.  The expression 
was used to describe the tumultuous conflict between the Sullans and Marians 
in the previous decade.  Cicero first used the expression to recount the moment 
when Verres changed his allegiance from supporting Carbo, under who Verres 
served as quaestor in 83, to supporting Carbo’s enemy Sulla when he returned 
to Italy.84  Cicero explained that etat tum dissensio civium “At that time, 
dissensio civium prevailed” (Cic. Ver. 2.1.34).  He used the expression a 
second time recalling the conflicts between Sulla and Marius.  He reminded his 
audience of civilis enim dissensionis et seu amentiae seu fati seu calamitatis 
non est iste molestus exitus, in quo reliquos saltem civis incolumis licet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
change of disposition and of tastes should occur, or if a dissensio in political views should 
arise… care must be taken lest it appear, not only that friendship has been put aside, but that 
open hostility has been aroused.  For nothing is more discreditable than to be at war with one 
with whom you have lived on intimate terms.” Cf. Off. 1.87:  Idemque praecipit, ‘ut eos 
adversarios existimemus, qui arma contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam 
velint’, qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio. “And he [Plato] 
likewise lays down the rule ‘that we should regard those as adversaries who take up arms 
against the state, not those who strive to have the government administered according to their 
convictions. This was the spirit of disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus 
Metellus: there was no trace of dissensio”. 
81 Hellegouarc’h (1963, 133-4) states that when dissensio is qualified by the adjective civilis, “Il y 
prend une valeur concrète qui fait qu’il se trouve au pluriel dans un sens qui est alors à peu 
près celui de seditio et celui du français ‘révolte’ ou ‘révolution’”  
82 See Oxford English Dictionary, “revolution” s.v.1. 
83 NB: Equating the Latin term dissensio with the modern term ‘revolution’ creates more 
problems than solutions.  Hellegouarc’h also suggests that the term dissensio conveyed a 
similar sense to the term seditio, which I think is more à propos.  For seditio, see Hellegouarc’h 
1963, 135-7. 
84 See RE VIIIa2 (Verres) no.1, 1563-8. 
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conservare “Our dissensio civilis – our insanity, our sad destiny, our evil luck, I 
know not which to call it, has ended not unhappily, in that we are at least 
allowed to preserve unharmed such of our countrymen as have survived it” 
(Ver. 2.5.152).  In this passage, Cicero was comparing the fate of Roman 
citizens, who were fortunate to survive the dissensio civilis during the Sullan 
period, to the fate of the Roman citizens of Sicily who were killed during Verres’ 
three years as governor of the island.85  However, the rhetoric in this passage is 
not our focus.  In either passage, Cicero could have chosen to use the 
expression bellum civile instead of dissensio civium or dissensio civilis to 
describe the conflicts between Sullans and Marians and evoked the same 
feeling among the jury.  There is no question that Verres’ political career 
benefitted from supporting Sulla.  Furthermore, many of the Sullani controlled 
the upper magistracies in the 70’s and certainly some of those who owed their 
political advancement to their association with Sulla were supporting Verres in 
his trial and were among the jury.86  In both instances, Cicero perhaps chose to 
use the expression dissensio civilis not only to signify the bella civilia in the 80’s, 
but also to incorporate the subsequent proscriptions, confiscations of property, 
creation of Sullan coloniae, changes in the composition of the juries, the 
deprivation of the rights of the plebeian tribunate, and other modifications to 
Roman government instituted under Sulla’s reign.  Perhaps, in Cicero’s opinion, 
the expression bellum civile was not broad enough to refer to all of the other 
violent acts against Roman citizens that occurred in the 80’s in the Verrines. 
Cicero was aware of these circumstances and perhaps consciously 
avoided using the expression bellum civile to not offend all of those in the jury 
who were perhaps involved in a war against their own countrymen.  However, 
the trial against Verres occurred during the final dismantling of Sulla’s reforms 
and Cicero did not refrain from indicating who he felt was taking bribes.87  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Verres was propraetor in Sicily from 73-71, see RE VIIIa2 (Verres) no.1, 1573.38-1578.28.  
For a brief summary of the Sicilians’ accusations against Verres, cf. Cic. Verr. 1.12-14.  Also 
see, essentially the second through fifth orations of the Actio Secunda in Cicero’s Verrines for a 
full account of the accusations while Verres governor of the island.   
86 For the factionalism among the Sulllani, see Gruen 1974, 38-46.  Therefore, we should avoid 
grouping the Sulllani as a cohesive faction.  However, those who were associated with Sulla 
dominated the consulship in the 70’s, see Gruen 1974, 122-7. For a list of the defense attorneys 
and known jurors, see TLRR, no.177. Verres’ lawyers and many on the jury had links to Sulla.  
For a list of the Sulllani, see Keaveney 1984. 
87 For the accusation of bribery, cf. Cic. Verr. 1.17-25.  Cicero quipped that Verres often boasted 
that he had plundered Sicily for three successive years: in the first year to enrich himself, in the 
second to enrich his patrons and clients, and in the third year to bribe the jury in any future trial 
against his governorship (1.40). 
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Nevertheless, the trial was abandoned as Verres left Rome to avoid certain 
condemnation due to Cicero’s comprehensive brief.88  Apparently both 
occurrences of the more abstract expression dissensio civilis in the Verrines 
were used to describe the tumult of the previous decade instead of using the 
specific expression bellum civile that explicitly indicated the armed conflict 
between the Sullans and Marians, but seemingly not the consequences of 
Sulla’s victory.89  Both expressions convey a similar sentiment, but could they 
be used synonymously? 
In the Third Oration, Cicero compared the affair of 63 to onmis civilis 
dissensiones, non solum eas quas audistis sed eas quas vosmet ipsi 
meministis atque vidistis “All the civiles dissensiones not only those of which 
you have been told, but those too which you remember as eyewitnesses” (Cic. 
Cat. 3.24).  The five recent dissensiones civiles Cicero listed were: i) the conflict 
between Sulla and P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88; ii) the conflict between the consuls 
L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Octavius in 87; iii) Cinna and Marius’ vengeance on 
Sulla’s supporters in 86, iv) Sulla’s retaliation against the Marians in 8290; and v) 
the conflict between M. Lepidus and Q. Catulus in 78-77.91  Although the 
dissensio civilis between the consuls Lepidus and Catulus occurred after Sulla’s 
death, the conflict was a direct result of the changes Sulla instituted during his 
reign.92  Therefore, all of these dissensiones civiles were borne out of the 
conflicts between Sulla and Marius.  Cicero imparted that all of these 
dissensiones civiles led to internicio civium “the slaughter of citizens” (3.25).  
The phrase was perhaps a euphemism for bellum civile, but the expression 
internicio civium was surely more graphic.  However, the latter expression most 
likely evoked a similar offensive feeling from his audience, which the former 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 On the date of the Verrines, cf. TLRR, no.177 n.12; Marinone 2004, 65-7.  Cicero might have 
circulated parts of the Verrines before the trial took place, see Settle 1962, 98-111. 
89 The expression dissensio civilis was also used in a similar manner in the Pro Ligario (Cic. Lig. 
26).  NB: The Pro Ligario was delivered in front of Caesar after his victory over the Pompeians.  
Therefore, it is understandable that Cicero avoided using a politically charged expression like 
bellum civile to describe the conflict between Pompey and Caesar because Cicero did not want 
to explicitly remind Caesar that he was involved in a war against his own countrymen.  
90 Cicero used the expression dissensio civilis twice to describe these conflicts in the Verrines 
(Cic. Verr. 2.1.34, 2.5.152). 
91 NB: In this passage, Cicero also used the verb dissentire to express the dissensio between 
Lepidus and Catulus the year after they were consuls together, see Dyck 2008, 202. 
92 NB: Plutarch, Appian, and Florus focused on Lepidus and Catulus’ argument over Sulla’s 
funeral as the spark of the conflict should be seen as an ancillary reason, cf. Sall. Hist. 1.47-72 
Plut. Sull. 34.4-5, 38.1; Pomp. 15; App. BC 1.105-7; Fl. 2.11.23.   
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would as well.93  According to the scholia Gronoviana, the five events that 
Cicero listed at Cat. 3.24 were identified instead as bella civilia.94  Evidently, the 
scholiast considered that the expressions dissensio civilis and bellum civile 
were analogous.  However, the suggestion that the expressions dissensio civilis 
and bellum civile were synonymous is perhaps too simplistic to explain why 
Cicero avoided using the expression bellum civile to label these events.  Twenty 
years later in the Eighth Philippic Cicero had no qualms about labeling four out 
of five of the events listed here in the Third Oration as bella civilia, which is 
discussed in section 4.7. 
Cicero explained that the dissensiones civilis that occurred decades 
earlier were essentially different from what was occurring in 63.  Cicero 
explained that those involved in the five dissensiones civilis listed above were 
non ad delendam sed ad commutandam rem publicam pertinerent “not 
concerned with destroying the res publica but with changing it.”  He further 
contended that the instigators of the five dissensiones civilis wanted in hac urbe 
florere ‘to triumph in the city’ (3.25).  Therefore, the commutatio was not 
planned to change the government, but who was controlling it.  According to 
Cicero’s point of view those involved with the events of 63 wanted delere not 
commutare, which he emphasized was one of the differences of this dissensio 
civilis from those of the past.  In this instance, Cicero wanted to create the 
perception that what Catiline, Manlius, Lentulus and their associates were 
planning was neither a dissensio civilis nor a bellum civile, but something more 
wicked.  Cicero claimed that the affair’s participants actually wanted hanc 
urbem conflagrare…exitium rei publicae quaesivit “to burn this city...[and] 
sought the destruction of the Republic” (3.25).  According to Cicero, the bellum 
the affair’s participants planned to wage was uniquely dangerous.  He 
proclaimed: 
in hoc autem uno post hominum memoriam maximo crudelissimoque bello, quale 
bellum nulla umquam barbaria cum sua gente gessit quo in bello lex haec fuit a Lentulo, 
Catilina, Cethego, Cassio, constituta ut omnes qui salva urbe salvi esse possent in 
hostium numero ducerentur 
“In this war, however, the most important and the most savage within the memory of 
man, a war as no tribe of barbarians ever fought among its own people, a war in which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Dyck (2008, 202) suggests the phrase internicione civium was a euphemism, but is silent 
about what or why. 
94 The scholia Gronoviana is: primum bellum ergo civile fuit inter Syllam et Sullpicium; 
secundum bellum inter Octavium et Cinnam; tertium inter Cinnam et Marium; quartum inter 
Sulllam et Marianos; quantum bellum inter Lepidum et Catulum.  Quote from Jal, 1963a, 43 n.1. 
Cf. Brown 2003, 106 n.51. 
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Lentulus, Catiline, Cethegus, and Cassius laid it down as a law that all who could be 
safe so long as Rome was safe should be counted among their enemies.” (Cic. Cat. 
3.25).95 
The affair’s participants might have had disagreements with the current regime 
however, in Cicero’s point of view, the dissensio civilis occurring in 63 was 
distinct.  The five dissensiones civiles Cicero already commented on were 
portrayed as arguments between two individuals.  Instead, Cicero implied that 
the affair’s participants of 63 not only had a disagreement against the cives, but 
also against the urbs - Rome, the very heart of the res publica.  Cicero clearly 
believed the term dissensio civilis was unsuitable to interpret the affair, which he 
declared in the passage cited above was maximo crudelissimoque bello “The 
most important and the most savage war.” 
As explained in the first section of this chapter, Cicero most frequently 
used the adjective domesticus to qualify the term bellum when referring to the 
affair and tended to avoid the expression bellum civile.  One could suggest that 
the military operations of the army in Etruria and perhaps in some other regions 
outside of Rome were closely affiliated with what Romans might describe as a 
bellum civile, but Cicero used various specific expressions instead to qualify the 
type of bellum the affair’s participants were planning.  These related 
expressions indicated that the affair included a bellum fought by citizens against 
the res publica, but also something more.  From the evidence examined in this 
chapter, we can argue that Cicero generally avoided using the phrase bellum 
civile because it was neither expressive nor ambiguous enough to identify all 
the facets of the affair of 63.96 
 
4.6  Sallust’s various expressions to identify conflicts between cives 
Sallust chose to use various specific expressions more often than the 
expression bellum civile to convey a war between citizens.  He used the 
expression dissensio civilis once in his writings.  The expression occurs in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Cf. Cic. Cat. 2.22. 
96 On the contrary, Brown (2003, 106) argues that the other expressions Cicero used were 
“milder” than bellum civile.  Brown’s argument stems from Cicero’s list of the four previous bella 
civilia in the Eighth Philippic and Cicero’s declaration that the hostile actions of Antony in 43 
were tantamount to a fifth (Cic. Phil. 8.7-8).  However, as shown in section 4.7, the list in the 
Eighth Philippic is very similar to the five ‘civil’ wars that Cicero labeled as dissensions civilis in 
the Third Oration (Cic. Cat. 3.24).  Regardless of the expression, the sentiment that Cicero 
wanted to convey to his audience in both speeches were that the affair of 63 and Antony’s 
actions in 43 were threatening the lives of Roman citizens and that the citizens supporting both 
affairs were hostes.  I argue that the two expressions dissensio civilis and bellum civile are more 
analogous than Brown’s argument that the former expression was “milder” than the latter.  
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brief digression in his monograph the Bellum Iugurthinum to explain the 
increasing friction after the fall of Cartharge in 146 between opposing political 
factions and the leading nobles in Rome who were seeking power in the city.97  
Sallust theorized that: nam ubi primum ex nobilitate reperti sunt qui veram 
gloriae iniustae potentiae anteponerent, moveri civitas et dissensio civilis quasi 
permixtio terrae oriri coepit. “For as soon as nobles were found who preferred 
true glory to unjust power, the state began to be disturbed and dissensio civilis 
to arise like an upheaval of the earth” (Sall. B Iug. 41.10).  In the passage that 
follows, he claimed that the result of the dissensio civilis fueled the Gracchi to 
oppose the few that held power in the res publica (42.1).98  Although in this 
passage the expression appears in the singular, Sallust seemingly used 
dissensio civilis to describe the era of conflicts between citizens after the 
destruction of Carthage.  This usage is reminiscent of Cicero’s usage of the 
expression in the Verrines to describe the period of civil conflicts during the 
80’s.  However, Sallust did not specifically label the exact conflicts that arose 
from this situation in Rome as dissensiones civilis like Cicero did in the Third 
Oration.99  Presumably, Sallust wanted to convey to his audience that the 
period he was describing in the Bellum Iugurthinum occurred during a time 
when dissensio civilis was on the rise.  However, because the expression was 
only used once in Sallust’s works, whether his interpretation of dissensio civilis 
was analogous to a bellum civile is inconclusive.  Therefore, we need to 
compare Sallust’s usage of other expressions that describe a similar context.   
Sallust claimed in the Catilina and the Bellum Iugurthinum that a reason 
for the decline of the mos maiorum in Rome was the desire for power (cf. Sall. B 
Cat. 10-13; B Iug. 41-42).100  As mentioned above, Sallust suggested that the 
desire was caused by the destruction of Carthage and the subsequent loss of 
the metus hostilis (cf. B Cat. 10.1; B Iug. 41.2).101  Therefore, the period of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Sallust frequently contended that the absence of a metus hostilis after the fall of Carthage in 
146 led to the decline of the mos maiorum, cf. Sall. Cat. 10; Iug. 41; Hist. 1.10.  For a detailed 
discussion on the theme in Sallust’s works, cf. McGushin 1977, 87-8; Conley 1981; Harris 1985, 
127-8, 266-7; McGushin 1992, 74-83; Kraus and Woodman 1997, 21-2, 27-30; Levene 2000.  
On Sallust and later Latin writers’ portrayal of the theme of metus hostilis, see Jacobs 2010, 
123-6.   
98 Sallust often used the term pauci (cf. Sall. B Cat. 41.7, 42.1; Hist. 1.46.23, 3.34.6, 28), or the 
expression pauci potentes (B Cat. 20.7, 39.1, 58.11; B Iug. 3.3, 31.19; Hist. 1.12) to refer to the 
‘few’ Romans that held power in Rome.  
99 See section 4.5. 
100 Cf. McGushin 1977, 86; Paul 1984, 123-32.  See n.97. 
101 McGushin (1992, 79) explains that Sallust’s opinion that 146 was the watershed year for the 
deterioration of the mos maiorum was not the tradition espoused by his predecessors, Polybius 
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dissensio civilis Sallust described in the Bellum Iugurthinum was the same 
period described in the Catilina.  Instead of using the expression dissensio 
civilis found in the former monograph, Sallust used the expression discordia 
civilis to interpret the period that Catiline was raised in the latter monograph (B 
Cat. 5.2).  Consequently, we can suggest that from Sallust’s point of view the 
expression discordia civilis conveyed an analogous sentiment to dissensio 
civilis as he used either term to describe the same era of civilian strife.  
Sallust also alluded to the future conflict between the Sullans and 
Marians as a bellum civile in the Catilina and the Bellum Iugurthinum without 
explicitly using the expression.  When he described the character of Sulla in the 
latter monograph, Sallust remarked that atque illi, felicissumo omnium ante 
civilem victoriam “Before his civilem victoriam, he [Sulla] was the most fortunate 
of all men” (B Iug. 95.4).  Although he did not use the expression bellum civile 
here to describe the future conflict between Sulla and Marius, the allusion that 
Sulla’s victory would be against cives is manifest.  In the preface of the Bellum 
Iugurthinum, Sallust implied that the events described in the narrative would 
explain the causes behind the eventual bellum atque vastitas Italiae “war and 
the devastation of Italy” (5.2).  He used the expression studium civium (‘the 
desire of the citizens’) in this passage to insinuate that some cives were 
desperate enough to start a bellum to have power in Rome.102  He presented 
examples of the studium civium by describing the eagerness of the leading 
citizens of Rome to accept bribes from Jugurtha and the Roman generals’ 
desire to be the commander of the conflict when victory was achieved; both at 
the expense of prolonging the engagement.103  The desire for power 
engendered animosity between the nobiles and the plebes as well as between 
the political leaders.104  The expression studium civium perhaps alluded to the 
bella civilia that would occur between Marius and Sulla in the 80’s, who both 
fought together in the conflict against Jugurtha.  In the Catilina, Sallust was less 
implicit about the conflict stating that Sulla had armis recepta re publica “gained 
control of the State by arms” (B Cat. 11.4).  However, his audience would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and L. Piso.  On the other hand, Pliny, Velleius Paterculus, Florus, Augustinus, and Orosius 
followed Sallust’s perspective, but not Livy. 
102 The cives that were most desirous of power that Sallust was referring to were the nobiles 
(Sall. Iug. 5.1). Cf. B Cat. 12-13.  See also, Earl 1961, 32-5. 
103 For Jugurtha’s bribery of the Romans, cf. Sall. B Iug.  13.5-9; 15.1; 28.1; 29.1-3; 32.1-4; 
34.1; 37.3; 40.1; 66.1.  Paul 1984, 261-3.  
104 Cf. Sall. Iug. 27.2; 30; 40-42; 84 
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understand that Sulla did not win power in the res publica without using arma, 
which implied that Sulla’s victory in his bellum must have been at the expense 
of other cives.  In sum, Sallust alluded to the bella civilia in the 80’s in the 
Catilina and the Bellum Iugurthinum, but used other expressions to stress that 
Sulla gained power in Rome by fighting against his own countrymen. 
In the extant fragments of the Historiae, Sallust used the expression bella 
civilia once to describe the conflicts between Roman citizens after the 
destruction of Carthage.  He claimed that after the metus hostilis of Carthage 
was expunged then plurimae turbae, seditiones et ad postremum bella civilia 
orta sunt “Frequent riots, party strife, and finally civil wars broke out” (Hist. 
1.12).  The bella civilia Sallust alluded to in this passage were most likely: i) 
those that occurred during the Sullan period; ii) the conflicts between citizens 
that occurred during the years 78-67 that the Historiae described105; and iii) the 
future conflicts between citizens in the 40’s.  In the Historiae, he used the 
metaphor sanguis civium (‘the blood of citizens’) or the expression arma civium 
to refer to each of these conflicts.106  Five more times in the Historiae, Sallust 
used either sanguis civium or arma civium.  He used the phrase sanguis civium 
as a metaphor to describe the conflicts and ensuing proscriptions during Sulla’s 
reign in the Oratio Lepidi (1.48.14).107  In addition, fragment Hist. 1.79 reads: 
inter arma civilia ”In the midst of civil war”.  McGushin explains that the fragment 
most likely alludes to the bella civilia between the Sullans and the Marians in 
the 80’s.108  In Sallust’s reproduction of the Oratio Philippi in the Historiae, L. 
Marcius Philippus reported that Lepidus was threatening Rome with an army 
composed of cives.109  Philippus claimed that quod multo propius est ab eo quo 
agitat statu, quam ex pace et concordia ad arma civilia “Verily, such an act is 
much nearer the condition in which he now finds himself than are peace and 
concord to arma civilia” (1.67.10).  In addition, Sallust alluded to the bellum 
civile between Pompey and Caesar in the Historiae by using the expression in 
civilibus armis (1.7).110  Therefore, in the Historiae, Sallust used both the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 E.g. Lepidus’ conflict with his co-consul Catulus in 78/77 and the continuing conflicts against 
the rebel Roman general Q. Sertorius who established a strong base of power in Spain from 83-
72. 
106 NB: The term arma can define the tools of war (OLD s.v. 1-3) and the act of war (s.v. 5). 
107 Cf. Sall. Hist. 1.48.25. 
108 McGushin 1992, 159-61. 
109 L. Marcius Philippus was consul in 91 and censor in 86.  Cicero often remarked that 
Philippus, in his prime, was an orator of note, cf. Cic. Orat. 2.316; Brut. 173, 186, 301, 326.  
110 McGushin 1992, 73-4. 
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expressions sanguis civium and inter arma civilia to imply a military conflict 
between citizens. 
Evidently, when Sallust’s works implicitly referred to the conflicts after the 
destruction of Carthage, he chose to use various expressions more frequently 
than the expression bella civilia.  Why Sallust generally circumvents the 
expression bellum civile in his works is not entirely clear.  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, Sallust was actively involved in one bellum civile between the 
Pompeians and the Caesarians in the early 40’s and was writing his works 
during the conflicts between Roman citizens in the aftermath of Caesar’s 
assassination and later among the second Triumvirate.  Sallust explained that 
he had voluntarily retired from politics (B Cat. 4.1), therefore, he seemingly had 
no need to worry about the political, social, or negative aspects the expression 
bellum civile might convey.  Perhaps, he chose other expressions to describe a 
‘civil’ war for stylistic variation.  However, the specific expressions dissensio 
civilis, discordia civilis, sanguis civium, or ad/inter arma civilia were, in Sallust’s 
point of view, perhaps more descriptive to identify the complex period of bella 
civilia after the fall of Carthage.  By adding in or ad to the term arma, Sallust 
signified the preparation or the act of war111, and when the term was qualified 
with the adjective civilia the suggestion of a bellum civile was clear. 
Sallust was primarily occupied with presenting a specific moral theme in 
his works.112  He lambasted the vitia (‘vices’) that corrupted Rome and its 
citizens that, according to his perspective, led to the bella civilia and the 
instability of the res publica during his lifetime.  On the other hand, in the 
preface of the Catilina, Sallust claimed he was writing about the affair of 63 due 
to the sceleris atque periculi novitate ‘The novelty of the danger and of the 
crime’ (4.4).  Although Sallust makes it clear that the scelera recorded in the 
Catilina were perpetrated by cives, he contended that the periculum arising from 
it was something novitas.  Apparently, Sallust felt the expression bellum civile 
was not always suited to express the novitas of the affair as a whole or he 
would have used the adjective civilis to qualify the term bellum more than twice 
out of the 29 occurrences of the term in the Catilina.  We could argue when 
Sallust’s works were written bellum civile was no longer a novelty.  Perhaps 
Sallust thought an expression like bellum civile did not emphasize the intricacies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 See OLD s.v.4. 
112 On the moral theme in Sallust works, cf. Earl 1961, 41-59; Syme 1964, 269-71; Paul 1982, 
124-5; McGushin 1992, 15-7.  
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of the affair of 63 and the multifarious actions of its participants to threaten the 
res publica. 
As evidenced above, Sallust used other various expressions or 
metaphors to allude to the bella civilia after the fall of Carthage and to interpret 
the conditions that perpetuated this type of military engagement.  Instead of 
explicitly identifying how these bella should be named, Sallust was more 
concerned with explaining how these events affected the stability of the res 
publica.  He theorized that each bella civilia was in some manner connected to 
the denigration of the mos maiorum after the destruction of Carthage.  
Consequently, the affair of 63, according to Sallust, had a common root.  The 
bellum fought between cives in 63 was an extension of all the dissensio civilis, 
discordia civilis, arma civilia, or bella civilia that preceded it.  The distinguishing 
factor of the affair of 63 from the earlier bellum civilia seemingly was that the 
cives involved with the affair both inside and outside of Rome were secretly 
planning to wage a bellum and that many of these cives were unknown.113  
Sallust highlighted the complexity the affair in the speech he furnished for Cato.  
When Cato was recommending the death sentence for those who had 
confessed to supporting the affair, he declared: 
coniuravere nobililissumi cives patriam incendere, Gallorum gentem infestissumam 
nomini Romano ad bellum arcessunt.  Dux hostium cum exercitu supra caput est.  Vos 
cunctamini etaim nunc et dubitatis quid intra moenia deprensis hostibus faciatis? 
“Citizens of the highest rank have conspired to fire their native city, they stir up to the 
Gauls, bitterest enemies of the Roman people.  The leader of the enemy with his army 
is upon us.  Do you even now hesitate and doubtfully ask yourselves what is to be done 
with foemen taken within your walls?” (Sall. B Cat. 52.24-25) 
 
Clearly, if the affair of 63 were successful it would be won at the expense of 
other citizens’ lives both inside and outside of Rome.  In this passage, the verb 
coniurare and bellum appeared together suggesting that the affair of 63 was 
distinct from the usual conflict between Roman cives because the bellum that 
was planned was conceived in a context that contained the criminal, secretive, 
immoral, and plural elements associated with a coniuratio examined in Chapter 
1. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 NB: Sallust did use the term coniurare does occur once in the Oratio Philippi in the Historiae 
(1.67.6).  However, coniurare in this case identified the actions in Etruria not the actions of 
Lepidus.  Therefore the verb perhaps indicates that certain areas of the region had allied 
together for a military operation instead of comparable to the way Caesar uses the term instead 
of the more ambiguous act of “conspiring”, see Chapter 5.2.  Sallust more often presented the 
conflict between Lepidus and Catulus as a bellum not a coniuratio in the fragments of the 
Historiae.   
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4.7  coniuratio or bellum?: Cicero’s interpretation after the affair’s 
suppression 
 
Cicero used the term coniuratio more often in reference to the affair of 63 
than the term bellum in his works.  However, as the first section in this chapter 
has shown, Cicero used the term bellum more often than coniuratio to identify 
the affair of 63 in the Orations that were delivered while it was occurring.114  In 
contrast, the term coniuratio was used more often in reference to the affair of 63 
in Cicero’s works written after his year as consul was over.  It is clearly 
problematic to determine how Cicero genuinely interpreted the affair, but the 
evidence suggests that he portrayed the affair either as a bellum or a coniuratio, 
or sometimes both, to suit his own purpose in the speeches delivered during the 
affair.  But before making any more conclusions, the final section of this chapter 
examines Cicero’s identification of the affair in some of his writings after 63.  
The evidence examined below suggests that Cicero’s perspective regarding the 
disturbances occurring inside and outside of Rome during his consulship 
changed.  First I examine the occurrences of the term bellum in the Pro Sulla 
delivered in 62 and the Eighth Philippic delivered in 43.  Then I note the 
absence of the term bellum in reference to the affair in Cicero’s other speeches.  
Although there is a dearth of letters in the Ciceronian epistolary corpus that 
refer to the affair in 63, a few of the letters did refer to the event.  The letters 
perhaps display Cicero’s intimate interpretation of the affair because they are 
typically devoid of the rhetoric found in his political and judicial speeches.  
Therefore, this section will examine these personal letters as well to further 
measure the change in Cicero’s perception of the affair of 63 after its 
suppression. 
In 62, Cicero defended P. Sulla, in part, from the accusations that he had 
been involved with the duae coniurationes of 66/65 and 63 (Cic. Sull. 11).115  
Cicero referred to both of these affairs as coniurationes or the affair’s 
participants as coniurati 38 times in the Pro Sulla.116  In comparison, the term 
bellum was only used five times in reference to the affair of 63 and its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 The term coniuratio occurred 18 times in the Orations compared to 30 occurrences of the 
term bellum in reference to the affair and those involved with it, see n.14.  NB: In contrast, the 
term coniuratio occurred four times and the term bellum twice in reference to the affair in the 
Pro Murena. 
115 See Chapter 2 n.131. 
116 See Chapter 1 n.18. 
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activities.117  The first instance of bellum in the speech was used rhetorically in 
reference to the aeternum bellum, which Cicero knew his enemies would 
continue to wage against him due to his severe suppression of the affair while 
he was consul (Cic. Sull. 28).118  The second occurrence of bellum was used in 
reference to the participants’ attempt to solicit support from the Allobroges in 
order to help the military operations in Etruria (36).119  The term bellum occurs a 
third and fourth time when Cicero was defending the actions of P. Sittius, whom 
the prosecution charged was sent to Hispania ulterior in order to solicit support 
in the region for the affair.120  Cicero rebuked the accusation claiming that it was 
not in Sittius’ nature, unlike the others supporting the affair, to wish for a bellum 
populo Romano or to plan a bellum contra patriam (58).121  The two phrases 
insinuated that Sittius was not raising an army in Spain in preparation for a 
bellum against the Roman people or the patria in contrast the bellum those 
involved with affair of 63 would wage.  The final instance of the term bellum 
occurred in the Pro Sulla when Cicero explained his suppression of the affair.  
Cicero claimed cum consul bellum gesserim cum coniuratis “I waged war upon 
the conspirators when I was consul” (83).  This instance is most telling because 
Cicero called those involved in the affair coniurati and suggested that waging a 
bellum was necessary to suppress the affair.  The term bellum might refer to the 
final military engagement against Catiline and Manlius’ army in Pistoria, but as 
Cicero was not physically involved in the battle, in this case, the bellum he 
waged was a rhetorical “war” against the affair’s participants.  When he referred 
to the prosecutors’ accusation that his client P. Sulla was supporting the affair of 
63 he always used the term coniuratio, not bellum, which suggests that the 
latter termed described Cicero’s perception of the affair and the former the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Cf. Cic. Sull. 28, 36, 58 (bis), 83. 
118 Cf. Cic. Cat. 4.22. 
119 NB: This instance described Cassius’ attempt to garner military support from the Allobrogean 
envoys, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.9. 
120 Cic. Sull. 56-58. See Berry 1996, 245-7. See Appendix I, [no. 37]. 
121 Cic. Sull. 58: Sittius…is homo est aut ea familia ac disciplina ut hoc credi possit, eum bellum 
populo Romano facere voluisse? ut, cuius pater, cum ceteri deficerent finitimi ac vicini, singulari 
exstiterit in rem publicam nostram officio et fide, is sibi nefarium bellum contra patriam 
suscipiendum putaret? “Sittius…is he the sort of man or are his family and upbringing such as 
to make it credible that he wished to make war upon the Roman people?  That a man whose 
father, when the others, his borders and neighbors were in revolt, displayed a unique sense of 
his ties and loyalty to Rome, planned to raise the standard of rebellion against his country?  
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prosecutors’ perception.  In the peroration122, Cicero summarized the charges 
against P. Sulla stating:  
grave esse videtur eum, qui investigarit coniurationem, qui patefecerit, qui oppresserit, 
cui senatus singularibus verbis gratias egerit, cui uno togato supplicationem decreverit, 
dicere in iudicio: ‘non defenderem, si coniurasset.’ non dico id quod grave est, dico illud 
quod in his causis coniurationis non auctoritati adsumam, sed pudori meo: ‘ego ille 
coniurationis investigator atque ultor certe non defenderem Sullam, si coniurasse 
arbitrarer.’ 
“It seems to cause resentment that the man who discovered the conspiracy, who 
exposed it, who suppressed it, whom the Senate thanked in a decree without 
precedent, the only civilian to whom a thanksgiving has ever been decreed, should say 
in a trial: ‘I would not be defending him if he had been a conspirator.’  I am not saying 
anything objectionable, but I am saying what in these cases concerned with the 
conspiracy I would claim to say not on the strength of my authority but as a man of 
honor: ‘I who investigated and punished the conspiracy would certainly not be 
defending Sulla if I thought he had been a member of it.” (Cic. Sull. 85) 
 
In this passage, Cicero was attacking the prosecutor’s accusation that he was 
defending someone charged with supporting the same affair, which Cicero had 
suppressed.  Cicero referred to the affair using the term coniuratio or its 
cognates five times.  As shown, Cicero’s usage of the term bellum in the Pro 
Sulla was primarily rhetorical aimed at comparing his suppression of the affair 
similar to a victory in war.  When first referring to the supplicatio the Senate 
wanted to award him in the Third Oration, Cicero quoted that his decreta verbis 
est: ‘quod urbem incendiis, caede civis, Italiam bello liberassem’ “The terms of 
the resolution read as follows: ‘because I had saved Rome from burning, the 
citizens from massacre and Italy from war’” (Cic. Cat. 3.15).123  In the Pro Sulla, 
Cicero had just made the claim that he had waged a bellum when he was 
consul (83).  Therefore, it would not have been surprising if Cicero had used the 
term bellum in the passage quoted above (85), especially when he referred to 
the unprecedented supplicatio awarded to him after the affair was suppressed.  
However, in the Pro Sulla, Cicero was defending his client against a crimen 
coniurationis (‘an accusation of conspiracy’)124 and therefore the term coniuratio 
dominated the way Cicero described the affair in the speech. 
In Cicero’s political and judicial speeches delivered after 62, he almost 
exclusively used the term coniuratio instead of bellum to refer to the affair as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Berry (1996, 44-8) explains that Pro Sullla did not follow the standard rhetorical framework.  
Cicero inverted the confirmatio and the reprehensio and according to Berry this passage occurs 
in the second confirmatio when Cicero defends his advocacy of P. Sulla (Cic. Sull. 80-85). 
123 Cicero used the exact same terms regarding the supplicatio that he was awarded in a letter 
to Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer in Janurary 62 (Cic. Fam. 5.2.8).  Cicero referred to the 
supplicatio in other speeches but did not specifically use the term bellum when referring to it, cf. 
Cic. Cat. 3.23, 4.5; Sull. 33; Pis. 6; Phil. 2.13, 14.24; Fam. 15.4.11.   
124 Cic. Sull. 13.  In reference to the “accusation of conspiracy”, cf. 12, 14, 30, 31, 48.  See 
Chapter 1, nn.59-60. 
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whole.125  After Cicero returned from exile in August 57, he referred to the affair 
only using the term coniuratio once in Post Reditum in Senatu, three times in 
De Domo, and once in De Haruspicum responsis.126  The instance of coniuratio 
in the latter speech occurred when Cicero recalled the haruspicum responsa 
predicting earlier historical conflicts.  Cicero affirmed that the haruspices had 
predicted the Social War, the subsequent conflicts between Sulla and Cinna, 
and tum haec recentem urbis inflammandae delendique imperi coniurationem  
“More recently still, of the conspiracy to burn and destroy the city” (Cic. Har. 
resp. 18).  Significantly, there is no mention of bellum in Cicero’s recollection of 
the haruspicum responsa of 63 in this political speech delivered seven years 
later.  The pattern continued in Cicero’s judicial speeches when recalling the 
affair.127  
In 56, Cicero referred to the affair of 63 using the term coniuratio four 
times in the Pro Sestio128, but once used the verb armare (‘to arm’) to refer to 
the military activities of the affair.  However, the term armare appeared when 
Cicero was explaining his client’s military assignment during the affair not to 
indicate its interpretation.  P. Sestius was sent with an army to Capua to prevent 
the town of Capua from supporting the affair when he was a quaestor in 63 
(Sest. 9).129  Therefore, the instance of the verb armare was included to 
designate the disturbances outside of Rome in order that Cicero could extol 
Sestius’ role in the affair and remind the jury of his client’s past service to the 
res publica in suppressing the reliquae coniurationis “remnants of the 
conspiracy” (11).130  Cicero did not refer to the military activities of the affair of 
63 in any of his later judicial speeches.131  Later that year in April, Cicero 
defended M. Caelius Rufus from an allegation that in his youth he was a 
supporter of Catiline and by extension a supporter of the affair of 63.  Cicero !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 The one exception of the term bellum was in the Pro Flacco, which alluded to the solicitation 
of the Allobrogean envoys and not the affair as a whole (Cic. Flac. 102).  NB: The term coniurati 
occurred twice in reference to the affair’s participants (94, 102). 
126 Cic. Red. Sen. 26, Dom. 63, 92, 101, Har. resp. 18. 
127 Cicero delivered De Haruspicum responsis in April or May of 56 (Marinone 2004, 119).  
128 Cf. Cic. Sest. 9(bis), 11, 42. 
129 See Chapter 3.4. 
130 According to Cicero, Sestius forced a certain C. Mevulanus, who was a military tribune of the 
consul C. Antonius and had earlier tried to incite the town of Pisarum, to retreat from Capua 
(Cic. Sest. 9).  Cicero also claimed Sestius played an important part in encouraging C. 
Antonius’s army to pursue the army in Etruria in January 62 (11). 
131 NB: In the Pro Sestio, Cicero used other military terminology in reference to the affair 
claiming that the coniuratorum copias veteres “the veteran forces of the conspiracy” and the 
Catilinae importunam manum “the dangerous army of Catiline” were now supporters of P. 
Clodius Pulcher (Cic. Sest. 42; cf. Dom. 58). 
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used the term coniuratio five times to refer to the affair in the Pro Caelio.132  He 
conceded that Caelius was a friend or a follower of Catiline in 63, but claimed 
that Caelius had no part in the coniuratio.133  Caelius was formally charged 
under the lex Plautia de vi, but Cicero argued that the charge was inappropriate 
to the case.  He explained that the lex de vi was specifically passed due to the 
armata dissensione civium “armed civil strife” between Lepidus and Catulus in 
78/77 and affirmed that the lex was used as the formal charge in the later trials 
against those involved with the coniuratio of 63 (Cael. 70).134  In this instance, 
Cicero again identified the affair of 63 as a coniuratio but implied that the affair’s 
participants were punished commensurate with those who were involved in a 
dissensio civilis.  As demonstrated above in section 4.5, the expression 
dissensio civilis was similar to describing a bellum civile.  However, Cicero was 
explicit in the Pro Caelio that the affair was a coniuratio and distinct from an 
armata dissensione civium or a bellum. 
Other examples of Cicero’s usage of the term coniuratio in reference to 
the affair in his political speeches delivered after 62 include the reference to the 
bellum Allobrogum in 61 that Cicero claimed originated from the coniuratio of 63 
in De Provinciis Consularibus delivered in 55 (Prov. con. 32).135  When 
comparing the affair’s participants of 63 remaining in Rome to the followers of 
P. Clodius Pulcher, Cicero most often used the term coniuratio or its cognates 
in his speeches136.  Furthermore, in 55, Cicero used the term when prosecuting 
L. Calpurnius Piso, one of the consuls in 58, who supported Clodius’ proposed 
legislation against Cicero’s severe punishment of the affair’s participants, which 
forced Cicero into voluntary exile that year.  In Cicero’s invective against the ex-
consul, he referred to the affair’s participants of 63 as coniurati three times and 
compared the coniurati of 63 to those who supported his exile and were against 
his recall (Pis. 5, 15, 16).137  The predominance of the term coniuratio or its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Cf. Cic. Cael. 15 (quat.), 70. 
133 At Pro Caelio 15, Cicero used the term four times in reference to the affair.  Cicero’s defense 
against the allegation that Caelius was involved with the affair was rather weak.  He contended 
that Caelius could not be involved in the affair because he was one of the successful 
prosecutors who made a coniurationis accusatione against Cicero’s colleague C. Antonius in 59 
(Cic. Cael. 15). See Chapter 2 n.106. 
134 Austin 1960, 42 and 152-3.  
135 On the De Provinciis Consularibus,, see Settle 1962, 210-4.  
136 Cf. Cic. Dom. 58, 62, 96, 103; Har. resp. 36; Sest. 28, 42; Pis. 16, 23; Att. 1.16.11; Parad. 
4.27. 
137 On the date of the In Pisonem, cf. Nisbet 1961, 199-202; Settle 1962, 218-22; Marinone 
2004, 126-7.  For more on the In Pisonem, see Nisbet, 1961.  On Cicero’s voluntary exile, see 
Chapter 2 n.128. 
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cognates in reference to the affair in Cicero’s speeches delivered after 62 
demonstrates that his perception that the affair of 63 was akin to a bellum, 
which he often expressed in the Orations, had changed. 
Cicero identified five earlier conflicts between citizens as dissensiones 
civilis in the Third Oration (Cat. 3.24) examined above in section 4.5.  Twenty 
years later in the Eighth Philippic, he described three of the same conflicts that 
occurred during the 80’s using the expression bella civilia instead.138  The bella 
civilia Cicero recalled were: i) the conflict between Sulla and Sulpicius; ii) the 
conflict between the consuls Cinna and Octavius, iii) Sulla’s revenge against 
Marius and Carbo; and iv) the most recent conflict between Pompey and 
Caesar.139  Cicero contended that horum omnium bellorum causae ex rei 
publicae contentione natae sunt “The causes of all these civil wars sprang from 
a political quarrel” (Phil. 8.7).140  Cicero’s aim in the Eighth Philippic was to 
persuade the Senate to declare Mark Antony a hostis rei publicae due to his 
hostile actions in 43 that were, according to Cicero, tantamount to a bellum 
civile.141  He warned that these actions would lead to the bellum quintum civile 
“fifth civil war,” but would be the primum non modo non in dissensione et 
discordia civium, sed in maxima consensione incredibilique concordia “The first 
that has arisen, not amid dissesione et discordia civium, but amid the utmost 
union and marvelous concord” (8.8).142  These passages in the Philippics 
indicate that in Cicero’s point of view a genuine bellum civile began with 
dissensio civilis.  Significantly, the conflict between the consuls Lepidus and 
Catulus in 78/77 that Cicero identified as a dissensio civilis in the Third Oration 
(Cat. 3.24) was not labeled in the Eighth Philippic as a bellum civile, moreover, 
neither was the affair of 63.  However, as explained above in section 4.5, Cicero 
claimed the affair of 63 in the Third Oration was not similar to the five 
dissensiones civium he referenced in that speech, but instead a unique attempt 
at gaining power in Rome.  The expression bellum civile occurred more often in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 The Eighth Philippic was delivered in the Senate on February 3, 43 (Marinone 2004, 253). 
139 NB: Cicero only alluded to the conflict between Pompey and Caesar here.  He did not 
mention either of their names because it was understood that their conflict was the most recent.  
140 NB: Regarding the most recent conflict between Pompey and Caesar, Cicero commented 
that ignoro causam “I do not know its cause” (Cic. Phil. 8.7).  Perhaps Cicero wrote this to offer 
his opinion that the causes behind Pompey and Caesar’s conflict were more nuanced.  Cf. 
Manuwald 2007 Vol. II, 940. 
141 Cf. Cic. Phil. 8.2-5.  On Cicero’s aims in the Eighth Philippic, see Manuwald 2007 Vol. II, 
905-13. 
142 NB: Cicero did not use the expression discordia civilis in reference to the affair of 63.  On the 
term discordia, see Hellegouarc’h 1963, 134.   
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the Philippics than in any other of Cicero’s works, but not in reference to the 
affair of 63.143  Nevertheless, Cicero emphasized the seriousness of the 
dangers Antony’s forces represented in 43 and the wickedness of their hostile 
actions against Roman citizens and, similar to the affair of 63, Cicero used 
specific expressions in the Philippics to persuade his audience that they should 
heed his warnings and follow his advice.  
In the Fourteenth Philippic after the initial victory against Antony’s forces 
at Mutina the Senate proposed to decree a supplicatio.144  But Cicero argued 
that the decree needed to be amended numquam enim in civili bello supplicato 
decreta est “For a thanksgiving has never been decreed in civil war” (Phil. 
14.22).  Cicero proposed that the supplicatio should only be awarded if those 
who led the forces against Antony, namely C. Vibius Pansa and A. Hirtius, the 
consuls of 43, and the young Octavian, were hailed as imperatores and Antony 
and his supporters were declared hostes.145  Cicero’s argument is clear – a 
bellum against cives was not the type of bellum to be celebrated.146  However, 
we noted earlier that Cicero had stated that when the affair of 63 was 
suppressed the Senate wanted to award him a supplicatio for preventing a 
bellum.147  But, because Catiline and Manlius had been declared hostes, Cicero 
considered that all the affair’s supporters were hostes by extension, as was 
explained in Chapter 3.  Although Cicero modestly refused the supplicatio in 63, 
he had no objection with the proposal for a supplicatio because, in his opinion, 
he had won a bellum against declared enemies of the res publica not against 
Roman citizens in a legal sense.148  We can infer from Cicero’s argument about 
the proposal for a supplicatio in 43 that the proposal for a supplicatio in 63 was 
warranted because the ‘victory’ over the affair that year was against cives that 
had been formally or informally declared hostes rei publicae, which validated his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 In all of Cicero’s works, the expression bellum civile occurred most frequently (26 times) in 
the Philippics, cf. Cic. Phil. 2.23, 37, 47, 70, 72, 5.5, 26, 39, 40(bis), 7.6, 25, 8.7(bis), 8, 10.8, 
11.34, 13.1(bis), 2, 7, 8, 9, 14.22, 23, 24.  NB: Not all the instances referred to the bellum civile 
Antony was waging in 43, see Brown 2003, 108 n.59-62.  Primarily, Cicero used the term to 
evoke hatred against the actions of Mark Antony and his supporters for rhetorical purposes, cf. 
Jal 1963h, 70-5; Brown 2003, 110-2. 
144 The “victory” against Antony’s forces at Mutina had been costly.  Both the consuls of 43 C. 
Vibius Pansa and A. Hirtius died in the fighting. 
145 Cic. Phil. 14.24. 
146 Brown (2003, 112) suggests that Cicero “would prefer” to refer to the conflict against Antony 
as a bellum domesticum like the affair of 63, but Cicero did not explicitly use this expression in 
reference to Antony’s actions.  Therefore, the statement is subjective. 
147 See n.123. 
148 Cicero refused the supplicatio but instead wished that the date of the suppression of the 
affair (December 3, 63) was a day remembered forever (Cic. Cat. 3.26). 
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extralegal actions as consul.  Clearly, Cicero’s aim in the Philippics to persuade 
the Senate to declare Antony a hostis was similar to the tactics he employed in 
the speeches regarding the status of those supporting the affair of 63.  The 
difference lies in Cicero’s choice of terminology.  He specifically presented 
Antony’s actions as similar to a bellum civile.  However, the activities of the 
affair of 63 were more complex.  Therefore, Cicero used various expressions to 
identify the conflict between Roman citizens when he was consul. 
When we shift our examination of Cicero’s identification of the affair after 
63 to his epistolary corpus a similar pattern emerges.  Cicero sent a letter to Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Celer in Janurary 62 sometime either before or after defeat 
of Catiline and Manlius’ army in Etruria.149  Metellus was the new governor of 
Cisapline Gaul and was ordered by the Senate to raise an army on his way to 
the region in order to oppose Catiline and Manlius’ forces if they attempted to 
venture into the region.150  Cicero stated in the letter that they both had a 
responsibility to protect the res publica but in different locales.  Cicero explained 
that ut ego urbem a domesticis insidiis et ab intestino scelere, tu Italiam et ab 
armatis hostibus et ab occulta coniuratione defenderes “My part was to guard 
Rome from domesticae insidiae and intestinum scelus, yours to protect Italy 
from arma hostium and occulta coniuratio” (Cic. Fam. 5.2.1).  Interestingly, the 
term coniuratio occurred in the part of the sentence in reference to Metellus’ 
duties.  Cicero was probably referring to other parts of Cisalpine Gaul that the 
affair’s participants had attempted to agitate.151  The expression occulta 
coniuratio most likely refers to a “secret alliance” more than a “secret 
conspiracy” between those in the region who were willing to support the affair.  
Cicero alluded to the type of support those in the region could lend the affair.  
He wrote that Metellus’ other task was to defend against arma hostium, which 
suggested the Cispadanes might support the military activities of the affair. 
On the other hand, Cicero’s duties were to defend the city from 
domesticae insidiae and intestinum scelus.  Both of these expressions perhaps 
were used to refer to the affair’s participants of 63, who had yet been brought to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Shackleton-Bailey (1977, Vol I: 273-4, 276-9) argues that the letter gives no indication that 
the army in Etruria had been defeated.  Cicero only wishes Metellus and his legions well in a 
typical epistolary opening: si tu exercitusque valetis.  I take Cicero’s silence as an admission 
that the army in Etruria was not yet defeated. 
150 For Metellus’ role in 63, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.5, 26; Sall. B Cat. 30.5; 57.1.  
151 For the supposed disturbances in Cisalpine Gaul, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.4; Sall. Cat. 42.1, 3.  See 
also Chapter 3.4. 
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justice in 62.  As evidenced by the Pro Sulla, several other influential Roman 
citizens were convicted later that year.152  Therefore, the qualifying adjectives 
domesticus and intestinus indicated that there were still some participants in the 
affair remaining in Rome in January 62.153 In addition, Cicero used the terms 
insidiae and scelus, which Chapter 1.2 demonstrated were often used to 
describe the criminal aspect of the affair, to further insinuate that the affair’s 
participants might still be continuing to “conspire.”  The letter from Cicero to 
Metellus Celer referred to the activities of the affair occurring inside Rome using 
the expressions domesticae insidiae and intestinum scelus, as well as the 
activities occurring outside of Rome using the expression occulta coniuratio and 
arma hostium, suggesting that at the time the letter was sent the affair 
continued on two fronts. 
Cicero sent a letter in late December 62 to P. Sestius, the quaestor in 63 
that Cicero sent to Capua to make sure the inhabitants in the town did not join 
the affair that year.154  Cicero joked that he was so deeply in debt after 
purchasing a house on the Palatine Hill from Crassus that he wanted to start a 
coniuratio.  He admitted as much in the letter to Sestius.  Cicero wrote: 
itaque nunc me scito tantum habere aeris alieni, ut cupiam coniurare, si quisquam 
recipiat, sed partim odio inducti me excludunt et aperte vindicem coniurationis oderunt 
 
“So take notice that I am now so deeply in debt that I should be glad coniurare, if 
anyone would have me.  But some of them bar me out of prejudice – they hate me as a 
vindicem coniurationis and make no bones about it” (Fam. 5.6.2). 
 
Most likely, the ill feelings towards Cicero in Rome were due to the execution of 
Lentulus and the others in 63 without recourse to a trial as well as the trials that 
continued in 62 in which he gave evidence to help convict other citizens 
charged with supporting the affair.  Therefore, Cicero admits that no one would 
be willing to join him even if they desired a coniuratio.  He had punished the 
affair’s participants (vindicem coniurationis), so why would anyone join him if he 
started a coniuratio of his own?  This letter confirms Cicero’s opinion that those 
involved in the affair of 63 started the coniuratio because of their massive debts.  
This corresponds with his persistent theme in the Second Oration that extreme 
debt was the common cause of the affair of 63.  However, I have argued that 
debt was too prevalent throughout the res publica to be the sole cause of the 
affair and, most significantly, I have shown that the primary leaders involved !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 See Chapter 1 n.65. 
153 See section 4.1. 
154 Cic. Sest. 9. 
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with the affair had other motives.  Certainly, the debt crisis could be a reason for 
some of the citizens in 63 to be desperate enough to resort to violence to 
address their debilitating condition.  However, there is evidence that other 
citizens who were involved desired more than tabulae novae to relieve this 
burden – they wanted power in Rome. 
Cicero sent a letter in April 55 to L. Lucceius, who was writing and 
finishing a history about Italicum bellum et civile “The Italian and Civil Wars” 
(Fam. 5.12.2).  Cicero requested that Lucceius include a book in his work a 
principio enim coniurationis usque ad reditum nostrum “from the beginning of 
the coniuratio down to my return from exile” (5.12.4).  Cicero suggested that 
Lucceius either place his consulship of 63 into a single narrative or like some 
Greek historians who separated wars from their narratives in a digression of 
sorts.155  He admitted that the events during his consulship should have a place 
in Lucceius’ historical work, but not in his books on wars against external foes.  
Instead, Cicero explained that Lucceius could write about the affair similar to qui 
omnes a perpetuis suis historiis ea, quae dixi, bella separaverunt, tu quoque 
item civilem coniurationem ab hostilibus externisque bellis seiungeres 
“[Callisthenes with the Phocian War, Timaeus with the war of Pyrrhus, and 
Polybius with that of Numantia], all of whom detached their accounts of these 
particular wars from their continuous histories.  Just so, you might deal with 
civilem coniurationem ab hostilibus externisque bellis” (5.12.2).156  Cicero stated 
in the same passage of the letter that Lucceius was also writing about the 
recent bella civilia between Sullans and Marians.  By qualifying coniuratio with 
the adjective civilis, Cicero implied that the affair of 63 was closer to a bellum 
civile than a bellum externum.  He insinuated that a discussion regarding the 
affair of 63 was not out of the scope of Lucceius’ work.  The insinuation that the 
coniuratio of 63 was akin to a bellum civile recalls Cicero’s perception of the 
affair in the Orations when he was consul.  However, Cicero was explicit that 
the affair of 63 was distinct in the letter and therefore was difficult to specifically 
identify. 
In addition, Cicero offers Lucceius a suggestion of what could be 
included in his history if he agreed to write about the affair of 63.  Cicero 
advises in quo et illa poteris uti civilium commutationum scientia vel in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 NB: L. Lucceius’ history does not survive and we are not certain if it was ever published. 
156 For the identification of these Greek historians, see Shackleton-Bailey 1977 Vol.I, 319-20. 
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explicandis causis rerum novarum vel in remediis incommodorum “In it you will 
also be able to make use of your special knowledge of political changes, in 
explaining the origins of the res novae and suggesting remedies for things awry” 
(5.12.4).  This is the only instance when Cicero explicitly used the expression 
res novae to identify the affair of 63.  As demonstrated in Chapter 1.2, Cicero 
and Sallust used specific terminology to identify the affair’s ‘criminal’ aim to 
overthrow the res publica.  The terminology Cicero and Sallust used to describe 
the affair’s intention to “destroy” the res publica was clearly used metaphorically 
to describe what we would most likely call a “revolution” in modern parlance.157  
Sallust used the expression res novae to identify what certain groups who 
joined the affair were desirous of, suggesting that they were not content with 
those in charge of the government in 63.  However, the expression was never 
used in reference to the affair itself or the leading members’ intentions.  Instead, 
Sallust used the expression to suggest the desires of the Sullan veterans and 
colonists in Etruria (28.4), the plebeian class (37.1) and the political faction in 
Rome that sympathized with the poor (39.3), the plebs urbana in Rome, and the 
soldiers in the army at Faesulae (57.1).  Therefore, whether we should project 
the modern term ‘revolution’ as a meaning of res novae is debatable due, in 
part, to the ambiguous quality of the multifarious term res.158  As the affair of 63 
is presented as an attempt to overthrow the government, then we could 
cautiously suggest that when Cicero and Sallust use the expression res novae it 
implied one of the affair’s aims.  The expression res novae literally meant “new 
things”, but whether the plebs and the Sullan veterans were desirous of a 
“revolution” in Cicero’s estimation remains difficult to determine due to the 
infrequency of the expression in his works.159 
 
4.8  Chapter conclusions 
The first chapter of my thesis demonstrated that Cicero and Sallust’s 
representation of the affair of 63 used specific terminology to identify the 
conspiratorial aspects of the affair that corresponded with their usage of the 
term coniuratio.  This chapter demonstrated that Cicero and Sallust also used 
the term bellum and various expressions analogous to a bellum civile to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 See Chapter 1.2. 
158 OLD (res) s.v. 1-19. 
159 NB: Surprisingly, there is a severe lack of scholarship on the expression res novae.  The 
expression is too subjective to advance the argument of the present thesis.  
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interpret the military preparations occurring in Italy or to describe the threat of 
the affair.  By using this distinct terminology, Cicero and Sallust suggested that 
the affair also contained elements indicating a state of bellum against the res 
publica and suggested that the bellum would be fought between Roman 
citizens.  However, the perception of the affair that Cicero rhetorically chose to 
accentuate in his speeches by using either the term coniuratio or bellum was 
not entirely misleading.  Sallust used both terms as well in his Catilina 
demonstrating that he agreed with Cicero and thought the affair contained 
identifiable elements related to both a conspiratorial and martial context making 
both terms appropriate lexical choices to interpret it. 
I have explained how Cicero and Sallust linked the disturbances 
occurring both inside and outside of Rome to the activities of the affair’s 
participants of 63 in an effort to emphasize the ‘dual’ threat that faced Rome.  
Both authors might have exaggerated the danger of these threats to make the 
entire affair more significant than perhaps it was, but how dangerous the threat 
actually was is obviously debatable.  However, we should only measure the 
affair of 63 from our existing narratives and their interpretation of the events.  
According to all of our sources, the affair was not only a significant and bold 
attempt to gain power in Rome, but also difficult to identify.  We can argue that 
a bellum, represented by the final battle against Catiline and Manlius’ army in 
Etruria, and a coniuratio including the clandestine, criminal, and violent plans 
the reliqua coniuratorum manusintended did occur simultaneously.  We can 
also conclude that those involved with the disturbances inside and outside of 
Rome were cives.  However, the expressions Cicero and Sallust used to imply 
that the affair of 63 was similar to a bellum civile were highly rhetorical. 
The conclusions of my thesis will compile the evidence this study has 
reviewed to see whether we can distinctly identify what type of event the 
Romans thought the affair of 63 represented.  Arguably, the term bellum is less 
ambiguous than the term coniuratio due to the state of affairs each term could 
describe.  As noted in Chapter 1, the term coniuratio can define the mutual 
taking of an oath to join an alliance, which might not always refer to a 
conspiratorial context similar to the affair of 63.  The following chapter will 
investigate the various meanings of the term coniuratio further to provide a 
comprehensive understanding what contexts the term could describe.  There 
are two terms in Latin that can define a conspiratorial context – coniuratio and 
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the term conspiratio or its cognates.  Therefore, before we can conclude how 
Sallust and Cicero interpreted the affair of 63, it is necessary to investigate 
when either the term coniuratio or conspiratio was used in their other works and 
whether the terms were used to describe a similar context.  In addition, to 
broaden our understanding of how the Romans perceived a context that was 
described by using either the term coniuratio or conspiratio or both terms, I 
examine the first occurrences of both terms written in Latin and the ways other 
writers contemporary to Cicero and Sallust used coniuratio and conspiratio in 
the following chapter and the addendum respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The concepts of coniuratio: Examining its usage in a military context, in 
Caesar’s Commentarii, and other contexts in the Ciceronian and 
Sallustian corpora 
 
 
This chapter reviews the usage of the term coniuratio in other works of 
Cicero, Sallust, and Caesar in order to further understand its possible meanings 
in other contexts.  The term coniuratio is not exclusively used to interpret a 
conspiratorial context or to define a conspiracy.  Instead, the term could signify 
the military oath administered when joining the Roman army or a mutual 
alliance between two or more people.  To begin, section 5.1 examines the 
earliest occurrence of coniuratio that survives in Latin literature.  The term 
occurs three times in plays attributed to Plautus written in the late third century 
to indicate the swearing of a mutual oath and to signify the sanctity of the oath.  
In comparison, I examine the usage of coniuratio on the late second century 
inscription of the SC de Bacchanalibus demonstrating that the term could 
express a negative state of affairs in the mid-Republic as well.  The section 
continues to examine the particular definition of coniuratio, which denotes the 
mutual oath taken when joining the Roman army and the pertinent instances 
when the term occurs in our sources. The brief literary history of coniuratio 
examined in this opening section provides a more developed understanding of 
the contexts the term could be used to describe. 
The occurrences of the term in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico are reviewed in 
section 5.2.1.  As will be demonstrated, coniuratio was used in a distinct 
manner in De Bello Gallico compared to the way the term was used to interpret 
a conspiratorial context such as the affair of 63.  The meaning of coniuratio is 
difficult to determine in De Bello Gallico, therefore a detailed analysis is 
necessary to explain how Caesar used it.  From this analysis, I sometimes offer 
alternate translations for the term coniuratio, as the term does not invariably 
identify a conspiratorial context.  On the other hand, section 5.2.2 examines the 
instances of coniuratio in De Bello Gallico that certainly identify a conspiratorial 
context due to the circumstances described.  Correspondingly, the other 
authors of Caesar’s Commentarii also used the term to describe a negative 
state of affairs, which is examined in section 5.2.3.  Throughout these sections 
concerning the usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s Commentarii, if the context 
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implies any of the secret, criminal, immoral, and plural aspects that correspond 
with identifying a conspiratorial context outlined in Chapter 1 then it will be 
noted for comparison. 
Logically, the Latin authors whose works were written in approximately 
the same period as Cicero and Sallust would yield the best lexicological 
comparison for the term coniuratio, but there are only a few authors whose 
works have survived that were their contemporaries.1  The term coniuratio does 
not occur in the poetry of Lucretius or Catullus.  The antiquarian Varro only 
used the term once in his works and the term only occurs twice in the 
biographies of Cornelius Nepos, so their works will only be briefly noted in this 
chapter.  Instead, the subsections 5.2.1-3 focus on Caesar’s Commentarii 
because the term occurs a significant amount of times producing a greater 
sample for comparison than Varro or Nepos. 
Scholars are in disagreement over the exact year that Caesar wrote the 
commentaries on his campaigns, but Cicero mentioned them in the Brutus 
composed in 46.2  Although this remains the only concrete terminus post quam 
for Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, scholars have argued whether seven of the books 
were published simultaneously before his split with Pompey in 50, the only year 
Caesar was not on campaign, or as individual journals while in Gaul.3 Aulus 
Hirtius, a partisan of Caesar and consul in 43, wrote the final book of De Bello 
Gallico after Caesar’s murder and perhaps the completed De Bello Civili as 
well.4  Some scholars accept that Hirtius, or Oppius, another of Caesar’s 
colleagues, might have written the commentaries De Bello Alexandrino, De 
Bello Africo, and De Bello Hispaniensi that cover the campaigns against 
Pompey and his supporters.5  Suetonius, in his biography of Caesar written in 
the second century A.D., admitted that the authors of the other Commentarii 
                                                
1 NB: The term coniuratio or its cognates do not occur in any of the fragments or references that 
are attributed to other historians who were contemporaries of Cicero and Sallust.  For these 
historians and the fragments refer to the HRR. 
2 Cic. Brut. 262. 
3 For the debates on a simultaneous publication of the first seven books of De Bello Gallico in 
51/50, cf. Rice Holmes 1914, ix-x; Adcock 1956, 89; Gelzer 1960, 155; Meier 1982, 309.  For 
the alternate theories of dating, see Rambaud 1953, 9-12.  For publication during the Gallic 
campaign or in parts, cf. Radin 1918, 283-300; Halkin 1930, 407-416; Wiseman 1998, 1-9. 
4 Hirtius explained in the preface of Book 8 of De Bello Gallico that he was finishing Caesar’s 
work posthumously.  Whether Hirtius completed De Bello Civili remains contensious, cf. Klotz 
1910, 156-7; Barwick 1951, 86-93; Adcock 1956, 89-96; Carter 1991, 17. NB: The term 
coniuratio does not appear in De Bello Civili. 
5 For a discussion on the authors of the other Commentarii, cf. Klotz 1910, 180-3 and 1927, 1-8; 
Adcock 1956, 101-7. 
 239 
remained uncertain.6  However, for my purposes, who wrote these 
commentaries is not as significant as when they were written and whether they 
used the term coniuratio, which in the case of the De Bello Alexandrino and the 
De Bello Hispaniensi they did.7  Therefore, I will dispense with the argument 
over the uncertainty of authorship regarding Caesar’s Commentarii and attribute 
the language found in these works worthy of comparison to Cicero and Sallust, 
as they were most likely written in the same literary period. 
Cicero and Sallust rarely use the term coniuratio to describe anything 
other than the affair of 63.  However, the few instances that the term does 
appear in the Ciceronian and Sallustian corpora that describe a different event 
are examined in Section 5.3 and 5.4 respectively in order to further understand 
how both writers used the term.  These sections demonstrate that both Cicero 
and Sallust used coniuratio invariably to describe its negative meaning.  The 
evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that coniuratio can carry either 
a neutral or negative meaning depending on the context. 
 
5.1  The term coniuratio as a mutual oath and its military context 
The following section highlights the principal definitions of the term 
coniuratio when it was used to define “the taking of an oath”.8  The earliest 
surviving occurrences of the term coniuratio or its cognates appear in three 
plays attributed to the Latin playwright T Maccius Plautus.  I examine two of 
these plays to demonstrate how Plautus used the term to express a mutual 
oath.9  The term coniuratio appears in the play Cistellaria, written at the end of 
the third century.10  The plot lines that can be determined from the fragments of 
the comedy concern the actions of Alcesimarchus, a young man from Sicyon, 
who falls in love with Silenium, a young prostitute from the city.  In the beginning 
of the play, Silenium states that Alcesimarchus “gave his word” to marry her 
(Plaut. Cist. 98: iuravit verbis).  But he has to break his promise to marry 
Silenium and instead accept his father’s wishes to marry the daughter of the 
first wife of Demiphro, a wealthy magistrate from Lemnos.  Throughout the play, 
                                                
6 Suet. Iul. 56.1. 
7 The author of De Bello Africo did not use coniuratio. 
8 OLD (coniuratio) s.v.1.  See introduction to Chapter 1 for definitions. 
9 Plautus also used coniurati in the Asinaria to refer to the people who took a mutual oath (Plaut. 
Asin. 318). 
10 Lines 197-202 of the Cistellaria recount the Roman victory over the Poeni (‘the 
Carthaginians’).  Victory in the Second Punic war could not be declared with certainty before the 
Battle of Zama in 202BC, therefore the terminus post quem for the play.  See Lange 1975. 
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Alcesimarchus bemoans his fate and longs to marry Silenium, who, in turn, had 
pledged to marry him.  In a scene between Alcesimarchus and one of his 
father’s slaves, the former remarks that coniurasset mecum et firmasset fidem 
“[Silenium] had given me her solemn promise, her sacred word” (Plaut. Cist. 
241).  Plautus most likely used coniurare to accentuate the reciprocity of the 
oath between the two lovers.  As explained in Chapter 1.4, the affix attached to 
the verb iurare implies an intrinsic plurality regardless of whether the verb 
occurs in the singular.  In this Plautine context, the compound reflexive pronoun 
mecum (‘with me’) was used instead of mihi (‘to me’), which further emphasizes 
the mutuality of their promise to each other.  The usage of coniuratio clearly 
indicates that both lovers had taken an oath. 
In Plautus’ Mercator, the verb coniurare is used again to indicate a 
mutual oath between two people.11  The comedy describes the underhanded 
attempt by an old merchant, Demipho, to marry his son’s lover, Pasicompsa.  
Demiphro’s son, Charinus, had fallen in love with Pasicompsa at Rhodes and 
when he returned home he attempted to have Pasicompsa brought into his 
father’s household as a slave.  Demipho also falls in love with Pasicompsa.  
The old man decides that Charinus cannot bring Pasicompsa into their family 
home and decides to sell her, so that she could be his mistress without openly 
being under the same roof as his wife.  The verb coniurare occurs in a scene 
between Pasicompsa and Demipho’s friend Lysimarchus, who just purchased 
the girl for Demipho.  When Lysimarchus questioned Pasicompsa about her 
chastity and her love for Charinus, she declared: 
certo, et inter nos coniurauimus, ego cum illo et ille me cum: ego cum viro et ille cum 
muliere, nisi cum illo aut ille mecum, neuter stupri causa caput limaret. 
 
“Certainly, we agreed, on oath, between ourselves, I with him, and he with me, that I 
would never have intercourse with any man except himself, nor he with any other 
woman” (Plaut. Merc. 536-9). 
 
The phraseology Plautus used in the passage ego cum illo et ille me cum 
indicates the mutuality of the oath that the term coniuratio describes.  However, 
there are aspects to Plautus’ usage of coniuratio that are familiar in a 
conspiratorial context.  Firstly, the coniuratio the lovers took in Plautus’ plays 
was clandestine as the context suggests.  Furthermore, his usage of the term 
insinuated that the oath was sacred and that it would be an immoral act to break 
                                                
11 The date of the Mercator remains indeterminable as well, but was most likely written during 
the late third and early second centuries.  
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their pledge of fidelity.  Therefore, in Plautus’ point of view, a coniuratio did not 
exclusively describe an oath taken for a criminal purpose.  
However, the bronze inscription discovered in Southern Italy in 1640 A.D. 
recording the Senatorial decree against the so-called “Bacchanalian Affair” of 
186 B.C. used the term coniuratio several times to indicate the clandestine, 
criminal, immoral, and plural aspects of those involved with the cult.12  It is 
significant to examine the text of the inscription, as it is contemporary to the 
writings of Plautus.  However, the term coniuratio is used to describe a negative 
state of affairs instead of the sacred oath taken between lovers.  The inscription 
ordered that no man or woman was able to perform a Bacchic ceremony unless 
they had already approached the praetor urbanus at Rome and offered a 
practical reason why it was necessary for them to celebrate the rites (line 3).13  
If the Senate accepted the request, the inscription further stipulated that they 
conduct the rites with no more than five people, at the most two men or three 
women in attendance (line 19).  The decree also demanded that no man or 
woman:  | neve post hac inter sed coniourase neve comvovise neve 
conspondise | neve conpromesise velet “henceforward seek to conspire, make 
vows, or make promises or guarantees in unison” (lines 13-14).14  The perfect 
infinitives of the Archaic Latin verbs in the inscription coniourase, comvovise, 
conspondise, and conpromesise correspond with the Classical Latin verbs 
coniurare, convovere (“to join in taking a vow”), conspondere (“to exchange 
pledges”), and compromittere (“to enter into an agreement”) respectively.15  
Although all the verbs seem to suggest similar actions in English, each word 
clearly referred to something subtly different to Latin speakers or the inscriber 
would not have used the four analogous terms.  The combination of the verbs 
made the warning more emphatic for those who were perhaps thinking of being 
initiated into the cult. 
Walsh’s translation for the archaic form of coniurare found on the 
inscription is “to conspire”.16  Perhaps the verb denotes “to join in taking an 
                                                
12 The inscription was discovered in the town of Tiriolo.  The end of the inscription designates 
where the decree was located (line 30: in agro Teurano). For the most recent list of scholars 
concerned with what part of Southern Italy in agro Teurano refers to, see Briscoe 2008, 245-6. 
Livy may not be our only surviving literary source for the episode.  A fragment of the Cato the 
Elder’s Oratoria (Cat. Orat. 68) might also refer to the decree of 186, see Levene 2000. 
13 For the complete Latin text of the SC de Bacchanalibus inscription, see ILS 18. 
14 The translation of the SC de Bacchanalibus is from Walsh 1994, 51-2. 
15 OLD (convovo) s.v. 2; (conspondo) s.v. 2; (compromitto) s.v. 3.  
16 Walsh 1994, 51. 
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oath” as all the other verbs in apposition to coniurare refer to the taking of a 
vow, a pledge, or entering into an agreement similar to the way Plautus defined 
the term.  The inscription continued to forbid any celebration of the Bacchic rites 
without the Senate’s consent, which included taking an oath and secretly 
conducting the ritual in private or in public.17  It was a crime if a person did not 
abide by the stipulations in the decree.  The inscription explained that the 
Senate could impose a capital charge against the people (lines 24-25).18  
Clearly, the inscription described a conspiratorial context therefore Walsh’s 
translation of coniurare as “to conspire” is not misleading.  However, several 
other verbs occur beside coniurare, which perhaps indicates that in the early 
second century coniurare was more nuanced and did not have the general 
meaning “to conspire.”19  Livy used the term coniuratio a dozen times in his 
account of the Bacchanalia (Liv. 39.8-19).  In Livy’s description of the 
Bacchanalia he continually used coniuratio or its cognates to describe the 
ethically negative actions of those involved with the cult.  Livy practically 
reproduced the senatorial decree found on the inscription but did not chose to 
reproduce the verbs regarding those who agreed to join the cult (39.18.8-9).  
However, I will not compare Livy’s usage of coniuratio when describing the 
Bacchanalia to the usage of the term in Cicero, Sallust, and Caesar’s works,20 
as Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita is from a different literary period.21 
                                                
17 NB: SC de Bacchanilibus line 15: in oquoltod “in secret.” 
18 Livy claimed that the Senate executed 7,000 men and women were executed for their 
participation in the Bacchanalia (Liv. 39.17.6). 
19 Livy opened his account of the Bacchanalia calling it an intenstina coniuratio (Liv. 39.8.1).  He 
called the episode the Bacchanalia only once (39.15.6).  The summary of Book 39 labeled the 
episode solely as the Bacchanalia, but claimed later that coniurationem pervenisset “[It] 
developed into a coniuratio” (Per. 39).  Scholars disagree whether the Bacchanalia should be 
described as a “conspiracy.”  For example, Gruen (1974, 34-78) entitles his chapter on the 
subject “The Bacchanalian Affair” and when he refers to the affair as a conspiracy the word is 
found in quotes. Pagan (2004, 50-67) entitles her chapter regarding the episode, “The 
Bacchanalian Affair”, but inconsistently refers to it as “The Bacchanalian Conspiracy” 
throughout the text of the chapter.  Nousek (2010) also uses the latter appellation, but 
sometimes refers to it simply as “The Bacchanalia” in her study. 
20 NB: This comparison has been investigated.  For the comparative narratological techniques 
found in Livy’s “Bacchanalia”, Sallust’s Bellum Catiline and Tacitus’ account of the “Pisonian 
Conspiracy”, see Pagan 2004, 87-90.  For the comparative language used in Livy’s account of 
the Bacchanalia to Sallust’s account of the affair of 63, see Briscoe 2008, 250.  For a 
comparison of Livy’s account of the Bacchanalia with Cicero’s account of the affair of 63, see 
Nousek 2010. 
21 Walsh (1961, 245) demonstrates Livy’s link with Republican historians, but definitely places 
him as a writer of the Augustan period.  Livy’s annalistic style began with his predecessors from 
the Republic, but his vocabulary and style was considered distinct from the writers of the 
Ciceronian era, cf. Rich 1997; Briscoe 2008, 248-50.  On new vocabulary appearing in Livy 
consult any of the commentaries of Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita by Briscoe, Oakley, Ogilvie, and 
Walsh.  For a summary of Livy’s usage of the term coniuratio, see n.33. 
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The term coniuratio can also denote the mutual oath of allegiance sworn 
by soldiers joining the Roman army.22  The coniuratio took place during a 
dilectus (‘a levy’) and was most likely administered out loud along with the 
traditional military oath called the sacramentum.23  The latter term indicates that 
the military oath for the Romans was considered a religious ritual and had a 
sacred quality.24  The military oath was taken in order for the gods to witness 
the act, in which the soldiers were solemnly bound to the army, its commanders 
and the military mission.25  Perhaps, Plautus knew his audience would be 
familiar with the term coniuratio and the solemnity that this audible and public 
pledge of allegiance further conveyed in a military context. 
 Vergil used the verb coniurare to describe the taking of the oath by the 
soldiers of Latium, who had allied with the forces of Turnus, King of the Rutuli, 
in the war against Aeneas.  Vergil wrote simul omne tumultu coniurat trepido 
Latium “All Latium at once swears allegiance in eager uprising” (Verg. Aen. 8.4-
5).26  Servius’ commentary of Book 8 of Vergil’s Aeneid explained that when 
there was an imminent threat of war, it was more practical to have those who 
enlisted in an army swear allegiance at the same time.27  Servius stated that 
this type of mass military recruitment dicebatur ista militia coniuratio “was called 
a coniuratio” (Serv. 8.1).28  As Servius’ readers were most likely accustomed to 
the negative connotation of the term coniuratio when it was used in a 
conspiratorial context, he asserted that in a military context the term could also 
be used de re bona, “for good things” (8.5). 
According to Livy, the soldiers who enlisted in the Roman army during 
the Second Punic War were required to take two distinct oaths of allegiance 
(Liv. 22.38.1-5).29  Apparently, the ius iurandum taken by the soldiers in 216 
                                                
22 On coniuratio as a military oath, cf. Habinek 1998, 76-78; Pagan 2004, 10-2; Rawlings 2007, 
57. 
23 OLD (sacramentum) s.v. 2. 
24 On the sacramentum, cf. Polyb. 6.19.5-21, 21.1-3; Liv. 22.38.1-5.  For the religious qualities 
of the military oath, cf. Rawlings 2007, 50-1; Sage 2008, 120-5.   
25 Cf. Polyb. 6.21.1-3; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.18.2; Liv. 22.38.1-5; Plut. Sull. 27.  See also, 
Keppie 1984, 78. 
26 Cf. Stat. Ach. 1.36; Theb. 5.162-3. 
27 Serv. 8.1: simul iurabant. 
28 Cf. Serv. 7.614: coniuratio, quae fit in tumultu, id est Italico bello et Gallico, quando vicinum 
urbis periculum singulos iurare non patitur “Conspiracy, which occurs in cases of sudden tumult 
like the Italian or Gallic war, refers to when the nearness of danger to the city does not allow for 
individual oaths of allegiance.” I quote Pagan’s translation (2004, 138 n. 41), but surely the term 
coniuratio should be translated here as a “mutual oath” not a “conspiracy.” 
29 This practice continued into the Empire but with the addition that the soldiers swore 
allegiance to the Emperor as well, cf. Campbell 1984, 19-23; Gilliver 2007, 187.  The timing of 
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was different than the oath that was administered to the army in previous years.  
Livy stated tum, quod numquam antea factum est, iure iurando ab tribunis 
militum adacti milites “An oath was then administered to the soldiers by their 
tribunes, which was a thing that they had never done before” (22.38.2).  The 
traditional sacramentum was administered as well, which was an oath that the 
soldiers swore iussu consulum conventuros neque iniussu abituros “to 
assemble at the bidding of the consuls and not depart without their orders” 
(22.38.2).  The sacramentum was followed by the coniuratio, according to Livy.  
He explained sua voluntate ipsi inter sese decuriati equites, centuriati pedites 
coniurabant sese fugae atque formidinis ergo non abituros neque ex ordine 
recessuros “They would exchange a voluntary pledge amongst themselves, the 
cavalrymen in their decuries and the infantry in their centuries, that they would 
not quit their ranks for flight or fear” (22.38.3-4).  Livy used the verb coniurare to 
denote the oath sworn mutually between the soldiers themselves whereas the 
sacramentum was taken to swear loyalty to the army’s commanders.30   
Livy specifically used the verb coniurare to denote the oath taken by 
those conscripted into the army perhaps due to the immediate threat of 
Hannibal’s presence in Italy.  Certain towns in Italy were supporting the 
Carthaginians at the time, which was a major concern for Rome.  Perhaps Livy 
made a distinction between the oaths to suggest that the Roman army was 
further obligated to defend the res publica by taking both oaths of allegiance.  
The religious term sacramentum in relation to the term coniuratio fosters the 
solemnity of the latter oath when it was taken to perform a specific military duty.  
Yet Livy primarily used either the phrase ius iurandum, or the verb iurare, or the 
word sacramentum without using coniuratio to refer to military oaths after this 
complete description in Book 22, Chapter 38.  In these other passages 
regarding military oaths, Livy was not explicit that the coniuratio was also 
administered.31  In the Ab Urbe Condita, the term coniuratio or its cognates 
occur 78 times and are found at least once in 23 of the surviving 35 books.  
However, only four times are they used to explicitly refer to the taking of an oath 
                                                                                                                                          
the coniuratio in Livy’s narrative coincides with a Republican coin from approximately the same 
era depicting the taking of a military oath, see Kent 1978, 11 with Plate no.7. 
30 Frontinus’ Strategemata written in the late first century A.D. explained the coniuratio in the 
exact same manner as in Livy, i.e the sacramentum referred to the usual oath of fidelity to the 
military tribunes, the coniuratio referred to the oath taken between the ranks of the soldiers, and 
the two oaths were first used during the Second Punic War (Front. Strat. 4.1.4). 
31 Only the sacramentum was administered, cf. Liv. 24.8.19, 25.5.8, 26.48.12, 28.27.4, 
28.27.11, 32.26.10, 35.2.8, 39.15.13, 40.26.7, 41.5.11. 
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in a military context.32  The other remaining occurrences of coniuratio in Livy’s 
work are invariably associated with conspiratorial contexts.33  For now it is 
significant to note that the term coniuratio could also denote an oath taken when 
soldiers joined an army. 
In the De Bello Gallico, Caesar used the term coniuratio thirteen times, 
but only once did the term explicitly denote the taking of a military oath.34  In 52, 
Caesar reported that due to the murder of the tribune P. Clodius Pulcher and 
the current tumultuous atmosphere in Rome, the Senate decreed that omnes 
iuniores Italiae coniurarent “All the younger men of military age in Italy should 
be sworn in” (Caes. B Gall. 7.1).  However, Caesar also used the phrases ius 
iurandum or the term sacramentum to denote the military oath more often than 
coniuratio in his works. Caesar used the term sacramentum when he asked 
Pompey to recruit soldiers from Cisalpine Gaul and send them to the campaign 
in Gaul (B Gall. 6.1).  Furthermore, the phrase ius iurandum or the term 
sacramentum each occur five times in De Bello Civili to indicate the military oath 
in different situations.35  Clearly, the distinction between the military oaths was 
not as important to Caesar as the distinction made by Livy when soldiers 
enlisted into the army.  The meaning Caesar wanted to convey was that a 
solemn oath had been administered regardless of the term he chose to denote 
the military oath. 
In addition, Caesar uses the phrase ius iurandum five times in the De 
Bello Gallico.  In contrast to the evidence previously examined, all of these 
instances refer to the oaths sworn by foreign enemies before preparing for war, 
not by Romans.36  After their chief Indutiomarus had been killed in battle against 
Caesar’s legions, the Treveri, a Belgian tribe situated west of the Rhine, 
                                                
32 Cf. Liv. 22.38.4, 26.25.12,16, 45.2.1. NB:  My count of the occurrences of coniuratio in Livy 
comes from a search of the term from the BTL on-line made in January 2010.   
33 Generally, we can group the occurrences of coniuratio or its cognates in Livy’s Ab Urbe 
Condita into the following genres: i) the murder or attempted assassination or the ousting of a 
political leader(s), cf. Liv. 1.51.5; 2.4.3,5,7, 6.2, 12.15, 13.2; 24.5.9-10, 7.3, 21.2, 4, 24.6,8-9; 
26.30.3; 40.21.10; ii) uprisings of plebs and/or slaves against the established authority, cf. 
2.32.1; 3.15.2,6; 4.45.1; 22.33.2; 32.26.7,10,13,15; 33.36.1,3; 39.29.9, 41.6; iii) military 
mutinies, cf. 7.38.8, 39.6, 41.5,8, 42.3-4; 27.3.4; 34.25.7,9, 41.3; 38.1.6; iv) alliances of enemies 
to attack the city of Rome or the Roman army, cf. 2.18.3; 6.2.2; 7.21.9; 8.3.3; 10.45.3; 34.11.7, 
41.3; and v) revolts by allies of Rome during wars against the Republic, cf. 8.19.13-14; 9.25.2,4, 
26.5,7-8, 27.1; 10.1.3; 24.18.4, 43.3; 25.8.3; 27.3.4; 30.26.12; 32.1.7; 34.56.2. 
34 NB: This count includes the three instances of coniuratio found in Book 8 of the De Bello 
Gallico by Hirtius (Caes. B Gall.. 8.1, 2, 23). 
35 For ius iurandum, cf. Caes. B Civ. 1.9, 1.76 (bis), 2.18, 3.28, 102, 107.  For sacramentum, cf. 
B Civ. 1.23, 86, 2.28, 32 (ter).  
36 For ius iurandum, cf. Caes. B Gall. 6.2, 7.2 (bis), 66, 67.  The final two occurrences refer to 
the oath sworn between the Gallic cavalry to attack the Caesar’s cavalry.  
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successfully tempted other tribes across the river to attack Caesar’s legions.  
The tribes confirmed their agreement to go to war by ius iurandum.  Caesar 
stated that iureiurando inter se confirmant “They took an oath to confirm their 
engagement” (Caes. B Gall. 6.2).  When most of the Gallic tribes pledged their 
allegiance to Vercingetorix, Caesar recorded that data iureiurando ab omnibus 
“An oath was taken by everyone” (7.2).  Again, Caesar was not specific in either 
passage when the ius iurandum was administered that his enemies had taken a 
sacramentum, or a coniuratio, or both.  However, it is important to understand 
that the expression ius iurandum could also refer to “non-Romans” pledging 
allegiance to perform military duties.37  More significantly, this usage is 
commensurate with the way Caesar used coniuratio in De Bello Gallico, in 
certain respects, to describe the mutual oaths taken by Gallic tribes to ally 
against Caesar examined in the following section. 
Cicero and Sallust do not use the term coniuratio to refer to a military 
oath. Cicero prefers the term sacramentum to indicate that a military oath had 
been taken.38  In contrast, Sallust used the expression ius iurandum twice to 
describe the swearing of an oath but in this case to join the affair of 63 not an 
army.  The first instance was examined in Chapter 1.4 concerning the rumor 
that the participants in the affair of 63 drank human blood to further confirm the 
solidarity of their mutual oath (Sall. B Cat. 22.1).39  The second instance 
described the pledge given verbally and in writing to the envoys of the 
Allobroges by Lentulus and the others (44.1).40  Evidently, both Cicero and 
Sallust reserved the usage of coniuratio to explicitly describe a conspiratorial 
context. 
There is nothing inconspicuous when either of the terms or expressions 
examined in this section described a military oath.  Habinek argues that when 
the word coniuratio specifically defined the military oath it was used in a manner 
that expressed an indifferent context.41  Habinek is referring to Servius’ 
interpretation that coniuratio can be used neutrally when it refers to a military 
                                                
37 NB: The author of De Bello Alexandrino used sacramentum once to refer to the military oath 
(B Alex. 56).  The anonymous authors of the De Bello Alexandrino and De Bello Hispaniense 
did not use coniuratio to express a military oath, see section 5.2.3 below. 
38 For sacramentum, cf. Cic. Off. 1.11.36; Dom. 78; Orat. 1.42; Fam. 7.32.2; Caecin. 97; Rep. 
2.60; Mil. 74. 
39 Cf. Dio 37.30.3.  
40 Cicero also used the phrase ius iurandum to refer to the oath given to the Allobroges (Cic. 
Cat. 3.9). 
41 Habinek 1998, 77.  
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oath.  Servius commented that nota de re bona coniurationem dici posse: nam 
coniuratio !ῶ" µ#$%" est “coniuratio can be used for good things, for the word 
has a middling sense” (Serv. 8.5.).42  As evidenced above, in Servius’ opinion, a 
coniuratio was usually taken due to an imminent threat of war, which during the 
Republic was arguably a constant (8.1).43  Therefore, the coniuratio signified a 
call to arms that obliged those who swore the military oath to prepare for hostile 
action.  The term has an indifferent sense but suggests a hostile context as the 
oath was administered due to a hostile situation or to commence hostilities. 
 
5.2  The usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s Commentarii 
This section examines the usage of coniuratio in De Bello Gallico, De 
Bello Alexandrino, and De Bello Hispaniensi and the contexts that the authors 
of Caesar’s Commentarii used the term to describe.  Caesar recorded the 
frequent alliances of certain tribes from Belgium, Germany, Gaul, and Britain to 
oppose his legions in De Bello Gallico.  As mentioned, the term coniuratio 
occurs thirteen times in the work and only once to explicitly describe the military 
oath to join the Roman army.44  The other twelve instances of coniuratio in De 
Bello Gallico most often describe the formation of an alliance between two or 
more Gallic tribes.  Caesar frequently used the term socii to identify the tribes’ 
allies, but chose the term coniuratio to describe the tribes’ alliance that he 
deemed were subversive in nature.  However, depending on the context, we 
could debate whether these coniurationes of Gallic tribes depicted a 
conspiratorial context similar to the affair of 63.  On the other hand, the term 
perhaps only signified the tribe’s mutual oath before an alliance to challenge 
Caesar’s legions similar to a coniuratio taken before joining an army.  In this 
section, the pertinent passages are detailed to demonstrate that Caesar 
sometimes uses the term in a manner different to that of Cicero and Sallust 
partly because of the martial context De Bello Gallico usually described.  
However, Caesar and the authors of the other Comentarii, in certain cases, 
identified a conspiratorial context similar to the way the term was used to 
                                                
42 The translation for the Greek in the passage from Servius is quoted from Pagan 2004, 13 
n.49.  
43 According to Livy, the doors of the temple of Janus were closed only once during the time of 
King Numa and once during the Republic after the First Punic War in 235, to signify that Rome 
was not at war (Liv. 1.19.3). 
44 Caes. B Gall. 7.1. 
 248 
recount the affair of 63.45  The meaning of the term coniuratio in the Comentarii 
is not always straightforward unless the historical context is scrutinized. 
 
5.2.1  The usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico indicating a 
mutual oath for war 
 
In the opening of Book 2, Caesar claimed that omnes Belgas…contra 
populum Romanum coniurare ‘All of the tribes in Belgium…coniurare against 
the Roman people’ (2.1).46  In the same passage, he used the term to describe 
the tribal alliances against his legions and listed the reasons for the coniuratio.47  
According to Caesar, the primary cause that spurred the Belgian tribes to form 
an alliance contra populum Romanum was due to the threatening presence of 
Caesar’s legions near the tribes’ borders or within their territory (2.1).  However, 
the Remi claimed that neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra 
populum Romanum coniurasse ‘They had neither agreed with the rest of the 
Belgians nor “conspired” against the Roman people’ (2.3).  Caesar had 
remarked earlier that he first heard about the Belgian coniuratio through 
rumores (‘rumors’).48  The reports of rumores perhaps indicated that the verb 
coniurare was chosen to describe the clandestine aspect of the tribal alliance.  
Clearly, the coniuratio had hostile intentions in Caesar’s judgment because the 
alliance was formed contra populum Romanum, which was represented by him 
and his legions.  Taking this into consideration perhaps the term coniurare 
defined a conspiratorial context, but when we examine the context closer this 
might not be the case.  
Caesar followed the military practice of demanding hostages from his 
enemies to indicate that they acquiesced to Rome’s dominance and to attempt 
to maintain peaceful relations.49  But, at this stage in the Gallic campaign, the 
Belgian tribes had not sent hostages to Caesar yet.  Therefore, we could argue 
that the Belgae had not acted subversively and the two instances of the verb 
coniurare did not indicate that the tribes had “conspired.”  A military context is 
                                                
45 NB: Caesar used a different terminology from Cicero and Sallust when describing the 
clandestine, criminal, immoral, and plural aspects that can identify a “conspiracy” examined in 
Chapter 1.  I will cite the specific language Caesar used to identify these aspects when 
appropriate. 
46 Caesar defined Belgium as a third of Gaul, cf. Caes. B Gall. 1.1, 2.1. 
47 Caes. B Gall. 2.1: coniurandi has esse causas. 
48 Caes B Gall. 2.1: crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat 
“Frequent rumors were brought to him, and dispatches also from Labienus informed him.” 
49 For a discussion of the practice of taking hostages, see Braund 1984, 15-6. 
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emphasized more than a conspiratorial context.  Caesar stated that an army 
was being assembled.50  In addition, he reported that the Remi informed him of 
the amount of soldiers each Belgian tribe promised to commit to the army.  
Caesar explained quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio 
ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint “They [the Remi] had learnt how large a 
contingent each chief had promised for the present campaign in the general 
council of the Belgae” (2.4).  The phrase in communi Belgarum concilio might 
refer to when the coniuratio was taken by the tribes to wage bellum against 
Caesar’s legions.  However, the term multitudo expressed the plurality of the 
Belgian forces preparing for bellum not the plurality of tribes in the coniuratio.  
Clearly, the Belgian tribes, at this point in the commentary, did not secretly 
“conspire” against Caesar by first sending hostages and then deciding to wage 
war like many tribes were reported to do in De Bello Gallico, as shown below.  If 
we translate coniurare as “to conspire” in both passages the translation might 
convey the tribes’ intentions to renew war after they had sent Caesar hostages.  
However, according to the circumstances, the term more precisely defines a 
mutual oath sworn to form an alliance to openly wage war without any indication 
that the coniuratio was a conspiratorial activity. 
In Book 3 of the De Bello Gallico, the term coniuratio occurs three 
times.51  Book 3 describes the events when Caesar was in Illyricum during the 
winter of 57/56.  During his absence from Gaul, it was reported that several 
tribes from the northern and western coasts formed alliances to jointly attack 
Caesar’s legions that were quartered in the region.  His legions were also 
attacked in Aquitania, the southwest region of Gaul.  Caesar used the verb 
coniurare twice to describe the alliance of these tribes.  First, he reported that 
the leading members of the Veneti and other tribes had inter se coniurant nihil 
nisi communi consilio acturos “bound themselves by mutual oath to do nothing 
save by common consent” (3.8).  The same prepositional phrase inter se occurs 
later in Book 3 to indicate a similar alliance between the Aquitanian tribes, the 
Vocates and Tarusates, and other border tribes from Spain.  Caesar stated that 
these tribes were planning coniurare, obsides inter se dare copias parare 
coeperunt “to conspire together, to deliver hostages each to other, and to make 
ready a force” (3.23).  In this passage, Edwards translates the verb coniurare as 
                                                
50 Caes. B Gall. 2.3: exercitum…conduci. 
51 At B Gall. 3.8, 10, 23. 
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“to conspire” instead of “to take a mutual oath”, as he did in the former 
passage.52  The verb coniurare and the phrase inter se place emphasis on the 
oath of allegiance sworn between the tribes by exchanging hostages.53  
However, before the Gallic alliance was formed, P. Licinius Crassus, one of 
Caesar’s lieutenants and Crassus’ son, was sent to Aquitania in order to wage 
war against the tribes of the region, who were continuing to resist Caesar’s 
invasion (3.20).  In the beginning of the engagement, only the Aquitanian tribe 
of the Sotiates was involved in the fighting.  They were defeated and 
subsequently sent hostages to Crassus to indicate that they had surrendered 
(3.23).  Book 3 does not explicitly state that either tribe exchanged hostages 
with the Romans before P. Crassus’ legions had entered Aquitania.  Therefore, 
similar to the occurrences examined in Book 2 above, the two instances of the 
term coniurare in Book 3 were used to refer to the formation of an alliance by 
swearing a mutual oath.  Therefore, Edwards’ translation for the verb coniurare 
as “to take an oath” is more accurate than “to conspire” due to the context. 
In Book 5, Caesar invents a speech for Ambiorix, a chief of the tribe of 
Eubrones, explaining the reasons why his tribe attacked Caesar’s troops.  
Ambiorix stated that his tribe hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae 
Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit “had gone to war because it had not 
been able to resist the sudden conspiracy of the Gauls.” (5.27).54  Caesar 
intimated in Ambiorix’s reported speech that the decision to wage a bellum was 
not his own, but was made by the people of his tribe.  Translating the adjective 
repentinus as “sudden” does not suitably describe the situation facing Ambiorix.  
According to the OLD, the adjective can also denote something “done to meet a 
sudden unexpected emergency or contingency”.55  Of course, the meaning of 
any word depends on its context and when examining the context of Ambiorix’s 
speech the adjective repentina used to qualify coniuratio seems to suggest this 
definition.  Due to the bad harvest in Gaul in the winter of 54, Caesar was 
forced to bivouac his legions in smaller camps over a wider area than usual so 
that they could be fed (5.24).  Caesar explained that the dispersal of military 
                                                
52 Edwards 1917, 149 and 169.  
53 For inter se, cf. Caes. B Gall. 2.1.1; BHisp. 36. 
54 NB: There is only one instance in the Periochae of Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita referring to an 
alliance between Gallic tribes Eubronas et alias civitates, quae conspiraverant “The Eubrones 
and other states which had banded together” (Per. 107).  The author of the Periochae used the 
analogous term conspiratio instead of coniuratio. The reference does not relate to Caes. B Gall. 
5.27, but to Caesar’s campaign against the Eubrones the following year described at 6.29-44.  
55 OLD (repentinus) s.v. 3. 
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strength made the Romans more vulnerable to attack.  Therefore, in order to 
capitalize on this unexpected contingency, several of the Gallic tribes were 
planning to attack all of his winter encampments on the same day (5.27).  The 
adjective repentinus emphasized the impetus for the Eubrones’ decision to ally 
with the other tribes implying that it was not the “suddenness” of the coniuratio 
that the Eubrones could not resist, but the urgency of the tribal alliances in order 
to attack Caesar’s legions when his forces were at their weakest.  In some 
respects, the Gallic coniuratio described in this passage was similar to the set of 
circumstances that Servius explained was the reason a coniuratio was taken 
during an emergency.56  Perhaps Caesar wanted his readers to realize the 
injustice of the tribal alliance that was formed while he was away from Gaul, 
therefore, he used the term coniuratio instead of another specific term to 
express their actions.  However, similar to the other occurrences of coniuratio 
above, Caesar’s usage of the term explicitly describes the formation of an 
alliance intending war not sedition per se. 
The one occurrence of coniuratio in Varro’s De lingua Latina identifies 
the same context.  When recalling the origins of the Poplifugia, a festival 
marking the “people’s flight” when Rome was sacked by the Gauls in the early 
fourth century, Varro explained that the people of Ficulea and Fidenae contra 
nos coniurarunt “united against us” (Varro Ling. 6.18).57  Varro used the verb 
coniurare to signify the alliance of the Ficuleans and Fidenates, who fought 
against Rome when it was at its weakest.58  Whether Varro chose to use 
coniurare to indicate a conspiratorial context is not explicit from the text, 
however he certainly used the term to describe the mutual oath between the 
Ficuleans and Fidenates to wage war similar to the examples examined above. 
 
5.2.2  The usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico describing a 
conspiratorial context 
 
Hirtius used the term coniuratio twice in Book 8 of the De Bello Gallico to 
signify the formation of tribal alliances similar to the way Caesar used the term 
in the passages examined above.  Book 8 described the final operations of 
Caesar and his legions until Gaul was effectively subdued in 50.  In the opening 
                                                
56 See section 5.1. 
57 On differing historical or mythical traditions for the Poplifugia, cf. Plut. Cam. 33.5-7; Dion. Hal. 
Ant. Rom. 1.56.5; Macrob. Sat. 3.2.10.  See also Scullard 1981, 159.  
58 Cf. Liv. 5.4.13. Fidenae changed allegiances often in the fifth century, see Cornell 1995, 311. 
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of the book, Hirtius stated complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli 
consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere “Reports came, however, that 
several states at once were considering fresh plans of campaign and forming 
coniurationes” (Caes. B Gall. 8.1).  Hirtius did not specifically name the tribes 
that were allying but he did claim that the coniurationes were made in order to 
renew the war against Caesar’s legions.  Later, Hirtius explained why Caesar 
only left a nominal force among the Gallic tribe of Bituriges when he set out for 
war.  Hirtius claimed that unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin 
bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent “They had proved more than a single 
legion in cantonments could restrain from warlike preparations and 
coniurationes” (8.2).  The term coniuratio appears in conjunction with bellum in 
both passages explicitly suggesting that the former term corresponded with a 
military context qualified by the latter.  However, according to the chronology of 
De Bello Gallico, many of the tribes that allied against Caesar’s legions in 50 
had at one point during the nine-year campaign given hostages to Caesar to 
signify their loyalty.  In the first passage, Hirtius explained that the Gallic tribes 
were planning to renovare (‘renew’) their bellum coniurationesque (8.1).  The 
phraseology implied that some of the Gallic tribes, who had acquiesced to 
Caesar’s power, had now decided to renew the defense of their territories.  
Therefore, Hirtius implied that the alliance to renew the war was a seditious act 
against Caesar and Rome by using the verb renovare when describing the 
intention of the Gallic coniurationes.  Furthermore, the instances of coniuratio in 
Book 8 imply that these military preparations were considered conspiratorial. 
The previous instances of the term coniuratio examined in section 5.2.1 
refer to an alliance by more than one Gallic tribe and imply that the agreement 
to ally together was an act of subterfuge.  On the other hand, an example in 
Book 4 explicitly stresses the conspiratorial quality of the coniurationes formed 
by certain tribes.  These tribes had specifically given hostages to Caesar before 
they planned to renew hostilities.59  The latter half of Book 4 recounts Caesar’s 
initial expedition to subdue the tribes in Britain.  When the British tribes heard 
                                                
59 NB: There is a similar explicit example of a seditious coniuratio in Book 3.  Caesar described 
an alliance of Belgian and German tribes that planned to renew war as a coniuratio, who had 
previously been subdued and sent hostages to him.  Caesar explained these tribes’ crimes: 
iniuriae rententorum equitum Romanorum rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis 
obsidibus tot civitatum coniuratio “The outrageous detention of Roman knights, the renewal of 
war after surrender, the revolt after hostages were given, the conspiracy of so many states” 
(Caes. B Gall. 3.10). 
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that Caesar planned to invade the island, they promised to send hostages when 
he arrived (4.21).  However, when Caesar’s legions landed on the island, the 
British tribes immediately attacked indicating that they had no intention of 
keeping their promise.  Caesar’s legions repelled the attack and were able to 
establish a beachhead.  After this initial victory, the British tribes sent hostages 
signifying a truce (4.23-4.27).  Caesar explained that his rebus pace confirmata 
“Peace was thus established” (4.28).  However, Caesar claimed that the British 
tribes, realizing his legions were undersupplied, held a conference deciding that 
optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione… itaque rursus coniuratione facta 
paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt “The 
best thing to do was to renew the war… Therefore they conspired together 
anew, and, departing a few at a time from the camp, they began secretly to 
draw in their followers from the fields” (4.30).  Rice Holmes, in his commentary 
of this passage, definitively states that the term coniuratio should not be 
translated as a “conspiracy.”  He insists that the phrase rursus coniuratio facta 
means, “They renewed their oaths of fidelity” and argues, “If we were to 
translate coniuratio by ‘conspiracy’, the religious character of the agreement 
would be lost sight of.”60 
Rice Holmes’ explanation is reasonable because the term coniuratio 
carries a sacred aspect when it indicated the swearing of an oath between 
individuals or an army, as demonstrated in section 5.1.  However, the passage 
suggests that the tribes had decided on a rebellio to recommence the war thus 
breaking the peace that was previously established when the tribes gave 
hostages to Caesar.61  The term coniuratio might convey the “oaths of fidelity” 
taken between the British tribes to renew hostilities, but the decision to wage 
war was taken in secret and after they had already surrendered hostages.62  
The clandestine aspect of the British coniuratio is stressed by the occurrence of 
the adverb clam.  Although the adverb does not qualify coniuratio, it does 
accentuate the secrecy in which the plan was implemented.  Moreover, we 
                                                
60 Rice Holmes 1914, 164. 
61 The term rebellio (3.10, 4.38) or phrase renovare bellum (3.2, 8.1) do not define a “rebellion” 
in the modern sense, but instead a renewal of hostilities specifically concerning episodes when 
hostages had already been exchanged and peaceful relations were agreed in De Bello Gallico.  
Cf. OLD (rebellio) s.v. 2; (renovo) s.v. 5a.  NB: Cicero and Sallust do not use the term rebellio in 
reference to the affair of 63, so the term’s meaning in De Bello Gallico cannot be accurately 
compared to with a coniuratio. 
62 NB: The term coniuratio was used in a similar manner to express an alliance after hostages 
had been given at B Gall. 3.10. 
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could suggest that, in Caesar’s opinion, the plan of the British coniuratio was an 
immoral act because they broke their promise to keep the peace.  Therefore, 
the coniuratio by the British tribes has a more seditious meaning than just 
describing what Rice Holmes translates as, “an oath of fidelity”.  Consequently, 
Edwards’ translation of rursus coniuratio facta as “they conspired together 
anew”, which was first quoted above, seems to more accurately describe 
Caesar’s feeling towards the British tribes that broke the initial peace by 
surreptitiously deciding to renew hostilities against his forces. 
Briefly turning our examination of Caesar’s De Bello Gallico to an 
occurrence of the term coniuratio in Cornelius Nepos’ biography of the Greek 
general Alcibiades, we can further demonstrate its sacrilegious aspect.  While 
the Athenians were preparing to attack Syracuse during the Peloponnesian 
War, the hermetic statues in Athens were desecrated.  Suspicion fell on 
Alcibiades for several reasons (Nep. Alc. 3.1-4).  Nepos emphasized that one 
reason the general was suspected of sacrilege was due to rumors that he 
celebrated the Elyusian mysteries within his own home.  Nepos remarked that 
the Athenians considered Alcibiades’ private celebration nefas and was non ad 
religionem, sed ad coniurationem pertinere ‘not in reference to religion, but to a 
coniuratio’ (3.5). This instance confirms that a coniuratio could be used in a 
religious context, which perhaps further exaplains Rice Holmes emphasis of this 
aspect of coniuratio in his commentary of the passage in De Bello Gallico 4.30 
quoted above.   
As mentioned, the passages examined in section 5.2.1 in De Bello 
Gallico describe a formation of an alliance by a mutual oath to wage war against 
Caesar’s legions and by extension the populum Romanum.  However, the 
passages examined show that the term coniuratio does not invariably denote an 
explicit conspiratorial context.  Clearly, the term suggests something akin to a 
“conspiracy” only after a tribe had exchanged hostages indicating that they had 
yielded to Caesar’s dominance.  Admittedly, the occurrences of coniuratio 
examined in this section all contain an underlying subversive and criminal 
connotation even when the term was used to explicitly describe an oath to join 
an alliance intending to wage war.  The fact that Caesar’s enemy took an oath 
to wage war expressed a subversive, criminal, and in some respect, immoral 
aspect of the Gallic coniurationes that the authors of De Bello Gallico most likely 
wanted the term to project. 
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On the other hand, in certain passages, Caesar, Hirtius, and the other 
anonymous authors of Caesar’s Commentarii used coniuratio in a less nuanced 
manner to specifically interpret a “conspiracy.”  In Book 1 of the De Bello 
Gallico, Caesar described an unsuccessful attempt by Ocengetorix, a noble of 
the Helvetii, to become chief of the tribe in 61.  Caesar stated that Ocengetorix 
had formed coniurationem nobilitatis “a conspiracy of the nobles” (Caes. B Gall. 
1.2).  Ocengetorix persuaded the other classes among the tribe to join the 
coniuratio promising that the Helvetii would become masters of Gaul under his 
leadership.  In addition, he attempted to persuade the neighboring tribes of the 
Sequani and the Aedui to join him when he became chief of the Helvetii.  
Ocengetorix determined that it would take two years to gather enough supplies 
before enacting the plans of the coniuratio (1.3).  By this time the coniuratio 
nobilitatis was discovered, but Ocengetorix was able to escape before he could 
be tried for treason.  After his escape, the magistrates of the Helvetii forcibly 
seized the supporters of the coniuratio and tried them for treason.  However, the 
coniuratio nobilitatis was effectively over when Ocengetorix was found dead 
(1.4).63  
In this case, the term coniuratio does not explicitly identify an alliance 
between two or more tribes.  Instead, the term describes the alliance between 
the leading men within a single tribe to oust the current regime similar to the 
way Cicero and Sallust interpreted the ultimate plan of the participants in the 
affair of 63.  Caesar’s account of the coniuratio nobilitatis contained the aspects 
that describe a conspiratorial context identified in Chapter 1.  The clandestine 
aspect is confirmed by the indication that the ultimate plan of the coniuratio was 
unknown until ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata “The design was 
revealed to the Helvetii by informers” (1.4).64  The criminal aspects of the 
coniuratio nobilitatis were clear.  First, when Ocengetorix was in negotiations 
with the son of the chiefs of the Sequani and the brother of the chief of the 
Aedui to usurp the leadership within their own tribes, Ocengetorix claimed suae 
civitatis imperium obtenturus esset “he was about to secure the sovereignty of 
his own state” (1.3).  The plurality is clarified by the plural adjective nobilitatis 
acting as a partitive genitive to qualify coniuratio indicating that others from the 
                                                
63 Caesar reported that Ocengetorix died under suspicious circumstances (Caes. B Gall. 1.4). 
64 NB: The verb nuntiare or the compounded forms of the verb enuntiare or renuntiare occur 
throughout De Bello Gallico.  Caesar accentuated his military prowess as he was almost always 
aware or informed of his enemies’ plans.  Caesar did not use the verbs of “discovery” like 
Cicero and Sallust reviewed in Chapter 1.1. 
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nobility were included not Ocengetorix alone.  Hence, the several causae 
(‘trials’) that continued after the discovery of the coniuratio and Ocengetorix’s 
death (1.4).  Consequently, the other nobiles who supported the coniuratio to 
illegally obtain power in the tribe were criminally prosecuted.  This secret 
attempt by certain elites among the Helvetii who attempted to install 
Ocengetorix as chief was discovered and the coniuratio failed.  The account is 
clearly similar to the discovery and eventual punishment meted out to the elite 
Roman citizens involved with the failed attempt to gain power in Rome in 63.  
As shown, the term coniuratio in De Bello Gallico most often interprets the 
alliance of Gallic tribes before they attacked Caesar’s legions.  Usually these 
tribes are identified by name in De Bello Gallico, but the account of the 
coniuratio nobilitatis among the Helvetii in Book 1 is attributed to a specific 
group of individuals within a tribe instead of a coniuratio taken by several tribes 
allying together. 
One other instance of the term in De Bello Gallico ascribes a coniuratio 
to a specific group of individuals.  These individuals were prosecuted as if they 
had committed a crime against Caesar instead of the usual military retaliation 
by his legions against the other Gallic coniurationes formed during the 
campaigns examined earlier in this section.  In the beginning of the campaign, 
Caesar replaced the chiefs of the tribes of the Carnutes and Senones with men 
who he hoped would remain loyal and, by this favor, prevent their tribes from 
attacking his legions.  Around 57/56, Caesar restored Tasgetius as chief of the 
Carnutes and for more than two years the tribe remained peaceful.  In 54, the 
Carnutes put Tasgetius to death signaling their discontent with Caesar’s 
meddling in their tribal affairs (5.25).  The Senones exiled Cavarinus, the chief 
Caesar appointed for the tribe at the beginning of his campaign in the same 
year (5.54).  Both tribes promised to support Indutiomarus, a chief of the 
Treveri, who was at war with Caesar’s legions (5.56).  However, Indutiomarus 
was killed before he could unite his forces with the Senones and Carnutes’ 
forces (5.58).  Consequently, in the spring of 53, when Caesar held a Gallic 
council composed of tribes that he had previously subdued or had sent 
hostages, the Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri did not attend as a display of 
fidelity between the three tribes (6.3).  Caesar adjudged that this affront 
indicated initium belli ac defectionis “The commencement of war and revolt” 
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(6.3).65  He initially set out to subdue the Senones and Carnutes in Central Gaul 
and after a great display of force both tribes pleaded for peace (6.4).  Caesar’s 
legions then defeated the Treveri (6.7-8). 
At the end of Book 6, Caesar singled out the defection of the Senones 
and Carnutes.  The Book recorded that Caesar indicto de coniuratione 
Senonum et Carnutum quaestionem habere instituit “was determined to hold an 
inquisition touching on the coniuratio of the Senones and Carnutes” (6.44).  A 
chief of the Senones named Acco was identified as the principal instigator of the 
plot.66  After the quaestio (‘trial’), Acco was found guilty and flogged to death for 
his involvement in the coniuratio.  Caesar reported that nonnulli iudicium veriti 
profugerunt, quibus cum aqua atque igni interdixisset “Some persons feared 
trial and fled, and these [Caesar] outlawed” (6.44).  This sentence suggests that 
Caesar planned to prosecute more participants than Acco involved with the 
coniuratio Senonum et Carnutum.  The term coniuratio clearly referred to the 
crime these tribes had committed not explicitly the mutual oath taken to form the 
alliance between the tribes.  This is the only episode in De Bello Gallico that 
describes Caesar presiding over a trial to punish those participating in a 
coniuratio.  Arguably, this occurrence of the term connotes a conspiratorial 
context more explicitly than the other instances of coniuratio examined in this 
section to describe a tribal alliance however subversive Caesar might have 
considered those alliances to be. 
 
5.2.3  The usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s Commentarii and its contexts 
The De Bello Alexandrino describes a plot to assassinate Q. Cassius 
Longinus the propraetor of Hispania Ulterior in 48 using the term coniuratio.67  
The year before, Q. Cassius was appointed as propraetor by Caesar and was 
left in power over the province when the conflict between Pompey and Caesar 
began.  The author of the De Bello Alexandrino recorded that Cassius was 
treacherously attacked and wounded by the local population when he was a 
quaestor in the province in late 50’s, which instilled in him an especial hatred for 
the province (B Alex. 48).  As propraetor, Cassius heavily taxed the rich 
provincials to pay off his own debts and tried to use the money to buy the loyalty 
                                                
65 NB: Cicero and Sallust did not use the term defectio to explain any activity connected with the 
affair of 63. 
66 Caes. B Gall. 6.44: Accone, qui princeps euis consili fuerat “Acco, the arch-conspirator, who 
had originated the plot.” 
67 B Alex. 48-55. 
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of the indigenous soldiers that were conscripted into the Roman legions (49).  
After years of extortion, the locals had grown to hate Cassius and the legions 
had no affection for him either (50).  Caesar ordered Cassius to send several 
legions to Africa as reinforcements (51), but the legions mutinied.  An ex-tribune 
and Caesarian, L. Racilius, and other influential Romans in the province thought 
Cassius would not be able to win over the legions’ loyalty due to his continuous 
rapacity.  If the legions continued to refuse to be led by Cassius then Caesar’s 
forces in Africa would not be reinforced.  According to De Bello Alexandrino, a 
client of Racilius, a few indigenous soldiers in Cassius’ legions from the Spanish 
province of Italica, and several others attempted to assassinate Cassius to 
remove him as their nominal commander (52-53).  However, he was only 
wounded in the attempt and the would-be assassins were tried for their 
involvement in the plot.  De Bello Alexandrino records twelve conspirators by 
name.68  Cassius executed some of these men, others were tortured, and some 
paid Cassius for their freedom.69  The author of De Bello Alexandrino explained 
that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and Annius Scapula were executed because in 
eadem fuisse coniuratione “[They] had all been involved in the same coniuratio” 
(55).  In this case, the coniuratio refers to the attempted assassination. 
The concrete noun coniurati occurs twice to denote the people involved 
in the attempt to murder Cassius.  After Cassius was initially wounded, the 
author remarked that clamore sublato fit a coniuratis impetus universis “No 
sooner was the alarm raised than all the coniurati joined in the attack” (52).  
After torturing some of the men involved in the coniuratio, the author explained 
that Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium coniuratorumque numerum 
auget “Calpurnius Salvianus, who made a formal deposition in which he named 
a larger number of coniurati” (55).70  The plurality of the coniuratio is manifest 
due to the number of people specifically named in the episode and due to the 
usage of the term coniurati to identify those accused of planning to murder 
Cassius.  Although the author of De Bello Alexandrino did not use terminology 
                                                
68 Racilius’ client Minucius Silo was the first to wound Cassius (B Alex. 52).  The men from 
Italica named are: Munatius Flaccus, T. Vasius, and M. Mercello (52).  Other would-be 
assassins whose affiliations remain unknown are: L. Licinius Squillus (52), Calpurnius 
Salvianus, Manilius Tusculus, L. Laterensis (53), L. Mercello, and Q. Sestius (55).  Annius 
Scapula, an influential domus nobilis within the province, is also named in the plot (55). 
69 Racilius, Laterensis, and Scapula were executed.  Minucius, Salvianus, Mercello, and 
Squillus were tortured.  Salvianus and Sestius were able to buy their freedom (B Alex. 55).  The 
author is silent regarding the fate of the others that were named, see note above. 
70 Cf B Alex 55, which insinuated that under torture L. Licinius Squillus nominat pluris “named 
many more.” 
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that explicitly emphasizes the clandestine, criminal, or immoral nature of the 
plot, the context the author described implies all three aspects.  It is clear that 
the coniuratio was made secretly because the assassins were able to wound 
Cassius before the plan was discovered.  The subsequent arrests, floggings 
and executions indicated that the coniuratio was a criminal offense.71  The 
author of De Bello Alexandrino was not explicit regarding the immorality of an 
attempted assassination of a propraetor of Rome.  However, the author of De 
Bello Hispaniensi included a speech by Caesar in 46 confirming the sacrilegious 
quality of the coniuratio to murder the propraetor Cassius two years before.  
Caesar addressed the Roman citizens of Spain proclaiming that vos iure 
gentium et civiumque Romanorum institutis cognitis more barbarorum populi 
Romani magistratibus sacrosanctis manus semel et saepius attulistis “You 
though no strangers to the law of nations and the rights of Roman citizens, have 
yet like barbarians often violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates” (B 
Hisp. 42). 
In a similar manner, Cornelius Nepos also used coniuratio to indicate the 
oath taken by the followers of Callippus to murder Dion, the tyrant of Syracuse 
in 353.  Nepos stated that the loyalty of those involved with the plan were 
coniuratione confirmat ‘confirmed by taking a mutual oath’ (Nep. Dion 8.3).  
Clearly, in Nepos’ opinion, the term coniuratio was appropriate to use when 
describing a criminal plan to murder an individual.  However, as shown in the 
previous section, Nepos also used the term to identify a conspiratorial context 
against the State, as Alcibiades had when he was accused of violating several 
religious rites (Alc. 3).   
The instances of the term coniuratio in De Bello Alexandrino are used to 
describe a different set of circumstances than previously examined in De Bello 
Gallico.  Similarly, the distinct context identified in De Bello Hispaniensi can be 
distinguished from those previously defined.  In this war commentary, the verb 
coniurare appears twice to describe the taking of a mutual oath between 
soldiers not to join an army, but to desert one army for another.  After Caesar’s 
defeat of Cato and Scipio’s forces at Thapsus in 46, Sextus and Cnaeus the 
Younger, Pompey’s sons, fled to Spain.  Pompey’s sons were able to entice 
                                                
71 The execution of the coniurati increased Cassius’ unpopularity and led to several mutinies 
among the individual commanders of the legions in Spain (B Alex. 56-64).  Eventually Cassius 
tried to escape from the province, but his ship sank and he drowned (64). 
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some of the towns in Spain to support them in their final stand against Caesar.72  
The author of the De Bello Hispaniensi reported that the cavalry in the legions 
led by Cnaeus planned to desert his army and join Caesar’s forces.  Three 
knights came into Caesar’s camp explaining that: 
equites Romanos coniurasse omnis qui in castris Pompei essent, ut transitionem 
facerent; servi indicio omnes in custodiam esse coniectos e quibus occasione capta se 
transfugisse  
 
“All the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey’s camp, had like them conspired to come 
and join [Caesar], that, on the information of a slave they had all been seized and cast 
into custody; that out of this number they only had escaped.” (B Hisp. 26) 
 
In this case, the verb coniurare perhaps signifies that a mutual oath was taken 
between omnes equites before their plan to facere transitio (‘to change 
allegiance’).73  When the plan was discovered, the knights were summarily 
punished.  The description of the mutiny suggests that the coniuratio was 
initially made in secret and was considered a criminal offense when the 
coniuratio was revealed. 
The second instance of coniurare in De Bello Hispaniensi was used to 
describe a plan made by a legion of Pompeian soldiers to surreptitiously attack 
Caesar’s legions soon after they had surrendered and had joined the Caesarian 
camp.  The author of De Bello Hispaniensi explained the scene after Caesar’s 
legions successfully besieged the town of Munda: 
cum diutius circumsederentur, bene multi deditionem faciunt, et cum essent in legionem 
distributi, coniurant inter sese ut noctu signo dato qui in oppido fuissent eruptionem 
facerent, illi caedem in castris administrarent. Hac re cognita insequenti nocte vigilia 
tertia tessera data extra vallum omnes sunt concisi. 
 
“Many of those who had escaped out of the battle, despairing of safety, surrendered to 
us; and being formed into a legion, coniurant inter sese, that upon a signal being given, 
the garrison should sally out in the night, while at the same time should begin a 
massacre in the camp.  But the plot being discovered, they were the next night, at the 
changing of the third watch, all put to death outside the rampart.” (B Hisp. 36) 
 
As examined above, the phrase coniurare inter sese indicated that an oath had 
been taken between the soldiers that had surrendered after the siege of Munda 
to act together.  The plan they agreed upon had aspects found in a 
conspiratorial context similar to the affair of 63.  The plural aspect is manifest by 
the usage of multi and omnes denoting the many soldiers involved.  The plan 
was to occur noctu (‘at night’) suggesting secrecy.  Furthermore, when the plan 
                                                
72 Cf. B Hisp. 1; Plut. Caes. 56.1. 
73 OLD (transitio) s.v. 3. 
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was discovered those soldiers who were involved were executed signifying its 
criminality.  The passage insinuated that the routed soldiers at Munda feigned 
loyalty to Caesar’s legions before attempting to murder them at night.  Certainly, 
the author of the De Bello Hispaniensi wanted to stress the immoral quality of 
this mutinous plan against Caesar’s legions.  The author used the two instances 
of coniurare to denote a conspiratorial context, however, the term was used in a 
nuanced manner from the other instances of the term examined in this study so 
far.  In the De Bello Hispaniensi, the verb defines the swearing of a mutual oath 
taken between soldiers not to join the army, or to wage war, or to overthrow 
their oppressors like in the other Commentarii and Cicero and Sallust’s works, 
but to indicate an agreement to mutiny.74 
From this detailed analysis of the usage of coniuratio or its cognates in 
Caesar’s Commentarii in sections 5.2.1-3, we can make the following 
conclusions concerning the meaning of the term.  In De Bello Gallico, when 
Caesar or Hirtius use coniuratio to convey the taking of an oath, it is difficult to 
ascertain the term’s meaning without thoroughly examining the context.  
Although the term occurs in a narrative describing Caesar’s military exploits, 
only once in the De Bello Gallico does the term specifically express the taking of 
an oath to join an army (Caes. B Gall. 7.1).  Caesar and Hirtius primarily use the 
term to describe the alliances that were formed against him by the Gallic tribes.  
As these alliances would often lead to war, the term coniuratio is most likely 
used to express the subversive aspect that it can often suggest.  In De Bello 
Gallico, the reader gets the sense that the term coniuratio is used to interpret an 
action that, in Caesar’s point of view, was conspiratorial in nature.  The author 
of De Bello Alexandrino and De Bello Hispaniensi use the term to explicitly refer 
to a plan to assassinate a Roman magistrate and attempts to desert an army, 
respectively.  In these two commentaries, the term also suggests a 
conspiratorial context.  Therefore, the usage of coniuratio in the Commentarii 
might explicitly denote the swearing of a mutual oath between those involved 
with a coniuratio, but it also implicitly referred to the subversive and treasonable 
aspects the term could describe as well.   
 
                                                
74 NB: This usage of coniuratio to define an oath to mutiny from an army is frequently found in 
Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita written a generation later.  Regarding mutinies in the Roman army, cf. 
Liv. 7.38.8, 39.6, 41.5, 8, 27.3.4, 42.3-4. For mutinies among the Greeks against Macedonian 
garrisons, cf. Liv. 34.25.7,9, 41.3; 38.1.6. 
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5.3  The other instances of coniuratio in the Ciceronian corpus 
As stated in Chapter 1, Cicero primarily uses the term coniuratio or its 
cognates to describe the affair of 63, its plans, and its participants. The term 
occurs 115 times in his works and 84 of these occurrences explicitly refer to the 
conspiracy of 63.75  If we eschew the eleven times the term is used in reference 
to P. Clodius Pulcher, his associates, and their deeds, which Cicero claimed 
were borne out of the affair of 63;76 in addition to the seven times the term was 
explicitly used to refer to the coniuratio of 66/65, which some of the participants 
in the affair of 63 had supposedly planned;77 then we are only left with fourteen 
occurrences of the term entirely unconnected with the affair of 63.78   In this 
section, I examine a number of these instances in order to demonstrate that 
Cicero exclusively uses the term to describe a conspiratorial context regardless 
of the situation.79  When coniuratio occurs in his forensic speeches it is used in 
reference to a crime.80  Similarly when the term occurs in Cicero’s philosophical 
and oratorical works, it is used in a judicial context.  First, I examine the seven 
occurrences of coniuratio in three forensic speeches.  Then I briefly review the 
                                                
75 NB: An on-line Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina search yields 118 times that coniuratio or its 
cognates occur in the Ciceronian corpus.  But 13 times these appear in the Pseudo-Ciceronian 
corpus, leaving us with 105 instances.  However, a BTL search only counts four uses of 
coniuratio in the Pro Caelio, but the term occurs four times in chapter 15 alone and once more 
in chapter 70.  The same problem occurs at Pro Sestio 9, where the term occurs twice in the 
same line giving a total of five times in this speech instead of four and at Ad Atticum 2.2.3 the 
term occurs twice not once.  In addition, a BTL search only counts 31 usages in the Pro Sulla 
due to the same problem again, whereas 38 can be counted.  Therefore the term actually 
occurs 116 times (excluding the occurrences in the Pseudo-Ciceronian corpus, however it 
should also be noted that the term appears once in Cicero’s epistolary corpus that was not 
written by Cicero but by P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther to the Senate (Cic. Fam. 12.14.6). The 
term in this letter refers to the revolt of Antonius and Dolabella in 43, which Cicero never refers 
to as a coniuratio in any of his works.  For this reason, I exclude this last occurrence of the term 
to arrive at my total of 115 times, which Cicero used coniuratio or its cognates. 
76 In reference to Clodius, his associates, and his actions, cf. Dom. 58, 62, 96, 103; Har. 18, 36; 
Sest. 28, 42; Pis. 15, 16; Att. 1.16.11, 2.2.3; Parad. 4.27.  On Clodius’ connection with Catiline 
and his complicated relationship with Cicero, see Lintott 1967, 158-9 and 169.  
77 Cicero discussed the coniuratio of 66/65 in the Pro Sulla, cf. 12, 13, 14, 67, 81 (bis), 82. 
78 NB: There might be one exception in these fourteen occurrences. Cicero discussed the 
permitted torture of witnesses de incestu et coniuratione quae facta me consule est “In cases of 
incest, and in the case of conspiracy that occurred during my consulship” (Cic. Part. Orat. 118).  
However, our accounts of the trials linked with the affair of 63 never discuss the torture of slaves 
or indicate that any slave gave information regarding the affair.  Rackham (1948, 400-1 n.b) 
explains that the relative clause in De Partitione Oratoria referring to Cicero’s consulship was 
most likely a later interpolation.  
79 The term coniuratio occurs twice in Cicero’s Pro Scauro, but these instances will be 
discussed in Appendix III as the term conspiratio also occurs in the speech. 
80 As mentioned earlier, there was no Republican Roman lex that was specifically concerned 
with the crime of coniuratio.  Anyone found guilty of the crime was probably charged under 
either the leges maiestatis or the leges de vi.  The conspirators of 63 were most likely tried 
under the latter law, specifically the lex Plautia de vi, cf. Sall. Cat. 31.4; Ps-Sal. Cic. 3. See also, 
TLRR, nos. 226-34.  On leges de vi, cf. Hough 1930; Gruen 1974, 224-7; Robinson 1996, 74-
80.  
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usage of the term in Cicero’s philosophical and oratorical works, which also 
demonstrate that Cicero uses the term to interpret a criminal situation.  
The first time the term appears in the Ciceronian corpus is during his 
prosecution of C. Verres, the governor of Sicily from 73-71, on the official 
charge de repetundis.  There was a significant delay in the prosecution of 
Verres.  Cicero had several months to gather evidence and witnesses from 
Sicily and a further delay occurred because the quaestio de repetundis was 
occupied with another case (Cic. Verr. 1.30-31).81 Apparently, the first speech 
Cicero delivered convinced Verres that a conviction was inevitable and he fled 
Rome.82  Cicero had planned several speeches to demonstrate Verres’ guilt, 
which are collectively named the actio secunda by modern scholars.  These 
speeches were most likely published before the case resumed, but were never 
delivered in court because Verres had left the city after Cicero’s first speech 
against him.83 
The term coniuratio occurs five times in the actio secunda, once in Book 
3 and four times in Book 5.  In Book 3, Cicero described the greed and illegal 
extortion by Verres and his tax collector Q. Apronius regarding the collection of 
tithes and the purchase of wheat from Sicily.  Apronius ordered the magistrates 
from the Sicilian town of Agyrium to pay off the debt he had accrued by buying 
the rights to collect tithes from the town’s inhabitants.  According to Cicero, 
Apronius demanded more money than he actually owed (2.3.68).  In addition, 
Apronius also demanded one sestertius per bushel of wheat that was received 
in order to make an extra profit (73).  When Verres was informed of the 
Agyrites’ refusal to pay Apronius, he ordered the magistrates and five leading 
citizens from the town to come to Syracuse to stand trial.  Cicero ironically 
described Verres’ sudden demand for a trial claiming that Verres reacted 
tamquam coniuratio… contra rem publicam facta aut legatus praetoris pulsatus 
esset  “as though some coniuratio… against the State had been occurring, or 
the governor’s representative beaten” (68).  The court that prosecuted the 
Agyrites was composed of Verres’ personal friends.  They were found guilty 
because Verres insisted that they adversus edictum fecisse “had broken a 
regulation” (69).  Verres threatened them with capital punishment, but offered 
                                                
81 A former governor of Achaia was also charged de repetundis in the same year (Cic. Verr. 
1.6.30). 
82 Intro to the Verrines and commentary 
83 The actio secunda was never delivered in court, cf. Cic. Orat. 129; Plut. Cic. 7.4; Plin. Sec. 
Ep. 1.20.10.  See also, Settle 1962, 100-1. 
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them the opportunity to surrender their property in order to save their lives.  
Cicero referred to Verres’ sentence as an iniquissima verba suggesting that it 
was “unfair” and implying that an unbiased jury would never convict anyone 
charged with such a vague offense of “breaking a regulation” (69).  Although 
Cicero used coniuratio to mock the urgency of Verres’ accusation, at the same 
time, the term’s criminal aspect was implied.  If the Agyrites had actually 
planned a coniuratio contra rem publicam then a trial would have been 
appropriate.84  However, according to Cicero, Verres had conflated the 
seriousness of the Agyrites’ action by calling it a coniuratio and was clearly 
abusing his power as governor of the island.  
In Book 5 of the actio secunda, Cicero planned to refute the claim made 
by Verres’ advocates that his influence as an experienced military commander 
prevented the slaves in Sicily from joining the servile war that was occurring in 
Italy while he was governor.  Sicily had a history of slave uprisings, the most 
serious occurring in 135-132 and 104-100.85  M’ Aquilius, the consul of 101, 
oversaw the end of the second servile war in Sicily.  After his consulship, 
Aquilius was appointed governor of the island.86  Cicero recalled the 
impassioned defense by M. Antonius for Aquilius on a charge de repetundis 
after he returned to Rome in 98.  According to Cicero, M. Antonius emphatically 
secured Aquilius’ acquittal by showing the jury the wounds Aquilius had 
received during the war (Cic. Verr. 2.5.3).  Cicero used this anecdote to counter 
the attempt by Verres’ advocates, who made the claim that Verres’ measures 
as governor in 73-70 were comparable to the military competence of Aquilius in 
100.  Cicero stated that Sicily had been at peace since Aquilius’ decree, which 
stated that it was forbidden for any slave to bear arms (7).  Furthermore, Cicero 
claimed that the Sicilians desired to continue their peaceful relations with Rome 
due to the advantages both communities had gained through trade over the 
years (8).  He reminded the jury that the servile war in 73-70 led by Spartacus, 
Crixus, and Oenomaus was purely an Italian affair.  Crassus had prevented the 
slave army from fleeing Italy to Sicily and Cicero insisted that Verres had 
nothing to do with Crassus’ success (5).87  According to Cicero, Verres was 
                                                
84 The expression crimen coniurationis was the cause for the trials in 62 of P. Sulla and the 
others accused of being involved with the affair of 63. 
85 On the first servile war of 135-32, cf. Diod. Sic. 34.2; Per. 56; Fl. 2.7; Oros. 5.6.4-9.6.  On the 
second servile war of 104-100, see Diod. Sic. 36.10; Fl. 2.8. 
86 RE of M’. Aquilius 
87 Cf. Plut. Crass.10.3-6; App. BC 1.118. 
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most often immersed in debauchery during his tenure as governor and 
consequently was too inebriated to oversee any serious military duty to prevent 
a slave revolt if it occurred (26-31; 81-2).88 
In any case, Cicero was prepared to discuss Verres’ assertion that he 
had suppressed two attempts by slaves who were accused of planning a 
coniuratio.  Cicero reported that Leonidae cuiusdam Siculi familia in 
suspicionem est vocata coniurationis “The slaves of a Sicilian named Leonidas 
came to be suspected of planning a coniuratio” (2.5.10).  Verres believed 
Leonidas’ slaves were guilty and ordered them to be executed.  However, 
Cicero intimated that homines sceleris coniurationisque damnati…repente 
multis milibus hominum inspectantibus soluti sunt et Triocalino illi domino redditi 
“Those men, after being convicted of the crime of coniuratio…were suddenly, 
before the eyes of thousands of people, unbound and handed over to their 
owner [Leonidas], the man from Triocala” (11).  Cicero admitted that he did not 
understand Verres’ sudden change of heart especially after the slaves were 
sceleris coniurationisque damnati “convicted of the crime of coniuratio,” but 
Cicero clearly thought the crime was worthy of the sentence.  He reiterated that 
ut eius facinoris damnatos servos quod ad omnium liberorum caput et 
sanguinem pertinerent “They were slaves condemned for a crime that 
endangered the persons and the lives of all free men” (13).  Cicero suspected 
that either Leonidas bribed Verres at the last moment to free the slaves or that 
Verres had bought the slaves for his own purposes.  The actual reason for the 
release of Leonidas’ slaves is never specifically stated in the text.  
Nevertheless, Cicero rhetorically used the episode to mock Verres’ inability to 
effectively suppress a coniuratio, if one actually had occurred.  Cicero declared: 
quis dubitet quin servorum animos summa formidine oppresserit, cum viderent ea 
facilitate praetorem ut ab eo servorum sceleris coniurationisque damnatorum vita vel 
ipso carnifice internutio redimeretur?  
 
“Who can doubt that he cowed and terrified the slaves, when they found our governor 
so easy-going that the executioner himself was the agent who purchased from him the 
lives of those slaves convicted of the crime of conspiracy?” (Cic. Verr. 2.5.14) 
 
                                                
88 Cic. Verr. 2.5.42: Esto; nihil ex fugitivorum bello aut suspicione belli laudis adeptus est, quod 
neque bellum eius modi neque belli periculum fuit in Sicilia, neque ab isto provisum est ne quod 
esset “Well, let it be granted that he has acquired no credit from any revolt, or threatened revolt, 
among the slaves, because in Sicily there was no such revolt, nor was there any reason to fear 
one, nor did he take any steps to prevent one.” 
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Cicero’s usage of the expression sceleris coniurationisque in conjunction with 
the term damnatio (‘cendemnation’), at 2.5.11 and 2.5.14 cited above, clearly 
indicated that Cicero interpreted a coniuratio as a crime. 
Cicero continued to describe another allegation of a coniuratio planned 
by Sicilian slaves to further demonstrate Verres’ abuse of power.  Verres had 
claimed that the slaves of Apollonius, a wealthy Sicilian from Panhormus, were 
involved in a coniuratio.  Verres suspected Apollonius’ head shepherd 
coniurasse et familias concitasse “had formed a coniuratio and had been stirring 
up the slaves on various estates” (17).  When Verres demanded that Apollonius 
produce the slave in question, the Sicilian was unable to do so because the 
slave Verres had named never existed.  According to Cicero, this was part of 
Verres’ plan to charge Apollonius with inciting bellum fugitivorum (‘a war of 
slaves’) instead of charging the fictional slave that Verres claimed had earlier 
“conspired” and punishing the slave accordingly (18).89  Apollonius spent 
eighteen months in captivity without recourse to a trial due to the bogus charge 
(20-1), further demonstrating Verres’ perversion of justice.  Although Cicero 
claimed that Verres had lied about the coniuratio of Apollonius’ slaves, he 
emphasized the hostile intentions a coniuratio suggesting that this action could 
eventually lead to bellum. 
As shown above, in the actio secunda of the Verrines, Cicero uses the 
term coniuratio or its cognates to identify the accusations of the crimes 
committed by the magistrates from Agryium and by Leonidas and Apollonius’ 
slaves.  Clearly, in Cicero’s point of view, anyone accused of being involved 
with a coniuratio was a serious charge and was a crime that required a formal 
trial.  However, Cicero used the term in the Verrines to emphasize Verres’ 
exaggeration of these crimes instead of focusing on the criminality associated 
with a coniuratio.  Cicero insinuated that Verres’ accusations that several 
coniurationes had occurred while he was governor were not only inappropriate, 
but also entirely disingenuous charges made by Verres for his own personal 
gain. 
In 69, Cicero defended M. Fonteius, who was governor of Gallia 
Narbonensis in 75-73/2, on a charge de repetundis (Cic. Font. 13-16).90  The 
                                                
89 Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.5.25: ad belli fugitivorum suspicionem “The supposed indications of a slave 
rising.” 
90 For the date of the Pro Fonteio, cf. Watts 1953, 306-7; Settle 1962, 113-4; Marinone 2004, 
21.  On the charges against M. Fonteius, cf. Watts 1953, 307. 
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prosecution had gathered witnesses from the Gallic tribes in the province to 
testify against Fonteius’ supposed extortion of the province. In the Pro Fonteio, 
Cicero belittled the testimonies of the Gallic witnesses labeling them testimonii 
barbarorum (‘testimonies of the barbarians’), in an attempt to persuade the jury 
to discard their evidence (23).91  Throughout the speech, Cicero reminded the 
jury of the injuries Gaul had inflicted on Rome in the past as well as their 
sacrilegious practice of human sacrifice; and listed other prejudices the Romans 
held, such as their dishonesty and warlike manner (29-36).  Cicero claimed that 
it was a juror’s duty to disbelieve witnesses who cupidis et iratis et coniuratis et 
ab religione non solum potest, sed etiam debet “are interested or prejudiced, 
who have entered into a coniuratio or who are devoid of scruple” (21).  By 
stating that the Gallic witnesses had participated in a coniuratio, Cicero 
indicated that an alliance was formed by mutual oath perhaps recalling the 
definition of the term in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico examined in section 5.2.1 
above.  However, in contrast to the way Caesar used coniuratio, Cicero did not 
use the term to indicate an alliance by mutual oath planning to wage war.  
Instead, he used the term to suggest that the Gallic tribes had colluded together 
before the trial began in order to make certain that their testimonies were 
consistent.  Quintillian explained that an advocate who wanted to criticize the 
testimonies of certain witnesses could state that si deficietur numero pars 
diversa, paucitatem, si abundabit, conspirationem “If the other side’s witnesses 
are lacking in number, we should attack them for fewness, if there are many, for 
conspiracy” (Quint. Inst. 5.7.23).  This passage suggests that when many 
witnesses gave a similar testimony then an advocate could claim that the 
testimony was disingenuous.  Although Quintillian used the term conspiratio 
instead of coniuratio, the terms are sometimes used synonymously, which is 
explained in Appendix III.  In the Pro Fonteio, Cicero most likely used the term 
coniuratio to make the jury more suspicious of the testimonies the Gallic 
witnesses gave against his client and to convince the jury that the evidence 
should be discarded.92 
 The violence in the 50’s displayed by the followers of Clodius and Milo 
was destructive.  The animosity between the two reached a fever pitch in 52 
                                                
91 Cf. Cic. Font. 4, 31, 44.  
92 NB: Similarly, in the Pro Scauro, Cicero used the terms conspiratio (Cic. Scaur. 20, 37) and 
coniuratio (38 bis) synonymously to suggest that the testimonies of the Sardinians against his 
client, M. Aemilius Scaurus, were an act of collusion. See also, Addendum. 
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culminating in Clodius’ murder prompting the prosecution of Milo and the 
suspension of elections for the whole year.93  In the Pro Milone, Cicero denied 
the accusation by a certain Licinius that T. Annius Milo’s slaves had conceived 
a plan to murder Pompey.  Cicero reported that Licinius confessed that Milo’s 
slaves de interficiendo Pompeio coniurasse “had been in a coniuratio to murder 
Pompeius” (Cic. Mil. 65).  He refuted this accusation by reporting other false 
allegations of violence against Milo.  Supposedly, Milo was stockpiling weapons 
to arm his supporters, planning to set Rome on fire (64), and hid a weapon 
under his toga when he attended the Senate (66).  Cicero stated that omnia 
falsa atque insidiose ficta comperta sunt “It has been established that these are 
nothing but groundless and treacherous fables” (67).  Whether any of the 
allegations or the coniuratio to murder Pompey was true or false cannot be 
proved.  However, despite Cicero’s defense, the odium against Milo and his 
supporters was insurmountable.  The jury duly convicted Milo and he was 
exiled. 94   
In the three forensic speeches examined above, Cicero uses the term 
coniuratio to describe three different episodes.  In the Verrines, he uses the 
term to describe Verres’ false accusations of coniurationes by Sicilian domi 
nobiles or their slaves.  In the Pro Fronteio, Cicero describes the coniuratio of 
witnesses allied against his client to emphasize the suspicious nature of their 
testimonies.  In the Pro Milone, he described an accusation of a coniuratio 
planned by Milo’s slaves to murder Pompey.  Each instance of the term 
contains the plurality and subversive aspects indicative of a conspiratorial 
context.  However, Cicero does not specifically describe the term’s clandestine 
aspect when he used it to define these coniurationes.  Perhaps, in Cicero’s 
point of view, the latter aspect was not as significant as the criminality that the 
term certainly implied. 
The criminal aspect of the term coniuratio is further demonstrated by 
examining the few times the term appears in Cicero’s works on philosophy and 
                                                
93 On the violence between Clodius and Milo’s supporters in the 50’s, see Gruen 1974, 150-2, 
294-300, 337-44. 
94 The version of the Pro Milone that was published was most likely revised and not the speech 
Cicero delivered in court, cf. Settle 1962; Ruebel 1979.  According to Asconius and Quintillian, 
there were two versions of the speech, cf. Asc. 42C; Quint. Inst. 4.3.17.  Also cf. Marshall 1985, 
190-1 contra Settle 1962, 252-7. Settle argues against the claim that there were perhaps two 
versions of the speech contending that, “Cicero did not gain his preeminence by rewriting 
unsuccessful orations” (257).  However, according to Dio, Cicero’s original defense of Milo 
failed (Dio. 40.54.2-4) and Asconius described Milo’s conviction (Asc. 54C). 
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oratory.  The term occurs once in De Officiis, once in the Brutus, and once in De 
Natura Deorum.  In the latter two works, Cicero used coniuratio in reference to 
the trials under the lex Mamilia of 110, which accused some of the Roman elite 
of supporting King Jugurtha of Numidia.  These men had accepted bribes from 
Jugurtha and the tribune C. Mamilius Limetanus proposed legislation to charge 
these men with the crime of aiding the King during the Numidian War.  In 
Sallust’s Bellum Iugurthinum, he claimed that quaestio exercita aspere 
violenterque ex rumore et lubidine plebis “The investigation was conducted with 
harshness and violence, on hearsay evidence and at the caprice of the 
commons” (Sall. Iug. 40.5).  In the Brutus, Cicero recorded that the 
accomplished orator C. Sulpicius Galba, who was pontifex maximus in 110, was 
convicted due to Iugurthinae coniurationis invidia “[an] outgrowth of the 
invidious charge of coniuratio with Jugurtha” (Cic. Brut. 127).  The same 
phraseology occurs in Book 3 of De Natura Deorum.  Cicero referred to those 
charged under the lex Mamilia who were accused of coniurationis Iugurthinae 
as an example of injustice (Cic. Nat. D. 3.74).  Although the term occurred in a 
context of judicial injustice in both the Brutus and De Natura Deorum, the term 
reflected Cicero’s opinion that a coniuratio described the crime these men were 
charged with.  This definition is further emphasized in Book 3 of De Officiis.  
Cicero discussed the predicament that can arise when one friend had to judge 
another friend’s conduct in a trial.  He professed that the bond of friendship 
should never be broken except when a friend was involved with a hostile action 
against the res publica, or violating one’s oath, or in court (Cic. Off. 3.43).  
Cicero declared that if a friend defends a friend who he knows is guilty then non 
amicitiae tales, sed coniurationis putandae sint “Such relations would have to 
be accounted not friendships but coniurationes” (3.44).95  In this case, Cicero 
used the term coniuratio in contrast with amicitia.  Therefore, in all three 
instances examined above in his philosophical works, Cicero clearly uses the 
term to convey a negative state of affairs as well as to signify the term’s 
criminality. 
 
 
 
                                                
95 On the theme of amicitia in Cicero’s De Officiis, cf. Griffin and Atkins 1991, xxi-vii; Dyck 1996, 
549. 
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5.4  The other instances of coniuratio in the Sallustian corpus 
This brief section examines the remaining occurrences of the term 
coniuratio in Sallust’s works other than the Catilina in order to identify what 
other contexts Sallust deemed the term could signify.  As explained in Chapter 
1, Sallust primarily reserves using coniuratio or its cognates to describe the 
actions and those involved with the actions in the affair of 63 similar to Cicero.  
The term occurs twenty-nine times in the Catilina, but only once in the Bellum 
Iugurthinum and twice in the Historiae.  
A reoccurring theme throughout Sallust’s Bellum Iugurthinum was King 
Jugurtha’s ability to bribe the Romans, his own citizens, and other nations in 
order to support his struggle against Rome.96  After feigning peace in 109, 
Jurgurtha renewed hostilities against Q. Caecillius Metellus Numidicus and 
Marius’ legions the following year.  Jugurtha bribed the leading citizens of the 
town Vaga to overthrow the Roman soldiers garrisoned there.97  Sallust claimed 
that Jugurtha induced principes civitatis inter se coniurant “The leading men of 
the town entered into a coniuratio” (Sall. Iug. 66.2).  The leaders of the 
coniuratio convinced all the inhabitants of Vaga to commence the hostilities 
during a Numdian festival when the Romans would least expect an attack.98  
The Vagenses invited the Roman soldiers stationed in the town to celebrate the 
festival and slaughtered almost the entire garrison (66.2-67.2).99  Similar to the 
instances of inter se coniurare found in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, Sallust most 
likely used the phrase to indicate that the leaders of Vaga had taken a mutual 
oath to ally together against the Romans.  The reason Sallust chose to use 
coniurare to express the hostile action by the Vagenses is clear.  The narrative 
implies that the coniuratio was conducted in secret as the Romans were 
unaware of the alliance and came unarmed to the festival (66.3-4).  In addition, 
the fact that the coniuratio was enacted on a holy day accentuated the term’s 
sacrilegious nature and the immoral conduct of the Vagenses.  In Sallust’s 
opinion, the plan to murder the Roman garrison was certainly a seditious and 
                                                
96 Jugurtha bribed Romans, his own citizens, and King Bocchus of Mauretania (Sall. Iug. 80.3, 
97.2), see also Chapter 4 n.103. 
97 The actions at Vaga are described at Sall. Iug. 66-69.  
98 On the festival at Vaga, cf. Koestermann 1971, 250-1; Paul 1984, 178-9. 
99 Only the prefect of the garrison, T. Turpilius Silanus, escaped (Sall. Hist. 67.3).  He was later 
put to death for cowardice (69.4). Metellus attacked Vaga two days later and the garrison was 
avenged (68.1-69.2).  Cf. Plut. Mar. 3, 8. 
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criminal act.  All these aspects recall the way Sallust defines the term coniuratio 
in the Catilina. 
In the Historiae, Sallust recorded a speech by L. Marcius Philippus 
delivered in the Senate in 77 arguing that the recent actions of the consul M. 
Aemilius Lepidus, who threatened to march on Rome with an army was an act 
of war (Sall. Hist. 1.67.1-22).100  Philippus attempted to convince the Senate 
that Lepidus should be declared hostis rei publicae and to follow Lepidus’ 
colleague, the ex-consul Q. Lutatius Catulus, in attacking Lepidus’ army that he 
had gathered from the disgruntled inhabitants of Etruria.101  Philippus explained 
that equidem a principio, cum Etruriam coniurare “At the very outset, when I 
saw Etruria conspiring” (1.67.6).102  According to the text, it was the Etruscans 
who had instigated a coniuratio not Lepidus.103 Lepidus took advantage of the 
coniuratio occurring in Etruria.  Instead of suppressing the coniuratio, he joined 
the Etruscans and used them as an army for his own objective to demand a 
second consulship in 77 in order to reinstate the powers of the tribunate, which 
Sulla had curtailed during his reign.104  Philippus’ speech apparently was 
successful as the Senate supported Catulus’ actions of leading an army against 
Lepidus.  Lepidus’ forces were defeated at the gates of Rome.  Lepidus and the 
remnants of his army fled from Italy to Sardinia.105 
The final instance of the term coniuratio in Sallust’s works occurs in 
fragment 3.95 of the Historiae.  Commentators are unsure where the fragment 
should be placed and uncertain what the fragment described.106 The fragment 
reads: coniuratione claudit “hampered by the coniuratio.”107  According to 
Maurenbrecher’s placement of the fragment, he suggests that it referred to a 
coniuratio by the legion under the command of L. Valerius Flaccus, who was 
killed in a mutiny by his soldiers in 86 during the Mithridatic War.108  In contrast, 
McGushin suggests that fragment might refer to the coniuratio by Perpenna to 
                                                
100 Philippus primarily called Lepidus’ actions a bellum (Sall. Hist. 1.67.2, 7, 15, 17, 18) and 
once an arma civilia (10).  For a commentary on the Oratio Philippi in the Historiae, see 
McGushin 1992, 132-48. 
101 Philippus called Lepidus a hostis, cf. Sall. Hist. 1.67.15, 22. 
102 Translation from McGushin 1992, 135. 
103 Cf. Sall. Hist. 1.64: Etruria omnis cum Lepido suspecta in tumultum erat. 
104 For Lepidus’ intentions, cf. Sall. Hist. 1.55.23, 1.67.14-15.  See also, Chapter 2 nn.75-8. 
105 Lepidus died on Sardinia, but the remnants of his army under the command of Perpenna 
joined Q. Sertorius in Spain, cf. Plut. Pomp. 16.6; App. B Civ. 1.107. 
106 NB: Maurenbrecher (1891, 121) places the fragment at 3.32 contra McGushin (1994, 138) 
who places the fragment at 3.95.  In reference to the fragment, I use the latter placement by 
McGushin. 
107 Translation by McGushin 1994, 138. 
108 Maurenbrecher 1891, 121. 
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murder Sertorius in Spain in 73.109  However, according to McGushin’s 
translation of the fragment quoted above, he believes that the inclusion of the 
verb claudere demonstrates that the coniuratio only “hampered” Sertorius’ 
objectives and does not specifically describe the plot to murder Sertorius.110  
Clearly, it is problematic to determine what the term coniuratio referred to due to 
its appearance in a fragment of uncertain placement.  However, whether the 
term referred to the mutiny by Valerius’ legion in 86 or Perpenna’s poisoning of 
Sertorius in 73, Sallust most likely chose the term to imply its negative 
conspiratorial aspects.  Yet, as shown in section 5.1, the term coniuratio does 
not always signify a conspiratorial context.  Therefore, in this instance, we can 
only speculate that fragment 3.95 of the Historiae describes a context implying 
hostile intentions, as this was the usual context the term coniuratio describes in 
all the other instances in Sallust’s works.  
 
5.5 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter investigated the various definitions of coniuratio and 
demonstrated that the term could indicate either a neutral sense when used to 
describe the mutual oath sworn by soldiers joining an army, or a negative sense 
when the term described a mutual oath signifying a “conspiracy.”  The first 
section examined how Plautus used the term to identify the mutual oath taken 
between lovers to describe their solemn bond.  The term was also used to 
describe the mutual oath between soldiers when joining an army.  Each of these 
usages described a neutral context, however the examination of the inscription 
of the SC de Bacchanalibus demonstrated that the term was also used to 
describe a negative situation in the early second century.  Therefore, the term 
coniuratio has an ambiguous meaning depending on its context. 
The following section explained that Caesar only used coniuratio once to 
signify the military oath taken when joining the army in De Bello Gallico and 
more often used the term to describe a mutual oath by tribes or several 
individuals intending hostile actions against his legions.  However, when 
examining these instances in De Bello Gallico it was shown that translating 
coniuratio invariably into English, as a “conspiracy” is not always suitable.  
Instead the precise translation of the term depended on whether Caesar used 
                                                
109 McGushin 1994, 138. 
110 According to McGushin (1994, 138), the commentator Gerlach (1870 non vide) suggests that 
the fragment referred to Sertorius’ murder. 
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the term to accentuate the conspiratorial actions of the Gallic tribes who had 
previously accepted Caesar’s dominance by exchanging hostages or the mutual 
agreement to go to war, which did not indicate a conspiratorial action.  The 
same can be said of the one instance of coniurare in Varro. 
The subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 showed that Hirtius and the other 
anonymous authors of Caesar’s Commentarii used coniuratio to describe a 
similar negative state of affairs to Caesar, but also used the term to describe 
plans for murder or plans for deserting one army for another.  Moreover, the last 
two sections of this chapter demonstrated that Cicero and Sallust only used 
coniuratio to describe a negative context.  In these sections, the instances of 
the term examined from Cicero and Sallust’s writings usually implied the secret, 
immoral, and above all criminal aspects, which recall the way they both used 
the term to describe the affair of 63 examined in Chapter 1.  Therefore, we can 
conclude that although the term coniuratio was used to describe a neutral 
context, it was more often used to describe a conspiratorial context by authors 
writing during the Late Republic. 
! 274 
Conclusion 
The aim of my thesis was to access modes of thinking about how the 
actions and those involved with the actions of the affair of 63 were interpreted 
by contemporaries, by exploring the terminology and the language found in our 
sources.  I began this study by identifying the terminology that Cicero and 
Sallust used to describe the conspiratorial aspects of the affair.  Chapter 1 
determined that while both authors often chose the coniuratio to identify the 
affair and its participants, they used other terminology to emphasize the 
clandestine, criminal, immoral, and plural aspects that corresponded with the 
conspiratorial context that coniuratio encompassed.  These related aspects 
were further explored by examining the disturbances inside and outside of 
Rome, in chapters 2 and 3 respectively, which our sources claimed were a 
concerted effort to achieve the affair’s participants’ primary objective of gaining 
power in Rome. 
In the first part of chapter 2, I underlined Cicero and Sallust’s emphasis 
on the serious threat remaining in Rome represented by those who remained in 
the city after Catiline left on November 8.  Both authors stressed the number of 
Roman citizens that were participating in the affair or willing to support it.  The 
participants remaining in Rome were from the upper echelons of society and I 
demonstrated how they were depicted as the leaders of the threat in the city.  
Our sources recorded that their criminal intentions included secretly planning 
murder, arson, and soliciting a Gallic tribe to support Catiline and Manlius’ army 
in northern Etruria.  The highest-ranking member of the reliqua coniuratorum 
manus was the current praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura.  The second part of 
chapter 2 thoroughly examined the portrayal of Lentulus in our sources.  I 
demonstrated his influential role in the affair by investigating his political career, 
family, and the evidence of the criminal activities he was involved with, in 
particular, the instigation of soliciting the Allobrogean envoys for their support 
and the letter and message he attempted to send to Catiline requesting him to 
enlist more soldiers and march on Rome.  In addition, I investigated our 
sources’ record of the prophecy Lentulus had in his possession that predicted 
he would rule Rome in 63.  The comprehensive examination of Lentulus proved 
that one could argue that our sources interpreted his role in the affair perhaps 
as influential as Catiline’s.  Moreover, the examination of Lentulus’ prophecy 
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suggested that his motivation and reasons for continuing the affair’s plan to gain 
power in Rome, a month after the plans were initially divulged and Catiline’s 
participation was exposed, were perhaps different, independent, and more 
urgent than the others involved. 
Similar methods were used to examine the disturbances outside of Rome 
in chapter 3, which our sources connected to the disturbances inside of the city 
through Catiline’s decision to leave Rome and join the army in northern Etruria. 
Our sources recorded that the supporters of Catiline’s candidacy for the 
consulship in 63 consisted partly of Sullan veterans, colonists, and those 
dispossessed by Sulla from Etruria.  The army that took the field at Faesulae 
led by the Sullan veteran C. Manlius included these supporters.  When 
Catiline’s plan to join Manlius’ army was confirmed, the Senate passed the SCU 
awarding the consuls unlimited power to protect the res publica as they saw fit.  
Catiline and Manlius were declared hostes rei publicae providing Cicero with the 
opportunity to punish both citizens and any others who were participating in the 
affair with impunity.  In addition, I explored our sources’ claims that other areas 
throughout Italy were being solicited to support the affair.  It was demonstrated 
that several of these areas were adversely affected by the foundation of Sullan 
colonies in their territory whereas in other areas the affair’s participants 
supposedly were inciting the slaves to revolt.  Whether these reports of 
disturbances outside of Rome, except for the army in Etruria, were genuine is 
indeterminable.  However, the examination of these disturbances outside of 
Rome indicated that the threat of the affair extended outside of the city’s walls 
and demonstrated that many Romans from the lower orders of society were 
attracted to support the plan to overthrow the current ruling establishment.  The 
army in Faesulae was certainly preparing for war, but Sallust’s record of a 
verbal message from Manlius’ army to Q. Marcius Rex suggested that they 
might have initially acted independently and initially for different reasons to 
those involved with the affair in Rome.  Although our sources stressed that the 
disturbances inside and outside of Rome were part of the same plot, Manlius’ 
army were in open revolt before those in Rome commenced their plans for 
murder and arson.  This evidence and the investigations made in chapter 2 and 
3 further demonstrate that the opinion that Catiline was the sole mastermind 
and instigator of the affair should be reconsidered. 
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It was determined that the disturbances occurring outside of Rome were 
primarily interpreted using terminology that indicated these areas were 
preparing for war.  Cicero and Sallust used specific language to stress that the 
affair’s participants were not only secretly planning murder and arson to achieve 
their goal to gain power in Rome, but were also openly planning a war.  Chapter 
4 reviewed both authors’ usage of the term bellum and other expressions to 
describe the military context of the affair.  I demonstrated that Cicero and 
Sallust rarely used the expression bellum civile to interpret the military 
preparations and the battle between Catiline and Manlius’ forces and the forces 
commanded by those loyal to the res publica.  However, the instances of other 
expressions, such as bellum domesticum ac intestinum or dissensio civilis in 
Cicero and Sallust’s accounts, implied that the affair’s violent and criminal plans 
to gain power in Rome was also presented as an armed struggle between cives 
commensurate to a “civil war.” 
The final section of chapter 4 demonstrated that after Lentulus and the 
others were executed and Catiline and Manlius’ army was defeated, Cicero’s 
later works interpreted the affair primarily using the term coniuratio and not 
bellum.  In order to further comprehend the definition of coniuratio and what 
contexts it was used to describe, I explored the occurrence of the term in Cicero 
and Sallust’s works unrelated to the affair of 63 in chapter 5.  It begins with a 
comparison of the earliest occurrences of coniuratio in Plautus’ plays and in the 
inscription of the SC de Bacchanalibus.  This comparison demonstrated that the 
term could be used in either a neutral or negative context as early as the late 
second century BC.  To provide a further understanding of its usage in a neutral 
context, I examined the instances when coniuratio defined the mutual oath 
taken between soldiers joining an army.  On the other hand, when thoroughly 
investigating the usage of coniuratio in Caesar’s Commentarii, which are 
contemporaneous with Cicero and Sallust’s writings, it was shown that the term 
most often indicated a negative state of affairs.  The term could be defined as a 
mutual oath, but it was foremost an oath sworn to commit a hostile act, such as 
renewing war, planning a murder, or a mutiny.  In addition, the negative 
sentiment of coniuratio is also shown in the examination of the term’s 
appearance in Cicero and Sallust’s works unrelated to the affair of 63.  I 
concluded that in Late Republic the term coniuratio had developed into an 
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ideology of crime and in most cases implied the other clandestine, immoral, and 
plural aspects indicative of a conspiratorial context identified in the first chapter. 
The process of distinguishing and examining the lexical choices Cicero 
and Sallust used demonstrated that both writers interpreted it as either a 
coniuratio, or a bellum, or both, involving a large number of Roman citizens.  
Both writers interpreted the affair using terms that emphasized the variety of its 
seditious plans and actions occurring inside and outside of Rome.  When they 
described the many participants in the affair it is evident that other citizens were 
as influential as Catiline over its management or as important as Catiline’s 
involvement to its success.  Cicero’s letter sent to the historian Lucceius in 55 
displayed Cicero’s own difficulty when attempting to classify the affair of 63.  In 
the letter, Cicero admitted that the affair he suppressed during his consulship 
could be interpreted as a coniuratio.  Cicero continued to suggest that the 
coniuratio could appear in Lucceius’ history of bella civilia, implying that the 
affair contained elements of civil war.  In addition, Cicero explained that 
Lucceius’ digression on the affair could include a discussion of the causes of 
the res novae.1  As mentioned in chapter 4, this latter term needs further 
scholarly investigation to determine its interpretation.  Other areas for profitable 
future research include a similar examination of the terminology in the accounts 
of the affair written by Greek authors to further investigate its perception.  
However, it is hoped that my thesis’ examination of the terminology and the 
language in our sources, used to interpret the affair and its participants, has 
highlighted its multiple interpretive possibilities.  
The accuracy of the modern historical label for the affair of 63, “The 
Conspiracy of Catiline”, can be questioned.  Cicero and Sallust accentuated its 
uniqueness and complexity therefore the English word “conspiracy” does not 
completely describe either author’s perception.  Furthermore, although writers in 
the Late Republic primarily used coniuratio to describe a conspiratorial context, 
it is imprecise to invariably translate the term as a “conspiracy” as was shown in 
chapter 5.  Moreover, as Cicero and Sallust’s accounts name other influential 
leaders, it is manifest that Catiline was not the sole instigator of the affair.  It 
was shown in Chapter 2 that after Catiline had left Rome the actions inside of 
Rome led by the praetor Lentulus and after his execution the affair was 
consigned to failure.  Lentulus might have had a separate and more compelling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See p.234 in Chapter 4 for the text of the letter. 
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reason to join the affair due to his possession of the prophecy.  In addition, 
there is evidence that Manlius and his army might have acted independently for 
reasons subtly different than Catiline and the others to gain power in Rome 
demonstrated in chapter 3.  If Manlius was Catiline’s associate, his army 
perhaps assembled too soon instigating the declaration of the SCU effectively 
exposing the affair before Catiline and the others in Rome were ready. 
Although one of the intentions of this study was to conclude that the affair 
of 63 has been imprecisely classified as the so-called “Conspiracy of Catiline”, it 
is not my intention to attempt to rename the affair.  Cicero and Sallust 
interpreted the affair using language describing it as either a “conspiracy,” or a 
“war,” or aspects of both.  Consequently, they used related terminology 
identifiable in a conspiratorial, or martial context, or both.  Therefore, offering a 
more precise title for the affair of 63 would not accurately represent the way the 
eyewitness accounts of Cicero and Sallust perceived it. 
Of course one could choose to disbelieve Cicero and Sallust’s accounts 
of the affair.  Modern scholarship considers the affair of 63 as either “a dastardly 
revolutionary plot, or a storm in a tea-cup.”2  However, it cannot be disputed that 
the executions of five Roman citizens without a trial led to rumblings within the 
Senate.  Subsequently, these tremors led to a disruption in Cicero’s political 
career.  Five years later, pressured by his political enemies, Cicero was forced 
into voluntary exile specifically due to his severity during the affair.  The threat 
that faced Rome and the res publica continued to reverberate until Cicero’s 
death by the order of Mark Antony, the stepson of Lentulus, who was executed, 
and the nephew of C. Antonius, Cicero’s consular colleague, who in 59 was 
exiled partly for his support affair as co-consul.  Therefore, due to these 
subsequent events, it is futile to argue that the affair of 63 was only “a storm in a 
tea-cup” even if certain actions were exaggerated or rhetorically presented. 
Modern scholarship recently changed the way we refer to the plot to 
murder the consuls in 66/65.  This plot used to be labeled the “First Catilinarian 
Conspiracy” and subsequently the affair of 63 was called the “Second 
Catilinarian Conspiracy.”  However, the so-called ‘First Catilinarian Conspiracy” 
was challenged in several historical studies in the late 20th century.  By the 
1970’s, scholars widely accepted that this label for the supposed plot to murder 
the new consuls of 66/65 was untenable. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Beard, North, and Price 1998, 138. 
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The arguments against the modern historical label of the so-called “First 
Catilinarian” closely resemble the arguments suggested in this study.  My thesis 
has demonstrated the seriousness, intricacies, and multifariousness of the affair 
of 63.  The eyewitness accounts of Cicero and Sallust evince that it was unique 
affair led by several Roman citizens from diverse backgrounds actively 
threatening the res publica from both inside and outside of Rome intending to 
gain power in the city through seditious and hostile means.  Identifying and 
examining the terminology Cicero and Sallust chose to describe the plot to gain 
power in Rome comprehensively proved that these actions were more complex 
than the English word “conspiracy” describes and demonstrated that we can 
question whether Catiline was its instigator or its most influential member.  
Similar to the scholars who challenged the label of the “First Catilinarian 
Conspiracy” before me, I hope that this study has shown that the historical label 
of the plan to gain power in Rome through violent means in 63 should be 
reconsidered. 
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Addendum 
 
 
The usage of the term conspiratio in various contexts 
 
 
The English words “conspiracy” and “to conspire” are directly derived 
etymologically from the Latin noun, conspiratio, and the verb, conspirare, respectively.  
Accordingly, it would be logical to expect that these terms or their cognates would 
typically define a conspiratorial context in Latin corresponding with their definition in 
English.  However, in the Latin, two sets of terms theoretically could synonymously 
denote a “conspiracy”.  The term conspiratio and its cognates occur less frequently in 
Latin than the cognates of the term coniuratio to signify something that we would define 
using a corresponding derivative of the word ‘conspiracy’ in English.  However, the 
addendum will also demonstrate that the term conspiratio could describe as a 
synonymous state of affairs like the term coniuratio. 
The definitions found in the OLD under the headwords conspiratio and 
conspirare read: 
conspiratio/~nis: n. 1. Agreeing together, harmony, concord; 2. Combination for hostile, 
or illegal activity, conspiracy; b. (meton.) the members of a conspiracy 
conspiro/~are: v.i. 1. To agree together, act in harmony, accord; b. (of things) to be in 
harmony, act together, agree; (of trumpets) to sound together; 2. To combine for hostile 
or illegal action, conspire.1 
 
The verb is constructed by combining the prefix con- with the verb spirare (‘to 
breathe’).2  Thus, the verb conspirare literally means “to breathe together” and logically 
the noun could convey the same meaning.  Both words could be used to denote a 
plurality of things literally or figuratively “breathing together”, however, according to the 
context the term could define the “combining for hostile or illegal action.”  I examine 
several instances of the term conspiratio or its cognates below that describe either a 
“positive” or “negative” context.3  The first section of the addendum will focus on the 
usage of conspiratio to describe a context of accord.  The second section will examine 
how conspiratio and coniuratio could synonymously express a conspiratorial context.  
However, it should be noted that Cicero never uses conspiratio in reference to the affair 
of 63 and the term does not occur in Sallust’s works.  For this reason, the following 
discussion of the term conspiratio appears here instead of the main body of my thesis.4 
 
 
                                                
1 OLD, 419.  
2 OLD (con-) s.v.1 and (spiro) s.v.1. 
3 For a review of conspiratio and its political usage, cf. Hellegouarc’h 1963, 98-9. 
4 NB: The term conspiratio does not occur in any of Sallust’s works. 
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Section 1  conspiratio as a term of “agreement” 
In contrast to the way coniuratio was used to express either a neutral or 
negative context demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 5, the term conspiratio was 
sometimes used to describe a clearly positive context.  Vergil and Quintilian used the 
verb conspirare in this regard expressing sound “acting in harmony.”  Vergil described 
the traditional “sounding together” of horns when the temple doors of Janus were 
opened to signal the commencement of war in the Aeneid.  Vergil wrote aereaque 
adsensu conspirant cornua rauco “And brazen horns blare out their hoarse accord” 
(Verg. Aen. 7.615).  In the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian commented that the art of 
musica and its understanding was as important and beneficial to both philosophers and 
generals as it was to soldiers and workers.  He claimed that work was easier to 
accomplish when in iis operibus in quibus plurium conatus praeeunte aliqua iucunda 
voce conspirat “The efforts of many are coordinated by a pleasant voice that sets the 
time” (Quint. Inst. 1.10.16).5  
The term occurred in other contexts suggesting things “acting in harmony” 
figuratively as well.  In De Bello Civili, Caesar used the word to express this definition in 
reference to the pila (‘the spears’) of the Ninth Legion that were thrust together 
simultaneously to defend against an attack by Pompey’s forces on his camp at 
Dyrrachium.  Caesar described the action stating milites legionis VIIII subito conspirati 
pila coniecerunt “The men of the Ninth with prompt and unanimous resolution hurled 
their pikes” (Caes. B Civ. 3.46).  In this passage, Caesar suggested that the camp 
would have been overrun except for this harmonious assault of spears, which was 
essential against the larger force.6 
Cicero sometimes used the term conspiratio to describe things in accord with 
each other.  In De Natura Deorum, Cicero used the verb conspirare twice in this 
manner.  First to interpret the Stoic precept that all things in nature are in accord with 
each other, Cicero explained quid vero tanta rerum consentiens, conspirans, 
continuata cognatio “consider the sympathetic agreement, interconnection, and affinity 
of things” (Cic. Nat. D. 2.19).  Second, to express the New Academic opinion regarding 
the harmonious ‘accord’ of the nature of things, Cicero wrote itaque illa mihi placebat 
oratio de convenientia consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione continuatam 
conspirare dicebas “And so I fully agreed with the part of your discourse that dealt with 
nature’s punctual regularity, and what you termed its concordant interconnection and 
correlation” (3.28).  A similar usage appears in De Finibus.  Cicero discussed how the 
virtue of iustitia “justice” ought to be in accord with other virtues so that a man could 
reach the ideal through conspiratio consensusque virtutum “a general union and 
                                                
5 Quintilian evidently agreed that music was beneficial to those who work either together or 
alone, even if the tune being played or sung was rudus “crude”, see Quint. Inst. 1.10.16. 
6 NB: Caesar did eventually retreat from Dyrrachium but not at this point in the narrative. 
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combination of the virtues” (Cic. Fin. 5.66).  Cicero professed in the Tusculan 
Disputations that those engaged in politics would achieve a happy life through life-long 
friendships with other learned men who share the same sentiments and who are 
continually in accord with each other’s counsel.  He declared adiunge fructum 
amicitiarum, in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitae consentiens et paene 
conspirans “Add to this the fruit which springs from friendships in which learned men 
find the counsel which shares their thoughts and almost breaths the same breath 
throughout the course of life” (Cic. Tusc. 5.72).  
In all of these instances in Cicero’s works, the term conspiratio is found in 
apposition with the terms consensio or its cognates.  Both consensio and consensus 
are nouns derived from the verb consentire “to reach agreement”, which principally 
denotes a ‘positive’ sense of unity.7  Cicero evidently used words synonymous with 
conspiratio in apposition in order to emphasize the principal definition for the term of 
conveying “things agreeing together”.  The terms conspiratio or its cognates were used 
in Cicero’s works to signify the “accord” that specifically existed between people as 
well.  The earliest instance of the word conspiratio and its cognates in our surviving 
Latin sources occurs in Cicero’s De Lege Agraria delivered in January 63 when he was 
consul.8  He used the terminology, in the peroration of the first of three speeches 
against the tribune Rullus’ proposed agrarian legislation when Cicero was consul, to 
remind the other tribunes that it was not only himself who opposed the legislation but 
the rest of the boni as well.9  He ordered them to conspirante nobiscum, consentite 
cum bonis ‘be in accord with us, agree with the best Senators’ (Cic. Leg. Agr. 1.26).10  
Again, the verb consentire occurs in apposition with conspirare to further emphasize 
Cicero’s claim that the Roman elite were in agreement with his opinion that the 
legislation should be vetoed. 
The same accidence of terms occurs in the Pro Ligario and De Finibus 
describing the agreement between family and friends.  In the Pro Ligario, Cicero 
appealed to the jury exclaiming that a harsh sentence leveled against his client Q. 
Ligarius was akin to sentencing his two brothers as well due to the consensum 
                                                
7 OLD (consensio, consensus) s.v. 1: “unanimity,” and (consentire) s.v.4: “to reach agreement.” 
These terms can be synonymons of conspiratio denoting an “agreement” (cf. TLL iii. 499.54 ff).  
On the other hand, consentire or its cognates could also denote a “conspiracy,” but this usage is 
rare, cf. (consensus) TLL 3.393.29; (consentire) TLL 3.399.47.  Sometimes, both words are 
found in the same sentence with coniuratio or its cognates to emphasize the “agreement” to the 
coniuratio, cf. Cic. Verr. 5.9, 18; Sest. 86; Caes. B Gall. 2.3. 
8 NB: This was certainly not the first time conspiratio occurred in Latin, but it remains the earliest 
occurrence of the term that survives. 
9 The plural masculine substantive, boni, was a common metonym for the political elite most 
loyal to the State. OLD (bonus) s.v. 5 & 6. 
10 Cf. Cic. Dom. 28: hanc conspirationem in re publica bene gerenda “Our union for the wise 
administration of the state.” 
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conspirantem that existed between them (Cic. Lig. 34).11 In De Finibus, Cicero referred 
to the philosopher Epicurus’ circle of friends stating they were amoris conspiratione 
consentientis “united by the closest sympathy and affection” (Fin. 1.65).12  
In the same manner, Cicero used the terms conspiratio or its cognates to 
convey a sense of agreement in the Philippics and his personal letters concerning the 
armed insurrection that Mark Antony and his allies were staging in late 44 and early 43.  
One of Cicero’s aims during these tumultuous years was to emphasize the agreement 
of Roman citizens from every rank whom, according to Cicero, agreed with his opinion 
that Antony and Dolabella were openly threatening the authority of the Senate and, in 
turn, the res publica with armed force.  Cicero used the verb conspirare four times in 
the Philippics to express this state of agreement.13  In the Third Philippic, he stated that 
the people of Cisalpine Gaul were opposed to Antonius’ presence in the province.  
According to Cicero, the consensus was so great that all of Cisalpine Gaul had agreed 
to defend both the Senate and the Roman People.  He declared: 
tantus autem est consensus municipiorum coloniarumque provinciae Galliae, ut omnes 
ad auctoritatem huius ordinis maiestatemque populi Romani defendendam conspirasse 
videantur 
 
“So great is the unanimity of the boroughs and colonies of the province of Gaul, that all 
seem to have been united to defend the authority of this our order and the majesty of 
the Roman people” (Cic. Phil. 3.13). 
 
Later in the same speech, he declared that all the Roman people throughout Italy were 
in “accord” with each other populo Romano conspirante, Italia tota ad libertatem 
reciperandam excitata “the Roman people in one spirit, all Italy roused for the recovery 
of liberty” (3.32).14  In contrast to the first instance of conspirare in the Third Philippic, 
Cicero used the term without using the term consensus in conjunction to demonstrate 
that everyone interested in protecting the Republic was in “accord” with his opinion.  In 
this case, the phrase Italia tota sufficiently expressed the widespread consensus of the 
people.15  Cicero was able to convince the Senate that D. Junius’ Brutus should remain 
in command of Cisalpine Gaul despite Antony’s claim to the province.16 
                                                
11 Cic. Lig. 34: quis est qui horum consensum conspirantem et paene conflatum in hac prope 
aequalitate fraterna noverit “Who is there who is not acquainted with the harmony existing 
between them united and molten together, as I may say, by their nearness of age to one 
another.” Translation quoted from Long 1858. 
12 Cf. Cic. Off. 2.16: conspiratione hominum atque consensus “The sympathetic cooperation of 
our fellow men.” 
13 Cic. Phil. 3.13, 32; 7.1; 11.2. 
14 Manuwald 2007 Vol II, 439-40. On Cicero’s opinion that libertas should be recovered in any 
manner even if it meant war, see n.20.  Cicero frequently claimed that Antony’s actions were 
tantamount to war, see Manuwald 2007 Vol II, 820-4.  
15 NB:  In the Philippics, Cicero used the term consentire or its cognates most frequently to 
express the agreement between the Senate and the Roman people regarding the threat posed 
by Antony and Dolabella.  Cf. Cic. Phil. 1.21: omnes enim iam cives de rei publicae salute una 
et mente et voce consentiunt; 1.36: parumne haec significant incredibiliter consentientem populi 
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In January of 43, envoys were sent by the Senate to negotiate with Mark 
Antony.  Cicero feared that the consul, Pansa, would accept Antony’s counter-
demands, which would legitimize his position and hinder Cicero’s attempts to persuade 
the Senate to act against Antony before more joined his banner.  In the Seventh 
Philippic, which was delivered before the envoys had returned, Cicero reminded his 
audience that Antony had all but been declared a hostis rei publicae due to his recent 
actions.17  Again, Cicero’s goal was to persuade the Senate of the extreme danger that 
faced the Republic.18  If the Senate continued to heed Cicero’s warnings and showed 
Antony no clemency unless he surrendered, then they would find all the Roman 
citizens in Italy in “accord” with their decision coniunctum huic ordini populum 
Romanum, conspirantem Italiam ‘The Roman people are unified with our order, Italy is 
in agreement’ (7.1).  In this instance, Cicero also used the verb coniungo (‘to marry’) to 
stress the conspiratio between all the classes of Rome.  The passage demonstrates 
that due to Antony’s current actions, his former support from the Roman populace had 
diminished.19  This was yet again another rhetorical tactic to convince the Senate that 
they should accept the popular opinion that Antonius was acting as an enemy of the 
Republic.  Cicero frequently makes the rhetorical claim that if Antony waged war 
against the Republic, then, in turn, he was waging war against every Roman citizen’s 
libertas.20 
                                                                                                                                          
Romani universi voluntatem; 3.2: senatus consensuque populi Romani; 3.36: populo Romano 
consentiente; 3.38 consensu militum veteranorum; 4.2: quod vos quoque illum hostem esse 
tanto consensu tantoque clamore adprobavistis; 4.7: omnes mortales una mente consentiunt; 
4.10: iam enim non solum homines, sed etiam deos immortales ad rem publicam conservandam 
arbitror consensisse; 4.12: numquam maior consensus vester in ulla causa fuit; 5.2: quantus 
consensus vestrum; 5.30: sententia mea maximo vestro consensus; 5.36: consensu provinciae 
Galliae; 6.3: quantum senatus auctoritas vesterque consensus apud Antonium valiturus esset; 
6.18: non inflammet tantus vester iste consensus; 7.20: consensum Italiae; 8.4: consensus 
populi Romani.  He also used consensus with concordia once, 8.8: in maxima consensione 
incredibilique concordia.  In addition, he used sentire once, 14.16: maximam populo Romano 
unum atque idem sentiente. 
16 Manuwald 2007 Vol. II, 300-1. 
17 Cf. Phil. 3.12, 14; 4.2, 14-15; 14.6-7, 9-10, 12, 21-25.  In late January, according to Philippics 
8.1, a state of war had been declared against Antony.  There is no exact date for when Antony 
was declared a hostis rei publicae and it is not entirely conclusive whether he was formally 
declared an enemy of the Republic by the Senate, see Manuwald 2007 Vol. I, 92-3.  Jal (1963b, 
60) explains the tactical usage of the term hostis, stating “et enfin de projeter sur l’adversaire la 
haine que tout Romain éprouvait ‘normalement’ envers un ennemi étanger”.  On the use of 
hostis specifically in the Philippics, see Jal 1963b, 70-9. 
18 Cic. Phil. 7.1: res in maximum periculum. Cicero never agreed with the Senate’s decision to 
send envoys to Antony, cf. 7.1,14. 
19 Cicero claimed that Antony’s popular support was waning, cf. Cic. Phil. 7.22; 13.45. 
20 Cicero remarked that Antony had conferred freedom (se liberam civitatem esse velle) upon 
the city when he had abolished the office of dictator after Caesar’s murder, cf. Cic. Phil. 1.4, 32.  
In contrast, Cicero maintained that Antony was oppressing the libertas of the Roman people, 
which must be defended or they would be reduced to servitium by Antony’s recent hostile 
actions, cf. Phil. 2.13, 20, 27, 118; 3.8, 19, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39; 4.1, 4, 7, 11; 5.11, 23, 34, 38, 
42, 46; 6.2, 19; 7.11, 21, 22, 27; 8.8, 12, 32; 10.9, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23; 11.9, 26, 27, 36, 39; 12.4, 
29; 13.1, 6, 7, 15, 47, 49; 14.11, 26, 27, 36, 37, 38. 
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After news reached Rome that Dolabella had murdered C. Trebonius, the 
provincial governor of Asia, the Senate declared him a hostis rei publicae.21  In the 
Eleventh Philippic, Cicero claimed that Dolabella was unaware that the Roman people 
were already in accord with the Senate to defend the res publica against both his and 
Antony’s forces.  Cicero professed that senatum cum populo Romano conspirasse 
“The Senate has united with the Roman people” (11.2).  He had continued to stress the 
conspiratio throughout Italy, which had been galvanized by the hostile actions of both 
Antony and Dolabella.  According to instances of conspirare in the Philippics, these 
hostile actions had brought the highest order of the res publica in agreement with the 
lower orders.  Cicero was finally able to persuade the consuls to march on Antony’s 
forces in Cisalpine Gaul in mid-March 43.22  
In addition to the Philippics, Cicero used the terms conspiratio and consensus 
in conjunction to proclaim that all Romans were in “aggrement” concerning the hostile 
actions of Antony and Dolabella in his personal letters.  The terms occur in two letters 
sent in March and April of 43 to L. Munatius Plancus, who was consul-designate and 
the governor of Transalpine Gaul in 43.23  Cicero wanted to persuade Plancus to attack 
Antony in order to assist D. Junius Brutus, who was besieged at Mutina.  The first letter 
suggests that Plancus should omnium gentium consensum et incredibilem 
conspirationem adiuva “Assist the union and the unique accord of all types of people” 
(Cic. Fam. 10.10.2).  In the second letter, Cicero wrote mirabiliter enim populus 
Romanus universus et omnium generum ordinumque consensus ad liberandam rem 
publicam conspiravit “Marvelous indeed is the unanimity with which the entire Roman 
people, and every type and order therein, has rallied to the cause of freedom” (Fam. 
10.12.4).  Similar to the example noted in the Third Philippic above, Cicero expressed 
the common theme that Antony was threatening the libertas of the Republic.24  The 
adjectives incredibilis and mirabilis emphasize the rarity of the consensus between all 
Romans of all classes against Antony.  Cicero assured Plancus that the Senate would 
support his decision if he supported the armies against Antony.  Additionally by using 
the similar expression omnis gentes and omnia genera, Plancus would know that he 
had the support of all the other classes of Romans as well.25  However, Cicero’s letters 
did not persuade Plancus to go to war against Antony.26  Instead, Plancus proposed 
                                                
21 Cicero described Dolabella as hostis, cf. Cic. Phil. 11.9, 15-16, 29; 13.23, 36-39. 
22 The First Philippic was delivered on September 2nd, 44 and it was only after the Twelfth 
Philippic delivered sometime in late Februrary, 43 that the consuls went to war against Antonius 
and Dolabella on March 19/20 (Manuwald 2007 Vol. I, 28). 
23 RE XVI1 (Munatius) no. 30, 545-51. 
24 See n.20. 
25 Cf. Cic. Phil. 11.39: id enim bellum gerunt, quod ab omnibus gentibus comprobatur “For they 
[Hirtius, Pansa, Plancus, and Octavian] are fighting a war approved by all nations.” 
26 Many letters exchanged between Cicero and Plancus in 44-43 are preserved, see Cic. Fam. 
9.29, 10.1-24. 
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that the Senate make peace with Antonius and bided his time until he was consul in 
42.27 
Cicero’s usage of conspiratio in the Philippics and his epistolary corpus to 
indicate the agreement between Roman citizens from all orders was not the only 
tactical terminology employed to persuade the Senate to react to Antony and 
Dolabella’s hostile actions.  Cicero did not use the term coniuratio to interpret the 
hostile actions of Antony and Dolabella, instead he consistently referred to the episode 
as a bellum civile.28 By the time the Second Philippic was composed, Antony was 
already in command of an army.  Therefore, Cicero continually warned his audience 
that he intended to start another “civil war.”  He calculated that the rhetoric of another 
bellum civile would persuade the Senate and the people of Rome to act against Antony 
more than the threat of a coniuratio.  On the other hand, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther 
in a letter to Cicero called Antony and Dolabella’s actions coniuratio sceleratissima “a 
most criminal coniuratio” (Cic. Fam. 12.14.6).29  Perhaps Cicero felt using a term that 
could identify a conspiratorial context was not appropriate to describe the violent acts 
Antony and Dolabella had already committed.  Significantly, Cicero did not use 
conspiratio as a synonym with coniuratio to describe a conspiratorial context, as 
demonstrated in the following section.  Evidently, he used the term conspiratio or its 
cognates to identify a friendly agreement in the Philippics and the phrase bellum civile 
to identify the hostile actions of the enemies Antony and Dolabella.  In contrast, the 
letter from Spinther to Cicero used coniuratio to describe Antony and Dollabella’s 
actions most likely in reference to their mutual agreement to wage war. 
Cicero used the term conspiratio once to stress a sentiment of agreement 
during the affair of 63.  The Fourth Oration recounts the Senate’s debate regarding the 
appropriate sentencing of the five Roman citizens, who had unanimously and 
manifestly confessed their guilt of being involved with the affair two days before.  In the 
speech, Cicero chose to use conspiratio to convey the almost unanimous agreement 
that the guilty should suffer nothing less than capital punishment.30  He declared: 
neque ulla profecto tanta vis reperietur, quae coniunctionem vestram equitumque 
Romanorum et tantam conspirationem bonorum omnium confringere et labefactare 
possit 
 
“Nor, surely, will any force be found strong enough to break or dissolve the bond 
between yourselves and the Roman knights and the complete harmony among all loyal 
citizens” (Cic. Cat. 4.22). 
                                                
27 Plancus’ peace proposals were rejected, cf. Cic. Phil. 13.7-10, 49-50; Fam. 10.27. 
28 See Chapter 4 n.143. 
29 NB: D. Junius Brutus and L. Munitius Plancus in a letter to Cicero used the same expression 
in reference to Antony and Dolabella’s actions, but used conspiratio instead. Cic. Fam. 
11.13a.2: contra sceleratissimam conspirationem hostium “Against a criminal combination of 
enemies.” See Addendum section 3. 
30 For the debate regarding their sentence, see Chapter 2 n.346. 
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The Fourth Oration was delivered in the Temple of Concord and Cicero used his locale 
rhetorically to stress that the events that threatened Rome had renewed the concordia 
between the knights and the Senate.  He proclaimed quos ex multorum annorum 
dissensione huius ordinis ad societam concordiamque revocatos hodiernus dies 
vobiscum atque causa coniungit  “After many years’ strife this day and this cause 
renews their harmonious alliance with your order and reunites them with you” (4.15).  In 
this instance, he used conspiratio in conjunction with coniunctio (‘union’) and concordia 
in conjunction with coniungare (‘to marry’) to emphasize the agreement between the 
Roman upper classes.31  However, when describing a conspiratorial context such as 
the affair of 63, one may expect that conspiratio would be used synonymously with 
coniuratio as both terms could define a “conspiracy”, which is examined below.  Cicero 
evidently felt the term more appropriately described the state of agreement against 
enemies of the res publica, which corresponds with the way the term was used in the 
Philippics.  Clearly, when referring to the affair of 63, Cicero exclusively used the term 
coniuratio or the other related terminology examined in Chapter 1 to describe its 
conspiratorial aspects. 
 
Section 2:  conspiratio in conspiratorial contexts 
If we refer back to definitions for conspiratio and conspirare in the previous 
section, the second entries under each headword denote that the terms can define a 
“combination for hostile or illegal activity” or a “conspiracy”.  However, when we 
examine the Ab Urbe Condita we find over 78 instances where Livy used the words 
coniuratio or its cognates compared to only 6 instances of conspiratio or its cognates to 
describe a conspiratorial context.32  In contrast to Cicero, Livy did not use conspiratio to 
express agreement in a “positive” context.  Sometimes the conspiratorial contexts 
where the term conspiratio appears in Livy’s work led to a “positive” outcome.  
However, the outcome was only achieved through hostile or illegal means. 
The first instance of conspiratio in Livy’s work occurs in invented speech for 
Menenius Agrippa (Liv. 2.37.8-12).  In 494, the plebs refused to be enlisted into the 
                                                
31 P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, proquaestor and the son of the eponymous consul of 57, sent 
a letter to the Senate and people of Rome while he was attempting to secure the revenues of 
Asia in late May/early June 43 (Cic. Fam. 12.5).  Some of the Rhodians supported Dolabella 
and had recently supplied his fleet.  Spinther used conspiratio in a similar manner to Cicero, 
telling the magistrates of Rhodes that all Roman citizens were in “agreement” regarding 
Dolabella’s hostis declaration.  Spinther wrote ut hanc concordiam et conspirationem omnium 
ordinum ad defendam libertatem propense non crederent esse factam “[The Rhodians] refusing 
to believe that the present union and conspiratio of all classes for the defense of freedom had 
come around spontaneously” (12.5.3).  It was the concordiam et conspirationem omnium 
ordinum that Lentulus Spinther’s letter emphasized so as to persuade the Rhodians to 
cooperate with Rome and its allies against Dolabella.  The term conspiratio occurs in apposition 
with concordia similar to Cicero’s usual pairing of related terms to articulate the “positive” 
meaning of conspiratio examined in this section. 
32 For Livy’s usage of coniuratio, see Chapter 5 n.33. 
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Roman army due to their growing concerns regarding the minimal representation of 
their class in the Republican government, their overall treatment by the patrician 
commanders, and the inequitable distribution of the spoils of war.  Menenius, a senator 
of plebian descent, was sent by the patricians to attempt to persuade those that had 
seceded from the city and were now entrenched on the Sacred Mount.  Menenius’ 
speech, which according to Livy was delivered in the rough manner associated with his 
class, included a parable regarding a conspiratio planned by man’s two hands against 
his stomach.33  The two hands were angry, as they seemingly did all the work, while 
the mouth, teeth, and stomach were the beneficiaries of their labor (2.32.9).  Menenius 
explained conspirasse inde ne manus ad os cibum ferrent “Therefore the hands 
conspired together that they should carry no food to the mouth” (2.32.10).  The point of 
the parable was that if the hands (a metaphor for the plebs) worked together with the 
mouth and stomach (metaphors for the patricians) only then the totum corpus (‘the 
entire body’, a metaphor for the res publica) would survive (2.32.10-11).  According to 
Livy, Menenius’ speech successfully persuaded the plebs to comply with the patricians’ 
demand to continue their military service (2.32.12).  In turn, the patricians agreed to 
nominate tribunes to represent the plebian class to balance the domination by the 
patrician order over the magistracies in the Republic since the expulsion of the 
monarchy (2.33.1). 
Livy remarked that the speech was delivered to repair the concordia between 
the orders (2.32.7) and reported that a state of concordia was achieved (2.33.1).  
However, in this instance, conspiratio has a “negative” connotation and was not used to 
define the agreement between all Romans against enemies of the res publica like 
Cicero most frequently used the term in the passages examined in the previous 
section.34  The beginning of the speech sets the tone tempore quo in homine non, ut 
nunc, omnia in unum consentient “In the days when men did not all agree amongst 
themselves, as is the case now” (2.32.9).  Livy used the verb consentire in the negative 
to assure his readers that when he used conspiratio later in the passage it explains the 
cause of the disagreement not a context expressing “accord.”  Interestingly, Livy used 
the two terms concordia and consentire not to emphasize the “positive” sentiment of a 
conspiratio found in the passages examined in Cicero’s works above.  Instead, the 
term conspiratio in the above passage from Livy is unrelated to the state of concordia, 
which perhaps indicates an ideological shift in the former term’s meaning from an 
agreement to act against enemies to an agreement to act in a hostile manner. 
The other instances of conspiratio occur in a less colloquial register than in 
Menenius Agrippa’s speech in Livy’s work.  Three times in Book 3, Livy used the terms 
                                                
33 On the origin of this parable, see Ogilvie 1965, 312-3. 
34 NB: The Pro Rege Deiotaro contains an anomalous instance when Cicero used conspiratio in 
a ‘negative’ sense, see Addendum section 3. 
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to describe the attempts by both the decemviri and the tribunes of the plebs to extend 
their magistracies for another year.  I will summarize the instances first before 
discussing how the term conspiratio was used to describe these actions. 
In 449, the decemviri had already dominated the leadership in Rome, in lieu of 
consuls, for two consecutive years.  While they controlled the government no other 
magisterial offices were represented.  When the decemviri extended their term again in 
449 through a display of force claiming that they were above the law,35 Livy remarked 
that the decemviri had non in praesentis modo temporis eos inuriam conspirasse, sed 
foedus clandestinum inter ipsos iure iurando ictum. “not only conspired for the present 
wrong-doing but had ratified with an oath a secret agreement amongst themselves not 
to call an election” (Liv. 3.36.9).  The stranglehold on the government and other 
injustices by the decemviri led to the second secession of the plebs and the Roman 
army (50.13-54.10).36  As Rome was already embroiled in a war against the Sabines 
and the Aequi, the decemviri were forced to acquiesce or Rome would be vulnerable to 
attack.  New tribunes of the plebs were elected and they forced the decemviri to resign 
(50.10, 54.5). 
Appius Claudius, the most ambitious and violent member of the decemviri in 
Livy’s narrative, was accused for his actions during his tenure by the tribunes of the 
plebs.37  Appius unsuccessfully tried to appeal to the tribunes claiming that it was his 
right as a citizen of Rome to be tried by the people.38  Appius’ argument was that quod 
si tribuni eodem foedere obligatos se fateantur tollendae appellationis in quod 
conspirasse decemviros criminati sint. “If the tribunes should confess that they were 
bound by the same agreement which they charged the decemviri with having entered 
into” (3.56.12).  In this passage, the term conspirare signified the criminal charge 
Appius faced.  Appius argued that if the tribunes had the right to appeal when they 
were also alleged of entering into a conspiratio, then he should be awarded the same 
rights.  However, his argument fell on deaf ears as the decemviri had revoked the right 
to provocatio during their tenure (36.6).  The people had not forgotten this injustice.  
Eventually, Appius committed suicide before he formally stood trial convinced that his 
                                                
35 The decemviri were attended in the Forum by their full complement of 120 armed lictores to 
enforce the action (Liv. 3.36.4).  On the decemviri supposed immunity, cf. 3.36.4, 55.14.  See 
also Ogilvie 1965, 499-500. 
36 The decemviri also incurred the hatred of the Senate by their illegal actions and hostile 
display of force (Liv. 3.38.8-12).  Other causes for the second secession included the murder of 
L. Siccius, cf. Liv. 3.43; Dion Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.25-27. See n.37. 
37 The injustice and lust Appius displayed centers on his illegal seizure of Verginia, the daughter 
of L. Verginius a popular centurion, cf. Liv. 3.44.1-50.9; Dion Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.28-37. 
38 Appius had declared provoco (‘I appeal’) after he was first charged of being involved in a 
conspiratio (Liv. 3.56.5). See n.39. 
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appeal to the people would be futile due to their particular hatred regarding his previous 
illegal actions (58.6).39 
Apparently, Appius’ allegations were not entirely unfounded, as the tribunes 
were accused of entering into a conspiratio the following year.  Livy described the 
attempt of the tribunes of the plebs to be reelected stating conspiratione inter tribunos 
facta ut iidem tribuni reficerentur ‘The tribunes entered into a conspiratio together so 
that they would be reelected’ (3.64.1).  However, the tribunes were eventually 
convinced that their aspiration to be reelected, the same aspiration that they had earlier 
charged and tried certain decemviri, was illegal and would evoke odium from all 
Romans (64.3).  Fearing future prosecution, the tribunes agreed to elect new 
magistrates for 448 (64.4).  However, the election did not return enough candidates.  
Therefore, the current tribunes were able to co-opt others from the plebian class into 
the tribunate (64.8-11).40 
In the first two instances, the verb conspirare occurs in a judicial context.  Livy, 
in this case, used the verb to signify the crime that both Appius and the tribunes 
committed or attempted to commit.  Accordingly, Livy uses other legal terminology to 
accentuate the criminal aspect of conspirare.  He used the noun iniuria (‘unlawful 
conduct’) in apposition with the verb conspirare to emphasize the illegal action of the 
decemviri (3.36.9: inuriam conspirasse).  He used more legal terminology in the second 
instance regarding the accusation by the decemviri that claimed the tribunes of the 
plebs had conspired (3.56.12: tollendae appellationis in quod conspirasse decemviros 
criminati sint).  In this passage, the verb criminari (‘to make charges against’) appears 
in the subjunctive within a causal quod clause, indicating that Appius considered the 
charge of entering into a conspiratio was accusatory.41  The noun appellatio (‘an 
appeal’) also occurs to further connote the judicial context of the narrative.42  Evidently, 
Livy used these terms to highlight the criminal aspect of a conspiratio. 
Furthermore, the usage of conspirare at 3.36.9 and 56.12, indicate that the 
agreement by the decemviri and the tribunes of the plebs to seek reelection was 
initially made in secret.  Any political activity that occurred in secret was deemed an 
illegal act because all political activity in Rome was considered public business, which 
                                                
39 The decemviri had revoked the right to provocatio during their tenure.  But particular hatred 
was directed towards Appius due to his attempt to seize Verginia culminating in her death.  See 
n.37.  
40 Cf. 5.11.9: conspirationi patriciorum, which refers to the attempted cooption of patricians into 
the plebian tribunate in 401.  On the practice of cooption, see Ogilvie 1965, 513-4, 647; Beard, 
North and Price 1998, 102-4 and 135-6. 
41 A quod clause with a verb in the subjunctive can express an assumed state of affairs, see 
Hale 1887, 167  Cf. Cic. Off. 3.112; Quint. Inst. 2.17.26. 
42  Liv. 3.56.13: apellatio provocatioque.  For the judicial usage of appellatio, cf. OLD s.v. 5; TLL 
2.271.17.  The term, appellatio can be synonymous with provocatio, see TLL 2.272.39.  The 
latter term refers to the formal right of a Roman citizen of a public appeal, cf. Cic. Rep. 2.53.  
See also Chapter 2 n.86. 
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is inherent in the meaning of the expression res publica itself.43  As examined above, 
Livy stated that the decemviri secretly agreed to conspire (3.36.9: sed foedus 
clandestinum inter ipsos iure iurando ictum).  The terms foedus (‘a treaty’) and the ius 
iurandum (‘an oath’) suggest that the decemviri were bound by oath to “conspire” and 
by qualifying foedus with the adjective clandestinus further suggests that the 
agreement to enter into a conspiratio was made in secret.44  Appius argued that the 
tribunes of the plebs had entered into the eodem fodere at 3.56.12, insinuating a 
similar sense of secrecy of their pact to conspirare.  In these passages, Livy 
emphasized the clandestine aspect that the term conspiratio could also relate.   
Livy’s narrative from 3.36-64 primarily describes several Roman citizens 
agreeing to an illegal plan in secret, which led to accusations of criminal activity.45  Two 
of the decemiviri were convicted for planning to conspirare and perhaps the tribunes of 
the plebs faced a similar fate if they continued their plan to conspirare for reelection.46  
Although Livy did not use any explicit sacrilegious terms, it was implied that the actions 
he described were immoral.  Therefore, all of the aspects identified in Chapter 1, which 
corresponded with a conspiratorial context are implied in these passages of Livy’s 
narrative.  Arguably, the judicial context of these passages in Book 3 was reduced to 
subtext as Livy stressed the conspiratorial context of the illegal actions the decemviri 
and the tribunes of the plebs planned to commit.  This examination demonstrates that 
the term conspiratio, in Livy’s point of view, was suitable to indicate a “negative” 
context similar to the term coniuratio. 
Before the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War (171-168), Livy used the term 
conspiratio once in reference to King Eumenes of Pergamum, who came to Rome to 
warn the Senate that Macedonia was planning to attack the res publica.47  Eumenes 
proclaimed that parts of Greece, Asia, and Rhodes had allied with Perseus, the King of 
Macedonia, against Rome (Liv. 42.11-13).  Perseus and the Rhodians sent envoys to 
Rome to refute Eumenes’ accusations, but the Romans were not convinced by their 
arguments.  Livy explained that Eumeni uero conspiratio aduersus eum fauorem 
maiorem apud Romanos fecit “The conspiratio against Eumenes won for him greater 
                                                
43 OLD (respublica) s.v. 1c. 
44 OLD (foedus2) s.v.1 and (ius2) s.v.5. 
45 This portion of Livy’s narrative from 3.36-64 also recorded the ongoing wars against the 
Sabines and Aequi at 42-3, and the Volscians at 60-63.  However, the seditious actions in 
Rome come to the fore, e.g. Appius Claudius and Verginia at 44.1-50.9, the second secession 
of the plebs at 50.13-54.10, the threatened trails and suicides of Appius and Sp. Oppius at 56-
58, and L. Siccius’ murder at 43. 
46 The decemviri Appius (Liv. 3.58.6) and Sp. Oppius (58.7-9) committed suicide before their 
trials. 
47 Livy recorded that Eumenes made the plea in person refuting Valerius Antias’ claim that it 
was Eumenes’ brother who came to Rome (42.11.1). 
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favor with the Romans” (Livy 42.14.10).48 Although the outcome of the conspiratio was 
positive for Eumenes, the term indicated that the conspiratio made by Perseus and the 
Rhodians against Eumenes was received negatively.  Similar to the instances in Book 
3, Livy used the term conspiratio to describe a negative action. 
In the previous section, I examined the instances Cicero used the term 
conspiratio to describe people in agreement.  However, two anomalous instances exist 
in the Pro Scauro and the Pro rege Deiotaro when Cicero used conspiratio to describe 
a conspiratorial context instead.  The Pro Scauro is examined in the section below on 
the synonymous usage of conspiratio and coniuratio, as both terms occur.  Presently, I 
examine Cicero’s usage of conspiratio in the Pro rege Deiotaro to further compare this 
instance with those examined in Livy. 
In 48, King Deiotarus, a tetrarch of Galatia that was allied with Rome, supported 
Pompey’s forces against Caesar at the Battle of Pharsalia (App. B Civ. 2.71).49  After 
Pompey retreated from Greece, the King returned home and the next year sought aid 
from Rome in his struggle against a King of Armenia, Pharnaces II, who was attacking 
his kingdom.  Caesar and his army came to Deiotarus’ aid and helped defeat 
Pharnaces.  In turn, Deiotarus supported Caesar’s troops throughout his campaign in 
Asia (Cic. Deiot. 14).  In 45, King Deiotarus’ grandson, Castor, accused his grandfather 
of plotting to murder Caesar after the King received Caesar in his palace to thank him 
for his support against Pharnaces.  Cicero defended Deiotarus and refuted the 
evidence submitted by Castor and his slave, who claimed he was ordered by Deiotarus 
to murder Caesar (15).  Cicero argued that a slave’s evidence must always be 
considered dubious, especially one who had purportedly been bribed by Castor, who 
supossedly wanted the throne (2, 5).  Cicero reminded Caesar that many others 
including Deiotarus had initially supported Pompey and sent him aid.50  Cicero often 
flattered Caesar referring to his peaceful intensions during the war with Pompey and 
the admirable clemency he showed his adversaries after his victory (66).51  Apparently, 
Caesar was somewhat persuaded by Cicero’s speech.  Caesar decided to defer his 
decision on the matter until a later date, which never occurred before his 
assassination.52 
                                                
48 Cf. Liv. Per. 46: eum conspirasse cum Antiocho adversus populum Romanum, which reports 
Eumenes was accused to have ‘conspired’ with Antiochus against the Republic in 167, three 
years after the former delivered his speech to the Senate at Liv. 42.11-13. 
49 The historical references of King Deiotarus’ support of Pompey can also be found in Cicero’s 
Pro rege Deiotaro.  Cf. B Alex. 35-40; Caes. B Civ. 3.4; Suet. Iul. 35. 
50 Support for Pompey came from many areas (Caes. B Civ. 3.4-5). 
51 In reference to Caesar’s clemency to Deiotarus, cf. Cic. Deiot. 8, 34, 38, 40, 42; Dio Cass. 
41.63.1-3.  
52 On Caesar’s decision, see Gotoff 1993, 269-72.  Deiotarus had earlier displayed his loyalty to 
Rome during his reign, cf. Cic. Deiot. 6, 11; Phil. 11.13.  He had supported Cicero when he was 
governor of Cicilia in 51 and Deiotarus took Cicero’s son and nephew into his care, cf. Att. 5.17, 
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At Deiot. 11, Cicero reported that Deiotarus had heard rumors that the consuls, 
men of consular rank, and all of the Senate had fled Italy due to Caesar’s advance on 
Rome.53  Later in the passage, Cicero avowed that Deiotarus nihil ille de condicionibus 
tuis, nihil de studio concordiae et pacis, nihil de conspiratione audiebat certorum 
hominum contra dignitatem tuam “Never heard a word of the conditions which you 
offered, nor of your eagerness for concord and peace, nor of the way in which certain 
men conspired against your dignity” (Deiot. 11).54  In this instance, he used conspiratio 
not to stress the concordia that Caesar purportedly aimed for, but instead used the 
term to identify a conspiratio by Caesar’s enemies, who perhaps informed Deiotarus 
that Caesar had no intension to peacefully resolve the conflict with Pompey.  Cicero 
used conspiratio in contrast with concordia, in this case, to stress the “negative” 
sentiment of the former term instead of emphasizing the state of “agreement” in 
conjunction with the latter as he did in the passages examined in the first section of the 
addendum.  Similar to Livy’s usage of conspiratio examined above, excluding the 
occurrence in Menenius Agrippa’s speech, the term is used in reference to an 
allegation in a judicial context.  More significantly, the occurrence of conspiratio in the 
Pro rege Deiotaro demonstrates that Cicero understood both its “positive” and 
“negative” implications.  However, Cicero only used conspiratio to signify its negative 
conspiratorial meaning three times in all of his works, once in the Pro rege Deiotaro 
and twice in the Pro Scauro examined in the following section. 
 
Section 3: The synonymous usage of conspiratio with coniuratio 
There are only two cases in Cicero’s works when the term conspiratio and 
coniuratio were used to express precisely the same context.  In the Pro Scauro, Cicero 
used both terms to emphasize that the testimonies against his clients by the Sardinian 
witnesses were lies.55  Firstly, he declared non agam igitur cum ista Sardorum 
conspiratione et cum expresso, coacto sollicitatoque periurio subtiliter “I will not 
therefore deal with ista Sardorum conspiratione and their perjuries so ingeniously 
elicited, wrung, and wheedled from them” (Cic. Scaur. 20).  This passage can be 
compared to Pro Scauro 38 where Cicero professed that the coniuratio the Sardinians 
                                                                                                                                          
18; 6.1; Deiot. 10.  Cicero discussed the support Deiotarus might bring against Dolabella’s 
forces in 43, cf. Phil. 11.31, 33-34.  
53 Cic. Deiot. 11: audivit consules ex Italia profugisse omnisque consularis - sic enim ei 
nuntiabatur - cunctum senatum, totam Italiam effusam “[Deiotarus] heard that the consuls had 
fled from Italy, and all the men of consular rank (for so it was reported) and with them all the 
Senate, and that the whole of Italy was emptied.”  NB: All 370 senators voted for Caesar to lay 
down his arms (App. B Civ. 2.30), but only 200 fled to Greece to fight with Pompey (Dio Cass. 
41.43.2). 
54 Gotoff (1993, 219) calls the anaphoric tricolon of nihil in this passage “pathetic”, most likely 
referring to Cicero’s constant flattery.  However, the flattery worked and Cicero was able to 
persuade Caesar to delay his decision.  On Cicero’s opinion of the Pro rege Deiotaro, see Cic. 
Fam. 9.12.  
55 Cf. Chapter 5 n.92. 
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had agreed to explained why their testimonies were unanimous.  Cicero explained that 
this unanimity, which they agreed to through a coniuratio, demonstrated that their 
testimonies should be discarded.56  An identical sentiment is expressed when he 
discounted their testimonies due to the conspiratio they had agreed to cited above.  
Secondly, when Cicero continued to attempt to persuade the jury to discount the 
Sardinians’ accusations, he declared:  
generi igitur toti accusationis resistere, iudices, debetis, in quo nihil more, nihil modo, 
nihil considerate, nihil integer, contra improbe, turbide, festinanter, rapide omnia 
conspiratione, imperio, auctoritate, spe, minis videtis esse suscepta 
 
“It is your duty, then, gentlemen, to resist at every point an accusation of this kind, in 
which you see that nothing has been done according to precedent, nothing with 
moderation, nothing with circumspectedness [sic] or disinterestedness, but on the 
contrary everything has been undertaken dishonestly, seditiously [sic], precipitately, hot-
headedly, by means of conspiratio, absolute power, undue influence, promises, and 
intimidation.” (Cic. Scaur. 37) 
 
Again, he used the term conspiratio to not only suggest that the testimonies from the 
Sardinians were false, but also to suggest that Scaurus’ prosecutors coached their 
witnesses before the trial.  Marshall explains that one of the prosecutors of Scaurus 
was P. Valerius Triarius, who had familial connections on Sardinia.57  Cicero most likely 
took advantage of Triarius’ connection with the island by insinuating that the Sardinian 
witnesses were perhaps Triarius’ clients.    Cicero used the term coniuratio at Pro 
Scauro 40 to express a synonymous accusation against the witnesses’ trustworthiness.  
In this passage, by expressing that the Sardinians had either entered into a coniuratio, 
he also insinuated that the prosecution had laid a trap for Scaurus.58 
The term conspiratio occurs in a letter sent in June 43 from D. Junius Brutus 
and L. Munatius Planus to the Senate preserved in Cicero’s epistolary corpus.  In the 
letter, D. Brutus and Plancus assured the Senate that they had ample forces to fight 
contra sceleratissimam conspirationem hostium “against a criminal combination of 
enemies” (Cic. Fam. 11.13a.2).  D. Brutus and Plancus were referring to Antony’s 
forces and those supporting him.  As examined in the first section of the addendum, P. 
Cornelius Lentulus Spinther sent a letter to Cicero around the same time as D. Brutus 
and Plancus’ letter was sent to the Senate, but Spinther chose instead to use the 
expression coniuratio sceleratissima to describe Mark Antony’s actions (12.14.6).59  
Evidently, both expressions using either conspiratio or coniuratio were used in 
reference to the same topic.  This case clearly demonstrates the synonymous usage of 
the two terms, which were both used to identify criminal actions of Antony’s hostile 
conflict with Rome. 
                                                
56 See Chapter 5 n.92. 
57 Marshall 1985, 122. 
58 Cic. Scaur. 40: obsaepiatur insidiis.  
59 For the possible dates when these letters were sent, see Shackleton Bailey 1977 Vol. II, 545 
and 562. 
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The synonymous usage is manifest in a passage from Caesar’s De Bello 
Gallico.  In 56, Caesar’s forces were facing threats from all corners of Gaul and from 
across the Rhine.  He was forced to divide his legions.  Caesar explained his 
reasoning: 
iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis 
obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio...prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum 
sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum putavit 
 
“Such were the outrageous detention of Roman knights, the renewal of war after 
surrender, the revolt after hostages given, the coniuratio of so many states…and 
therefore he deemed it proper to divide his army and disperse it at wider intervals 
before more states conspirarent.” (Caes. B Gall. 3.10) 
 
As explained in Chapter 5.2.2, when the term coniuratio occurred in De Bello Gallico to 
describe the mutual oath by Gallic tribes to combine forces against Caesar, which had 
already acquiesced to Caesar’s dominance by sending hostages, then the coniuratio 
genuinely described a conspiratorial context.  Similarly, we could make the same 
argument for the occurrence of conspirare in this particular passage.  Caesar claimed 
that he was facing a coniuratio of Gallic tribes that had previously sent hostages and 
decided to send his legions to separate parts of Gaul to ensure that more tribes did not 
conspirare.  Certainly, Caesar had every opportunity to use the verb coniurare instead, 
which would convey exactly same meaning.  Modern commentaries typically explain 
the term coniuratio, but they are silent whether there is any nuance between coniuratio 
and conspiratio.  Furthermore, they do not comment why the two terms appear in the 
same sentence.60  Although Caesar chose to use the noun coniuratio and the verb 
conspirare, we cannot identify any nuance between the two terms, as conspiratio or its 
cognates only occur together in this passage of De Bello Gallico.  Furthermore, Caesar 
more often used the verb coniurare throughout his record of the Gallic campaign to 
indicate a similar state of affairs, which the verb conspirare expressed in this case.  As 
both terms carried the same meaning and identified the same context, I think Caesar 
probably used both terms for stylistic variety because he used them in the same 
sentence.  Clearly, Caesar felt the two terms could be used synonymously regardless 
of the fact that he only chose to use conspirare once in De Bello Gallico to identify the 
many Gallic coniurationes during his campaign.61 
As previously stated, Livy most frequently used the term coniuratio in his work 
to identify a conspiratorial context,62 however, he did chose to use conspiratio to 
convey a similar context that were examined in the section above, albeit much less 
frequently.  The term conspiratio occurred more frequently in works written during the 
                                                
60 Cf. Carbonetto 1948, 31-2; Kraner and Dittenberger 1961, 255-6; Rambaud 1965, 155-6. 
61 NB: Caesar only used conspiratio or its cognates once more in De Bello Civili, examined in 
Addendum section 1.  The other anonymous authors of Caesar’s Commentarii did not use 
conspiratio in their works. 
62 See Chapter 5 n.33. 
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Empire to describe conspiratorial contexts.63  These writers also used the term 
coniuratio and, in certain cases, both coniuratio and conspiratio were used in 
synonymous contexts.  These instances are most prevalent in the works of Tacitus and 
Suetonius when they recorded the “conspiracies” to assassinate the leaders of Rome. 
Tacitus used the term coniuratio or its cognates twenty times in Book 15 of the 
Annales in reference to the plan to assassinate the Emperor Nero in 65 A.D.64  
However, Tacitus did not exclusively use coniuratio to describe the plot.  He used the 
term conspiratio three times in Book 15 to describe the same specific context.65  
Although, the instances of conspiratio and coniuratio did not occur in the same 
passages in Book 15 of the Annales, whether Tacitus chose to use either term to 
express a specific nuance regarding the plot is not definitive.  Apparently, Tacitus used 
both terms interchangeably to describe the plot to assassinate Nero. 
A more definitive example of the synonymous usage of conspiratio and 
coniuratio occurs in Suetonius’ Divus Iulius.  Suetonius ascribed the plan devised in 66 
to murder the incoming consuls of 65 to Caesar (Suet. Iul. 9.1).  In order to defend his 
accusation, Suetonius recorded the sources he referenced regarding Caesar’s 
supposed involvement in the aborted plan.66  Suetonius reported that the speeches of 
C. Curio and M. Actorius Naso also recorded that Caesar planned to coordinate the 
timing of the planned murders in Rome with a revolt outside of the city conducted by 
Cn. Calpurnius Piso, who was in Spain as propraetor in 65.67  Suetonius asserted: 
idem Curio sed et M. Actorius Naso auctores sunt conspirasse eum etiam cum Gnaeo 
Pisone adulescente, cui ob suspicionem urbanae coniurationis provincia Hispania ultro 
extra ordinem data sit; pactumque ut simul foris ille 
 
“Not only Curio, but Marcus Actorius Naso as well declare that Caesar conspirasse 
[another time] with Gnaeus Piso, a young man to whom the province of Spain had been 
assigned unasked and out of regular order, because he was suspected of coniurationes 
at Rome.” (Suet. Iul. 9.3) 
 
Despite the two terms’ reference to different events – first the conspiratio to murder the 
consuls and simultaneously revolt in Spain and second the previous unspecific 
coniurationes Piso had joined – both clearly identify a similar conspiratorial context.  
Again, no specific nuance between the terms can be detected.  Both Caesar and Piso’s 
suspected participation in either a coniuratio or a conspiratio remained allegations, as 
neither Caesar nor Piso were ever formally tried for supporting this aborted plot. 
                                                
63 NB: Generally, in other authors writing under the Empire, conspiratio was also used as a term 
of “agreement” in positive contexts as well.  However, conspiratio was clearly used more 
frequently to describe a conspiratorial context. 
64 Cf. Tac. Ann. 15.48, 49, 50, 51 (bis), 52 (ter), 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74.  
65 Cf. Tac. Ann. 15.56, 66, 68. 
66 Suetonius claimed he referenced the history of Tanusius Geminus, the edicts of M. Bibulus, 
C. Curio’s speeches, and the author M. Actorius Naso (Suet. Iul. 9.2-3). 
67 See Appendix I, [no. 7]. 
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In the instance above, Suetonius used the terms to synonymously convey a 
conspiratorial context, but each term referred to a different event.  In Suetonius’ 
account of Emperor Gaius Caligula, he used both terms synonymously and, similar to 
Tacitius’ account of the plot to assassinate Nero, both terms described the plans to 
murder Caligula.  Suetonius wrote: 
sed una atque altera conspiratione detecta, aliis per inopiam occasionis cunctantibus, 
duo consilium communicaverunt perfeceruntque, non sine conscientia potentissimorum 
libertorum praefectorumque praetori; quod ipsi quoque etsi falso in quadam 
coniuratione quasi participes nominati, suspectos tamen se et invisos sentiebant 
 
“But when one or two conspirationes had been detected and the rest were waiting for a 
favorable opportunity, two men made common cause and succeeded, with the 
connivance of his most influential freedmen and the officers of the praetorian guard; for 
although the charge that these last were privy to one of the former coniurationes was 
false, they realized that Caligula hated and feared them.” (Suet. Gai. 56.1) 
 
The passage described conflicting plots to murder Caligula and the success of one of 
these attempts over the other.  Although different people planned these “conspiracies”, 
Suetonius used the term conspiratio and coniuratio in the same passage to describe 
similar plans to assassinate the Emperor of Rome. 
The instances examined in this section regarding the synonymous usage of 
conspiratio and coniuratio demonstrated that they were both used either to describe a 
similar conspiratorial context, or were used interchangeably to describe precisely the 
same event.  The nuances between the two terms are not noticeable even when the 
terms occurred in the same passage because the contexts they identified were similar.  
Moreover, when both terms occurred the writers chose to convey their synonymous 
conspiratorial aspects indicating a secret plan by more than one person to commit an 
illegal, hostile, criminal, and/or immoral act. 
 
Section 4: Addendum conclusions 
In the first section of the addendum, I primarily examined Cicero’s usage of 
conspiratio to convey a state of “agreement” in several of his works.  Only three times 
did Cicero use the term to describe a conspiratorial context, once in the Pro rege 
Deiotaro and twice in the Pro Scauro.  On the other hand, Livy consistently used 
conspiratio to define a ‘negative’ context examined in the second section.  In the third 
section, I chose examples when conspiratio was used as a synonym to coniuratio to 
describe conspiratorial contexts.  Despite the two synonymous occurrences of 
conspiratio and coniuratio in Cicero’s Pro Scauro and one synonymous occurrence of 
the terms in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, it was demonstrated that the synonymous 
usage of both terms to describe identical conspiratorial contexts or similar 
conspiratorial actions occurred more frequently in Tacitus and Suetonius’ works written 
during the Empire.  In the passages I examined when both terms occurred to describe 
a plan to “conspire”, we can distinguish no apparent nuance between the terms.  
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Therefore, from the sample scrutinized in the previous section of this addendum, the 
terms were sometimes used interchangeably.  If a greater sample was examined then 
perhaps the nuance between the two terms might be determinable, which demands 
further study.  However, when the terms were used to describe identical conspiratorial 
contexts in Latin an author could seemingly chose to use either conspiratio, or 
coniuratio, or both. 
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Appendix I 
 
The names of the participants and possible participants 
 
 
This appendix list the names of the participants and possible participants 
connected with the affair of 63 recorded in our sources.  The list includes the executed, 
convicted, accused, or suspected participants supporting the affair.  The volume and 
page number from the RE and/or MRR appears alongside the participant or possible 
participant’s name for general reference.  A brief summary regarding their status, role, 
complicity with the affair and their ultimate fate due to their participation follows.  In 
addition, the references in our source that name or describe the role of the participant 
or possible participant are listed after their summary.1 
 
[1] Q. Annius Chilo  RE I2 (Annius) no. 18, 2263; MRR II, 487 
Q. Annius Chilo was most likely from the senatorial order (Sall. B Cat. 17.3).  The 
Commentariolum petitionis mentioned a certain Annius with no praenomen, who was 
an amicissimus of Catiline (Cic. Comment. pet. 10).  This is perhaps the same Q. 
Annius Chilo named in Cicero’s Third Oration.  The Allobrogean envoys testified that 
Annius was one of the affair’s participants who attempted to solicit their support.  
Consequently, Annius was one of the nine citizens Cicero and the Senate 
recommended should be held in custody due to their involvement (Cic. Cat 3.14).  
However, Annius remained at large.  His ultimate fate is indeterminable as there is no 
further record. 
References: Cic. Cat 3.14; Comment. pet. 10; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 50.4 
 
[2] C. Antonius Hybrida RE I2 (Antonius) no.19, 2577-82; MRR II, 165-6 
C. Antonius Hybrida was tribune of the plebs in 71.  The censors expelled him from the 
Senate in 70/69.2  Despite his expulsion, C. Antonius soon rehabilitated his political 
career and was elected (along with Cicero) as a praetor for 66.  Cicero, Antonius, and 
Catiline were candidates for consul in 64 (Cic. Att. 1.1.1; Comment. pet. 7-10; Asc. 
82C).  Cicero attacked Antonius and Catiline in the Toga in Candida claiming they were 
unworthy candidates due to their criminal pasts.3  Before the elections, Cicero delivered 
                                                
1 NB: I do not list specific references for Catiline [no. 36] as there are too many.  The sources 
mentioning Catiline can be found in the RE and MRR supplied alongside his entry below.  In 
addition, I do not list specific references within the summary supplied for P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Sura [no.14] as they have been cited in Chapter 2. 
2 For the possible reasons for Antonius’ expulsion, see Chapter 2 n.106. Pliny reported that 
Antonius received his cognomen after his brutal treatment of indigenous Greeks when he was 
legate under the dictator Sulla (NH. 8.213). 
3 Dio mentioned that Antonius, when consul, supported a motion for the cancellation of debt 
(Dio Cass. 37.25.4).  The cancellation of debts was one of Catiline’s campaign promises when 
he was running for consul in 64 and 63, see Chapter 3 n.13. 
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the speech to besmirch Antonius’ character, yet Antonius was elected as Cicero’s 
colleague in the consulship (cf. Cic. Comment pet. 8-10, 28, 52; Asc. 82-84C).  
Purportedly, Antonius and Catiline were friends, therefore, our sources hint that the 
former sympathized with the affair (Cic. Cat 3.14; Mur. 49; Sest. 8; Plut. Cic. 12.3; Dio 
37.30.3).4  Cicero claimed Catiline and Manlius’ army were bolstered by the promises 
Antonius supposedly gave to Catiline before the latter left Rome (Cic. Mur. 49).5  
Antonius also had connections with P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura [no. 14].  Both were 
expelled from the Senate the same year and Lentulus had married Julia, Antonius’ 
brother’s widow, and the triumvir Mark Antony’s mother.  According to the sources, 
Cicero was able to buy Antonius’ loyalty by assigning his proconsular appointment to 
govern the province of Macedonia to his colleague (Sall. B Cat. 26.4; Plut. Cic. 12.4).6  
Antonius was ordered to raise an army to confront Catiline and Manlius’ army in 
northern Etruria (Sall. B Cat. 36.3; App. B Civ. 2.7; Plut. Cic. 16.6; Flor. 2.12.5).  
However when these armies met in the final battle near Pistoria, Antonius was ill and 
his legate M. Petronius led his forces (Sall. B Cat. 59.4).  Dio claimed he feigned an 
illness in order to not face his friend in battle (Dio Cass. 37.39.3-4).7  Antonius was 
prosecuted in 59 and most likely accused of supporting the affair.  Cicero gave 
testimony on his former colleague’s behalf, but Antonius was convicted and exiled (Cic. 
Att. 2.12.2; Flac. 5, 95; Dom. 41; Dio Cass. 38.10).8  C. Antonius was Mark Antony’s 
uncle and the former’s political career flourished again due to the latter’s influence in 
the 40’s.9 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.14; Mur. 49; Comment. pet. 7-10; Sest. 8; Sall. B Cat. 21.3, 
24.1, 26.1, 4, 36.3, 56.4, 57.4-5, 59.4; Plut. Cic. 11.1-2, 12, 16.6, 22.8; App. B Civ. 2.7; 
Dio Cass. 37.30.3, 39.3; Flor. 2.12.5, 11 
 
[3] P. Autronius Paetus  RE II2 (Autronius) no.7, 2612-3; MRR II, 157 
P. Autronius Paetus was one of Cicero’s colleagues in the quaestorship in 75.  
Autronius was elected consul with P. Cornelius Sulla [no. 15] in 66.  Soon after the 
elections, they were both convicted of ambitus and stripped of their office.  They lost 
their seats in the Senate and were disqualified from holding any subsequent office.  
During P. Cornelius Sulla’s trial in 62, Cicero reported that Autronius had been 
convicted that year for his support of the supposed plan to murder the new consuls of 
                                                
4 Chapter 2 n.104. 
5 Cicero was not specific what Antonius promised Catiline.   
6 Plutarch claimed Cicero’s tactic of swapping provinces also bought Antonius’ opposition 
against Rullus’ agrarian legislation in the beginning of 63 (Plut. Cic. 12).  In the Pro Sestio, 
Cicero suggested Sestius, Antonius’ quaestor in 63, helped keep Antonius loyal (Cic. Sest. 8). 
7 NB: Some sources claimed it was Antonius who defeated Catiline in the battle, cf. Plut. Cic. 
22.8; App. B Civ. 2.7; Flor. 2.12.5, 11; Eutrop. 6.15).  See also, Chapter 2 n.105. 
8 Antonius might have been charged de vi instead or de repetundis.  The trial probably included 
an extortion charge while governor of Macedonia as well, cf. Settle 1962, 167-9; TLRR, no. 119 
nn. 2-3.  See also, Chapter 2 nn.106-7. 
9 Antonius was elected censor in 42 with Mark Antony’s support (Cic. Phil. 2.98). 
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65, who had prosecuted both men when they were consul-designates, and his 
participation with the affair of 63 (Cic. Sull. 7, 10, 15-19).  Although Autronius was not 
mentioned in any of Cicero’s Orations or the Pro Murena delivered in 63, Cicero 
depicts Autronius as an influential member of the affair and involved with most of its 
designs in the Pro Sulla.  Perhaps Cicero did not mention Autronius in the speeches 
delivered in 63 because his participation was not discovered until 62.  However, Berry 
suspects that Cicero most likely stressed Autronius’ criminal character during his 
defense of P. Sulla to present him as a more virtuous man than his former colleague.10  
Regardless of whether Cicero conflated Autronius’ role in 63, the latter was convicted 
de vi (Sull. 7, 71).  Sallust listed Autronius as a convicted supporter of the affair from 
the senatorial order (Sall. B Cat. 17.3), but did not specify his role.11  Dio reported that 
one of the tribunal measures in 63 was to restore Autronius and P. Sulla’s senatorial 
status (Dio Cass. 37.25.3).  However, Cicero reported that P. Sulla was unable to 
repair the ignominy resulting from his conviction and it follows that Autronius was 
unable to restore his status either (Cic. Sull. 88-91).  The record in Sallust’s Catilina 
about Autronius’ senatorial status in 63 was perhaps in reference to his previous 
status.  It seems unlikely that he had regained senatorial status when he was 
prosecuted and convicted in 62.12 
References: Cic. Sull. 1, 7, 10, 13-19, 36-38, 51, 53, 66-67, 71, 76; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 
18.2, 5, 47.1, 48.7; Dio Cass. 36.44.3-5, 37.25.3, Flor. 2.12.3 
 
[4] M. Caelius Rufus   RE III1 (Caelius) no. 35, 1266-72; MRR II, 235 
In 56, Cicero defended M. Caelius Rufus from several criminal charges.  Most 
significantly, Caelius’ was accused of murdering an Alexandrian ambassador.  The 
Alexandrian envoys were in Rome complaining about the support certain influential 
Romans were giving to the recently deposed Egyptian King Ptolemy Auletes.13  To 
sully Caelius’ character in the case, the prosecution discussed his support of Catiline in 
the consular elections of 63 (Cic. Cael. 10-11). 14  In the Pro Caelio, Cicero refuted this 
allegation proclaiming that Caelius should be excused from his former relationship with 
Catiline.15  Cicero explained that others, including himself, were deceived by Catiline’s 
enigmatic character before learning about Catiline’s involvement with the affair of 63 
                                                
10 See Chapter 2 n.134. 
11 Florus listed the Autronii as one of the elite families involved with the affair of 63, but did not 
specifically mention Autronius Paetus’ status (Flor. 2.12.3) 
12 On Autronius’ senatorial status, see Linderski 1963, 512 n.10. 
13 For the charges made against Caelius, cf. TLRR, no. 134; Austin 1960, 42. 
14 This allegation was levied despite the fact that in three years earlier, in 59, Caelius was one of 
the successful prosecutors of C. Antonius concerning the latter’s role in the affair (Cael. 15).   
15 Quintillian recorded that it was necessary that an advocate defend the client’s earlier crimes 
before dealing with the present charge.  As an example, he used Cicero initial rebuttal of 
Caelius’ friendship with Catiline and the former’s alleged involvement with the affair before 
addressing the specific charges of the current case (Quint. Inst. 4.2.27). 
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(12-14).16  Cicero insisted that Caelius’ friendship with Catiline did not prove that 
Caelius actively supported the affair.  Cicero reminded the jury that Caelius was never 
specifically named as a participant (15).  He was acquitted and whether he actually 
supported the affair remains an accusation. 
References: Cic. Cael. 10-15; Quint. Inst. 4.2.27 
 
[5] M. Caeparius   RE III1 (Caeparius), 1279 
According to Sallust, M. Caeparius was a Roman citizen from the port town of 
Terracina in Latium.  He was most likely one of the many domi nobiles Sallust claimed 
supported the affair (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).17  Our sources claim his role was to incite the 
pastores of Apulia to support the affair (Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 46.3).  Whether 
Caeparius had any connection with Apulia is not recorded, but Cicero and Sallust 
accounts’ corroborate his role.18  Sallust recorded that T. Volturcius [no. 44] informed 
the Senate that Caeparius and P. Gabinius Capito [no. 24] enlisted him into the affair 
several days earlier before December 3 (47.1).  After learning that Cicero had seized 
the letters and pledges Volturcius were carrying from Lentulus and others bound for 
Catiline and Manlius, Caeparius tried to flee from the city that morning.  He was 
captured later in the day (46.4, 47.4) and was one of the five Roman citizens executed 
on December 5 (55.6). 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 46.3-4, 47.1,4, 52.34, 55.6 
 
[6] L. Calpurnius Bestia RE III1 (Calpurnius) no. 24, 1367; MRR II, 174 
L. Calpurnius Bestia was a senator and tribune-designate in 63.  According only to 
Sallust’s Catilina, Bestia was supposed to charge Cicero in front of the Senate for 
exacerbating a war that the consul could have avoided.  Bestia’s diatribe was the 
supposed signal for the arson and murder in Rome to commence the following night 
(Sall. Cat. 43.1; App. B Civ. 2.3).  On the other hand, Cicero never specifically accused 
Bestia for being involved.19  Perhaps, they were not on friendly terms when Bestia 
entered the tribunate.  Either Bestia and/or Q. Caecilius Metullus Nepos, his colleague 
in the tribunate, were already denouncing Cicero’s actions as consul (cf. Cic. Mur. 81; 
Fam. 5.2.6-8; Sall. B Cat. 43.1; Plut. Cic. 23.1; Dio Cass. 37.38).  In the Fourth Oration, 
                                                
16 Cicero considered defending Catiline for extortion in 65, cf. Cic. Att. 1.1.1, 1.2.1; Cael. 14; 
Asc. 85C. 
17 Robinson (1947, 138-43) suggests that Caeparius was one of the two equites sent to 
assassinate Cicero on the morning of November 7.  His argument rests on Cicero’s text, which 
claimed the two assassins were equites (Cic. Cat 1.9). Cicero only named C. Cornelius as one 
of the assassins, but never reveals his accomplice (Cic. Sull. 18).  Robinson refutes Sallust’s 
Catilina, which names C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius as the two assassins because the latter 
might not have been an eques (Sall. B Cat. 28.1).  See Chapter 2 n.170. 
18 NB: Although Caeparius was executed for his supposed role in the affair, Cicero did not 
mention him in any other work except at Cat. 3.14. 
19 Cicero called Bestia a friend (Cic. Cael. 26). 
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Cicero reported that a certain senator, or senators, was absent when the Senate 
debated the sentence of those apprehended on December 5 (Cic. Cat 4.10).20  Bestia 
might have been absent perhaps indicating his disapproval of Cicero’s actions.21  
Bestia probably supported Nepos when the latter prevented Cicero from giving a 
prolonged account of his consulship to the people on the day when his consulship 
expired (cf. Cic. Mur. 83; Fam. 5.2.6-8; Plut. Cic. 23.2; Dio Cass. 37.38).  Bestia was 
never accused nor did he stand trial for his supposed participation with the affair.  
There are no indications that his political career was hindered from this accusation.  
Bestia was aedile in 59 and won the praetorship in 56.  He was accused de ambitus 
that year and Cicero agreed to be his advocate (Cic. Q. fr. 2.3.6).  Bestia was convicted 
(Cic. Phil. 11.11).22  Relations between Cicero and Bestia probably deteriorated after 
his conviction.  Twenty years after the affair of 63, M. Junius Brutus recalled Bestia’s 
severe abuse of Cicero during his consulship suggesting that their enmity at that time 
was conspicuous (Cic. Ad. Brut. 1.17.1).23 
References: Sall. Cat. 17.3, 43.1; Plut. Cic. 23.1-2; App. B Civ. 2.3  
 
[7] Cn. Calpurnius Piso RE III1 (Calpurnius) no. 69, 1379-80; MRR II, 159 
A staunch anti-Pompeian, Cn. Calpurnius Piso was violently opposed the passage of 
C. Manilius’ proposal to grant Pompey extraordinary imperium in 67 (Val. Max. 6.2.4).  
Due to his enmity towards Pompey, Piso was considered a threat to the general’s 
supporters in Rome.  He was elected quaestor for 65.  Although only a quaestor, he 
was appointed as a propraetor in Spain for 65-64.  Sallust implied that the Senate 
awarded Piso this extraordinary appointment to physically remove him from Rome and 
the business of government (Sall. B Cat. 19.2).24  Asconius reported that Piso and 
Catiline were friends and claimed the former was involved with all of the latter’s violent 
designs (Asc. 66C).  Asconius implied that Piso was party to both the intended violence 
in 66/65 and the affair of 63.  Our sources attest that Piso and Catiline were involved 
                                                
20 Dyck (2008, 223) explains that the term nemo in this passage could indicate more than one 
person.  Cadoux (2006, 612-3) disagrees. 
21 Cicero claimed that the absent senator had implied he would support Cicero and the Senate’s 
judgment because, according to Cicero, he had already voted to place Lentulus and the others 
in custody, to reward the informants, and had publically thanked Cicero for his suppression of 
the affair (Cic. Cat. 4.10).  Drummond (1995, 14-5) suspects either Nepos and/or Bestia were 
the absent senators. 
22 Cf. TLRR, no. 268 and 269.  Cicero might have defended Bestia in three earlier cases before 
the former’s voluntary exile in 58 and perhaps twice in 56, cf. Cic. Cael. 16, 56, 76, 78; Phil. 
11.11.  This L. Calpurnius Bestia might have been the same man or a relative of the tribune of 
62, cf. TLRR, no. 249-52 n.1; RE III1 (Calpurnius) no. 24 and 25. 
23 NB: Although more evidence of Nepos’ vituperation of Cicero’s consulship survives, Brutus 
names Bestia instead.  He was allied with Mark Antony in 43 (Cic. Phil. 11.11). 
24 Cicero claimed Piso became propraetor through the influence of Crassus, cf. Cic. Mur. 81; 
Sull. 67-68.  Sallust also reported that Crassus was influential in Piso’s appointment as 
propraetor (Sall. B Cat. 19.1) NB: Sallust contradictorily reported that it was Catiline and 
Autronius, who sent Piso to Spain to levy an army in 65 (Sall. B Cat. 18.5). 
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with the plan to murder the consuls of 65 (cf. Cic. Mur. 81; Sull. 67; Sall. B Cat. 18.4; 
Asc. 83C, 92C; Seut. Iul. 9.3; Dio Cass. 36.44.4).25  However, Piso’s participation in the 
affair of 63 is affirmed only in Sallust’s Catilina.  It claims that Piso’s role was to enlist 
an army to support the affair while he was in Spain (Sall. B Cat. 18.4).  In contrast, 
other sources recorded that Piso was killed in Spain before the affair of 63 was 
discovered (Seut. Iul. 9.3).  It was rumored that either the Spanish forces under his 
command mutinied and killed him, or those loyal to Pompey in the province had him 
murdered (cf. Sall. B Cat. 19.3, 5; Asc. 92-93C; Dio Cass. 36.44.5).  As Sallust tended 
to antedate some of the actions of the affair to accentuate the tumultuous years of 66-
63, Piso’s participation remains unproven, as he was most likely killed before the affair 
of 63 was planned.26 
References: Cic. Mur. 81; Sull. 67-68; Sall. B Cat. 18-19; Asc. 66C, 83C, 92-93C; Suet. 
Iul. 9.2; Dio Cass. 36.44.4-5 
 
[8] L. Cassius Longinus  RE III1 (Cassius) no. 64, 1738-9; MRR II 152 
L. Cassius Longinus was one of Cicero’s praetorian colleagues in 66.  Cassius 
unsuccessfully canvassed for the consulship in 64 (cf. Cic. Comment. pet. 7; Asc. 
82C).27  He was a senator in 63 (Sall. B Cat. 17.3).  His role in the affair was to 
organize the arson in Rome and to negotiate with the Allobrogean envoys to send 
cavalry support to Catiline and Manlius’ forces in Etruria (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.9, 14, 4.13; 
Sull. 36-39, 53; Sall. B Cat. 44.1).28  According to Sallust, Cassius left for Gaul soon 
after the meeting with the Allobrogean envoys perhaps to persuade other Gallic tribes 
to lend military support or to ensure the Allobroges honored their commitment (Sall. B 
Cat. 44.2).  He was not in Rome on December 3 when Cicero apprehended the other 
citizens who had given pledges and letters of support to the Allobrogean envoys.  
Cassius was punished in absentia for his alleged actions in 63 (Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B 
Cat. 50.4). In the Pro Sulla, Cicero expanded Cassius’ role in the affair.  Cicero claimed 
those involved with the affair had met at Cassius’ house to discuss most of their plans 
(Cic. Sull. 39).  Certainly, this meeting between the participants was different to the 
meeting that took place at M. Porcius Laeca’s [no. 32] house on November 6.29  
                                                
25 Sallust claimed Piso was the instigator of the plan to murder the consuls and then enlisted 
Catiline and P. Autronius Paetus’ support (Sall. B Cat. 18.5).  Cf. Suet. Iul. 9.3; Dio Cass. 
36.44.4. 
26 Suetonius and Dio recorded that Piso was killed soon after the plan to murder the consuls of 
65, cf. Suet. Iul. 9.3; Dio Cass. 36.44.5. 
27 Asconius called Cassius stolidus (‘stupid’) in his commentary of the In Toga Candida, but did 
not comment whether Cicero attacked Cassius’ character in the speech (Asc. 82C). 
28 Cicero exclaimed Rome had nothing to fear from the adipes (‘obesity’) of Cassius (Cic. Cat. 
3.16). 
29 Sallust did not mention a meeting at Cassius’ house.  Sallust recorded three meetings 
between the conspirators: i) at Catiline’s house before the consular elections of 64 (20.1), ii) at 
Laeca’s after Catiline’s defeat in the election of 63 (27.3), and iii) at D. Junius Brutus’ house, the 
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Whether Cassius was executed for his alleged role in the affair of 63 is doubtful.  
Cicero reported that Cassius, presumably during his own trial in 62, had specifically 
fingered Autronius [no. 3] and others when they met with the Allobrogean envoys (Cic. 
Sull. 36-39).30  We can assume that Cassius was condemned for his participation due 
to the allusions to his trial in the Pro Sulla.  The evidence suggests that the capital 
sentence recommended for Cassius in 63 was reassessed the following year.  There is 
no later record of Cassius in our sources, so his ultimate fate remains a matter of 
conjecture. 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.9, 14, 16, 25, 4.13; Sull. 36-39, 53; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 44.1, 2, 
50.4 
 
[9] C. Claudius Marcellus  RE III2 (Claudius) no. 215, 2733-4 
There is some confusion over the identification this C. Claudius Marcellus and the M. 
Claudius Marcellus [no. 10] listed below.  Orosius claimed a father and son from the 
Claudii Marcelli were involved with the affair.  According to the RE, this C. Marcellus is 
not to be confused with the C. Marcellus, who was praetor in 80, or his son, who was 
consul in 50.31  In the Pro Sulla, Cicero referred to the latter pair of Claudii Marcelli as 
relatives of Sulla.  These Claudii Marcelli are not to be confused with the father and son 
duo, which participated in the affair listed in this appendix.32  Supposedly, C. Claudius 
Marcellus and his father Marcus’ were to garner support for the affair from the Paeligni 
in 63.  L. Vettius [no. 43] divulged their plan, which led to its prevention.  However, 
Orosius’ record suggests that the disturbances among the Paeligni continued into the 
following year until they were finally suppressed by M. Calpurnius Bibulus, who was 
praetor in 62 (Oros. 6.6.7).  In contrast, Cicero reported that a C. Marcellus was sent to 
Capua to gain support from the gladiators in the town.  When P. Sestius was quaestor 
in 63, he successfully prevented C. Marcellus’ from achieving his goal and expelled him 
from Capua (Cic. Sest. 9).  Therefore, his role in the affair remains obscure.  C. 
Marcellus was certainly a Roman citizen, but we cannot be certain of his rank, as there 
is no further record. 
References: Cic. Sest. 9; Oros. 6.6.7 
 
[10] M. Claudius Marcellus RE III2 (Claudius) no. 228, 2760 
Similarly to C. Claudius Marcellus [no. 9] listed above, this man’s identity is confusing.  
M. Claudius Marcellus was perhaps his father and therefore involved with the attempt 
                                                                                                                                          
husband of the conspirator Sempronia, between the Allobrogean envoys and the conspirators 
remaining in Rome (40.5). 
30 Cicero was keen to tell the jury that Cassius did not mention Sulla as a participant in the affair 
(Cic. Sull. 37). 
31 RE III2, C. Claudius Marcellus no. 214, 2733 and no. 216, 2734-6. 
32 Cf. Cic. Sull. 19.  See MacDonald 1977, 332 n.a.  
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to gain support from the Paeligni in 63 (Oros. 6.6.7).  The First Oration recounts that 
when Catiline was facing accusations regarding his involvement in the affair before 
November 8, he purportedly tried to place himself into custody.  Cicero claimed that 
several men refused Catiline’s request including a M. Marcellus, who Cicero called a 
sodalis (‘an intimate companion’) of Catiline (Cic. Cat. 1.19).33  In this passage, the 
surviving manuscripts of Cicero’s First Oration are inconsistent regarding the spelling of 
M. Marcellus’ name.34  M. Marcellus was certainly a citizen, but his rank and ultimate 
fate are indeterminable as there is no further record.  This M. Marcellus should not be 
confused with the homonymous consul of 51, who Cicero later praised in the same 
speech (1.21).35 
References: Cic. Cat. 1.19; Oros. 6.6.7 
 
[11] C. Cornelius  RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 19, 1255 
According to Sallust, C. Cornelius had equestrian status in 63 (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).36 
Cornelius was one of the two equites who volunteered to murder Cicero on the morning 
of November 7 (Cic. Cat. 1.9-10).  In 62, C. Cornelius’ homonymous son was a 
prosecutor in P. Cornelius Sulla’s trial.  Cicero explicitly named his father as one of the 
assassins sent that day (Cic. Sull. 18, 52; Sall. B Cat. 28.1).37  C. Cornelius was 
prosecuted, confessed to the crime, and convicted before P. Sulla’s trial (Cic. Sull. 6, 
                                                
33 OLD (sodalis) s.v. 2. NB: Cicero also called M. Marcellus a vir optimus (Cic. Cat. 1.19).  
However, according to Quintillian, Cicero was being ironic in this passage (Quint. Inst. 9.2.45).  
Dyck (2008, 102) explains that the passage is ironic due to the occurrence of the term videlicet.  
NB: In the Institutio Oratoria, Marcellus’ name is written as Metellus, see the note below.  
34 MacDonald (1977, 52 n.1) explains that this M. Claudius Marcellus either appears as M. 
Marcellum in most MSS., or as Metellum with no praenomen in the codex Laurentianus XLV.2, 
or as M. Metellum according to some other editions of the First Oration, cf. Dyck 2008, 102. 
Gwatkin (1934, 276-7) argues that, as the Orations were edited for publication in 60, the true 
reading should be Metellum, which would refer to Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos the tribune who 
berated Cicero’s severe actions as consul, cf. Cic. Fam. 5.2.6-10; Dio Cass. 37.38, 43.  
However, a sentence before the occurrence of M. Marcellus’ name Cicero claimed that Q. 
Metellum referring to the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer and not Nepos, also turned down 
Catiline’s request to be placed into custody (Cic. Cat. 1.19).  Therefore, I think the arguments 
that suggest the reading of the manuscript as M. Marcellum are more likely correct than 
Metellum or M. Metellum at Cic. Cat. 1.19, as neither Metellus Celer or Nepos had the 
praenomen Marcus.  Perhaps, Cicero was referring to M. Caecilius Metellus the praetor of 69, 
but it is doubtful.  Cicero claimed Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer the current praetor had rejected 
Catiline’s request to be held in custody therefore it seems illogical that Catiline would expect a 
different answer from Quintus’ older brother Marcus. 
35 According to Adams (1978, 145-66), Cicero most often named people in his speeches using 
their praenomen when they were first introduced.  Therefore, if Cicero was referring to the same 
M. Claudius Marcellus at Cat. 1.19 (see note above), then he would not have reintroduced 
another M. Marcellus at Cat. 1.21.  On M. Claudius Marcellus the consul of 51, see RE III2 
(Claudius) no. 229. 
36 This C. Cornelius should not be confused with homonymous tribune of 67, who Cicero 
defended de maiestate in 65, see TLRR, no.209.  
37 Regarding the names of the assassins Sallust followed Cicero, but Plutarch and Appian 
mistook C. Cornelius for C. Cornelius Cethegus, cf. Plut. Cic. 16.1-2; App. B Civ. 2.3.  Their 
mistake most likely originated from Sallust’s claim that Cethegus volunteered to murder Cicero 
when those remaining in Rome after Catiline had left were contemplating to commence with 
their plans for murder and arson (Sall. B Cat. 43.2). 
 307 
52).  Cicero claimed that C. Cornelius supplied his son with some evidence to prove 
that P. Cornelius Sulla was involved in the affair of 63.  However, Cicero quickly 
dismissed the evidence on the grounds that C. Cornelius’ father was guilty and 
therefore untrustworthy (52).  Whether C. Cornelius was a blood relation of any of the 
following participants from the gens Cornelia listed below is not recorded. 
References: Cic. Sull. 6, 18, 51-54; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 28.1 
 
[12] C. Cornelius Cethegus RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 89, 1278-9; MRR II, 489 
Cicero claimed C. Cornelius Cethegus had attempted to murder Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Pius (cos. 80) in Spain when Metellus was commanding an army against the rebel Q. 
Sertorius in the 70’s (Cic. Sull. 70).  This is the only explicit record of Cethegus before 
his participation in the affair of 63.  Therefore, Cicero’s accusation concerning his 
actions in Spain cannot be cross-referenced.38  After Catiline and P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Sura, Cethegus’ name occurs most frequently in our accounts of the affair of 63.  He 
was most likely a senator that year (cf. Sall. B Cat. 17.3; Flor. 2.12.4).39  According to 
Cicero, Cethegus’ task was to coordinate the murders of the leading members in Rome 
opposing the affair (Cic. Cat. 4.13).  According to Sallust, he was to assassinate Cicero 
when he and the others remaining in Rome commenced their plans for murder and 
arson (Sall. B Cat. 43.2).40  He was one of the participants who remained in Rome and 
gave the Allobrogean envoys a letter and pledge of his loyalty if they supported the 
affair (Cic. Cat. 3.9; Sall. B Cat. 44.1).  The letters were seized and Cethegus was 
placed in custody (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 46.3, 47.4).  In front of the Senate, he 
acknowledged his seal and confessed to writing the letter confirming his intrigue with 
the Allobrogean envoys (Cic. Cat. 3.10; Sall. B Cat. 47.2).  The Senate also searched 
Cethegus’ house and many weapons and torches were found (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.8; Plut. 
Cic. 18.2, 19.2).  Cicero claimed the weapons were to be used either to arm the 
Allobroges, or to arm Cethegus and the others remaining in Rome (Cic. Cat. 3.10).  
Cethegus was sentenced to death and some of his retainers tried in vain to free him 
                                                
38 In Sallust’s invented speech for Cato, there is an allusion to a previous crime committed by 
Cethegus.  The speech states that his participation with the affair of 63 was iterum patriae 
bellum fecit “the second time that he [Cethegus] has made war upon his country” (Sall. B Cat. 
52.33). McGushin (1977, 267) suggests that Sallust was perhaps alluding to Cethegus’ 
involvement in the plan to murder the consuls of 65, but there remains no specific evidence 
regarding Cethegus’ participation in this plot.  On the other hand, Sallust might have been 
alluding to Cethegus’ assassination attempt on Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius in Spain (Cic. Sull. 
70). Cf. Ramsey 1984, 217. 
39 For the frequency of Cethegus’ name in our sources, see Chapter 2 nn.76-9.  On Cethegus’ 
senatorial status, see Ryan 1994, 258-9. 
40 Plutarch and Appian mistakenly reported that Cethegus was one of the two assassins who 
came to murder Cicero on November 7.  Their mistake is forgivable not only due to their similar 
nomina, but also because Cethegus was often described as a violent, impatient, and unstable 
character, cf. Cic. Cat. 3.16, 4.11; Sull. 75-76; Sall. B Cat. 43.3-4, 52.33; Luc. B. Civ. 2.543, 
6.794.  Less forgivable is that Appian imprecisely recorded that Cethegus was also a praetor 
(App. B Civ. 2.3). 
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(Sall. B Cat. 50.2; App. B Civ. 2.5).  He was executed on December 5 (Sall. B Cat. 
55.6; Plut. Cic. 22.3).41 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 25, 4.11, 13; Sull. 53, 70, 75, 76; Sall. B 
Cat. 17.4, 32.2, 43.2-4, 44.1, 46.3, 47.2, 4, 48.4, 50.2, 52.33, 55.6, 57.1; Luc. B. Civ. 
2.543; Plut. Cic. 16.1-2, 18.2, 19.1-2, 22.3, 8, 30.5; App. B Civ. 2.2-5, 15; Flor. 2.12.4; 
Ampel. Lib. Mem. 31 
 
[13] P. Cornelius Faustus Sulla42 RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 377, 1515-7; MRR 
II, 170 
P. Cornelius Faustus Sulla was the son of the dictator Sulla (Asc. 20C, 73C).  The 
prosecutors of his cousin P. Cornelius Sulla [no. 15] alleged that gladiators were being 
procured in the region of Campania in 63, not for the future games celebrating the 
dictator three year later in 60, but as a pretext to support the affair (Cic. Sull. 54-55).  
Cicero claimed it was Faustus who initially approached his cousin regarding the 
acquisition of gladiators for the games.  Apparently, the prosecution thought it was 
suspicious to acquire gladiators a few years before the games were scheduled.43  
However, Cicero implied that the gladiators hired were insufficient to be involved in the 
games, let alone be of any use for the affair (54).  Furthermore, Cicero claimed it was 
Faustus’ slave not his client’s slaves who were in charge of procuring the gladiators 
(55).  There is no further evidence that implies that Faustus participated with affair of 
63.44 
References: Cic. Sul. 54-55  
 
[14] P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura RE IV1 (Cornelius) no.240, 1399-1402; 
MRR II 76, 102, 121, and 166 
For an in-depth examination of P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura and his participation in the 
affair, see Chapter 2.4 and its subsections.  In sum, Lentulus was consul in 71 and 
expelled from the Senate soon after by the censors of 70/69.  Lentulus rehabilitated his 
career and was a praetor in 63, making him the highest-ranking citizen executed for his 
participation with the affair.  He was involved with soliciting the Allobrogean envoys and 
gave them a letter pledging his loyalty.  Furthermore, Lentulus wrote a personal letter 
to Catiline, which, for Cicero, confirmed the link between the disturbances inside of 
Rome and Manlius and Catiline’s army in Faesulae.  Lentulus confessed that he wrote 
                                                
41 Ampelius Lib. Mem. 31 claimed Cethegus’ brother also voted for his execution. 
42 NB: Faustus is listed in the RE as Faustus Cornelius Sulla. 
43 The games Faustus held for his father in 60 were extravagant (Dio Cass. 37.51.4). 
44 In order to prove the accusation against his client P. Cornelius Sulla included others, Cicero 
reported that Faustus asked his brother-in-law C. Memmius, his nephew Q. Pompeius, and L. 
Julius Casear (cos. 64) to also buy gladiators (Cic. Sul. 55).  If P. Cornelius Faustus Sulla was 
procuring slaves to join the affair then one might have included the three others mentioned 
above accused of the same suspicious activity in this appendix.  However, I only include 
Faustus in this list, as the accusations against Memmius, Pompeius, and L. Caesar were 
exactly the same.  Furthermore, I singled out Faustus in this case because he might have been 
related to the other Sullae in this appendix.    
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both letters and was placed in custody.  The Allobroges also testified that Lentulus 
proclaimed he had obtained a prophecy that predicted he would be the third Cornelii to 
rule Rome specifically in 63.  He was forced to resign or was stripped of the praetorship 
and executed on December 5. 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.4, 6, 9-10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 25; 4.2, 5, 10, 12-13, 17; Sull. 16-
17, 30, 33, 53, 70, 75, 76; Flac. 95-97; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 32.2, 39.6, 43.1, 44.1, 3, 46.3, 
5, 47.2-3, 50.1, 51.7, 52.17, 33, 55.2, 5, 57.1, 58.4; Diod. Sic. F35.1; Liv. Per 102;; Vell. 
Pat. 2.34.3-4, 35.3; Luc. B Civ. 2.543; Plut. Cic. 17-22, 24.1; Caes. 7.4, Cat. Min. 22.2; 
Quint. Inst. 5.10.30; App. B Civ. 2.2-6; Flor. 2.12.3-11; Dio Cass. 37.30.4-36.4, 39.1, 
38.14.5, 46.20.2-5 
 
[15] P. Cornelius Sulla (i)  RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 386, 1518-21; MRR II,
     157 
P. Cornelius Sulla was most likely the dictator Sulla’s nephew.45  P. Sulla was elected 
consul in 66 with P. Autronius Paetus [no. 3].  Both were stripped of the office after they 
were convicted of electoral corruption following the election and were barred from 
future office (cf. Cic. Sull. 91; Fin. 2.62; Sall. B Cat. 18.2; Liv. Per. 101; Asc. 75C, 88C; 
Suet. Iul. 9.1; Dio Cass. 36.44.3).  In 62, Cicero defended P. Sulla, who was accused 
of being involved with duae coniurationes along with other allegations of subversion 
and violence (Cic. Sul. 11).46  These duae coniurationes were: i) the intended murder of 
the newly elected consuls, who had convicted P. Sulla and Autronius in 66, on their first 
day of office in 65; and ii) the subversive activities occurring in 63.  Like others tried for 
their involvement in either coniuratio or both, P. Sulla was prosecuted under the leges 
de vi.  Whether he was guilty of participating in the affair, like his relatives, P. [no. 16] 
and Ser. Cornelius Sulla [no. 17] listed below, remains contentious.47  Cicero was able 
to persuade the jury to acquit P. Sulla exculpating him from any participation in either 
coniuratio despite the accusations.48  P. Sulla died shortly after his trial (Cic. Fam. 
15.17.2). 
References: Cic. Sull. passim; Sall. B Cat. 18.2 
 
[16] P. Cornelius Sulla (ii)  RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 385, 1518; MRR II, 489 
P. Cornelius Sulla was Ser. Cornelius Sulla’s brother [no. 17] and perhaps a nephew or 
relative of the dictator.49  It follows that this P. Cornelius Sulla was most likely a relative 
                                                
45 P. Sulla was most likely the dictator’s nephew, cf. Reams 1987, Berry 1996, 320-1.  Dio 
mistook this P. Sulla as the dictator’s son (Dio Cass. 36.44.3).  Cicero called P. Cornelius Sulla 
a propinquus (‘close relation’) of the dictator, not specifically his nephew (Cic. Off. 2.29).  
However, Cicero wanted to avoid mentioning his client’s relation to the dictator too often for 
obvious reasons. 
46 For the charges against P. Sulla, see Berry 1996, 20-1. 
47 For arguments regarding P. Sulla’s guilt, see Berry 1996, 33-9. 
48 See previous note in chapters from commentary (Berry) regarding his sentence. 
49 Reams (1987, 302) argues that P. and Ser. Cornelius Sulla were distant relatives contra 
Münzer RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 385 and no. 389. 
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of the P. Cornelius Sulla [no.15] and P. Cornelius Faustus Sulla [no.14].50  Sallust 
claimed he was a senator in 63 (Sall. B Cat. 17.3).  Cicero listed him as one of those 
convicted in 62 for their participation in the affair, but his actual role remains unclear 
(Cic. Sull. 6).  After the report of his conviction, there is no further record. 
References: Cic. Sull. 6; Sall. B Cat. 17.3 
 
[17] Ser. Cornelius Sulla RE IV1 (Cornelius) no. 389, 1521; MRR II, 490 
Servius was the brother of the P. Cornelius Sulla [no. 16].  According to Sallust, 
Servius was a senator in 63 (Sall B Cat. 17.3).  Sallust mentioned that T. Volturcius 
informed the Senate that P. Gabinius Capito [no. 24] had informed him that Servius 
was a participant in the affair (47.1).  According to Cicero, Servius was convicted in 62 
for his participation with the affair in 63 (Cic. Sull. 6).  Like his brother listed above, 
Servius is not mentioned again after his conviction. 
References: Cic. Sull. 6; Sall. Cat. 17.3, 47.1 
 
[18] Q. Curius   RE IV2 (Curius) no. 7, 1840; MRR II 122 
Q. Curius was a quaestor in 71 and was expelled from Senate by the censors of 70/69 
(cf. Asc. 93C; App. B Civ. 2.3).  He was a close friend of Catiline (Cic. Comment. pet. 
10). Sallust listed Curius as a senator in 63 (cf. Sall. B Cat. 17.3; Flor. 2.12.4).  
Sallust’s Catilina later alluded to Curius’ expulsion from the Senate as a reason why he 
participated in the affair of 63.  Therefore, whether he had rehabilitated his political 
career after his expulsion is unclear (Sall. B Cat. 23.1-3).51  Curius boasted to his lover, 
Fulvia [no. 20], that he was involved in a plot that would make him powerful (23.3; App. 
B Civ. 2.3).  Sallust remarked that Curius was sometimes violent towards Fulvia, 
therefore, she told her friends of his plans (Sall. B Cat. 23.3-4; Diod. Sic. F35.2-5).52  
Later in 63, Cicero, through Fulvia, coerced Curius to betray the conspiracy.  Curius 
revealed its designs and named others who were participating (Sall. B Cat. 26.3).  
Sallust further claimed it was Curius who warned Cicero that he would be murdered on 
November 7/8 (28.2-3).53  On the other hand, Cicero never mentioned either Curius or 
Fulvia in any of his works regarding his discovery of the affair of 63.  Cicero claimed he 
                                                
50 Dio wrongly identified P. Cornelius Sulla [no. 16] with P. Cornelius Sulla [no. 15], who was 
defended by Cicero (Dio Cass. 36.44.3). 
51 See Chapter 2 n.170. 
52 NB: The dating of Sallust’s anecdote about Curius and Fulvia in his narrative apparently 
occurred before the consular elections of 64.  These rumors about Catiline’s violent plans 
helped Cicero defeat him in the elections that year (Sall. B Cat. 23.5-6).  McGushin (1977, 155-
6 and 296) notes that this anecdote is antedated in Sallust’s Catilina.  A fragment concerning 
the affair of 63 found in Diodorus Siculus (F35.2-5) relates a similar anecdote regarding Curius 
and Fulvia’s relationship and why the latter divulged the affair to Cicero.  Diodorus did not 
mention Curius and Fulvia by name, but his transmission of the story is similar to Sallust’s 
account.  For the text of Diodorus’ fragment, see Müller 1975, xxvi. 
53 Plutarch recorded it was Fulvia, not Curius, who warned Cicero of the assassination attempt 
(Plut. Cic. 16.2).  Appian claimed Fulvia told Cicero all of the affair’s plans (App. B Civ. 2.3). 
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discovered all the intricacies of the plot through his own diligence and divine 
providence instead of naming a specific informer(s).54  The Senate voted to reward 
Curius for his information, but he was denied any monetary compensation for his 
defection because he implicated C. Julius Caesar in the plot, which was considered a 
false accusation at the time (Suet. Iul. 17.1).  Although Curius might not have received 
a monetary reward (17.2), he was probably exonerated from his initial support of the 
affair by acting as an informant.  His ultimate fate is unknown. 
References: Cic. Comment. pet. 10; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 23.1, 4, 26.3, 28.2; Asc. 93C; 
Plut. Cic. 16.2; Suet. Iul. 17.1-2; App. B Civ. 2.3 
 
[19] C. Flaminius55   RE VI1 (Flaminius) no. 4, 2502 
Cicero claimed that some of the supporters in Rome for Catiline’s consular candidacy 
in 63 hailed from Arretium, but did not mention any supporters by name (Cic. Mur. 49).  
According to Sallust, Catiline spent several days in mid-November with a C. Flaminius 
in Arretium in northern Etruria.  He helped Catiline gather weapons and men before the 
latter joined Manlius’ forces at Faesulae approximately 20 miles away from Arretium 
(Sall. B Cat. 36.1).  Flaminius was most likely one of the domi nobilis who supported 
the affair (17.4), but whether he had a wider role is indeterminable.  His ultimate fate is 
unknown. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 36.1 
 
[20] Fulvia   RE VII1 (Fulvius) no. 112, 280-1 
Sallust reported that Fulvia was a noble woman and a mistress of Q. Curius [no. 18] a 
participant in the affair (Sall. B Cat. 23.3).56  Refer to the summary under Q. Curius [no. 
18] for her specific role in the affair.  The Ciceronian corpus never mentioned Fulvia, 
however, Cicero remarked that Catiline attempted to attract women to participate with 
the affair (Cic. Cat. 2.7).  According to Sallust and Appian, Catiline approached both 
high and low born women to entice their husbands and/or lovers to support the affair of 
63 or murder them if they did not (Sall. Cat. 24.4; App. B Civ. 2.2).57  Q. Curius is 
named as Catiline’s friend before 63 (Cic. Comment. pet. 10), therefore, perhaps Fulvia 
supported the affair before she decided to tell her friends of its designs or convince 
                                                
54 See Chapter 2 n.32. 
55 NB: The citation found in the RE suggests that C. Flaminius might have been the same C. 
Flaminius mentioned in the Pro Cluentio, who was perhaps a curule aedile in 67 and president 
of the quaestio de sicariis in 66 (cf. Cic. Clu. 126, 146).  However, there is no evidence that the 
C. Flaminius from Arretium Catiline stayed with in 63 was ever a magistrate of Rome.  Therefore 
these  Flaminii should be separated by the RE. 
56 Florus called Fulvia vilissimum scortum “A worthless prostitute” (Flor. 2.12.6).  NB: The RE 
(VII1, 281) explains that this Fulvia should not be confused with P. Clodius Pulcher’s wife, who 
was later married to a different Q. Curius than the one listed here, and later to M. Antonius the 
triumvir.  
57 NB: This passage in the Catilina occurs after Sallust’s anecdote about Curius and Fulvia and 
introduced his description of Sempronia [no. 34]. 
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Curius to divulge its secrets to Cicero.  Appian and Florus claimed Cicero discovered 
the affair through Fulvia (App. B Civ. 2.3; Flor. 2.12.6).  However, whether Fulvia was a 
participant in the affair who decided to later betray the affair, or an informer after she 
initial heard of it, or an entirely fictional character originally created by Sallust, remains 
debatable.58 
References: Sall. B Cat. 23.3-4, 26.3, 28.2; Plut. Cic. 16.2; App. B Civ. 2.3; Flor. 2.12.6 
 
[21] A.? Fulvius (filius)59   RE VII1 (Fulvius) no.8=94, 268 
Our sources record that a senator named Fulvius put his son to death after he learned 
his son was travelling to join Catiline and Manlius’ forces in Etruria (cf. Sall. B Cat. 
39.5; Val. Max. 5.8.5, Dio Cass. 37.36.4).60  Dio claimed other senators also put their 
sons to death for joining the affair of 63, but our sources only name a senator’s son 
from the gens Fulvia.  Schwartz argues that this man might be the son of the 
participant M. Fulvius Nobilior [no. 22] listed below.61  However, Schwartz suggestion is 
flawed.  The RE explains that none of the known Fulvii Nobilioris have Aulus as a 
praenomen.62  In addition, Sallust states M. Fulvius Nobilior was not a senator, but a 
knight (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).  Moreover, M. Fulvius Nobilior had joined the affair, so why 
would he punish his son for supporting it.  Therefore, this Fulvius was most likely some 
other senator’s son from the gens Fulvia. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 39.5; Val. Max. 5.8.5; Dio Cass. 37.36.4 
 
[22] M. Fulvius Nobilior?  RE VII1 (Fulvius) no. 94, 267-8 
According to Sallust, M. Fulvius Nobilior was from the equestrian order (Sall. B Cat. 
17.4).  His precise role in the affair is remains unknown because he is mentioned only 
once by Sallust.  According Cicero, a M. Fulvius Nobilior had been convicted for 
ambitus in 54 (Cic. Att. 4.18.3).  Whether this M. Fulvius Nobilior was the same man 
mentioned in Sallust’s Catilina is unclear.  In addition, there is no record about M. 
Fulvius Nobilior’s specific role in the affair or his ultimate fate.  Also refer to A.? Fulvius 
(filius) [no.21] above. 
References: Sall. Cat. 17.4 
 
 
                                                
58 See Chapter 1 nn.45-6. 
59 The citation found in the RE for A. Fulvius (no.8) subsequently refers to M. Fulvius Nobilior 
(no. 94).  
60 N.B. Sallust only mentioned the nomen Fulvius.  The praenomen Aulus appears in Valerius 
Maximus and Dio’s text, the latter calling the son Aulus. 
61 Schwartz 1897, 563 n.4.  
62 See RE VII1 (Fulvius) no.94, 268.11-6. Münzer explains that the praenomen Aulus does not 
occur in the seven known Fulvii Nobilioris including M. Fulvius Nobilior [no.22], so if they were 
the same Fulvius is a matter of conjecture 
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[23] P. Furius   RE VII1 (Furius) no. 23, 317 
Cicero identified P. Furius as a Sullan veteran and colonist from Faesulae. Cicero 
claimed Furius had solicited the Allobrogean envoys and would be punished 
accordingly (Cic. Cat 3.14).  According to this timeline, Furius must have been in Rome 
before T. Volturcius [no. 44] and the letters he was delivering to Catiline and Manlius 
[no. 29] were seized on December 3.  However, Furius was not in Rome that day and 
remained at large (Sall. B Cat. 50.4).  He might have left Rome to join Catiline and 
Manlius’ forces in Etruria before the final battle in January of 62.  Sallust made an 
allusion to a man from Faesulae who was in charge of the left flank of Catiline and 
Manlius’ forces in the final battle near Pistoria.  He referred to this man as Faesulanum 
quendam, ‘a certain man from Faesulae’ (59.3).  Sallust’s narrative remarked that 
Manlius and this Faesulanus were the first men to die in the battle (60.6).63  However, 
we cannot certainly identify the Furius mentioned by Cicero with the Faesulanus in 
Sallust’s Catilina, therefore, his specific role and ultimate fate remain uncertain. 
References: Cic. Cat 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 50.464 
 
[24] P. Gabinius Capito   RE VII1 (Gabinius) no.15, 431 
P. Gabinius Capito was from the equestrian order in 63 (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).  Cicero 
once gave Gabinius the cognomen Cimber (Cic. Cat 3.6).65  His role in the affair 
included: setting fires in Rome (Sall. B Cat. 43.2), soliciting the Allobrogean envoys 
(Cic. Cat 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 40.6), and assisting in murdering the leading citizens in the 
city (Cic. Cat 4.13).  According to Sallust, T. Volturcius [no. 44] claimed Gabinius and 
M. Caeparius [no. 5] had enlisted him into the affair.  Volturcius also testified that 
Gabinius specifically told him that P. Autronius Paetus [no. 3], Ser. Cornelius Sulla [no. 
17], L. Vargunteius [no. 24] and many others were involved in the affair (Sall. B Cat. 
47.1-2).  Cicero reported that Gabinius confessed to soliciting the Allobrogean envoys 
and giving them a written pledge of his support, but Cicero did not record Gabinius’ 
intrigue with Volturcius (Cic. Cat 3.12).  He was executed for his participation with the 
affair on December 5 (Sall. B Cat. 55.6). 
References: Cic. Cat 3.6, 12, 14; 4.13; Sall. B Cat. 17.4, 40.6, 43.2, 46.3, 47.1,4, 
52.34, 55.6 
 
 
 
                                                
63 The editors of the RE (VII1, 317) state one could speculate that Furius was the unnamed man 
from Faesulae at Sall. B Cat. 50.4.  Cf. McGushin 1977, 59.3; Ramsey 1984, 197. 
64 Perhaps alluded to at Sall. B Cat. 59.3, 60.6. 
65 Only in Sallust’s work is the cognomen Capito written.  Münzer (RE VII1, 431) explains Cicero 
probably designated Gabinius Cimbrum to associate him with the Cimbri tribe who threatened 
the res publica in the 100s alluding to his violent nature.  Cf. Dyck 2008, 175. 
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[25] C. Iulius   RE X1 (Iulius) no. 21, 110 
C. Iulius is mentioned in Sallust’s Catilina.  Supposedly, Catiline had sent Iulius to 
Apulia to incite a revolt (Sall. Cat. 27.1).  Iulius was perhaps another Sullan veteran 
involved with the affair of 63.66  Presumably, he had some sort of influence or familiarity 
in Apulia or he would not have been sent there.  The RE suggests this Iulius could 
have been a legate of M. Antonius Creticus in 72.67  However, whether C. Iulius the 
legate was the same man sent to Apulia remains inconclusive. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 27.1 
 
[26] C. Iulius Caesar68 RE X1 (Iulius) no. 131, 186-275; MRR II, 171, 173, and 
187-8 
Both the accusations that C. Iulius Caesar and/or M. Licinius Crassus [no. 27] 
supported the affair of 63 apparently originated from an unpublished essay on Cicero’s 
consulship.  The essay does not survive, but some sources comment that Cicero 
implied that Caesar and Crassus had participated in the affair (cf. Asc. 83C; Plut. Caes. 
8.4; Crass. 13.3; Dio Cass. 39.10.2-3).69  Asconius remarked that Caesar and Crassus 
were supporting Catiline and C. Antonius during their candidacy for the consulship of 
63.  Whether either man supported the affair or what their support would specifically 
entail is not entirely clear.  Sallust reported that others attempted to implicate Caesar 
the day after his speech in the Senate recommending that Lentulus and the others 
should not be sentenced to death, but should be placed in custody for life and 
confiscate their property.70  On December 4, Q. Lutatius Catulus [no. 28] and C. 
Calpurnius Piso tried to coerce either Cicero or the affair’s informers to implicate 
Caesar (Sall. B Cat. 49.1; Plut. Caes. 7.5).  Caesar had just defeated Catulus in the 
elections for pontifex maximus and had prosecuted Piso for extortion in 63.71  Cicero 
was not convinced to take any further action perhaps due to their personal grudge 
against Caesar.72  However, Sallust recorded that accusations circulated by Catulus 
and Piso on December 4 had provoked enough odium that some threatened to murder 
Caesar on the spot (Sall. B Cat. 49.4; Plut. Caes. 8.2-3; Suet. Iul. 14.2).  Suetonius 
claimed Caesar was involved in the plot to murder the consuls of 65 and the affair of 63 
                                                
66 Refer to note in Chapter 3 TBD most likely MOVE: C. Julius’ name occurs in the same list as 
the Sullan veteran C. Manlius [no.29] and Septimius of a domus nobilis of Camerinum [no. 35]. 
Unlike Spetimius, there is no idication where C. Julius was from making it more likely he was a 
Sullan veteran than a domus nobilis. 
67 RE X1 (Iulius) no. 21, 110.54-8. 
68 Regarding Caesar’s possible participation with the affair, see RE X1 (Iulius) no. 131, 192.45-
193.62.  See also Chapter 2. 
69 See Chapter 2 n.115. 
70 See Chapter 2 n.346. 
71 Cicero defended Piso and won the case (Cic. Flac. 98).  The speech was not published, see 
Settle 1962, 147-8 and 167 n.15. 
72 Sallust claimed the allegations were false from the beginning (Sall. B Cat. 49.1: indicem… 
falso).  Cf. Plut. Cic. 20.7. 
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(Iul. 9.1, 14.1), but it remains contentious whether Caesar genuinely supported either 
plot.  The new consul L. Aurelius Cotta for 65 was Caesar’s cousin, so it is unlikely he 
supported a plan to murder him.73  In 63, Caesar had just been elected to a life-long 
position as pontifex maximus in Rome and praetor for the following year.  If he did 
support the affair of 63, it is understandable that he backed out before its designs and 
some participants were discovered.  He had no need to endanger his political career by 
associating with the participants in the affair.  Caesar was never brought to trial for his 
alleged support of the affairs of 66/65 or 63 regardless of the accusations made on 
December 4, 63, or Cicero’s later accusation of his support of the affair of 63 
supposedly recorded in secret memoir of his consulship.74 
References: Cic. Cat. 4.7-10; Sall. B Cat. 49, 50.4-5, 51; Asc. 83C; Plut. Cic. 20-21; 
Caes. 7-8; Cat. Min. 21-26; Crass. 13.3; Suet. Iul. 9.1, 14.1-2; Dio Cass. 37.36.1; App. 
B Civ. 2.6 
 
[27] M. Licinius Crassus75 RE XIII1 (Licinius) no. 68, 295-331; MRR II, 126, 
214-5 
Asconius stated that Cicero’s essay on his consulship accused M. Licinius Crassus of 
instigating the affair of 63 (cf. Asc. 83C; Plut. Crass. 13.3; Dio Cass. 39.10.2-3).  
However, Crassus is not implicated in any of Cicero’s extant works.76  On the other 
hand, Sallust’s Catilina plainly asserts that if the affair were successful then Crassus 
would be the main beneficiary (Sall. B Cat. 17.7).  Crassus persuaded the Senate to 
bestow praetorian powers on Cn. Calpurnius Piso [no. 7], a quaestor in 65, in Spain 
(19.1-2).  Sallust implied that Crassus wanted Piso to diminish Pompey’s popularity in 
Spain, therefore, it remains uncertain if Piso was sent to Spain to explicitly support the 
affair of 63.  In addition, Sallust included a story that L. Tarquinius [no. 39] testified in 
front of the Senate on December 4, 63 that Crassus ordered him to warn Catiline and 
Manlius’ army in Faesulae about the recent arrests of Lentulus and the others in Rome 
(48.4).  However, Cicero discarded Tarquinius’ accusation for several reasons (48.5-
8).77  Sallust claimed Crassus told him that Cicero instigated the accusation (48.9).  
Further suspicion that Crassus was involved was due to the letter Crassus gave Cicero 
on October 20 or 21 that contained a warning from Catiline regarding the impending 
                                                
73 Gelzer 1960, 39. 
74 See also, Chapter 2 n.115. 
75 Regarding Crassus’ possible participation with the affair, see RE XIII1, (Licinius) no. 68, 
310.65-313.19.  
76 Crassus might have been absent from the debate in the Senate on December 5 regarding the 
punishment of Lentulus and the others (Cic. Cat. 4.10). Cf. Hardy 1924, 87-8; Gelzer 1969, 98; 
MacDonald 1977, 24 and 145 n. c.; Ward 1977, 189 contra Drummond 1995, 14-5.  See esp. 
Cadoux 2006, 614-8.  Whether his absence indicated support for Lentulus and the others is 
contentious, cf. Ward 1977, 189-90; Dyck 2008, 223. 
77 Dio did not name who accused Crassus on December, but concurred with Sallust that Cicero 
dismissed the evidence (Dio Cass. 37.35.1-2). 
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plan to murder the leading citizens in Rome (Plut. Cic. 15.1-3; Dio Cass. 37.31.1).78  
Plutarch suggested that Crassus gave Cicero this letter to remove any connection to 
Catiline or the affair because Crassus felt the affair would soon be exposed (Plut. 
Crass. 13.2-4).  Similar to Caesar [no. 26], Crassus was never formally tried for his 
participation with the affair.  Therefore, whether Crassus supported the affair remains a 
matter of conjecture. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 17.7, 19.1, 48.4-9; Asc. 83C; Plut. Cic. 15.1-3; Crass. 13.3; 
Dio Cass. 37.31.1, 35.1-2, 39.10.2-3 
 
[28] Q. Lutatius Catulus  RE XIII1 (Lutatius) no. 8, 2082-94; MRR II 85 
Q. Lutatius Catulus’ homonymous father (cos. 102) supported Sulla in his conflict 
against Marius.  When the Marians gained control of Rome in 87, Catulus’ father was 
proscribed and was killed by M. Marius Graditianus.79  When Sulla proscribed his 
enemies in 82, Catiline allegedly murdered M. Marius Graditianus (Asc. 84C).80  
Catiline’s role in avenging Catulus’ father’s murder might be the reason why the son 
supported Catiline in court in 73 for the defilation of a Vestal Virgin and in 65 for 
extortion.81  After Catiline left Rome, he sent Catulus a letter explaining his decision not 
to go into exile but to join Manlius’ army at Faesulae instead (Sall. B Cat. 35).  Catulus 
read out the letter in the Senate (34.3).  Our sources do not accuse Catulus of 
supporting the affair, instead it is recorded that he accused Caesar, his rival in the 
elections for pontifex maximus that year, for supporting it (49).82  Cicero often praised 
the character of Catulus.83  Regarding the punishment of Lentulus and the others 
remaining in Rome that had confessed to participating in the affair, Catulus voted for 
the death penalty (Plut. Cic. 21.4).  Therefore, there remains no concrete evidence that 
he was a participant.  However, one can speculate that Catulus might of initially 
supported the affair due to his former friendship with Catiline and only divulged the 
contents of Catiline’s letter when the affair was exposed to remove any suspicion that 
might arise. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 34.3, 35, 49; Plut. Cic. 21.4 
                                                
78 NB: Along with Crassus, Plutarch recorded that Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica and 
M. Claudius Marcellus, purportedly gave Cicero a letter from Catiline warning them of a 
impending plan to murder the leading citizens in Rome (Plut. Cic. 15.1).  Plutarch suggested 
that Crassus gave Cicero the letter of warning in order to distance himself from Catiline’s plans 
(15.2-3). Consequently, Metellus Scipio and Marcellus, who most likely was M. Claudius 
Marcellus (cos. 51), might have given Cicero the letters for a similar reason.  However, in 
contrast to Crassus, our sources do not make this claim.  Therefore, I do not list Metellus Scipio 
and this M. Claudius Marcellus as possible participants. 
79 On Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102) support of Sulla and the former’s murder by M. Marius 
Graditianus, see RE XIII1 (Lutatius) no.7, 2078.51-2079.43. 
80 See Chapter 3 n.52. 
81 See Chapter 2 n.310 
82 Cf. Plut. Cic. 21.4; Dio Cass. 37.37.2, 44.1. 
83 Cf. Cic. Cat. 3.24; Mur. 36; Pis. 3 
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[29] C. Manlius84   RE XIV1 (Manlius) no. 18, 1156-7 
For a discussion of C. Manlius’ role in the affair, see Chapter 3.1-3.  C. Manlius was a 
Sullan veteran and colonist most likely from Faesulae.  Our sources record that 
Manlius had assembled an army from northern Etruria and were in arms at Faesulae 
on October 27 (Cic. Cat. 1.7; Sall. B Cat. 30.1).  According to the timeline of events, 
Manlius’ army acted before Cicero officially exposed the affair on November 8, which 
suggests that they might have initially acted independently to those involved with the 
affair in Rome.  Furthermore, Manlius’ army sent a delegation to Q. Marcius Rex 
claiming that if his army’s grievances were met they would consider laying down their 
arms (33).  However, there is conflicting evidence that Manlius was instructed by 
Catiline to raise an army in this area (27.1, 4), which the latter would lead when he 
arrived at the camp.85  Manlius was killed with Catiline in the final battle near Pistoria 
(60.6). 
References: Cic. Cat 1.7, 10, 23-24, 30, 2.14, 16, 20; Sall. B Cat. 24.2, 27.1, 4, 28.4, 
29.1, 30.1, 32, 33, 36.1,2, 56.1, 59.3, 60.6; Asc. 50C; Plu. Cic. 14.3, 15.5, 16.1, 6; App. 
B Civ. 2.2, 3; Fl. 2.12.8; Dio Cass. 37.30.5, 37.33.2 
 
[30] C. Mevulanus?86  RE  XV1 (Mevulanus), 1511; MRR II, 170 
C. Mevulanus was a military tribune serving under the consul C. Antonius in 63.  
According to Cicero, Mevulanus attempted to incite the inhabitants in Pisarum and 
other areas of the ager Gallicus to support the affair.  Cicero claimed that P. Sestius, C. 
Antonius’ quaestor in 63, was able to thwart Mevulanus’ attempts to gather support 
outside of Rome (Cic. Sest. 9).  Mevulanus’ ultimate fate is unknown. 
References: Cic. Sest. 9 
 
[31] Minucius  RE XV1 (Minucius) no. 8, 1941 
According to Cicero, Minucius was an associate of Catiline in 63 (Cic. Cat 2.4).  
Minucius was an influential plebeian family name during the Republic.87  However, the 
status of this Minucius is indeterminable.  Cicero claimed Minucius and Publicius [no. 
33] had run up massive debts in taverns in Rome and left the city with Catiline on 
November 8.  Minucius and Publicius perhaps joined Manlius at Faesulae with Catiline 
and died in the final battle near Pistoria.88 
                                                
84 See further Chapter 3.  On the mandata sent by Manlius’ army to Q. Marcius Rex, see 
Chapter 3.5. 
85 See Chapter 3 nn.36-41. 
86 I use the spelling of this man’s name corroborated in the Teubner and Loeb editions of the 
Pro Sestio.  For the varying spellings for this passage, see Maslowski 1986, 7 n.16. 
87 On the plebian status of the nomen Minucius and its origins, see RE XV2 (Minucius), 
1937.34-1939.17. 
88 Whether the three associates, Minucius [no. 31], Publicius [no. 33], or Tongilius [no. 40], 
mentioned by Cicero at Cat. 2.4 were present at the final battle near Pistoria is unknown.  In the 
Second Oration, Cicero emphasized their immoral characteristics to mock the quality of men 
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References: Cic. Cat. 2.4 
 
[32] M. Porcius Laeca  RE XXII1 (Porcius) no. 18, 213; MRR II, 495 
M. Porcius Laeca was a senator in 63 (Sall. Cat. 17.3; Flor. 2.12.3).  Catiline and the 
others participating in the affair met at Laeca’s house on the night of November 6 to 
discuss their plans (cf. Cic. Cat 1.8-9, 2.13; Sull. 52; Sall. B Cat. 27.3).89  Cicero 
claimed he knew who was present at the meeting and what roles they were assigned.  
However, what specific role Laeca had beyond allowing the affair’s participants to meet 
in his home remains uncertain.  Cicero recorded that Laeca was convicted in 62 for his 
participation (Cic. Sull. 6). 
References: Cic. Cat. 1.8-9, 2.13; Sull. 6, 52; Sall. B Cat. 17.3, 27.3; Flor. 2.12.3 
 
[33] Publicius RE XXIII2 (Publicius) no. 5, 1896 
Publicius was an associate of Catiline (Cic. Cat. 2.4).  His name occurs in the same 
sentence as Municius [no. 31] and the information given about the two men is the 
same.  The nomen Publicius is attested as a plebian name during the Republic and 
might have an Etruscan origin.90  Publicius left Rome with Catiline, but his status, 
origin, role, and ultimate fate in the affair remain inconclusive.91 
References: Cic. Cat. 2.4 
 
[34] Sempronia  RE IIa2 (Sempronius) no. 103, 1446 
In 63, Sempronia was the wife of D. Junius Brutus (cos. 77) and the mother of D. 
Junius Brutus Albinus one of Caesar’s future assassins.  Sallust’s Catilina is the only 
source to mention Sempronia’s involvement in the affair of 63.  According to Sallust, 
Sempronia joined the affair because her extravagant and licentious lifestyle had put her 
into debt (Sall. B Cat. 24.3, 25).92  Sempronia agreed to let the affair’s participants 
negotiate with the Allobrogean envoys at her house in Rome while her husband was 
away (40.5).93  Her ultimate fate is unknown. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 25, 40.5 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
that left Rome with Catiline and would join Manlius’ army, cf. Cic. Cat. 2.5, 23-24.  Cicero clearly 
wanted to play down the threat in Etruria and emphasize the danger of those involved with the 
episode who remained in Rome and were had a far greater status than the reprobates Minucius, 
Publicius, or Tonglius,  
89 See notes on multiple meeting in Sallust in Chapter 2 TBD. 
90 On the origin and different spelling of the nomen Publicius, see RE XXIII2 (Publicius), 
1895.38-1896.22. 
91 See n.88. 
92 See McGushin 1977, 302-3. 
93 D. Junius Brutus’ absence practically removes any suspicion that he supported the affair.   
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[35] Septimius   RE IIa2 (Septimius) no. 1, 1560 
Sallust reported that Catiline sent Septimius to Picenum to enlist anyone willing to join 
the affair of 63 (Sall. B Cat. 27.1).  Septimius was from Camerinum, a town near 
Umbria that Cicero claimed supported the affair (Cic. Sull. 53).  However, Cicero did 
not specifically mention that Camerinum lent support due to Septimius’ actions.  
Septimius’ status also remains speculative.  He might have been a domus nobilis or a 
Sullan veteran.  Regardless of his rank, Septimius presumably had ties in Umbria or he 
would not have been sent to the region.  His ultimate fate is unknown. 
References: Sall. B Cat. 27.1 
 
[36] L. Sergius Catilina RE IIa2 (Sergius) no. 23 1693-1711; MRR II, 138, 147 
L. Sergius Catilina was implicated in the supposed plan devised in 66 to murder the 
incoming consuls of 65 (cf. Cic. Cat. 1.15; Mur. 81; Sull. 51; Sall. B Cat. 18.5-9; Asc. 
83C; Dio Cass. 36.44.3-4).  After Catiline’s successive defeats for the consulship in 64 
and 63, he agreed to a plan to gain power in Rome through violent means.  Catiline 
and the affair’s plans were exposed on November 8 and he left Rome the same night.  
Catiline joined Manlius’ army at Faesulae around mid-November and they were 
declared hostes rei publicae.94  Catiline and Manlius’ army were decisively defeated in 
mid to late January 62 (Sall. B Cat. 60-61).  Catiline’s head was sent to Rome (Dio 
Cass. 37.40.2). 
References: For where Catiline appears in our sources, refer to the RE and MRR 
 
[37] P. Sittius  RE IIIa1 (Sittius) no. 3, 409-11 
P. Sittius was perhaps a local noble from Nuceria in Campania (Sall. B Cat. 21.3).  
Cicero remarked that Sittius was wealthy (cf. Cic. Sull. 56; Fam. 5.17.5).95  Catiline 
informed the affair’s participants that he had sent P. Sittius to Mauretania to levy an 
army to support the affair (cf. Cic. Sull. 56; Sall. B Cat. 21.3).  In the Pro Sulla, Cicero 
claimed that Sittius left for Mauretania in 64, which was before the affair of 63 began, 
and insisted that the reported disturbances occurring in the area were not connected 
with Sittius or the affair (Cic. Sull. 56-57).  Sittius was a close friend of P. Cornelius 
Sulla [no. 15] (cf. Sull. 57; Fam. 5.17.2).  Therefore, Cicero refuted the accusation 
against his client’s friend that Sittius was a participant (Sull. 56-59).  Sittius was 
                                                
94 See Chapter 3.3. 
95 Shackleton Bailey (1978 Vol. I, 323) assumes P. Sittius was an equestrian.  NB: Sittius was 
also in serious debt in 63, but Cicero remarked that Sittius’ debts were acquired honestly in 
contrast to the indebted citizens involved with the affair (Cic. Sull. 56, 58-59).   
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apparently cleared of the accusation that he was involved in the affair of 63, but was 
later exiled from Rome in absentia for an unknown charge in 57.96 
References: Cic. Sull. 56-59; Fam. 5.17; Sall. B Cat. 21.3 
 
[38] L. Statilius  RE IIIa2 (Statilius) no. 6, 2185-6 
L. Statilius was from the equestrian order in 63 (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).  He and Gabinius 
[no. 24] were tasked to oversee the setting of fires in twelve strategic areas of Rome 
(43.2).  In addition, Statilius swore a mutual oath with the Allobrogean envoys and gave 
a written pledge of his support to the tribe (Cic. Cat. 3.9; Sall. B Cat. 44.1).  His letter 
was seized in the ambush on the Mulvian Bridge and he was summoned to Cicero’s 
house (Cic. Cat. 3.6; Sall. B Cat. 46.3).  In front of the Senate, Statilius confessed to 
writing the letter (3.10) and was placed into custody (Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 47.4).  
He was executed for his participation with the affair on December 5, 63 (55.6). 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.6, 9, 10, 14; Sall. B Cat. 17.4, 43.2, 44.1, 46.3, 47.4, 52.34, 
55.6 
 
[39] L. Tarquinius  RE IVa2 (Tarquinius) no. 10, 2390 
According to Sallust, L. Tarquinius attempted to leave Rome on December 4 to tell 
Catiline in Faesulae about the capture of Lentulus and those remaining in Rome (Sall. 
B Cat. 48.3-4).  Tarquinius was captured on December 4 and immediately testified in 
front of the Senate.  He corroborated the evidence that was heard on December 3 
about the affair’s plans for murder, arson, and their military preparations.  In contrast to 
the previous testimony given by T. Volturcius [no. 44], Tarquinius implicated Crassus in 
the affair.  Tarquinius claimed Crassus ordered him to inform Catiline in Faesulae of 
the arrests in Rome (48.4).  Cicero decided that Tarquinius’ testimony was false and 
his implication of Crassus was discarded (48.5-6).  Sallust recorded that some people 
believed either Autronius [no.3] or even Cicero coerced Tarquinius to accuse Crassus 
(48.7-8). 
References: Sall. B Cat. 48.3-8 
 
[40] Tongilius RE VIa2 (Tongilius), 1710 
Cicero is the only source that mentions Tongilius support of the affair.  Cicero claimed 
Catiline had had an intimate relationship with Tongilius since he was in praetexta, the 
purple-edged toga worn by Roman boys until they were sixteen years old (Cic. Cat. 
                                                
96 Appian and Dio recorded that while Sittius was exiled he was still active in Mauretania and 
other regions of Africa.  In 46, he played several African princes against each other and 
supported Caesar’s African campaign (cf. B Afr. 25; App. B Civ. 4.54; Dio. Cass. 43.3). 
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2.4).97  Similar to Minucius and Publicius, Tongilius also accompanied Catiline when he 
left Rome and his ultimate fate is unknown.98 
References: Cic. Cat. 2.4 
 
[41] P. Umbrenus  RE IXa1 (Umbrenus) no. 2, 593 
According to Cicero, P. Umbrenus was a libertinus and first introduced the Allobrogean 
envoys to P. Gabinius Capito [no.24] (Cic. Cat. 3.14).  Umbrenus’ role in the affair is 
expanded in Sallust’s Catilina.  Sallust did not comment on Umbrenus’ status as a 
freedman.  Instead, he recorded that Lentulus [no. 14] ordered Umbrenus to make the 
initial contact with the Gallic envoys in Rome (Sall. B Cat. 40.1).  Sallust explained that 
Umbrenus had several business dealings in Gaul and knew many of the leading men 
among the Gallic tribes (40.2).  He was able to convince the Allobrogean envoys that 
the participants in the affair would address the tribe’s grievances, which the Senate had 
ignored, if their plan to gain power in Rome was successful (40.3).  Umbrenus 
convinced the envoys to meet at Sempronia’s [no. 34] house and introduced them to 
Gabinius and named other influential participants in order to further persuade the 
envoys to lend their support (40.4-6).  Umbrenus was not apprehended on December 
3, but was sentenced to death in absentia (50.4).  His ultimate fate is unknown. 
References: Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 40; 50.4 
 
[42] L. Vargunteius  RE VIIIa1 (Vargunteius) no. 3, 377-9; MRR II, 497 
L. Vargunteius was a nobilis (Flor. 2.12.3) and from the senatorial order (Sall. B Cat. 
17.3).  Sallust recorded that after the night meeting on November 6/7 at home of M. 
Porcius Laeca’s [no.32] house the senator Vargunteius and C. Cornelius [no. 11] 
volunteered to murder Cicero (28.1).  He and C. Cornelius appeared at Cicero’s door 
the following morning, but the consul was warned and the assassination attempt was 
aborted (28.2-3).  Cicero mentioned that C. Cornelius was one of the two assassins 
(Cic. Sull. 18, 52), and once remarked that two equites arrived at his house on the 
morning of November 7 intent on murder (Cat. 1.9-10).  However, Cicero never named 
Vargunteius as his other would-be assassin.99  The discrepancies in Cicero and 
Sallust’s accounts also raise the question about Vargunteius’ senatorial status in 63.  
According to the Pro Sulla, Q. Hortensius Hortalus unsuccessfully defended 
Vargunteius on a charge de ambitu (Sull. 6).  Vargunteius was most likely convicted 
around the time of the supposed plan to murder the consuls in 66/65 (cf. 6, 67).100  Our 
                                                
97 See MacDonald (1977, 72 n. a).  Cicero’s inclusion of this phrase was perhaps an allusion to 
an inappropriate relationship between Catiline and the young Tongilius.  Cf. Dyck 2008, 131-2. 
98 See n.88. 
99 Cf. Chapter 2 nn.27-8. 
100 Vargunteius conviction is only implied in the Pro Sulla (cf. Cic. Sull. 6).  Cicero further implied 
that Vargunteius was perhaps involved with the plan to murder the consuls of 65 (67).  
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sources did not record why Vargunteius was charged of ambitus, but if convicted he 
would have lost his position in the Senate.  There is no evidence that Vargunteius had 
regained his senatorial status by 63 or by 62 when he was convicted for participating in 
the affair of 63 (6).  We can solve the discrepancies in Cicero and Sallust’s accounts by 
assuming that in 63 Vargunteius was more likely an eques and Sallust was instead 
referring to his previous status as senator.  T. Volturcius [no.44] testified that he had 
overheard P. Gabinius Capito [no. 24] declare that Vargunteius was a participant of the 
affair (Sall. B Cat. 47.1).  Whether he played a part in soliciting the Allobrogean envoys 
is indeterminable. 
References: Cic. Sull. 6, 67; Sall B Cat. 17.3, 28.1, 47.1; Flor. 2.12.3 
 
[43] L. Vettius  RE VIIIa2 (Vettius) no. 6, 1844-50 
The RE records that L. Vettius was of equestrian status.101  Suetonius and Orosius are 
the only historians that mention Vettius’ role in the affair of 63.  According to Suetonius, 
he gave information along with Q. Curius [no. 18] to implicate Caesar in the affair.  
Vettius claimed he had a letter written by Caesar to Catiline professing his support.  
Vettius’ allegation was received violently by the public and Caesar placed Vettius in 
custody (Suet. Iul. 17).  According to Orosius, Vettius exposed the attempts of C. and 
M. Claudius Marcellus [nos. 9 and 10] to incite the Paeligni (Oros. 6.6.7).  Whether 
Vettius was ever a participant before he turned informer like Curius and T. Volturcius 
[no. 44], remains a matter of conjecture. 
References: Suet. Iul. 17; Oros. 6.6.7 
 
[44] T. Volturcius  RE IXa1 (Volturcius), 857-8 
T. Volturcius was most likely one of the many domi nobilis who Sallust claimed 
supported the affair (Sall. B Cat. 17.4).  He hailed from either Cortona in Etruria or 
Croton in Bruttium (44.3).102  Volturcius was instructed by Lentulus to escort the 
Allobrogean envoys to Catiline and Manlius’ army in Faesulae and to deliver a personal 
letter and message from Lentulus to Catiline requesting the latter to enlist more men 
and to march on Rome (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.8, 12; Sall. B Cat. 44.3-6).  Volturcius also 
carried letters from Lentulus [no. 14], Cethegus [no. 12], Gabinius [no. 24], and Statilius 
[no. 38] addressed to the Allobroges about their written pledge of support they swore to 
the Gallic tribe’s envoys (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.9-11; Sall. B Cat. 47).  Volturcius’ mission was 
betrayed by the envoys and the letters were seized in an ambush on the Mulvian 
Bridge at daybreak on December 3 (Cic. Cat. 3.4-6; Sall. B Cat. 45; App. B Civ. 2.4).  
                                                                                                                                          
Hortensius’ famous ability as an orator was purportedly in decline after his consulship in 69, see 
Cic. Brut. 319-20. On Vargunteius’ senatorial status, see also Chapter 2 n.170. 
101 RE VIIIa2 (Vettius) no. 6, 1844.38. 
102 See Chapter 2 n.234. 
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He agreed to testify and named several of the affair’s participants, which was 
corroborated by the Gallic envoys, in the Senate.103  Volturcius claimed he agreed to 
participate with the affair only several days earlier and was indoctrinated by Gabinius 
[no. 24] and Caeparius [no. 5] (Sall. B Cat. 47.1).  Volturcius was pardoned and 
rewarded by the Senate (Cic. Cat. 3.8, 4.5; Sall. B Cat. 50.1). 
References: Cic. Cat 3.4, 6, 8, 11-12, 4.5; Sall. B Cat. 44.3-4, 45.3-4, 46.6, 47.1, 48.4, 
49.4, 50.1, 52.36; App. B Civ. 2.4 
                                                
103 According to Sallust, Volturcius named Gabinius, Caeparius, Ser. Cornelius Sulla, Autronius, 
and Varguneteius as participants (Sall. B Cat. 47.1). According to Cicero, Volturcius named the 
first two in the list above, plus Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Cassius, Annius Chilo, Furius, and 
Umbrenus (Cic. Cat. 3.14). 
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Appendix II 
 
A timeline of the affair of 63 
 
 
The comprehensive studies concerning the affair of 63 sometimes offer a 
timeline of the events.  The timeline reproduced below separates the actions occurring 
inside and outside of Rome to correspond with the structure of my thesis.  The timeline 
records actions directly and indirectly related to the affair from the magisterial elections 
Cicero presided over as consul in the summer of 63 until his death on December 7, 43.  
Our sources that recorded these actions appear in parentheses for the purpose of 
reference and should be compared to ascertain any discrepancy. The specific dates of 
certain events remain contentious.1 
Date Actions inside of Rome Actions outside of Rome 
July 63 Cicero postpones the magisterial 
elections due to the violence that 
Catiline’s supporters were purportedly 
planning (Cic. Cat. 1.11; Sull. 51; Mur. 
51-52; Plut.Cic. 14.3-8; Dio Cass. 
37.29.2-5). 
Sullan colonists and veterans, primarily 
from northern Etruria, arrive in Rome to 
support Catiline’s candidacy for the 
consulship (Cic. Mur. 49).  C. Manlius 
might have attended the elections (Plut. 
Cic. 14.2-3). 
c. July to 
mid-Oct.  
When the consular elections are finally 
held, Catiline is defeated (Cic. Mur. 52-
53; Sall. B Cat. 26.5; Plut. Cic. 11). 
After Catiline’s defeat, C. Manlius, 
Septimius and C. Julius are each 
instructed to incite the inhabitants of 
Etruria, Picenum, and Apulia respectively, 
to support the plan to gain power in 
Rome (cf. Cic. Cat. 2.6; Sall. B Cat. 27.1; 
App. B Civ. 2.2). Others were perhaps 
sent to Bruttium, Transalpine and 
Cisalpine Gaul (Sall. B Cat. 42.1-2). 
c. Oct. 
18 to 20 
Crassus, M. Claudius Marcellus, and 
Q. Caecilius Pius Metellus Scipio give 
Cicero letters containing a warning of 
Catiline’s impending plan to massacre 
the leading citizens of Rome (Plut. Cic. 
15.1-4; Crass. 13.3; Dio Cass. 
37.31.1). 
 
Oct. 21 Reports are heard in the Senate of an 
army amassing in northern Etruria 
under the leadership of C. Manlius, a 
Sullan veteran (cf. Cic. Cat. 1.7; Sall. B 
Cat. 30.1; Liv. Per. 102; Plut. Cic. 15.5; 
Dio Cass. 37.31.2). The SCU is 
passed awarding extraordinary powers 
(Cic. Cat. 1.3-4; Sall. B Cat. 29.2-3; 
Plut. Cic. 15.5; Dio Cass. 37.31.2).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 On the problem of dating in Sallustʼs Bellum Catilinae, see esp. McGushin 1977, Appendix III.  
For alternative timelines, see MacDonald 1977, xxxviii-ix; Taylor 1984, 19-22; Marinone 2004, 
83-4; Dyck 2008, xvii.  Certain discrepancies of dating are indicated in my timeline when the 
abbreviation “cf.” occurs. 
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Oct. 27  Manlius and the army from Etruria take 
the field at Faesulae (Cic. Cat. 1.7; Sall. 
B Cat. 30.1).  Catiline sends money and 
arms to Manlius (cf. Cic. Cat. 1.24, 2.13; 
Sall. B Cat. 24.2, 27.4; App. B Civ. 2.3). 
Rumors of disturbances among the 
slaves of Capua and Apulia are reported 
(Sall. B Cat. 30.2). 
Oct. 28 Cicero claims Catiline intended to 
massacre the leading citizens in Rome 
on this day, but the massacre was 
postponed because Cicero had 
previously warned the Senate (Cic. 
Cat. 1.7). 
 
Late Oct. 
or mid-
Nov. 
Catiline and Manlius are declared 
hostes rei publicae (Cf. Cic. Mur. 83; 
Sall. B Cat. 36.2). Catiline faces 
threats of prosecution. 
Q. Marcius Rex is sent to Faesulae, Q. 
Metellus Creticus is sent to Apulia, the 
praetor Q. Metellus Celer is sent to 
Picenum, the praetor Q. Pompeius Rufus 
and the quaestor P. Sestius are sent to 
Capua to prevent any further revolts in 
these areas (cf. Cic. Cat. 2.5, 26; Sest. 9-
11, Sall. B Cat. 30.3-5; Plut. Cic. 16.1; 
Dio Cass. 37.33.4). 
Nov. 1  An attempt to take Praeneste by the 
affair’s participants is prevented due to 
Cicero’s knowledge of the plan (Cic. Cat. 
1.8). 
Nov. 6 
[night] 
Catiline and the others involved with 
the affair meet at M. Porcius Laeca’s 
house at night to discuss their plans 
(Cic. Cat. 1.9, 2.6, 13; Sull. 52; Sall. B 
Cat. 27.3-4). 
 
Nov. 7 Cicero, informed of the affair’s plans, 
foils an assassination attempt against 
him (Cic. Cat. 1.9-10; Sull. 18, 52; Sall. 
B Cat. 28.1-3; Plut. Cic. 16.1-3; Dio 
Cass. 37.32.4-33.1). 
 
Nov. 8 Cicero delivers the First Oration with 
Catiline present in the Senate exposing 
the affair’s plans (Cic. Cat. 2.12-13; 
Sall. B Cat. 31.5-9; Plut. Cic. 16.3-5; 
Flor. 2.12.6-7). 
Catiline leaves Rome that night and 
travels to Manlius and the army at 
Faesulae (cf. Cic. Cat. 2.1-6, 13-14; Mur. 
84; Sall. B Cat. 32.1, 36.1; Plut. Cic. 16.6; 
App. B Civ. 2.3; Dio Cass. 37.33.1; Flor. 
2.12.7-8). 
Nov. 9 Cicero delivers the Second Oration to 
the people informing them about 
Catiline’s choice to join Manlius’ army, 
the types of people willing to support 
the affair from inside and outside of 
Rome, and the threat remaining in the 
city (Cic. Cat. 2). 
 
Nov. 9 to 
mid. 
Nov. 
The Senate dispatches Cicero’s 
colleague C. Antonius to levy an army 
and confront Catiline and Manlius’ 
army in northern Etruria (Cic. Sest. 12; 
Sall. B Cat. 36.3; Plut. Cic. 16.6; Dio 
Cass. 37.33.3).  
Catiline arrives at Forum Aurelii where 
more of his supporters are waiting (Cic. 
Cat. 1.24, 2.6).  Catiline spends a few 
days with C. Falminius around Arretium 
gathering more men and arms then 
procedes to Manlius’ camp in Faesulae 
(cf. Sall. B Cat. 36.1; Dio Cass. 37.33.2).  
Nov. 9 to 
Dec. 2 
Cicero defends the consul-designate L. 
Licinius Murena on a charge de 
ambitu. In the Pro Murena, Cicero 
convinces the jury that Murena’s 
military experience is necessary in 
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case the threats occurring inside and 
outside Rome continue into the 
following year (Cic. Mur. 79-90). 
Nov. 9 to 
Dec 2 
After Catiline had left Rome, the 
praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus and 
other Roman citizens involved with the 
affair remaining in the city continue the 
plan to overthrow the current 
leadership in Rome through murder 
and arson (Cic. Cat. 3. 3-4, 8, 25; Mur. 
78, 84-85; Sull. 53; Sall. B Cat. 39.6; 
Plut. Cic. 17.1, 5, 18.1-3; App. B Civ. 
2.3; Flor. 2.12.8). They decide to 
approach the Allobrogean envoys of 
the Allobroges and attempt to gain 
support from the Gallic tribe (Cic. Cat. 
3.4, 9, 22; Sull. 37-39; Sall. B Cat. 40; 
App. B Civ. 2.4; Plut. Cic. 18.5; Dio 
Cass. 37.34.1; Flor. 2.12.9). 
Disturbances continue to be reported in 
the regions of Transalpine and Cisalpine 
Gaul, Etruria, Umbria, Picenum, Apulia, 
and Bruttium (cf. Cic. Cat. 2.6, 26, 3.4, 
14; Sall. B Cat. 42.1; Plut. Cic. 10.5; 
Oros. 6.6.7). 
Before 
Dec. 2  
After Lentulus and the others had 
negotiated with the Allobrogean 
envoys and given them letters and 
pledges of their support, the envoys 
inform their patron Q. Fabius Sanga of 
Lentulus and the others’ plans.  Sanga 
subsequently informs Cicero, who 
persuades the Gallic envoys to feign 
interest in joining the affair (Sall. B Cat. 
41, 44.1-3; Plut. Cic. 18.7; App. B Civ. 
2.4-5).  The envoys tell Cicero that 
they will be escorted from Rome to 
Faesulae to meet with the Catiline and 
Manlius on the night of December 2 by 
way of the Mulvian Bridge. Cicero 
orders the praetors Q. Pomepius and 
L. Valerius Flaccus to ambush the 
entourage (Cic. Cat. 3.5; Sall. B Cat. 
45.1-2). 
 
Dec. 2/3  The ambush at the Mulvian Bridge is 
successful.  The Allobrogean envoys, as 
was planned, give up without a fight.  T. 
Volturcius, the messenger carrying the 
letters from Lentulus and the others, 
surrenders (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.5-6; Sall. B 
Cat. 45.3-4).  The letters are seized and 
Volturcius and the envoys are brought to 
Cicero’s house (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.6; Sall. B 
Cat. 46.3-6). 
Dec. 3 
[early 
morning] 
Volturcius and the envoys divulge who 
gave him the letters and Cicero 
summons these men to his home.  The 
praetor Lentulus, the senator C. 
Cornelius Cethegus, and two knights, 
P. Gabinius Capito and L. Statilius 
accept the summons (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.6; 
Sall. B Cat. 46.3-4). Cicero calls an 
emergency meeting of the Senate and 
brings the sealed letters, Volturcius, 
the envoys, and the arrested men to 
the Temple of Concord (Cic. Cat. 3.7; 
Sall. B Cat. 46.5-6). 
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Dec. 3 
[in the 
Senate] 
Volturcius and the Allobrogean envoys 
testify and Lentulus and the others 
confess to writing the letters in the 
meeting of the Senate (Cic. Cat. 3.10-
13; Sall. B Cat. 47.2).  Including the 
four men who confessed, five other 
citizens are named as participants in 
the affair:  the senators L. Cassius 
Longinus and Q. Annius Chilo, P. 
Furius, a Sullan colonist, P. Umbrenus, 
a freedman, and M. Caeparius, a 
nobleman from Terracina (Cic. Cat. 
3.14-15; Sall. B Cat. 50.4).  The latter 
is caught trying to leave Rome (Cic. 
Cat. 3.14; Sall. B Cat. 46.3-4), but the 
other four remained at large. All nine 
are found guilty without a trial (Cic. 
Cat. 3.14-15).  Lentulus is ordered to 
resign as praetor (Plut. Cic. 19.3; Dio 
Cass. 37.34.2).  He, Cethegus, 
Gabinius, Statilius, and Caeparius are 
detained until their punishment is 
decided (Cic. Cat. 3.15-16; Sall. B Cat. 
47.3-4).   
 
Dec. 3 
[after the 
meeting] 
Cicero delivers the Third Oration to the 
people informing them of the 
testimonies from the Allobroges and T. 
Volturcius, who had named several the 
affair’s participants still remaining in 
Rome (cf. Cic. Cat. 3.14; Sull. 36-39).  
Cicero explains that these men 
confessed and would be held in 
custody until an appropriate 
punishment was decided (Cic. Cat. 
3.8-16; Plut. Cic. 19.4; Dio Cass. 
37.34.3). 
 
Dec. 4 During another meeting of the Senate, 
L Tarquinius claims that Crassus was 
involved in the affair.  Cicero and the 
Senate disbelieve the allegation (cf. 
Sall. B Cat. 48.3-9; Plut. Crass. 13.3; 
Dio Cass. 37.35.1-2).  In addition, Q. 
Lutatius Catulus and C. Calpurnius 
Piso claim Caesar was involved.  The 
allegation is also dismissed, but some 
knights who believed Caesar was 
involved try to kill him (cf. Sall. B Cat. 
49; Plut. Caes. 8.2-5; Suet. Iul. 14). 
 
Dec. 5 Cicero delivers the Fourth Oration in 
the Senate to debate the punishment 
for the Roman citizens who confessed 
to being involved in the affair (Cic. Cat. 
4.6-14, 18-19; Sall. B Cat. 50.4-53.1). 
Cicero and the Senate agree that 
Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, 
Statilius, and Caeparius should be 
sentenced to death (Cic. Cat. 4.19; 
Sull. 21, 31-32; Sall. B Cat. 53.1, 55.1). 
The five citizens are executed that 
night. 
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c. mid. 
Dec. 
The probable date for those remaining 
in Rome to commence with the plans 
for murder and arson (cf. Cic. Cat. 
3.10; Sall. B Cat. 43.1-2; Plut. Cic. 
18.2). 
Catiline and Manlius informed of the 
executions and the failure of the affair’s 
plans in Rome decide to retreat to Gaul 
(Cic. Sull. 17; Sall. B Cat. 57.1, 58.4; Plut. 
Cic. 22.8; App. B Civ. 2.7; Dio Cass. 
37.39.2). 
c. mid. 
Dec. to 
mid. Jan. 
62 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer and C. 
Antonius’ forces restrict Catiline and 
Manlius’ forces from the northwest and 
south respectively (Sall. B Cat. 57, 58.6; 
Dio Cass. 37.39.2). 
c. Dec. 
30 
The tribune Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Nepos prevent Cicero from delivering 
the customary out-going consular 
address to the Roman people (Cic. 
Fam. 5.2.6-7).  They questioned his 
severity of executing five Roman 
citizens without a trial (Cic. Fam. 5.2.8; 
Dio Cass. 37.38).  Nepos proposed to 
bestow further military jurisdiction on 
Pompey, who was returning from Asia, 
to confront Catiline and Manlius’ army 
(Plut. Cic. 23.4). Nepos’ proposals led 
to violenct protestations (Cic. Fam. 
5.2.8-10; Dio Cass. 37.43). 
 
mid. to 
late Jan. 
62 
 Catiline and Manlius’ army are decisively 
defeated in the mountains of Northern 
Etruria near Pistoria (Sall. B Cat. 59-61; 
Vell. Pat. 2.35.5; Plut. Cic. 22.8; App. B 
Civ. 2.7; Dio Cass. 37.40.1).  Catiline’s 
head is sent to Rome (Dio Cass. 
37.40.2). 
c. Jan. to 
May 62 
Trials regarding others who perhaps 
supported the affair of 63 take place.  
Those convicted include L. Cassius 
Longinus, P. Autronius Paetus, P. 
Cornelius Sulla, Ser. Cornelius Sulla, 
M, Porcius Laeca, L. Vargunteius from 
the senatorial order and the knight C. 
Cornelius (Cic. Sull. 6-7, 36-39). 
 
c. 62-60  Q. Tullius Cicero and M. Calpurnius 
Bibulus, serving as praetors in 62 
suppress disturbances among the Bruttii 
and the Paeligni respectively, which are 
attributed to the affair of 63 (Oros. 6.6.7). 
In 60, C. Octavius, father of Octavian, 
was propraetor.  On his way from Italy to 
his provincal governorship in Macedonia, 
C. Octavius suppressed a slave revolt in 
Bruttium, also attributed to the affair of 63 
(Suet. Aug. 3.1). 
Spring 
59 
C. Antonius is found guilty of 
incompetence as governor of 
Macedonia and of supporting the affair 
of 63 despite Cicero’s testimony (Cic. 
Att. 2.12.2; Flac. 5; Dom. 41; Dio Cass. 
38.10). Antonius is exiled (Cic. Flac. 
95). 
 
Feb. to 
late Apr. 
58 
P. Clodius Pulcher, now tribune, 
passes legislation renewing the laws 
against executing a Roman citizen 
without allowing his inalienable right of 
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a public appeal.  Clodius’ legislation is 
clearly directed at Cicero for executing 
five citizens (Vell. Pat. 2.45.1; Dio 
Cass. 38.14.4-7). Cicero decides to go 
into voluntary exile at the end of April 
(Cic. Att. 3.2, 4-8; Sest. 53-54; Vell. 
Pat. 2.45.2; Plut. Cic. 30-32; Pomp. 
46.9; App. B Civ. 2.15; Dio Cass. 
38.17.7). 
Jan. to 
early 
Sep. 57  
 After being reinstated to the Senate in 
January, Cicero returns to Rome in the 
late summer (Cic. Att. 4.1.5; Dom. 76, 
144; Red. sen. 5, 8; Red. pop. 11; Vell. 
Pat. 2.45.3; Plut. Cic. 33.7; App. B Civ. 
2.16; Dio Cass. 38.30.1). 
Dec. 7, 
43 
Mark Antony, C. Antonius’ nephew and 
the stepson of Lentulus, marks Cicero 
for proscription.  Cicero was killed and 
his head and hands were cut off (Vell. 
Pat. 2.66.2-3; Val. Max. 5.3.4; Plut. 
Cic. 47-48; Ant. 19.1-20.2; App. B Civ. 
4.19-20; Flor. 2.16.5; Dio Cass. 
47.8.3). 
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